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1 Introduction 
Complaints about environmental pollution, discussions about the adverse impacts of global cli-
mate change and calls for more environmental protection are nowadays omnipresent in most 
developed countries. Governments spend billions of euros yearly to meet people’s demand for 
the protection and restoration of our natural environment. However, given limited public funds 
on the one hand and the high costs of environmental projects on the other, policy makers have to 
justify their decisions when implementing measures aimed at enhancing environmental quality. 
European Union regulations, for example, oblige the member states to carry out cost-benefit as-
sessments prior to the implementation of major environmental projects. For this purpose, the 
costs and benefits accruing to society from a particular project have to be quantified and com-
pared to each other. To ensure an efficient allocation of public funds, only those environmental 
projects which are expected to generate higher benefits than costs should be realised. In the envi-
ronmental sector, cost assessments are relatively simple. The main factors which make environ-
mental projects costly are inputs like labour, capital and materials as well as forgone economic 
opportunities; the total costs of an environmental project can be computed based on market pric-
es of these factors. The benefits accruing from environmental projects to society, such as im-
proved air quality, enhanced landscape beauty or the protection of rare plant and animal species, 
are more complicated to assess. These ‘environmental goods’ often lack an observable indicator 
of value. This is because most environmental goods fall into the category of so-called non-
market goods, i.e. valuable things which are not traded in markets and therefore have no market 
price. However, knowledge about the monetary value of environmental goods is essential for the 
appraisal of projects with substantial environmental impacts. 
 To overcome this problem economists have developed different environmental valuation 
methods. These methods take up a very basic concept which is also used when determining the 
value of goods traded in markets. The price of a market good indicates the minimum amount 
consumers are willing to pay for this good. Willingness to pay (WTP), in return, directly relates 
to the utility increase an individual expects to experience when consuming the good. A rational 
individual will only purchase a particular good for a given price if the utility gained from con-
suming this good exceeds the utility loss resulting from a decreased income. Hence, the act of 
spending money reveals that an individual is better off consuming a particular good than not 
consuming it. Following this idea, environmental valuation methods aim to assess people’s WTP 
for environmental goods. These methods can be broadly divided into revealed preference tech-
niques and stated preference techniques. Revealed preference techniques draw inference from 
people’s actual choices on markets that are somehow related to the environmental good of con-
cern. For example, money spent on a visit of a national park reveals people’s appreciation of the 
plants, animals and natural sceneries that they can enjoy in this park. Stated preference tech-
niques assess environmental values in a more direct way, namely by asking the affected popula-
tion about their preferences for a particular environmental good. Stated preference techniques 
 
2 
make use of extensive surveys during which respondents are introduced to a hypothetical market 
scenario, which offers them the opportunity to ‘buy’ a particular environmental good. Self-report 
payment intentions are expected to indicate individuals’ true WTP for the environmental good in 
question. 
 Revealed and stated preference techniques have in common that they provide monetary values 
of goods that lack a market price. Based on such figures the social benefit of an environmental 
project can be estimated and straightforwardly used as an input for a comprehensive project ap-
praisal, since benefits and costs are expressed in the same units (i.e. money). The striking differ-
ence between the two kinds of environmental valuation approaches is that they account for the 
preferences of different groups of beneficiaries. While revealed preference techniques exclusive-
ly capture the preferences of the users of a particular good, i.e. those spending money on the re-
lated market, stated preference techniques can assess the preferences of a broader range of bene-
ficiaries. The winners of environmental improvements encompass people who use the environ-
mental good in question and, in many cases, also individuals who enjoy the environmental good 
without actively using it. For example, not only the visitors of a national park can be expected to 
appreciate its maintenance but also people who have never visited it and do not even plan a visit 
in the future may wish to conserve the park. Like the maintenance or expansion of a national 
park many environmental projects generate considerable non-use benefits, such as their positive 
effects for the wellbeing of future generations. Since revealed preference techniques ignore such 
passive benefits, decision makers should favour stated preference approaches to determine the 
social benefits of environmental projects.  
 For environmental assessments, the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is the most fre-
quently used stated preference technique and also constitutes the focus of this dissertation. The 
overall objective of a CVM study consists of assessing individual utility changes resulting from 
an environmental change. Afterwards these individual welfare measures are aggregated in order 
to approximate the social benefit (or cost) of a change in environmental quality. Individual utility 
gains are typically assessed by directly asking the participants of a representative household sur-
vey to state how much money they are willing to pay for the realisation of a particular environ-
mental project that is expected to enhance their wellbeing. WTP statements serve as a basis for 
approximating the social value of environmental improvements which is typically calculated by 
multiplying the average WTP of a representative sample by the total number of households af-
fected by the environmental improvement in question. Closely following the valuation of market 
goods, CVM takes up the idea that respondents’ WTP refers to the utility they derive from enjoy-
ing, actively or passively, the environmental good under consideration. 
 Since its first applications in the 1960s, CVM has always been prone to a lot of criticism. 
Critics suspect this survey-based method to produce biased value estimates, i.e. WTP statements 
that do not reflect individuals’ true preferences for environmental improvements. Literature 
demonstrates that this bias can take different directions, namely over- and understatement of 
actual WTP (c.f. Venkatachalam, 2004). Given the observation that hypothetical payments fre-
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quently exceed actual payments, much research has focussed on explaining why people tend to 
overstate their WTP for environmental goods. One explanation is that people tend to overlook 
their budget constraint when being asked a payment question in the context of a CVM interview 
(e.g. Hausman, 2012). Other researchers have pointed to strategic reasons, such as exaggerating 
one’s WTP in the hope of increasing the likelihood of having the environmental project realised 
and, at the same time, not being obliged to pay the stated amount (e.g. Carson and Groves, 
2007). In addition to explaining why respondents may overstate their actual WTP, motives for 
understatement have also been explored. In this context another form of strategic behaviour, 
namely free-riding, has been in the focus of debates (e.g. Whittington et al., 1992). Furthermore, 
negative attitudes towards some aspect of the environmental project and the related payment 
have been shown to negatively affect stated WTP (e.g. Jorgensen and Syme, 2000). Another po-
tential source of downward bias is the presence of respondents who refuse to spend money in 
general. Extremely stingy individuals can be expected to state a zero WTP, not because they do 
not appreciate the prospective environmental improvement or because they prefer to spend their 
money on other purposes than the environmental project, but because of the exaggerated im-
portance they attach to accumulating their financial resources. In the latter case WTP is not a 
genuine expression of preferences for an environmental good but some misleading outcome of 
people’s money attitudes. Even though money plays such a central role in CVM studies, both as 
a measuring rod and as a means of payment on the hypothetical market, the relationship between 
people’s money spending dispositions and stated WTP has never been addressed in the environ-
mental valuation literature. The present study attempts to reduce this lack of research. 
 WTP statements reflecting people’s refusal to spend money in general rather than their appre-
ciation of the environmental good to be valued pose problems because they risk distorting the 
overall survey result. If a significantly large share of respondents states a zero WTP that is unre-
lated to the environmental project of concern, the CVM study may trigger a wrong project ap-
praisal. Decision makers might mistakenly reject an environmental project that would actually 
enhance society’s wellbeing for the mere reason that some stingy respondents have misreported 
their WTP so that the CVM survey underestimates the actual benefit of this project. The risk of 
misjudging the welfare effects of environmental projects underlines the need to scrutinise money 
spending dispositions in CVM surveys. The occurrence of understatement may be reduced by 
informing the respondents about the hypothetical nature of the payment question, for example by 
letting them know that existing funds will be used to finance the project and that no additional 
money will be collected from households. Obviously, such cheap talk risks to make the survey 
implausible, implying that more respondents give meaningless answers when asked about their 
WTP than in the case of a realistic and consequential survey. A promising alternative consists of 
identifying stingy respondents subsequent to the data collection, to verify whether their WTP 
statements are meaningful or not and discarding biased WTP statements from the data. For this 
purpose analysts require a suitable tool to measure respondents’ attitudes towards spending, for 
example a particular set of auxiliary questions. 
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 However, given the absence of CVM studies on this topic, there is no established standard 
regarding the identification and treatment of the supposedly meaningless WTP statements of 
stingy respondents. Apart from the lack of research in the environmental valuation context, eco-
nomic literature is generally rather silent about individual differences in money spending habits. 
In economics, spending much or spending little is typically explained in terms of people’s budget 
constraint and their preferences for present and future consumption. Psychological factors, such 
as the pleasure derived from retaining one’s financial resources, are mostly absent in micro- as 
well as macroeconomic analysis. Psychological literature, in contrast, points to a number of 
money-related personality traits and attitudes that are, in addition to economic motives and con-
straints, supposed to affect people’s spending behaviour. Researchers with psychoanalytical 
background have extensively described the habits of a group of people who have been labelled 
‘misers’ (Kaufman, 1956), ‘compulsive savers’ (Goldberg and Lewis, 1978) or ‘tightwads’ 
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Individuals belonging to the latter group share an extremely 
strong inhibition against spending money in general. The latter kind of attitude is, according to 
psychological theory, essentially unrelated to people’s financial means and preferences for con-
sumption but rooted in some less palpable desire for money as such. Furthermore, social psy-
chologists have attempted to measure money attitudes empirically. With the rise of psychometric 
money attitude inventories, such as Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) ‘Money Attitude Scale’ or 
Furnham’s (1984) ‘Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale’, it is nowadays possible to analyse indi-
vidual difference in money spending dispositions in a broader than the clinical context and to 
relate them, for example, to saving habits (see e.g. Hayhoe et al., 2012), charitable giving 
(Wiepking and Breeze, 2012) and more general consumption patterns (Rick, 2008). Still, the 
relationship between money attitudes and stated WTP remains to be explored. 
 One explanation why this topic has not attracted researchers’ interest so far might be the fact 
that no actual transactions take place during a CVM interview. The payment question is purely 
hypothetical and respondents make no actual commitment when stating their WTP. Thus, one 
may doubt whether people who are reluctant to spend money on real markets behave the same 
way in a hypothetical interview situation. Furthermore, a strong inhibition against spending can 
be expected to be a rather rare phenomenon in most societies. Accordingly, the share of misers in 
the population might be so small that it is of no statistical relevance for the overall result of a 
CVM survey. For example, if the group of misers makes up less than 5% of a population, their 
potentially biased WTP statements would hardly affect the sample’s average WTP. At the same 
time, there are also good reasons why a person’s disposition to spend money in general may in-
fluence his or her decision regarding a hypothetical payment for an environmental project. The 
first reason stems from the guidelines of best practise regarding the design of the hypothetical 
market presented in a CVM survey (e.g. Arrow and Solow, 1993). In order to obtain meaningful 
WTP statements, the hypothetical market should resemble an actual purchase situation as closely 
as possible. Hence, if respondents perceive the payment scenario as realistic and consequential, 
i.e. if they believe that there will be actual payments for the environmental good and that their 
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WTP statements may decide the monetary amount to be paid, their behaviour should resemble 
their habits in a real purchase situation. Therefore, it is to be expected that a person who cares 
little about spending money states a higher WTP than a stingy respondent, even if both of them 
anticipate the same benefit from enjoying the environmental improvement. Moreover, the socio-
cultural context of the present study renders the analysis of the effect of money spending disposi-
tions on WTP particularly interesting. The empirical part of this dissertation deals with the as-
sessment of the social benefit of an environmental restoration project in Northwest China and 
hence with the monetary value Chinese respondents assign to this project. Strong inhibition 
against spending money in general may be particularly widespread among Chinese people. This 
is because thrift and frugality are core values in Confucianism, which is one of the most influen-
tial ethical systems in China. Before the rapid development of China’s market economy Chinese 
people considered thrift as a virtue (cf. Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Faure and Fang, 2008). Today, 
modern values, like materialism and ostentatious consumption, seem to dominate the traditional 
value of thrift (c.f. Faure and Fang, 2008). However, even nowadays Chinese children are taught 
at school to retain their money and read in textbooks about the importance of thrift and frugality 
(cf. Chan, 2006). Hence, it is to be expected that Chinese people act stingier than individuals 
who grew up in societies that attach less importance to these values. Accordingly, maybe to a 
greater extent than in western countries, WTP statements are likely to be influenced by Chinese 
respondents’ attitudes towards spending money in general. Taken together, the realistic design of 
the payment question as well as the socio-cultural context of the CVM survey to be analysed in 
this dissertation add to the relevance of exploring respondents’ money spending dispositions. 
 The present work attempts to scrutinise the psychological concept of money attitudes and to 
analyse it in an economic context. It explores the role of people’s disposition to spend money, 
including the extreme case of miserliness, in CVM studies theoretically and empirically. The 
question whether or not the desire for accumulating money threatens the validity of the results of 
CVM surveys will receive particular attention. The empirical analysis of people’s spending dis-
positions requires the identification and adaptation of a suitable instrument to measure this hith-
erto overlooked respondent characteristic in a CVM survey. The effect of miserliness on WTP 
statements will then be analysed econometrically, using data gathered from a CVM study con-
ducted in Beijing in autumn 2013. 
 
The remainder of this study succeeds as follows: After the general introduction to contingent 
valuation and money attitudes in the present chapter, the economic valuation of environmental 
goods is introduced in more detail in chapter 2. The first section addresses the purpose of con-
ducting environmental valuation studies, the economic concept of environmental values as well 
as different valuation methodologies. As a stated preference technique, contingent valuation is a 
particularly useful technique for assessing the so-called total economic value, including use and 
non-use components, of an environmental project. The second section therefore looks at this par-
ticular method in more depth. It offers an overview of the theoretical underpinning of CVM.  
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Finally, the third section focuses on more practical issues, including the design of CVM surveys 
and validity assessment of WTP data. It concludes with a discussion of several sources of bias 
that may affect the results of a CVM survey, including the possibly distorting effects of people’s 
attitudes towards spending money. 
 Since the present study aims to analyse the psychological concept of money attitudes in the 
context of an economic methodology, the role that money plays in the two scientific disciplines 
of concern, which are economics on the one hand and psychology on the other, needs to be well 
understood. Chapter 3 therefore sheds light on the concept of money in economics. It exposes the 
traditional approach to explain the origins of money and illustrates how the so-called neutrality 
postulate has shaped both the micro- and the macroeconomic branches of the discipline. While 
money is mostly analysed as a medium of exchange which does not affect people’s behaviour, a 
number of behavioural economists have stressed the relevance of analysing individual differ-
ences in spending money when predicting people’s consumption choices. Two behavioural eco-
nomic contributions dealing with money and miserliness have been identified as particularly 
enlightening in this context, namely Schmölders’ (1982) ‘Psychology of Money’ and the ‘Pain of 
Paying’ (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998, Rick, 2013). The last section of the chapter comprehen-
sively reviews these two frameworks. Chapter 4 focuses on psychological research on money. In 
psychology, people’s behaviour with money has been primarily analysed by researchers with 
psychoanalytical background. The corresponding literature explores extreme patterns like hoard-
ing, compulsive bargaining, overspending and gambling. Furthermore, social psychologists have 
developed money attitude inventories, i.e. scales that measure different money attitude facets. As 
it turns out in the course of the chapter, money retention, i.e. a strong inhibition against spending 
money on any purpose in any situation, is a recurrent theme in psychological literature on    
money. 
 Following the reviews of the economic and psychological literature on money and miserli-
ness, the two approaches of analysing people’s behaviour with money shall be consolidated and 
put into the environmental valuation context in chapter 5. The first section compares and con-
trasts the economic and the psychological approach to analyse individuals’ behaviour with mon-
ey. This undertaking encompasses a comprehensive analysis of the most frequently discussed 
money attitude facets, which are ‘power’, ‘foresight’ and ‘miserliness’, thereby questioning 
whether these three money attitude facets are likely to systematically affect and potentially dis-
tort an individual’s WTP for environmental improvements. As argued in this section, only miser-
liness can be expected to systematically affect and possibly distort WTP. The second section 
presents two possibilities of integrating miserliness into the economic theory of consumer 
choice. Both approaches imply a negative effect of miserliness on WTP. However, the two ap-
proaches lead to different conclusions regarding the question whether or not miserliness causes 
bias. To explore whether miserliness only affects WTP or also threatens its validity, the effect of 
this money attitude facet on WTP has to be explored empirically. The chapter ends with a 
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presentation of research questions and hypotheses regarding the role of money attitudes in CVM 
surveys. 
 These research questions and hypotheses will be addressed empirically in chapter 6. The 
chapter builds on a case study, which is the Sino-German research project SuMaRiO. The first 
section introduces the general background of this research project. The second section focuses on 
a CVM survey carried out in the context of this project, which aimed to assess Beijing citizens’ 
WTP for more sustainable oasis management in the Tarim Basin. The third section summarises 
some general results of this CVM study. It includes descriptive statistics as well as an explana-
tion and application of the econometric techniques used to estimate and analyse WTP. Finally, 
the fourth section provides a comprehensive analysis of money attitudes in this exemplary CVM 
survey. The analysis encompasses validity testing of the inventory used to measure Beijing citi-
zens’ money attitudes and scrutinising the distribution, the characteristics and the monetary hab-
its of misers in the sample. Afterwards, the attitudinal variable is integrated into an econometric 
model used to assess the determinants of WTP statements. The question whether or not the pres-
ence of misers in CVM surveys threatens the validity of the overall WTP estimate is addressed in 
the fourth section. Consequences of discarding the potentially meaningless answers of misers 
from the sample, especially the effects of such data cleansing in terms of the sample’s represent-
ativeness and average WTP, are demonstrated at the end of the section. The chapter closes with a 
discussion of the implications of the money attitude assessment and gives a number of recom-
mendations regarding the analysis and treatment of money attitudes in CVM surveys. Chapter 6 
concludes with a summary of the key findings and points to their relevance for future environ-
mental valuation studies. 
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2 The economic valuation of environmental goods 
2.1 Environmental valuation: why, what and how? 
Economic valuation of environmental goods (environmental valuation in short) aims to put mon-
etary values on natural resources, ecosystem services, biodiversity, the restoration or protection 
of ecosystems and other aspects of the natural environment. On the one hand, major international 
organisations like the World Bank or the OECD regularly apply environmental valuation tech-
niques to monetise the costs or benefits of environmental goods (see Nunes, 2002: 46). On the 
other hand, some people argue that putting a price on nature is inappropriate or unethical. Those 
people cannot understand economists’ motivation for doing so. Hence, one might wonder what 
environmental valuation is actually good for. In the following, the main purposes for environ-
mental valuation will be identified (section 2.1.1). Afterwards, the economic concept of envi-
ronmental values will be considered in more detail (section 2.1.2). Finally, several environmental 
valuation techniques will be introduced and discussed (section 2.1.3). 
2.1.1 Motivation for environmental valuation 
The natural environment favours people’s life in many ways. Most importantly, it provides life 
support systems like air, water and food which are essential for the existence of human life (see 
Tietenberg, 2007: 13). In addition, the natural environment provides the economy with raw ma-
terial, minerals and energy which can be used for the production of consumption goods. Natural 
ecosystems also play an important role in climate regulation and the purification of water and air; 
rain forests, for example, provide such regulating ecosystem services. Enjoying a beautiful sun-
set, watching wildlife or being happy about the pure existence of certain plant or animal species 
can be added to the list of examples which illustrate the benefits of the natural environment for 
society. The various benefits of the natural environmental will be termed environmental goods 
in the present study. 
 Most environmental goods have public good characteristics, meaning that nobody can be ex-
cluded from using them and, in the case of a few environmental goods, consumption is non-rival. 
An example for an environmental good which shares the characteristics of non-excludability and 
non-rivalry is fresh air. Everybody can breathe fresh air without hindering others to breathe it. 
Furthermore, nobody can be excluded from breathing fresh air by legal means. While non-
excludability also applies to most other environmental goods, non-rivalry is the exception. For 
instance, nobody can be excluded from swimming in a public bathing lake (non-excludability) 
but swimming becomes less enjoyable in a crowed lake (rival consumption). Public lakes, rivers, 
natural parks, fishery, land for hunting or grazing and many other environmental goods fall into 
the category of so-called amenities, i.e. non-excludable but rival environmental goods. 
 Private markets typically fail when it comes to the provision, protection or restoration of envi-
ronmental goods. This is because non-excludability implies that rational individuals do not pay a 
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price for the benefit they gain from consuming environmental goods. Economic theory postulates 
that rational individuals will take the position of free-riders, meaning that they consume envi-
ronmental goods but refuse to bear the costs of their provision, protection or restoration. Taking 
the fresh air example again, rational individuals will not contribute personally to the improve-
ment of air quality as long as other members of society are likely to exploit their efforts by en-
joying improved air quality without reducing their polluting activities. As a consequence, envi-
ronmental goods are not or not efficiently allocated by the market and require government activi-
ty. In particular, governmental intervention is indispensable in the case of environmental ameni-
ties which risk being overused or to be fully depleted. Governments can reduce this risk, for ex-
ample by restricting the access to environmental goods or by taxing their exploitation. Hence, 
government intervention is needed in order to prevent an underprovision of environmental 
goods. 
 Besides the theoretical justification of government activity in the environmental sector, envi-
ronmental awareness has risen over the last decades in many countries and there is an increasing 
pressure to account for environmental impacts in decision-making (cf. Bennett, 2011). Therefore, 
it is in the best interest of governments to bring forward environmental projects, i.e. measures 
which lead to environmental improvements. Public resources for funding environmental projects 
are, of course, limited. Spending public funds on an environmental project means that these re-
sources cannot be spent for any other purpose. Therefore, government representatives have to 
judge the desirability of every major environmental project and make choices concerning the 
allocation of the available budget among alternative projects. Government representatives should 
justify their decisions by assessing the effects of a particular project on society’s wellbeing. This 
is generally done by comparing the gains (benefits) and losses (costs) of all members of a society 
who are affected by a particular project or policy. A practical standard for approving projects and 
policies is that a policy measure’s benefit should exceed its costs (cf. Atkinson and Mourato, 
2008). Moreover, government representatives should opt for those projects or policies with the 
highest benefit-cost ratio (see Nunes and Schokkaert, 2003: 47). 
 Obviously, a precondition for a project assessment by means of cost-benefit analysis is that 
the project’s costs and benefits are measurable and can be compared to each other. While the 
estimation of the costs incurred when implementing and monitoring an environmental project is 
relatively straightforward, the assessment of the benefits of such a project is by far more compli-
cated. Since environmental goods with public good characteristics are typically not traded in 
markets the value of environmental improvements cannot be simply derived from market prices. 
Here, environmental valuation comes in: Based on particular non-market valuation approaches, 
environmental valuation studies provide monetary values for environmental goods. Hence, envi-
ronmental valuation plays a key role for cost-benefit analysis of projects or policy proposals 
which directly aim to enhance environmental quality (cf. Bateman et al., 2002). Moreover, envi-
ronmental valuation is also needed for a comprehensive project assessment in others than the 
environmental sector. Projects in the transport sector, for example, often affect the state of the 
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neighbouring environment. The construction of a new highway typically goes along with envi-
ronmental damage such as the destruction of habitat or higher levels or air pollution. Investments 
into public transport, by contrast, often enhance environmental quality due to a reduction of traf-
fic fumes. Hence, not accounting for environmental impacts would lead to a wrong project ap-
praisal. 
 In addition to its essential role in providing monetary values to cost-benefit analysis, envi-
ronmental valuation also serves to calculate welfare indicators which account for the state of the 
environment of a country, like the green gross domestic product (GDP). In its standard form, 
the GDP only accounts for the production of goods and services in an economy in a given inter-
val in time. Since industrial production often goes along with environmental deterioration the 
classical GDP is likely to overestimate the actual welfare of a country. The green GDP is an ex-
tension of the classical measure because it accounts for the change of the natural capital stock in 
addition to the conventional estimate of national income (cf. Ahlheim, 2003). The monetisation 
of the cost of environmental degradation and of negative externalities such as pollution is of cen-
tral importance in the calculation of the green GDP (see Nunes and Schokkaert, 2003: 48). 
 Another purpose of environmental valuation is the assessment of environmental damage 
costs caused by industrial accidents such as oil spills, nuclear disasters and other accidental pol-
lutions. In the U.S. environmental valuation studies are conducted frequently subsequent to in-
dustrial accidents. This is because U.S. states and individuals can claim compensation payments 
for environmental damage. The monetary value estimates derived from damage assessment stud-
ies build a legal basis for claims for monetary compensation in liability cases. In Europe, envi-
ronmental damage assessment has not become an issue yet because legal arrangements are dif-
ferent than in the U.S. (ibid.).  
 Finally, environmental valuation is sometimes used to calculate environmental tax rates or 
to simply demonstrate the environmental consequences of certain activities (see Bateman et 
al., 2002: 15). An example for such demonstrative studies is the ExternE initiative, which was a 
project series funded by the European Commission aimed to explore suitable approaches to as-
sess the social cost of energy production (see e.g. ExternE, 2005). Hence, environmental valua-
tion is applied in several diverse areas. However, its application in the context of cost-benefit 
analysis of public investment projects remains one of the most important uses (see Freeman et 
al., 2014: 3). To get a deeper understanding of the welfare economic background of environmen-
tal cost-benefit assessments, the welfare-criterion underlying this approach as well as the eco-
nomic concept of environmental values will be introduced in the next section. 
2.1.2 Economic concepts: welfare criteria and environmental values 
Assessing the desirability of the realisation of certain policies is a key aspect of applied welfare 
economics (see Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 18). From the welfare economic perspective, a policy 
is desirable if it enhances the wellbeing of society. By definition, the wellbeing of society de-
pends on the welfare of all its individual members and is formally given by a social welfare func-
tion, e.g.  
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𝑊 = 𝑤(𝑈1,𝑈2, … ,𝑈ℎ), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑈ℎ > 0; (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻), (2-1)  
where Uh is the utility level of all individual households h making up a society of H members. 
Hence, the utility changes of all individuals affected by a certain policy need to be considered in 
order to judge the desirability of this policy. Although this concept seems to be very obvious at 
first glance, determining the direction of the change in social welfare, i.e. answering the question 
whether or not society is better off after a certain policy change has happened, has bothered 
economists for centuries (see Bockstael and McConnell, 2007: 12). 
 In welfare economics, judgements concerning the desirability of a certain policy or project are 
based on so-called welfare criteria. The standard welfare criterion is the Pareto criterion. It 
states that a policy or project is desirable if and only if it makes at least one person better off 
while making nobody worse off than in the initial situation. Hence, a policy or project is benefi-
cial for society if and only if there are no losers. In practise, however, there are hardly any policy 
changes which make nobody worse off; most government programmes or projects improve the 
wellbeing of some people but affect the wellbeing of others in negative ways. Thus, the strict 
Pareto criterion is seldom helpful for practical project assessments. A weaker and at the same 
time more practicable welfare criterion is the compensation principle proposed by Hicks (1939) 
and Kaldor (1939). According to the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle, a policy or project 
is desirable if those who gain from this policy or project could potentially compensate those who 
lose. The Pareto criterion would be met if the winners indeed compensated the losers (see 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 21). However, the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle does not 
require that the compensation is actually paid. The criterion has therefore also become known as 
the ‘potential Pareto criterion’ or the ‘potential compensation test’. 
 The assessment of environmental projects by means of cost-benefit analysis operationalises 
the potential Pareto criterion by checking whether the gains outweigh the losses experienced by 
those members of a society who are affected by the project in question. If this is the case, the 
winners could potentially compensate the losers, indicating that the policy change is desirable 
from society’s perspective. Benefit-cost considerations require that the gains and losses are ex-
pressed in terms of the same units, in other words, the economic value of gains and losses must 
be monetised. At an individual basis, the value of a good equals the maximum amount of money 
an individual is willing to give up in exchange for the good out of his or her budget, i.e. an indi-
vidual’s WTP (see Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 21). The value of a good for society, i.e. its social 
value, is thus some aggregate of individual values, for example the sum of individual WTP    
figures.  
 A consequence of this welfare economic conceptualisation of the social value of environmen-
tal improvements is that the worth of an environmental good is exclusively determined by the 
utility humans gain from this good. The importance of environmental goods for non-human spe-
cies is not taken into account when assigning economic values to environmental goods, at least 
not directly. As a consequence, all what matters when assessing the desirability of an environ-
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mental project is determining the direction of the change in social welfare it causes – nature has 
no value on its own within the economic framework. The purely anthropocentric procedure to 
determine the value of environmental goods used in economics can be opposed to the approach 
to assign ‘intrinsic values’ to nature, which is sometimes propagated by philosophers or ecol-
ogists. An intrinsic value is a value which is independent of human interests (see Tietenberg, 
2007: 18). Intrinsic values can thus be ascribed to all kinds of things, including environmental 
resources, independently from their usefulness in satisfying human wants. Hence, from this al-
ternative perspective on environmental values, the question how much benefit society gets from 
a particular environmental improvement does not matter when assigning a value to an environ-
mental good. 
 It is to be noted that the idea that the value of nature consists of more than just its direct use-
fulness for humans is quite consistent with the concept of environmental values that many con-
temporary economists employ. As pointed out by Weisbrod (1964) and Krutilla (1967), the utili-
ty of an environmental good is not exclusively related to people’s active consumption of that 
good; it can also result singularly from a person’s knowledge about the existence of a particular 
species, landscape or any other environmental good or from having the option of using an envi-
ronmental good in the future. This idea inspired the development of the concept of the so-called 
total economic value (TEV) conferred by natural resources. The TEV encompasses the use val-
ue (UV) and the non-use value (NUV) of an environmental good (cf. Bateman et al., 2002). The 
use value refers to the benefit people gain from directly using/consuming the good (see Nunes, 
2002: 4). For example, a particular river clean-up project benefits all those who use this river as a 
source of drinking water or for recreational purpose (swimming, fishing, taking a walk along the 
riverside, etc.). The non-use value embraces any value people attach to the environmental good 
without using it actively. Researchers often break the non-use value down into several subcate-
gories, such as the option value, altruistic value, bequest value and existence value (cf. Ahlheim 
et al., 2013b). The option value (OV) refers to the satisfaction people gain from knowing that 
they have the possibility to use the environmental good some day in the future. Taking the river 
clean-up project again as an example, even if a person does not actively use the river for recrea-
tion purpose or as a source of drinking water, he or she may still be happy to have the option to 
enjoy the benefits of clean river water. Altruistic values (AV) arise when an individual believes 
that the environmental good should be available for his or her fellow citizens. People who are 
concerned that future generations should have the possibility to enjoy the environmental good 
will attribute bequest value (BV) to the protection or improvement of environmental goods. For 
instance, irrespective of whether a person uses the river actively or not, he or she may be happy 
that his or her fellow citizens (AV) and/or future generations (BV) can drink clean river water or 
use the river for recreational purpose. Finally, the existence value (XV) refers to simply know-
ing about the protection of an environmental good. Some people may appreciate the environmen-
tal impacts of the exemplary river clean-up project for its own sake, independent of any active or 
optional use and the benefit of the river for others. Taken together, the TEV corresponds to: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑈𝑇 + 𝑁𝑈𝑇 = 𝑈𝑇 + (𝑂𝑇 + 𝐴𝑇 + 𝐵𝑇 + 𝑋𝑇)1 
The inclusion of non-use benefits into the economic concept of value has a number of conse-
quences for environmental valuation studies. First of all, accounting for non-use values often 
increases the scope (and cost) of an environmental valuation study. Since the social benefit of an 
environmental project refers to the increase in wellbeing of all individuals affected by the envi-
ronmental improvement, a researcher needs to know who is actually affected, before implement-
ing an environmental valuation study. The definition of the members of the population who are 
affected, however, is not straightforward if non-use values of an environmental project are taken 
into account. Most environmental valuation studies are conducted at the place where the envi-
ronmental project in question shall be realised. Local people are typically considered as being 
affected by the environmental project since the wellbeing of these people is likely to increase 
most noticeably through the environmental improvement. However, in addition to the local pop-
ulation, other people may also benefit from the environmental improvement in question. By def-
inition, non-use values can be experienced without active usage of a good. Therefore, the poten-
tial beneficiaries of an environmental project may live at any distance from the project site, in a 
neighbouring country or even on another continent. As argued by Ahlheim et al. (2013b) envi-
ronmental evaluation studies which exclusively focus on the benefits of the local population risk 
to produce an underestimate of the true social value of the project of interest and may thus cause 
wrong project appraisals. At the same time, assessing the benefits of a greater number of people 
(e.g. a country’s entire population) is more complex and usually more costly than just focussing 
on the local population, especially when survey techniques are used to determine the value of an 
environmental project.  
 Secondly, the concept of the TEV has consequences for the choice of the environmental valu-
ation technique to be applied. Ideally, the social value estimate of an environmental project 
should capture both use and non-use values. In many cases, non-use values make up a major part 
of the benefits accruing from the protection or preservation of a particular environmental good. 
Ignoring such values would lead to a dramatic underestimation of the true benefits of many envi-
ronmental projects (see Nunes, 2002: 7). However, as the next section will show, not all envi-
ronmental valuation techniques account for both use and non-use values. Unfortunately, those 
methods which do allow for a comprehensive assessment of the TEV of environmental goods are 
at the same time the most time-intensive, costly and criticised ones. In the next section the most 
commonly used environmental valuation techniques will be reviewed and discussed with respect 
to their capacity of accurately estimating the social value of environmental projects. 
                                                 
1 It is to be noted that there is no standardised way of classifying the different value components of the TEV. Bate-
man (2002: 28), for example, puts the option value into the category of use value since ‘use values relate to actual 
use of the good in question (…) or planned use’. Nunes (2002) also assigns the option value to the group of use 
values but does not explicitly mention the altruistic value as a component of the TEV. Tietenberg (2007), in turn, 
resigns from breaking down the non-use value into subcategories but opens a separate category for the option value, 
presumably because future use is possible but not certain so that the option value cannot unambiguously be classi-
fied as use or non-use value. 
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2.1.3 Environmental valuation techniques 
There are two main approaches to place monetary values on environmental goods: stated and 
revealed preference methods. Stated preference techniques rely on surveys which are used to 
elicit people’s preferences for changes in the quantity or quality of a particular environmental 
good. Survey participants are asked to state their preferences for the environmental good, for 
example to express their WTP for a particular environmental project. Revealed preference tech-
niques are based on information on consumers’ past behaviour on markets which are unambigu-
ously related to the environmental good in question (see Bennett, 2011: 3). The choices consum-
ers have made in these related markets, for example the prices they paid or the costs they in-
curred to visit an environmental site, reveal their preferences for the same environmental good. 
In contrast to stated preference techniques, which rely on hypothetical answers to hypothetical 
questions, revealed preference techniques draw inference from actual choices. Given that re-
vealed preference techniques use seemingly more objective data than stated preference tech-
niques, they also enjoy the status of providing more accurate environmental values. However, as 
argued in the following paragraphs, revealed preference techniques risk underestimating the 
TEV of environmental goods. 
 In the context of environmental valuation the travel cost method and the hedonic price method 
are the most frequently used revealed preference methods (cf. Atkinson and Mourato, 2008). The 
travel cost method (TCM, cf. Haab and McConnell, 2002, chapter 6 for a comprehensive 
overview) is frequently applied to assess the monetary value of recreational sites, such as public 
parks, conservation areas or beaches. The principal idea underlying this methodology is that the 
trip costs people bear when visiting a particular recreational site reveal the value they attribute to 
this environmental good. Trip costs include transit costs, equipment cost, entrance fees as well as 
time cost and vary across visitors. People living at immediate distance of a recreational site ob-
viously face lower trip costs than people living far away. Accordingly, locals typically take a 
higher number of trips than people who have to travel long distances. TCM practitioners make 
use of the relationship between visit frequency and trip cost by constructing demand functions 
that relate these two variables to each other (cf. Parson, 2003). These demand functions can then 
be used to assess the benefits accruing to the visitors of an environmental site. Depending on the 
complexity of the travel cost model, the method requires more or less comprehensive data. In its 
simplest variant, TCM uses only information about the number of visitors from different regions. 
Such data can be easily gathered, for example by asking the visitors about their postal code when 
entering the recreational site. More sophisticated travel cost models require more detailed data 
which is usually obtained from extensive surveys conducted with the visitors of an environmen-
tal site (for a detailed overview of different travel cost models and a recent example of a survey-
based TCM application, see e.g. Riera et al., 2011).  
 The hedonic price method (HPM, cf. Bockstael and McConnell, 2007 for a detailed review) 
is an appealing option for assessing the benefits of environmental improvements that directly 
affect the price of some market commodity. For example, different levels of ambient air quality, 
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road noise or landscape beauty are likely to affect the price of houses. If two houses have mostly 
identical characteristics, say, the same size, the same number of rooms and windows, but differ 
in terms of the level of ambient air pollution in the area they are located, it can be expected that 
the two houses differ in prices – the one that is located in a region with clean air will sell at a 
higher price than the one located in a region where people suffer from severe air pollution. HPM 
aims to isolate the price component referring to such environmental attributes from the overall 
price of a house (cf. Brouwer et al., 2010). The so-called implicit price of an environmental at-
tribute reflects homeowners’ marginal WTP for this attribute and builds the basis for estimating 
the welfare effects of a change in the quality or quantity of this attribute. HPM uses data from 
sales of houses and building sites in a particular region within a certain period of time. Such data 
can be relatively easily obtained from property records (cf. Ahlheim and Frör, 2003). 
 In addition to the travel cost and hedonic pricing techniques, there are cost-based revealed 
preference methods which are occasionally used in the context of environmental valuation. The 
averting behaviour method (cf. McConnell and Rosado, 2000 for more details), for example, 
explores the costs of behavioural adjustments people make to environmental changes. Expendi-
tures on goods which are consumed as substitutes for environmental goods are expected to 
change with the supply of environmental goods. For example, increased expenditures on bottled 
water are likely to reflect the social cost of poor tab water quality. 
 Revealed preference methods have in common that they observe actual choices people have 
made to use a particular environmental good to draw inference on the value of this good. This 
means that all kinds of benefits which are independent from active usage are not reflected in the 
value estimates obtained from these methods. However, as stressed in section 2.1.2, environmen-
tal goods often generate non-use values, which are, by definition, unrelated to active usage. 
Since revealed preference methods are so to speak ‘blind’ (Ahlheim and Frör, 2003: 360) for 
non-use values, they should not be applied whenever an environmental project or policy is likely 
to affect the welfare of more people than just the active users of the environmental good(s) to be 
provided. In addition to that, revealed preference methods are not suitable for the valuation of 
prospective environmental changes. This is because these methods rely on data of past behav-
iour. Accordingly, the value of environmental goods provided in the future, like opening a new 
natural reserve, cannot be assessed with the help of these techniques. Furthermore, revealed 
preference methods can be applied only to a limited number of environmental goods. While 
TCM is almost exclusively used to assess the value of recreational sites, applications of HPM are 
more diverse but studies assessing the value of air quality are most prominent. However, the ap-
plicability of HPM strongly depends on the location of the environmental good – ideally densely 
populated areas where property frequently changes owners – and the availability of comprehen-
sive data from the local real estate market. In that sense, both methods are rather inflexible, i.e. 
they cannot be applied to any environmental good in any location. Taken together, the at first 
glance appealing idea of making inference from actual behaviour on real markets on environ-
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mental values goes along with severe limitations. Some of these limitations can be overcome by 
employing stated preference methods. 
 Contingent Valuation2 is the oldest and most frequently applied stated preference technique 
(see Atkinson and Mourato, 2008: 319). As can be inferred from its name, the value estimates 
that the CVM produces are contingent on a hypothetical market where a particular environmental 
good is traded. The hypothetical market scenario usually encompasses a description of the envi-
ronmental good in question; the institution(s) responsible for its provision; and an explanation 
regarding the funding mechanism of the environmental good’s provision (ibid.). Most CVM 
practitioners design the hypothetical market scenario as an environmental project to be financed 
by private households’ contributions. Afterwards, they ask the respondents to state their WTP for 
this environmental project. Individual WTP statements are interpreted in terms of the utility in-
crease a respondent would experience due to the resulting environmental improvement. Under 
certain circumstance – most notably, a survey that is representative for all individuals affected by 
the environmental change in question – the sample’s average WTP provides a suitable basis for 
assessing the overall value of an environmental good. 
 During the last two decades choice modelling has become increasingly popular for assessing 
environmental values. Similar to HPM, choice modelling involves estimating attribute-specific 
values of a particular good. Like CVM, the method is survey-based and uses hypothetical mar-
kets to assess the value of non-market goods. In the environmental valuation context choice 
modelling is particularly attractive for the assessment of society’s preferences for several charac-
teristics of an environmental project. The most prominent variant of choice modelling are so-
called choice experiments (cf. Hoyos, 2010 for a recent overview). Just as CVM interviews, 
choice experiments typically start with a detailed description of the environmental good of inter-
est. After having learned more about a particular environmental problem, participants of a choice 
experiment are presented with a so-called choice set and asked to choose their most preferred 
alternative from this set. For example, a choice set may consist of the following three alterna-
tives: a) a large scale renaturation project at a high cost per household in additional taxes; b) a 
low scale renaturation project at a low cost per household in additional taxes; and c) a baseline 
alternative corresponding to the current situation, i.e. no renaturation project and no additional 
cost. The alternative projects are defined by a number of attributes and the level of attributes 
differs across alternatives (c.f. Hoyos, 2010). To increase the amount of information obtained 
from a choice experiment, the choice task is usually repeated several times by presenting multi-
ple programs which encompass different levels of the relevant attributes to the participants. Each 
time when confronted with a new choice set respondents have to make trade-offs between attrib-
ute levels and costs. By analysing these trade-offs the method yields estimates for the marginal 
rates of substitution between pairs of attributes (c.f. Freeman et al., 2014). Provided that a money 
measure (cost or price) is included as an attribute of the alternative programs, the marginal WTP 
                                                 
2 A detailed overview can be found in the textbook by Mitchell and Carson’s (1989) as the primary reference for 
contingent valuation studies. Furthermore, section 2.2 and section 2.3 of this chapter provide more details regarding 
the theoretical underpinning and the practical use of this method. 
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for each attribute can be assessed (c.f. Hoyos, 2010). Choice experiments are an appealing alter-
native to CVM surveys for the assessment of the social benefit accruing from an environmental 
project because they yield more information on people’s preferences for several aspects of the 
project in question. Standard CVM surveys merely provide a monetary value for a specific envi-
ronmental project. Such a single-shot value can also be estimated from a choice model but in 
addition to that, marginal WTP figures for each attribute of the project are obtained. From a poli-
cy maker’s perspective, such attribute-specific values can be very informative, especially when 
having to decide on the scope of an environmental project or among different policy options. 
However, confronting the participants of a stated preference survey with a sequence of choice 
tasks, rather than with a single payment question, goes along with a number of difficulties. Most 
notably, respondents may lose interest or feel overburdened when repeatedly asked to select their 
preferred option out of a set of alternatives. This can have severe consequences for the validity of 
the results of choice experiments. For example, a number of studies found that respondents tend 
to ignore attributes when confronted repeatedly with similar choice tasks (c.f. e.g. DeShazo and 
Fermo, 2002, Carlsson et al., 2010). Furthermore, many respondents seem to use rules-of-thumb 
instead of making trade-offs among all attributes presented to them (cf. Freeman et al., 2014). 
 Contingent valuation and choice experiments are necessarily based on interview-administered 
or self-administered surveys. Accordingly, they are relatively costly environmental valuation 
approaches. Furthermore, both techniques suffer from similar methodological weaknesses, in-
cluding all kinds of biases discussed in section 2.3.2. For example, WTP statements of stingy 
respondents are likely to distort the results of both CVM surveys and choice experiments. In the 
case of a CVM survey, misers can be expected to state a zero WTP when asked about the amount 
of money they would be willing to pay for the environmental project in question. Likewise, it 
must be anticipated that misers always choose the cheapest alternative from a choice set, i.e. the 
status quo option that implies no additional expenditure to them. As will be shown in more detail 
in chapter 5, the presence of stingy respondents in a stated preference survey poses problems if 
their choices are unrelated to the environmental improvement to be valued and simply reflect a 
strict decision rule like ‘I don’t want to spend money on anything’. Obviously, the presence of 
misers does not distort the results of revealed preference studies. Since revealed preference 
methods rely on the observation of actual spending decisions, the preferences of non-spenders 
are not represented in the corresponding datasets. Stingy people, the poor and all other individu-
als who do not spend money on the related market of concern fall into the category of non-users 
and hence the share of society whose preferences are neglected in revealed preference studies. 
However, in the same way as the dispositions of people to spend money in general can be ex-
pected to influence their answers in stated preference surveys, it is also plausible that people’s 
attitudes towards spending affect their expenditures for visiting recreational sites, the amount of 
money they are willing to spend on housing, their expenditures for bottled water and hence the 
results of revealed preference studies. Accordingly, irrespective of the valuation technique used, 
environmental values may always reflect a society’s money attitudes. However, only stated pref-
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erence techniques risk to yield biased value estimates because they account for the presumably 
meaningless WTP statements of misers.  
 Despites their comparatively higher cost and vulnerability to bias, stated preference methods 
have several advantages over revealed preference methods. Compared to the latter group of 
methods, stated preference methods are more flexible environmental valuation tools (c.f. Carson 
and Hanemann, 2005). Stated preference surveys are suitable for the assessment of the monetary 
value of virtually any environmental change occurring in any region, at any time. For example, 
the value of environmental improvements in remote regions which are hardly visited by tourists 
and scarcely populated can be relatively easily assessed in surveys. TCM or HPM are not suita-
ble for such cases due to the absence of tourists and sufficiently large housing markets. Moreo-
ver, stated preference data is not necessarily limited to a particular group of people within the 
overall population (e.g. tourists in the case of TCM or house owners in the case of HPM). Re-
searchers can organise the CVM survey in a way so that the value estimate reflects the prefer-
ences of all kinds of people potentially affected by an environmental change. Most importantly, 
stated preference methods do not rely on past utilisation behaviour. Therefore, social value esti-
mates are expected to capture the whole TEV, i.e. both use and non-use values. In spite of per-
sisting debates concerning the reliability and validity of stated preference methods (cf. section 
2.3.2), CVM and choice experiments are of great practical importance in the policy context. This 
holds especially true for the U.S. where the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) advises explicitly including non-use values in environmental damage assessments (c.f. 
Arrow and Solow, 1993). 
 In sum, inferring monetary values for environmental goods from hypothetical answers to hy-
pothetical questions is still controversial. However, revealed preference techniques represent no 
alternative to stated preference methods in many circumstances, especially when individuals are 
likely to place value on an environmental good they do not actively use (c.f. Freeman et al., 
2014). The two stated preference techniques considered here, CVM on the one hand and choice 
experiments on the other, have in common that they provide monetary measures of the total eco-
nomic value of an environmental good, accounting for both use and non-use values. Each meth-
od has strengths and weaknesses, but it is hard to say whether the traditional CVM or the more 
recently developed choice modelling approach perform better in providing coherent monetary 
values for environmental goods. Given the comparatively longer tradition of using CVM surveys 
to assess environmental values and the huge amount of research aimed at improving this meth-
odology, opting for CVM may be the safest choice for the assessment of the social benefits of a 
complete environmental project. However, if an analyst is interested in the values individuals 
place on certain characteristics of an environmental project, the choice experiment is the more 
suitable option. The empirical part of this dissertation relies on an extensive CVM survey which 
was implemented to assess the preferences of Beijing’s urban population for an environmental 
restoration project in Northwest China. Hence, the theoretical underpinnings of this particular 
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method as well as issues related to the practical implementation of a CVM survey will be ad-
dressed in the following sections. 
2.2 Theoretical underpinning of the Contingent Valuation Method 
In the environmental valuation context, contingent valuation surveys are used to obtain correct 
estimates of the benefits of environmental projects (c.f. Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Such figures 
can then be used in a cost-benefit analyse to determine the impact of a change in environmental 
quality on society’s welfare. Environmental projects typically have a number of effects which 
affect the wellbeing of at least some, if not all households in a society. A river clean-up project, 
for example, leads to improved environmental conditions at the project sites. In addition to that, 
people living at any distance of the river may enjoy the benefits of the clean-up projects which 
are unrelated to direct use, such as its value for future generations. Furthermore, if existing pub-
lic funds are insufficient to finance such a project and the government has to collect additional 
money from households, individuals will suffer a decrease in their income levels. Due to en-
hanced environmental quality on the one hand and reduced income levels on the other, house-
holds’ consumption habits may also change. For example, the demand for swimming suites may 
increase while the demand for bottled water might decrease subsequent to the realisation of a 
river clean-up project. Changes in the demand for market goods, in return, have effects on rela-
tive prices. Hence, environmental projects typically affect society’s wellbeing through different 
channels, namely direct environmental effects as well as indirect effects on income and market 
prices (cf. Ahlheim, 2003). In order to know whether or not society is better off after the imple-
mentation of an environmental project, all these potential effects should be taken into account 
when assessing the benefits of an environmental project. What is needed for an accurate project 
assessment is an indicator which unambiguously indicates the direction of the welfare change 
induced by an environmental project. 
 Since social welfare is defined in terms of the utility of individual households (cf. equation   
2-1 in section 2.1.2), the assessment of a welfare change can be broken down into two steps. The 
first step consists of determining individual utility changes; the second step comprises the aggre-
gation of these individual utility changes in order to obtain an indicator of social welfare (ibid.). 
The next section focuses on the first step, namely on the identification of individual welfare 
change. 
2.2.1 Identification of individual welfare change 
As explained in section 2.1.3, the objective of CVM surveys and other environmental valuation 
techniques is the assessment of people’s WTP for environmental goods. The concept of WTP is 
derived from theoretical measures of welfare change. The traditional welfare measure identified 
in literature is the consumer surplus, first proposed by Dupuit ([1844] 1995) and developed more 
fully by Marshall (1989) in the 19th century. Changes of the consumer surplus due to, for exam-
ple, a price change, are commonly interpreted as money measures of utility changes. However, 
 
20 
measuring welfare changes based on this concept has a number of drawbacks. Most importantly, 
in cases of multiple price changes or when prices and income change simultaneously, the change 
of consumer surplus is affected by the order in which the changes of the different variables are 
considered. In addition to that, the consumer surplus serves as a meaningful measure of utility 
change only based on very stringent, extremely unrealistic assumptions (for a detailed illustration 
see e.g. Ahlheim, 1998b: 495-501, Just et al., 1982: 73-83). 
 In view of the shortcomings of the traditional welfare measure, Hicks (1943) suggested four 
alternative measures of welfare change. Two of these measures, the equivalent variation (EV) 
and compensating variation (CV), apply to situations where an individual is free in adjusting its 
consumption choices subsequent to a price or quantity change of a particular good. Hicks (1943) 
described two additional measures, the equivalent surplus (ES) and the compensating surplus 
(CS), which are suitable in cases where individuals cannot freely adapt their consumption choic-
es when the economic environment changes but have to consume imposed quantities of a good 
(c.f. Just et al., 1982). The two Hicksian surplus measures are frequently applied to measure the 
welfare effects of policies or projects which lead to changes in the provision of public goods and 
which leave prices unaffected (c.f. Freeman et al., 2014). However, ES and CS are not suitable 
for the evaluation of policies and projects that can be expected to cause price changes. This is 
because in market economies individuals are free to adjust their consumption, for example to 
consume less of a particular good subsequent to an increase in its price. In other words, they are 
able to adapt their consumption choices (c.f. Just et al., 1982). 
 Having two kinds of Hicksian welfare measures at choice, variation measures and surplus 
measures, the question arises which one is most suitable for the evaluation of environmental pro-
jects. On the one hand, many environmental goods are, like public goods, available at fixed 
quantities only. The fact that households cannot simply adjust their consumption of, for example, 
clean air but have to take the quantity or quality of environmental goods as given calls for the 
use of one of the two surplus measures when assessing the welfare effects of an environmental 
project. Several authors, including pioneering economists in the field of environmental valuation 
like Mitchell and Carson (1989) and Freeman et al. (2014), recur to ES and CS to assess the wel-
fare impacts of environmental policy proposals. On the other hand, for the conduct of a compre-
hensive cost-benefit assessment of an environmental project, not only the environmental conse-
quences but also all kinds of indirect effects, especially price and income effects should be taken 
into account (cf. Stephan and Ahlheim, 1996). Hence, EV and CV appear to be more adequate 
choices than the two surplus measures to evaluate the welfare effects of environmental projects 
with direct and indirect effects. The focus of this section therefore lies on the theoretical devel-
opment of EV and CV as exact measures for the welfare effects of environmental projects. The 
remainder of this section closely follows the illustrations in Stephan and Ahlheim (1996) and 
Ahlheim (2003). 
 The theoretical derivation of individual welfare measures for environmental projects involves 
alternative ways of expressing the satisfaction a household gains from the consumption of differ-
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ent goods, including market goods and environmental goods. The utility a household gains from 
the consumption of market goods and the state of the environment can be described by means of 
the traditional direct utility function uh(xh, z). The direct utility function is monotonically in-
creasing in market consumption, described by the vector xh, and in the state of the environment, 
described by the vector z. The parameters encompassed by the vector z refer to public goods; this 
means that all households consume the same quantity of these goods, namely the quantities 
available in a particular situation k. Furthermore, the enjoyment of these public goods is free of 
charge. Given the prices p of market goods and their fixed income I, all households H will max-
imise their utility. The constrained utility maximisation problem of an individual household h 
can be expressed as 
max. 𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧) s.t. 𝐼ℎ ≤ 𝑝𝑥ℎ; 𝑧 = 𝑧𝑘; (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻). (2-2) 
An alternative way of representing the constrained utility maximisation problem is based on the 
indirect utility function υh(p, z, Ih). The indirect utility function indicates the maximum utility 
level a household can attain, given a specified price level p, the state of the environment zk and 
the household’s income Ih. The indirect utility function is obtained by solving the utility maximi-
sation problem displayed in equation 2-2. Doing so yields the Marshallian demand functions for 
all market goods (commonly denoted as x∗ = x�p, zk, Ih�). To derive the indirect utility function, 
the Marshallian demand functions have to be substituted into the direct utility function. Since the 
indirect utility function relates the maximum utility level a household can reach to the price lev-
el, the state of the environment and the household’s income, its employment turns out to be par-
ticularly useful when discussing the effects of environmental projects with direct and indirect 
effects on society’s wellbeing. 
 Finally, a third way of expressing the constrained utility maximisation problem is of im-
portance for the following discussion. This third approach involves the expenditure function and 
the following associated expenditure minimisation problem: 
min. 𝑝 ∙ 𝑥ℎ s.t. 𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧) ≥ 𝑈ℎ, (2-3) 
where Uh is an arbitrarily specified level of utility that the household can at least realise. Solving 
the expenditure minimisation problem yields the Hicksian-compensated demand functions 
(commonly denoted as x∗ = ξh(p, zk, U)). Plugging these functions into an expression referring 
to the household’s total expenditure yields the expenditure function eh(p, zk, Uh). The expendi-
ture function gives the minimum expenditure the household needs to make in order to reach the 
specified utility level Uh, given the state of the environment zk and prices p. The expenditure 
function is monotonically related to utility; it strictly increases with the utility level Uh. This is to 
say that the higher the utility level a household wishes to realise is, the more the household needs 
to spend. Because of this strict relationship between utility and expenditures in terms of money 
the expenditure function is commonly known as the ‘money-metric utility function’ (Samuelson, 
1983), i.e. a function which measures utility in monetary units. Under the assumptions that 
households spend all their disposable income on market goods, the expenditure function equals a 
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household’s income. In a world without time where individuals consider their income as nothing 
else than a means to purchase the goods and services they desire, this assumptions is quite plau-
sible. In the real world, however, there are of course reasons why households refrain from de-
pleting their entire income, including their need to save for future consumption or their desire to 
accumulate their financial resources. Even though the assumed equality between income and 
expenditures is not fully realistic, the representation of a household’s utility by means of the ex-
penditure function is appealing because income levels are, in contrast to utility, empirically ob-
servable. 
 A change in the wellbeing of a household induced by the implementation of an environmental 
project can thus be defined in different ways, depending on the kind of utility function employed. 
In general, the change in wellbeing, denoted by ∆U in the following illustrations, equals the dif-
ference between a household’s utility level before and after a particular environmental project 
has been carried out. In the following equations, these two situations will be indicated by the 
superscript k, where k=0 describes the initial situation and k=1 the final situation. A first form of 
expressing the utility difference between the status quo and the new situation is (Ahlheim, 2003: 
11): 
∆𝑈ℎ
01 = 𝑈ℎ1 − 𝑈ℎ0 = 𝑢ℎ(𝑥ℎ1, 𝑧1) − 𝑢ℎ(𝑥ℎ0, 𝑧0); (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻). (2-4) 
Uh0 indicates the utility level in the initial state, i.e. the situation before the project has been real-
ised, and Uh1 the utility level in the new situation, i.e. the situation after the implementation of 
the project. Alternatively, the change in utility of an individual household can be expressed via 
the indirect utility function: 
∆𝑈ℎ
01 ≡ 𝜐ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1, 𝐼ℎ1) − 𝜐ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0, 𝐼ℎ0); (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻). (2-5) 
Equation 2-5 is a more evident way of representing the utility change induced by an environmen-
tal project because it reflects the three different channels through which the implementation of an 
environmental project may affect individual utility, namely changes in environmental quality 
(z0  z1), changes in income (I0  I1) and changes in prices (p0  p1). However, since neither 
the direct nor the indirect utility function can be observed empirically, further modifications are 
required in order to define a practically useful, i.e. empirically observable, welfare measure. 
 For this purpose, economists employ the concept of the expenditure function. As mentioned 
above, the expenditure function indicates a household’s minimum expenditure on market goods 
to reach a specified utility level Uh, given prices p and the state of the environment z. If p and z 
are set constant, a change in utility can only result from a change in expenditure on market 
goods. To make use of this relationship between utility and expenditures, prices and income 
must be fixed at some arbitrary level. Two possibilities lie at hand, namely fixing prices and in-
come at the initial level k=0 or the new level k=1. Accordingly, the utility change induced by an 
environmental project can be expressed in two different ways (see Ahlheim, 2003: 12). Fixing p 
and z at the initial level k=0 gives the equivalent variation: 
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𝑇𝑇ℎ
01 = 𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ1) − 𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0) = 𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ1) − 𝐼ℎ0. (2-6) 
Fixing p and z at the new level k=1 gives the compensating variation: 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 = 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1,𝑈ℎ1) − 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1,𝑈ℎ0) = 𝐼ℎ1 − 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1,𝑈ℎ0). (2-7) 
The utility change resulting from an environmental project is now expressed as the difference 
between two money metric utility functions. As illustrated in equation 2-6 and 2-7, EV and CV 
measure the difference in (money) expenditure levels associated with two utility levels when the 
state of the environment and prices are kept constant. The EV, as displayed in equation 2-6, 
measures the difference between the fictitious minimum expenditure the household would have 
to make to reach the new utility level U1, given initial prices and initial environmental quality, 
and the household’s actual expenditure level, i.e. its income, in the initial situation. Analogously, 
as denoted in equation 2-7, the minimum expenditure required to attain the new utility level, giv-
en new prices and the new state of the environment, equals a household’s income in the new 
situation. The second term in equation 2-7 corresponds to the fictive expenditure level that would 
bring the household back to its initial level of utility U0, given new prices p1 and new environ-
mental quality z1. Hence, the CV corresponds to the difference in a household’s actual income in 
the new situation and the fictitious expenditure the household would have to make to attain its 
initial utility level, given the new state of the environmental and new prices. 
 EV and CV will take different signs, depending on whether an environmental project affects a 
household’s utility positively or negatively. If the project has a positive effect on a household’s 
utility, the expression eh�p0, z0, Uh1� − Ih0, and hence the EV, is positive; this is because the fic-
tive expenditure level would be higher than the household’s actual income in the initial situation. 
On the contrary, the EV becomes negative in the case of a utility decrease. Regarding the CV, 
the difference Ih1 − eh�p1, z1, Uh0� is positive for a utility-increasing policy change; this is be-
cause the household’s effective income in the new situation exceeds the fictitious expenditure 
level necessary to reach the initial utility level, given new prices and the new state of the envi-
ronment. By contrast, the CV takes a negative sign in the case of a utility-decreasing policy 
change. 
 It is well-known that the Hicksian welfare measures can be interpreted in terms of willingness 
to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). To facilitate the following discussion, the EV 
and the CV are plugged into the indirect utility function. In the case of the EV this yields the 
following expression: 
𝜐ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0, 𝐼ℎ0 + 𝑇𝑇) = 𝜐ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1, 𝐼ℎ1).  (2-8) 
The EV corresponds to the amount by which a household’s initial income would have to be ad-
justed in order to make the household indifferent between not obtaining and obtaining a prospec-
tive policy change. As already highlighted, the EV will be positive in the case of a utility-
increasing policy. Therefore, it corresponds to the amount of money by which the household’s 
income would have to be increased to raise the household’s utility to the same level as the policy 
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measure would have done. Hence, the EV can be interpreted as a household’s willingness to ac-
cept compensation to forgo a utility-increasing policy, for example an environmental protection 
project. Since the EV will be negative in the case of a utility-decreasing policy change, it corre-
sponds to the amount of money which could be subtracted from a household’s income to de-
crease the household’s utility level to the same extent as the policy change would have done. 
Thus, the EV corresponds to a household’s willingness to pay to prevent the negative effects of a 
policy, for example its WTP to prevent the implementation of a measure that would cause envi-
ronmental damage. In the environmental context, researchers commonly interpret the EV as a 
household’s WTA to forgo an environmental improvement or as its WTP to prevent environmen-
tal damage (c.f. Ahlheim, 2003). Analogously, the CV can be interpreted in terms of WTP and 
WTA. Plugging the CV into the indirect utility function gives the following equality: 
𝜐ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1, 𝐼ℎ1 − 𝐶𝑇) = 𝜐ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0, 𝐼ℎ0).  (2-9) 
The CV describes the amount of money by which a household’s income would have to be ad-
justed in order to bring the household back to its initial utility level, once the policy change in 
question has happened. Since the CV takes a positive sign in the case of a utility-increasing poli-
cy, it equals the amount of money that could be taken away from the household’s income in re-
turn to the policy change, leaving the household as well off as in the initial situation. In the case 
of a utility-decreasing policy the CV is negative and corresponds to the amount of money that 
would have to be added to a household’s income to compensate the household for the loss in 
utility caused by the policy measure. Hence, it is common practise to interpret the CV in terms of 
a household’s WTP for an environmental improvement and its WTA compensation for environ-
mental damage (ibid.). 
 Both welfare measures reliably indicate the direction of a specific utility change: EV and CV 
are positive if the environmental project leads to a utility increase; and they are negative if the 
environmental project induces a loss in utility. Hence, a researcher has the choice between em-
ploying or the one or the other theoretical welfare measure for the assessment of the direct and 
indirect effects of a particular environmental project on individual wellbeing. However, in prac-
tical applications the CV is often preferred to the EV. In CVM surveys, for example, the benefits 
of environmental projects are typically derived from WTP questions. WTA measures are rarely 
used because respondents have an incentive to exaggerate their demand for compensation when 
answering WTA-questions. Early CVM studies backed this argument by showing that WTA es-
timates are consistently higher than WTP values for the same amenity (c.f. Mitchell and Carson, 
1989). Since the present work focuses on the valuation of the benefits of an environmental pro-
ject by means of WTP survey questions, the following illustrations are limited to the CV. 
 It is to be noted that the welfare indicator which is assed in a stated preference survey is not 
exactly the CV as displayed in equation 2-7. This is because the formulation of the compensating 
variation involves the abstract term eh�p1, z1, Uh0�. This term refers to the expenditure necessary 
to reach the initial utility level, given new prices and the new state of the environment. The term 
is fully abstract and cannot be observed empirically. Hence, additional modifications need to be 
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made to obtain an empirically observable welfare measure. Since environmental projects affect a 
household’s utility through different channels, the CV can be separated into different compo-
nents reflecting the environmental change, the change in market prices and the change in income 
the project in question would cause, i.e. (Stephan and Ahlheim, 1996: 175) 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 = 𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0) − 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0) + 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0) − 𝑒ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧1,𝑈ℎ0) + 𝐼ℎ1 − 𝐼ℎ0. (2-10) 
The first two expressions in equation 2-10 refer to a change in market prices (p0  p1); the third 
and the fourth expression refer to the change in environmental quality (z0  z1); and the last two 
expressions describe the income change (I0  I1). Making use of this additive nature, the CV can 
be decomposed into three separate components (Ahlheim, 2003: 16): 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 = 𝐶𝑇𝐶ℎ01 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶ℎ01 + 𝐶𝑇𝐼ℎ01. (2-11) 
The overall CV (CVh01) thus equals the sum of three sub-CVs which refer to the utility change 
caused by a change in prices (CVPh01), by a change in environmental quality (CVZh01) and by a 
change in income (CVIh01). This implies that different valuation techniques can be applied to as-
sess the sub-CVs empirically. For the purpose of empirical computation, equation 2-11 is further 
modified, leading to the following expression (ibid: 17): 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 = ∫ 𝜉ℎ(𝑝, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0)𝑑𝑝 + ∫ 𝜋ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑧,𝑈ℎ0)𝑑𝑧 + 𝐼ℎ1 − 𝐼ℎ0𝑧1𝑧0𝑝0𝑝1 . (2-12) 
In equation 2-12 the change in prices is expressed as the integral over the Hicksian demand func-
tions ξh(.) between old and new prices; the change in environmental quality is represented by the 
integral over the income compensated environmental shadow price function πh(.) between the 
initial and the new state of the environment; and the change in income corresponds to the differ-
ence in income levels before and after the realisation of the environmental project in question. 
The empirical computation of the income-specific CV is relatively simple if an environmental 
project’s welfare effects are assessed subsequent to the project’s implementation. In this case, the 
income change can be calculated based on census data. Naturally, things become more compli-
cated when an assessment takes place before a project’s implementation. In that case future in-
come levels have to be forecasted. The computation of the change in prices is more challenging 
because the corresponding expression involves the Hicksian demand function. Since Hicksian 
demand functions are not empirically observable, economists have developed heuristic methods 
such as Vartia’s (1983) algorithm to compute the welfare effects of changes in market prices. 
These techniques make use of observable Marshallian demand functions in order to compute the 
integral over Hicksian demand functions. Like the assessment of prospective income changes, 
the computation of the price effect is more complicated when the project has not been imple-
mented yet. This is because the new price level and hence the Marshallian demand functions are 
unknown in such a situation. Finally, the estimation of the compensating variation of a change in 
the state of the environment represents the greatest challenge. Neither the difference in expendi-
ture levels reflected by CVZh01 , nor the integral over the income compensated environmental 
shadow price function between the initial and the new state of the environment are observable. 
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Heuristic methods such as Vartia’s (1983) algorithm cannot be employed because the shadow 
prices of environmental goods are unknown and cannot be immediately deduced from observed 
market behaviour. Hence, more direct assessment techniques, such as the Contingent Valuation 
Method, have to be employed to assess the compensating variation of a change in environmental 
quality. Before turning to these practical aspects, the second step in the assessment of the welfare 
impacts of an environmental project shall be briefly addressed. 
2.2.2 Aggregation of individual welfare changes 
The WTP of a single household for an environmental project is little informative for decision 
makers who are interested in the welfare effects of their activities for society as a whole. There-
fore, once the individual compensating variations have been assessed for all households affected 
by an environmental project, they have to be aggregated in order to obtain a monetary measure 
for the overall benefit of the project under consideration. To decide whether a project is benefi-
cial for society, the Hicks-Kaldor decision criterion is typically employed. As explained in sec-
tion 2.1.2, this criterion requires that the winners of a project could potentially compensate the 
losers without being worse off than without the project. Expressed in terms of CV, this decision 
criterion can be formulated as follows (Ahlheim, 2003: 22): 
∑ 𝐶𝑇ℎ
01
>=<0 ⇒ ∆𝑊>=<0𝐻ℎ=1 . (2-13) 
The decision criterion postulates that if aggregate CV is positive (negative), social welfare in-
creases (decreases). In equation 2-13 aggregate CV equals the sum of individual CVs, i.e. the 
sum of all WTP figures of those households benefitting from the project and the WTA of all 
households suffering utility losses due to the project. According to the standard interpretation, a 
positive sum of individual CVs indicates that the project is beneficial from a social point of view, 
while a negative sum indicates the opposite.3  
 As illustrated in the previous section, the overall compensating variation (CVh01) can be de-
composed into income, price and environmental changes. Furthermore, these three components 
can be expressed as the difference in income levels between the new and the old situation, the 
integral over the Hicksian demand functions between new and old prices and the integral over 
the income-compensated shadow price function between the new and the old state of the envi-
ronment (cf. equation 2-12). Hence, the exact computation of the social value of an environmen-
tal project requires that income, price and environmental effects are known for the entire popula-
tion under consideration. Assessment of this data would be extremely time-consuming and    
costly. The determination of price effects, for example, involves complex and data-intensive pro-
                                                 
3 It should be kept in mind that this decision criterion is not compatible with ordinal utility theory because it implies 
that utility intensity can be measured and compared across individuals. This ‘aggregation problem’ has been covered 
extensively in literature, for instance by Johansson (1994), and will not be further addressed in the present work. 
Furthermore, the aggregation procedure may follow different rules than the simple one described here. For example, 
decision makers may wish to assign welfare weights to the WTP of certain groups of society instead of simply 
summing up the individual WTP measures.  
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cedures in order to estimate the demand systems for all households. Therefore, analysts often 
apply a simplified and less costly approach in practical environmental valuation studies. This 
simplification is based on a linear approximation of the exact version of the CV, displayed in 
equation 2-12 (see Stephan and Ahlheim, 1996: 176-179 for a detailed illustration). This simpli-
fication yields the following expression: 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 ≈ −∇𝑝𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0)[𝑝1 − 𝑝0] − ∇𝑧𝑒ℎ(𝑝0, 𝑧0,𝑈ℎ0)[𝑧1 − 𝑧0] + 𝐼ℎ1 − 𝐼ℎ0, (2-14) 
where ∇peh(p0, z0, Uh0) and ∇zeh(p0, z0, Uh0) are the Hessian matrices of the corresponding ex-
penditure functions. Because of the relationship between expenditures functions and Hicksian 
demand functions as given by Shepard’s Lemma4, expression 2-14 can be further simplified. 
This yields the following approximation: 
𝐶𝑇ℎ
01 ≈ 𝑝1 ∙ [𝑥ℎ1 − 𝑥ℎ0] + 𝜋ℎ0 ∙ [𝑧1 − 𝑧0], (2-15) 
where 𝜋ℎ0 is a vector of shadow prices the household assigns to the different environmental pa-
rameters encompassed by the vector z. The expression p1 ∙ [xh1 − xh0] now represents price and 
income effects. In the exact version of the total compensating variation (cf. equation 2-10 and   
2-11) these two effects are measured by the sub-CVs for prices (CVPh01) and income (CVIh01). 
 In addition to this simplification, practical cost-benefit assessments are based on the assump-
tion that environmental projects are financed out of scare economic resources. This means that if 
the environmental project in question was not implemented, these resources would be used for 
the production of market goods. As a consequence, prices will increase subsequent to the imple-
mentation of an environmental project. This price increase, in return, will lead to a reduction of 
the demand for market goods. Hence, the sum of the simplified price and income effects repre-
sents the overall cost of the environmental project to society. Practitioners approximate these 
social costs by the input costs related to an environmental project (wages, material, etc.). This 
gives the traditional benefit-cost expression  
𝐵𝐶01 ≈ ∑ 𝜋ℎ
0𝐻
ℎ=1 ∙ [𝑧1 − 𝑧0] − 𝑞1 ∙ 𝑦1 ≈ ∑ 𝐶𝑇𝐶ℎ01 − 𝑞1 ∙ 𝑦1𝐻ℎ=1 , (2-16)  
where q is a vector of input prices and y a vector of input quantities needed in order to realise the 
project. According to the standard interpretation, a positive benefit-cost result indicates that a 
project should be implemented, while a negative result indicates the opposite. Naturally, the 
simplification of the exact variant of the CV goes along with a loss in precision. For example, the 
indirect effects of an environmental project on a household’s utility, namely price and income 
effects which can affect a household’s demand for market goods, are not captured by the simpli-
fied cost-benefit expression (c.f. Stephan and Ahlheim, 1996). However, the benefit-cost expres-
                                                 
4 Shephard’s Lemma for market goods (a) and environmental goods (b) corresponds to (cf. Ahlheim 1998 for more 
details) 
(a) 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑛
(𝑝, 𝑧,𝑈) ≡ 𝜉𝑛(𝑝, 𝑧,𝑈) = 𝑥𝑛; (𝑛 = 1,2, … ,𝑁) 
(b) 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑧𝑙
(𝑝, 𝑧,𝑈) ≡ −𝜋1(𝑝, 𝑧,𝑈) = −𝜋; (𝑙 = 1,2, … , 𝐿) 
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sion makes the assessment of the welfare effect of an environmental project much easier. Since 
the estimation of input costs is rather simple, the only remaining challenge consists of assessing 
the effect of the environmental change accruing from an environmental project on society’s 
wellbeing. As highlighted in the previous section, CVZh01 is usually interpreted as the WTP of an 
individual household affected by the environmental project in question. Since this WTP is not 
directly observable from market data, revealed or stated preference techniques have to be em-
ployed for its estimation. The overall benefit of an environmental project (social benefit, Bsocial) 
is then approximated by multiplying the average WTP of a representative sample by the number 
of all households affected by this project, i.e.. 
𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠��������� = 𝐻 ∙ 𝑊𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑠𝜕��������������� . (2-17) 
This figure is then compared to the social costs of the same project (Csocial) in order to derive the 
net benefit accruing from the project: 
𝐵𝑛𝜕𝑛������ = 𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠��������� − 𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠��������� . (2-18) 
As highlighted by Ahlheim et al. (2010b), the net benefit (Bnet) is a good proxy for the sum of 
individual CVs displayed in equation 2-13. Hence, if the net benefit turns out to be positive, the 
environmental project is desirable from society’s point of view. By contrast, the environmental 
project should not be implemented if its net benefit is negative. Obviously, the computation of 
the net benefit of an environmental project makes only sense if both benefits and costs are ex-
pressed in the same units. Since the social costs of an environmental project constitute the sum of 
all kinds of public expenditures related to the implementation of this project as well as forgone 
profits, the cost component of the benefit-cost equation 2-18 is necessarily a monetary value. 
Accordingly, the social benefit must also be expressed in terms of money. To avoid burdensome 
processes of conversion, it has become common practise to monetise individual utility changes 
directly rather than assessing them in some alternative unit first and to convert them into mone-
tary units afterwards. The most prominent possibility of monetising individual benefits of im-
proved environmental conditions consists of implementing a comprehensive CVM survey that 
asks a representative sample of households how much money they are willing to give up in ex-
change of the environmental improvement of concern. The next section focuses on the multiple 
challenges related to this undertaking. 
2.3 The Contingent Valuation Method in practise 
As highlighted in section 2.1.3, contingent valuation is a suitable method for the appraisal of 
prospective environmental projects that are likely to generate both use and non-use values. The 
present section introduces this environmental valuation method in more detail. The first part fo-
cuses on the administration of CVM studies. Issues related to the questionnaire design and the 
implementation of CVM surveys will be addressed. In the second part, criteria for the validity 
and reliability of CVM welfare measures shall be introduced. As a survey-based method, CVM 
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is prone to a huge number of errors. The most prominent sources of error and bias, and ways to 
reduce them will be discussed. 
2.3.1 Questionnaire design and survey administration 
As shown in section 2.2.1, the compensating variation measures the utility increase a household 
would experience due to enhanced environmental quality. The CV is commonly interpreted in 
terms of the household’s maximum willingness to pay to obtain better environmental quality. 
Hence, a CVM practitioner’s objective is to assess people’s maximum WTP for an environmen-
tal good as precisely as possible. This is typically done by directly asking survey participants 
about the value they place on a specified environmental project. This payment question, or, in 
more technical terms, value elicitation question is the central element of an extensive CVM in-
terview conducted based on a standardised questionnaire. Besides the payment question CVM 
questionnaires contain several information components as well as auxiliary questions to gather 
information that a researcher can use for the analysis of the WTP statements. A CVM question-
naire usually consists of the following parts (cf. Carson and Hanemann, 2005: 898): 
 
(1) an introduction briefly presenting the purpose of the survey and some warm-up ques-
tions to assess a respondent’s background knowledge about the environmental good in 
question 
(2) a comprehensive description of the environmental good and the public project or policy 
which would lead to an increased provision or efficient protection of the environmental 
good (the project scenario) 
(3) an explanation of the hypothetical market for the environmental good, including a 
payment vehicle, payment rule and the implementation rule (the payment scenario) 
(4) the value elicitation question 
(5) debriefing questions to gain insights into the respondent’s motivation for giving a par-
ticular answer to the value elicitation question  
(6) follow-up questions concerning respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics as well as attitudinal questions  
 
Even though there are no ‘golden rules’ for designing a CVM study, the recommendations of the 
NOAA panel (Arrow and Solow, 1993) still serve as a key reference. The NOAA panel was con-
stituted three years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989, to 
evaluate the reliability of CVM surveys. This reliability assessment built a response to Haus-
man’s (1993) severe criticism of the damage assessment study conducted by Carson et al. 
(1992). The latter study made use of the CVM to estimate the environmental damage caused by 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. It was the first time that a stated preference technique was used to 
determine the fine that the oil industry had to pay as compensation for the pollution of Alaska’s 
coast and for having killed thousands of animals. Despite the complaints of the oil industry and 
sceptical economists, the NOAA panel, headed the two Nobel winners Kenneth Arrow and Rob-
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ert Solow, concluded that the CVM was a reliable environmental valuation technique. Further-
more, they published a number of guidelines regarding the design of CVM surveys. In addition 
to the NOAA report, Carson and Hanemann’s (2005) contribution in the Handbook of Environ-
mental Economics as well as Bateman et al.’s (2002) manual on stated preference techniques are 
primary references for the design of contingent valuation studies. 
Design of the informative components and the hypothetical market 
A careful design of part (2) of the questionnaire, which explains the environmental improvement 
to be valued to the survey participant, is of particular importance. This is because in many cases, 
CVM surveys deal with prospective environmental projects. Hence, the participants of a CVM 
interview might have never heard about the environmental good in question and, accordingly, 
have never thought about how much an increase in the provision or the protection of the same 
good would be worth to them. Thus, respondents have to undertake a quite challenging task 
when participating in the survey. Theoretically, they have to think about the utility increase they 
would experience subsequent to the realisation of a particular environmental project and translate 
this utility increase into monetary units. It is therefore extremely important that a CVM ques-
tionnaire contains an exact and detailed description of the expected environmental benefit. CVM 
practitioners often use pictures, maps and graphs to substantiate the written information. At the 
same time, the analyst has to make sure that respondents do not get bored during the survey be-
cause of too much or too complex information (cf. Carson and Hanemann, 2005). 
 Setting up a hypothetical market (part (3) of the questionnaire) in which the environmental 
good is traded lies in the heart of any CVM study. One central issue is the choice of a suitable 
payment vehicle, i.e. the means by which people hypothetically pay for the prospective provi-
sion of the environmental good. Researchers have the choice between taxes, fees, voluntary con-
tributions and other kinds of payment vehicles. The payment vehicle should be both credible and 
accepted by the respondents (ibid.). Many studies employ tax payments as payment vehicles, 
especially when the environmental project in question requires long-term funding. However, 
announcing a tax increase can lead to a rejection of the valuation exercise due to many people’s 
general opposition to increasing taxes. In view of this issue mandatory contributions to funds or 
the introduction of a particular fee are often more suitable payment vehicles than taxes. In addi-
tion to explaining how people would make their monetary contribution to the environmental pro-
ject, the questionnaire should also provide information on the magnitude of the final payment, 
the frequency of payment and the institution responsible for collecting and managing the money 
(the so-called payment rule). Both issues critically depend on the environmental project in ques-
tion and also on institutional settings in the country where the survey is conducted. The last ele-
ment of the payment scenario is the implementation rule that includes information about how 
the survey results will be used by decision makers when determining whether the project should 
be implemented or not. The NOAA panel recommended to frame the value elicitation question 
as a referendum. This guideline also prescribes a particular implementation rule, namely that the 
environmental project will be implemented only if at least 50% of respondents agree to contrib-
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ute a specified amount of money. Alternatively, if the value elicitation question is not a majority-
vote-like referendum question, respondents should be informed under what circumstances the 
project will be realised. Hence, a properly designed implementation rule gives the participants of 
a CVM survey the impression that the survey outcome matters for government representatives’ 
decision regarding the implementation of the environmental project in question. The latter aspect 
is of great importance since it decreases the likelihood that respondents make meaningless WTP 
statements (see Freeman et al., 2014: 403). 
Design of the payment question 
The design of part four of the questionnaire involves the choice of an elicitation format, i.e. the 
way of formulating the payment question and the associated answer options. Different kinds of 
elicitation questions and response formats have been developed, applied, refined and sometimes 
abandoned over the many years of CVM research. The oldest of all formats is the bidding game 
introduced by Randall et al. (1974). Bidding games imitate auctions by asking the respondent 
whether he or she would pay a particular price for the environmental good of concern; if the an-
swer is ‘yes’, the bid is increased until the respondent rejects to pay the proposed amount of 
money. The highest bid the respondent tolerates to pay is interpreted as his or her maximum will-
ingness to pay. If the initial answer is ‘no’, the iteration proceeds downwards until the respond-
ent gives a positive response. A major problem inherent to this elicitation format is that the start-
ing bid tends to influence the value respondents assign to the good in question (c.f. Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989). Several studies showed that the WTP amounts are affected by the initial bid: the 
higher (lower) the initial bid is, the higher (lower) the maximum price respondents agree to pay. 
Due to this so-called starting point bias the bidding game is hardly used anymore. The primary 
elicitation formats that have persisted are the open-ended, payment card and dichotomous choice 
formats and their variants (c.f. Boyle, 2003). An overview of these three main elicitation formats 
is given in Table 2-1. 
 Open-ended elicitation questions directly ask respondents to state their maximum willingness 
to pay for an environmental improvement. However, answering such a question is an unfamiliar 
task for most respondents. Empirical evidence shows that many respondents have difficulty in 
dealing with open-ended questions and opt for not giving any response. As a consequence, the 
rates of item nonresponse (i.e. the number of missing answers to the payment question) in sur-
veys employing the open-ended format are often intolerably high (c.f. Venkatachalam, 2004). 
The payment card approach is less prone to this issue. It employs a range of money amounts or 
intervals listed on a card from which respondents pick the value that comes closest to their max-
imum WTP. Compared to the open-ended question, the payment card facilitates the valuation 
task significantly thereby decreasing the share of missing WTP statements. An unfortunate 
drawback of the payment card is that the range and the location of the money amounts displayed 
on the payment card may affect a respondent’s answer (c.f. Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The 
third elicitation format simplifies the respondent’s valuation task even further. Dichotomous 
choice (DC) questions ask survey participants whether they would give up a particular amount of 
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money in order to obtain a particular environmental improvement or not. These questions are 
typically framed as a referendum, asking the respondents whether they would vote in favour of 
an environmental project although it would imply higher public charges to them. For this reason, 
the terms ‘referendum format’ or ‘take-it-or-leave-it approach’ are often used a synonyms for the 
DC format. 
Table 2-1: Overview of value elicitation formats  
(adapted and modified from Boyle (2003): 137) 
 Open-ended Payment card Dichotomous Choice 
Method introduced by Hammack and Brown 
(1974) 
Mitchell and Carson 
(1981) 
Bishop and Heberlein 
(1979) 
Short description Respondents are asked 
how much they would pay 
for the environmental 
good 
Respondents are asked to 
indicate their WTP for the 
environmental good on a 
card containing a series of 
alternative payment 
amounts 
Respondents are asked 
whether they would pay a 
certain, predefined 
amount in order to obtain 
the environmental good  
Exemplary elicitation 
question 
‘How much would you 
pay?’ 
‘What is the highest 
amount you would pay?’ 
‘Would you pay €___?’ 
Variants  Two step WTP-question 
(e.g. Meyerhoff and 
Liebe, 2006) (‘Would you 
pay something?’; ‘If yes, 
please indicate the amount 
you would pay’) 
Multi-bounded dichoto-
mous choice (Carson et 
al., 1986) 
Trichotomous choice 
(Loomis et al., 1999) 
  
In difference to open-ended and payment card questions, the DC format brings to mind real life 
situations. Answering a DC question resembles the everyday task of deciding whether or not 
paying a specified price for a desired good. Voting in favour or against a policy proposal is also a 
task that most people living in a participative democracy are familiar with. Due to the compara-
tively easy decision task, response rates to DC questions are generally higher than for open-
ended or payment card formats (cf. Bateman et al., 2002). Furthermore, based on experience, the 
DC format normally speeds up the interview process because fewer respondents challenge the 
interviewer to explain the valuation task again and because they need less time to think about 
their answer as compared to open-ended or payment card questions. The main disadvantage of 
the DC format is that maximum WTP cannot be directly inferred from a respondent’s response. 
The information gained from a ‘yes’ response is that the respondent’s WTP must be equal or 
higher than the specified amount; in case of a negative response the specified amount can be 
interpreted as an upper bound of a respondent’s maximum WTP (cf. Freeman et al., 2014). 
Hence, confronting all respondents with an identical question regarding one particular price to be 
paid in exchange for an environmental improvement would be little informative. In order to de-
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rive a sound measure for WTP, respondents are randomly assigned to different money amounts 
from a set of predetermined bids. Based on the answers of all survey respondents, a so-called bid 
function can be estimated. The bid function relates the likelihood of agreeing with the DC ques-
tion to the different payment amounts employed in the survey. In other words, the bid function 
ideally shows how the likelihood of ‘buying’ the environmental good decreases when its ‘price’ 
increases. The sample’s average WTP can be estimated based on these functions using econo-
metric techniques. Section 6.3.2 gives an overview of the corresponding econometric framework. 
 In the original variant of DC, introduced by Bishop and Heberlein (1979) and Bishop et al. 
(1983), respondents have to make their decision of supporting or not supporting a particular pub-
lic project after having been confronted by one single bid. Therefore, this kind of elicitation for-
mat is also known as single-bounded DC. Variants of the DC format, so-called multi-bounded 
DC models, use follow-up questions where respondents are randomly assigned to a lower bid in 
case of a negative answer to the initial question or a higher bid in case of a positive answer. Such 
a follow-up question can be asked once (double-bounded DC) or several times. Multi-bounded 
DC was developed to overcome ‘the inefficient nature of the standard take-it-or-leave-it offer’ 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 103), by increasing the information that can be gained from a sam-
ple. For example, if a respondent’s true maximum WTP is €6 and the randomly assigned bid is 
€10, he or she will reject €10 in a first step but accept €5 in a second. In the case of a single-
bounded DC question the researcher knows that the true value lies between €0 and €10, while the 
double-bounded DC format suggests that it lies between €5 and €10. Hence, the information 
gained from the double-bounded DC format is more precise so that smaller samples and weaker 
statistical assumptions are required than for single-bounded data (cf. Bateman et al., 2002). Be-
sides these advantages, it has been found that, similar to bidding games, respondents tend to an-
chor their response to the follow-up valuation question on the initial bid (c.f. DeShazo, 2002). 
Furthermore, the credibility of a CVM survey is likely to be reduced when an interviewer starts 
‘bargaining’ with the respondent by offering him or her higher or lower prices of the environ-
mental good. Hence, the advantage of being statistically more efficient than standard DC seems 
to be outperformed by several disadvantages of the multi-bounded DC format. 
 Loomis et al. (1999) proposed another variant of the referendum format, namely the so-called 
trichotomous choice format. As can be inferred from its name, a third answer option is added to 
the standard yes-no format. This third option gives respondents the possibility to let the research-
er know that they would vote in favour for the project if it implied lower costs to them than the 
assigned bid suggests (c.f. Loomis et al., 1999). An example of the wording of this third option 
is, ‘No, but if the amount was lower, I would support the project’. The idea of adding such an 
option to the response format results from the concern that many respondents tend to give social-
ly desirable or politically correct answers when asked a standard referendum question. Hence, 
these respondents are likely to answer ‘yes’ even if the assigned bid exceeds their true WTP. The 
inclusion of a third answer option potentially helps to reduce the share of such untruthful ‘yes’ 
responses. 
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 In addition to the choice of the elicitation format, the selection of bids, the so-called bid de-
sign, is critically when payment cards, DC or one of its variants are used in a CVM survey. This 
is because the number and range of bids can affect the estimated variance and hence the reliabil-
ity of WTP measures (c.f. Kanninen, 1995). When using a payment card a researcher has to 
make sure that the range of payment intervals displayed on the payment card covers the range of 
true WTP amounts. In particular, the maximum bid, which should be chosen only by an insignif-
icantly low number of respondents, has to be identified during pretests. Due to its statistical 
properties, the bid design requires even more pretesting in the case of DC questions. Cooper 
(1993), Kanninen (1993) and Alberini (1995) developed different theoretical criteria to increase 
the statistical efficiency of DC models. However, the underlying assumption of all optimal bid 
design methods is that the distribution of WTP is known prior to the execution of a CVM survey. 
Since this is virtually never the case, these methods cannot be applied in practice. Therefore, the 
choice of bids is usually based on rule-of-thumbs such as Kanninen’s (1995: 123) recommenda-
tion ‘to keep bids within the 15th to 85th percentiles’ for a single-bounded DC format. The lowest 
bid, which should be accepted by 85% of the survey respondents, and the highest bid ideally 
rejected by 85% of the respondents, have to be identified during the preparation phase of the 
survey. Hence, in most practical applications, the final set and range of bids is the result of an, in 
many cases time-intensive, trial and error process. 
 Besides a careful selection of bids, increasing the sample size usually decreases bias and vari-
ance of WTP derived from DC-data (c.f. Kanninen, 1995). The need for relatively large sample 
sizes is, however, one of the main disadvantages of the single-bounded DC format. The NOAA 
Panel recommended using at least 1,000 valid observations, which is considerably more than the 
minimum number of observations necessary to reliably estimate WTP based on open-ended or 
payment card data. Furthermore, due to the comparatively complex bid design, a great number of 
pretest interviews are usually needed in the case DC-surveys. Both aspects increase the costs of a 
CVM survey. 
 Despite these issues, the choice of the elicitation format has also consequences for a research-
er’s possibilities to identify and treat meaningless value statements when analysing CVM data. 
For example, analysing the validity of zero WTP statements (so-called zero bids) is not possible 
when a standard DC format has been used because binary choice data only indicates whether a 
respondents’ WTP is higher or lower than the assigned bid. In contrast to that, respondents can 
unambiguously indicate that they are not willing to pay anything for a particular environmental 
good when presented an open-ended question or a payment card. Likewise, the trichotomous 
choice format is suitable for such an analysis because researchers can include a particular answer 
option that allows accounting for zero WTP (e.g. ‘No, I don’t want to pay anything for this pro-
ject’). Taking the role of money attitudes in CVM surveys as an example, assessing WTP by 
means of the prominent single-bounded DC format limits a researcher’s reporting and analysis 
options substantially. This is because the presumably meaningless zero WTP statements of mi-
sers would be hidden behind the ‘no’-option, which is supposed to cover the preferences of all 
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those having a WTP that is lower than the assigned bid. For this reason, only open-ended, pay-
ment card and TC questions offer the possibility for exploring the consequences of having ex-
tremely stingy respondents in one’s sample. 
 Finally, the question arises whether assessing WTP by means of a referendum question is 
worth its comparatively high costs. Put differently, does DC yield more accurate value estimates 
than alternative elicitation formats? Many comparison studies showed that DC-based WTP esti-
mates are higher than WTP estimates derived from open-ended or payment card data (c.f. Boyle, 
2003). The reasons for such differences are relatively well understood and will be discussed in 
section 2.3.2 (see ‘elicitation effects’). It is, however, still an open question which elicitation 
format provides the most accurate WTP data. As already mentioned, Arrow and Solow (1993) 
recommended the use of DC questions for practical CVM studies. Until today, DC and its vari-
ants is the most frequently applied elicitation format, but it is not absolutely clear that DC is in-
deed superior in its capacity of providing coherent value estimates as compared to alternative 
elicitation formats. In the end, the choice of the elicitation format depends on many study-
specific factors such as the population to be surveyed, the survey mode, a researcher’s methodo-
logical interests and, of course, the available budget. 
Interpretation of WTP statements 
As explained in section 2.2.1, economists interpret individual WTP statements in terms of the 
Hicksian compensating variation. Just as the CV, an individual’s value statement is supposed to 
be monotonically related to the utility change that would accrue to the individual if the environ-
mental project in question was realised. Therefore, a positive WTP statement is generally inter-
preted in terms of a utility increase. In other words, respondents with a non-zero WTP would be 
better-off if the environmental project was implemented, according to the standard interpretation. 
By contrast, respondents who are not willing to sacrifice a single cent would experience no utili-
ty gain. Furthermore, analysts do not only focus on a respondent’s general willingness to give up 
some money in exchange for an environmental improvement but also interpret the amount of 
money a person would sacrifice. The higher the amount of money a respondent tolerates to con-
tribute to a particular environmental project is, the higher the utility increase he or she expects to 
experience if this project was implemented. Table 2-2 summarises the assumed relationship be-
tween WTP and a person’s wellbeing. 
 Analysing group-specific WTP statements, for example the average WTP of men, of elderly 
people or of graduates turns out to be helpful for the prediction of the distributional effects of an 
environmental project. Comparing the scope of WTP across socio-demographic groups enables a 
researcher to identify the losers and the winners of an environmental project. However, there are 
a number of reasons that call the standard interpretation of WTP statements assessed in a CVM 
survey into question. Under certain circumstances, the monotonic relationship between an indi-
vidual’s utility and WTP may be distorted. In the environmental valuation literature, WTP state-
ments which do not or not adequately relate to the actual utility increase a respondent would ex-
perience if the environmental project to be valued was realised, are termed biased WTP state-
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ments. Probably the most popular example of biased WTP statements are the answers of re-
spondents who perceive the payment question as purely hypothetical and therefore state an im-
plausibly high WTP (see ‘hypothetical bias’ in section 2.3.2). Another hitherto overlooked 
source of bias is the presence of misers in the CVM sample. People who hate spending money on 
anything in any situation most likely also refuse to contribute money to any environmental pro-
ject, irrespective of the kind and scope of environmental improvement caused by the associated 
measures. If misers behave the same way on hypothetical markets as on actual markets, they will 
always state a zero WTP. Such WTP statements can be judged as truthful because they corre-
spond to misers’ actual WTP, like the amount of money a miser would spend in a simulated 
market experiment. However, they are meaningless in the sense that they do not refer to the utili-
ty increase misers would experience due to enhanced environmental conditions.  
 Biased WTP statements pose problems because they threaten the validity of the overall value 
estimate derived from a CVM survey. If a significant share of respondents has stated a WTP 
which is essentially unrelated to the value they attach to the environmental project, the sample’s 
average WTP will be biased as well. Furthermore, if the overall social value of the environmen-
tal project in question is based on such a biased figure and used as an input for a cost-benefit 
analysis, the outcome of this cost-benefit study might be misleading. Accordingly, the share of 
biased WTP statements in a CVM survey must be minimised. Different kinds of biases, their 
sources and strategies to minimise biased WTP statements in a CVM survey are discussed in the 
environmental valuation literature (cf. section 2.3.2). Some of these biases, for example protest 
against some aspects of the payment scenario, can be minimised through a careful survey prepa-
ration. Other kinds of biases, for example miserliness, will always occur and should be tackled 
subsequent to the data collection. Since it is unavoidable that stingy people are interviewed in a 
representative CVM survey, the only strategy for minimising the bias of the survey results con-
sists of identifying these problematic respondents ex-post so that their WTP statements can be 
discarded from the data if necessary. For this purpose, the inclusion of well-formulated and care-
fully tested auxiliary questions is of particular importance. 
Table 2-2: Interpretation of WTP statements  
WTP Utility change (∆𝑼𝒉𝟎𝟎) Interpretation 
zero 𝑈ℎ1 = 𝑈ℎ0 The individual would not be better off if the environmental 
project was realised. 
low 𝑈ℎ1 > 𝑈ℎ0 The individual would be somewhat better off if the envi-
ronmental project was realised. 
high 𝑈ℎ1 > 𝑈ℎ0 The individual would be substantially better off if the envi-
ronmental project was realised. 
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Inclusion of auxiliary questions 
For the analysis of WTP statements, especially in view of validity checks and data cleansing, 
comprehensive data is needed. Therefore, CVM practitioners collect socio-demographic infor-
mation (respondents’ gender, age, income, etc.) as well as other data that is likely to explain a 
respondent’s motivation to give a certain answer to the payment question. A set of debriefing 
questions is usually asked directly after the elicitation question. Answers to these questions can 
then be used to verify the plausibility of individual WTP statements. There are two kinds of de-
briefing questions, namely those to explain why respondents are willing or unwilling to pay for 
the environmental project of concern and those to scrutinise respondents’ impressions of the pro-
ject scenario (c.f. Bateman et al., 2002). The first set of questions help to assess whether a re-
spondent’s answer is affected by certain characteristics of the hypothetical market. As will be 
discussed in section 2.3.2, WTP statements which reflect, for example, a respondent’s negative 
attitude towards the elicitation question or the payment vehicle reduce the validity of the overall 
value estimate derived from a CVM survey (see ‘protest bids’ in section 2.3.2). The second type 
of debriefing questions helps to find out whether respondents have perceived the project scenario 
as meaningful and credible. Answers to these questions are particularly useful to check whether 
respondents have overlooked their budget constraint and/or behaved strategically when making a 
value statement (see ‘hypothetical bias’ and ‘strategic behaviour’ in section 2.3.2). 
 Furthermore, the interests of the researcher essentially determine the contents of the last part 
of the questionnaire. In addition to collecting socio-demographic information and asking debrief-
ing questions, it has become common practice to integrate psychological instruments into CVM 
questionnaires. Psychometric inventories make psychological variables such as particular atti-
tudes or personality traits measurable. For instance, several CVM studies (e.g. Spash, 2006, Ojea 
and Loureiro, 2007, Meyerhoff, 2006) addressed the question whether general attitudes and ethi-
cal beliefs towards environmental preservation affect WTP estimates by integrating the ‘New 
Environmental Paradigm Scale’ (Dunlap et al., 2000, Dunlap and Van Liere, 2008) or similar 
question inventories developed by Paul Stern and colleagues (Stern et al., 1993, Stern et al., 
1995, Stern, 2000) into their surveys. Moreover, Frör (2008) used techniques borrowed from 
cognitive psychology to detect different types of information processing modes and to analyse 
how these information processing modes affect respondents’ answers to the payment question. In 
a recent paper, Börger (2013) used an inventory to measure respondents’ tendency to give social-
ly desirable answers and showed how this variable affects the results of a CVM survey. In the 
present study a money attitude scale will be integrated into an exemplary CVM questionnaire in 
order to measure respondents’ attitudes towards spending money in general. This inventory of-
fers the possibility to construct a variable that indicates different levels of miserliness. As ex-
plained before, assessing the relationship between attitudes towards spending money and WTP 
as well as scrutinising the WTP statements of extremely stingy respondents may alter a research-
er’s understanding of the key determinants of WTP statements. Focussing on this hitherto over-
looked psychological variable may also enhance the validity of CVM surveys. 
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 Unfortunately, the identification of one single psychological construct often involves an ex-
tensive number of questions. In many cases, these attitudinal questions are somewhat complex so 
that respondents generally need some time to think about their responses. On the one hand, ac-
counting for psychological variables certainly contributes to a better understanding of the factors 
determining individual WTP statements. On the other hand, this undertaking may overwhelm 
some participants of a CVM survey. Hence, taking account of potentially relevant individual 
difference variables while not overburdening a respondent with apparently unrelated questions is 
another issue that needs to be carefully considered when designing and testing a CVM question-
naire. 
Survey modes and sampling 
Apart from carefully designing the CVM questionnaire, researchers have to decide on more 
technical issues such as the survey mode, the sampling method and the sample size. As in the 
case of other survey-related issues, CVM practitioners have to make trade-offs between the cost 
and the quality of the survey and adapt to the institutional and cultural context of the survey site. 
A first challenge consists of finding a suitable survey mode. CVM data can be gathered through 
personal interviews, telephone, mail or web-based surveys. Due to the recruitment, training and 
payment of interviewers, personal interviews are the most costly of all survey administration 
modes. Still, personal interviews are preferable to telephone, mail or internet surveys for several 
reasons. They have advantages over alternative survey modes in view of the representativeness 
of the sample (see Bateman et al., 2002: 103). The selection of respondents is ideally based on a 
random selection of households from registration lists. If interviews are conducted at a reasona-
ble time of the day, for example in the evening when most people are at home, each individual of 
a population has the same probability to be interviewed. Mail, telephone and internet surveys, in 
contrast, systematically exclude certain groups of the population, namely those who have no tel-
ephone, no internet connection and those who are illiterate. While the latter point might not be 
seen as a problem when conducting a CVM survey in industrialised countries, it should be con-
sidered in developing countries or in study sites where a considerably large part of the population 
or certain groups within the population have received little education. A related issue is the re-
sponse rate, which is generally higher in personal interviews than in self-administered or tele-
phone interviews (see Bateman et al., 2002: 102). A low response rate can affect representative-
ness of the sample, for instance when particular groups of the population such as the working 
population or people with lower levels of education, are less likely to participate in the survey 
than others. Moreover, researchers have a higher degree of control over the survey process in 
personal interviews than in mail or internet surveys. With the presence of an interviewer it can be 
ensured that respondents do not leave out any sections of the questionnaire thereby reducing item 
nonresponse (ibid.). Moreover, the interviewer can take notes concerning the respondent’s moti-
vation and reaction to certain questions. It can also be expected that respondents are more atten-
tive and willing to participate in a time-intensive survey when interviewed personally. CVM 
questionnaires often contain long text passages and complex questions so that it is hardly possi-
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ble to conduct the survey on the phone. The presentation of visual material such as maps, graphs 
and pictures makes the valuation task easier but also excludes telephone surveys from the admin-
istration modes at choice. Based on experience, personal interviews have several advantages 
over alternative surveys modes but certain weak points should also be kept in mind. Besides be-
ing more costly than other survey modes, the major drawback of personal interviews is the so-
called interviewer bias. The answer to the payment question, in particular, might be influenced 
by the presence of an interviewer. This would be for instance the case when a respondent wants 
to please the interviewer by giving political correct responses or, on the contrary, wants to make 
the interviewer angry by giving crude responses (see Stephan and Ahlheim, 1996: 67). As high-
lighted by Bateman et al. (2002), the interviewer bias can be partly corrected by rigorously train-
ing the interviewers prior to the survey.  
 Regarding the sampling technique, it is clear that a randomly selected household sample is 
preferable whenever the results of a CVM study shall be generalised and used as an input for 
practical cost-benefit assessment. Drawing inference from a sample to the general population 
requires that the chance of being included in the sample is the same for each member of the pop-
ulation in question (see Carson and Hanemann, 2005: 903). However, random sampling is only 
feasible when a complete sampling frame of the population under consideration exists and is 
available for the researcher. If this is not the case, alternative sampling techniques such as ran-
dom walks or quota sampling need to be applied. In the case of random walks interviews have to 
be conducted at people’s apartments; quota-based intercept surveys allow for a more flexible 
selection of interview spots. On the one hand, a respondent’s apartment is a very suitable loca-
tion for conducting a CVM interview because respondents interviewed at home may be more 
likely to concentrate and to focus on the questions than those interviewed in public, potentially 
busy and noisy places. On the other hand, the conduct of household interviews can be extremely 
difficult when people are hesitant to open their doors to strangers or when the interviewers have 
no access to people’s homes. For example, if it is likely that most interviewers will be stopped by 
security guards when trying to enter an apartment building, the conduct of household interviews 
is little promising. In some cases, intercept interviews are a more efficient way to collect CVM 
data. 
 The required sample size is immediately related to the sampling technique and the elicitation 
format used to assess WTP. A way of ensuring representativeness of small samples consists of 
selecting respondents along certain predefined criteria, such as gender and age (quota sampling). 
Representative probability samples, in contrast to this, require bigger sample sizes. Furthermore, 
due to the statistical properties of dichotomous choice models, surveys using this format require 
higher numbers of observations (at least 1,000) than those using open-ended or payment card 
formats. 
2.3.2 Validity and reliability of stated WTP 
As highlighted before, assessing environmental values by means of surveys is prone to a lot of 
criticism. This criticism mainly circles around aspects concerning the validity and reliability of 
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value estimates, i.e. the WTP figures, assessed in stated preference surveys. Validity refers to the 
question whether an environmental valuation method actually measures the theoretical construct 
of interest which is the true economic value of an environmental project (see Venkatachalam, 
2004: 90). Reliability refers to the consistency of an estimate in general and to the question 
whether the estimate for a particular environmental good can be reproduced in particular (ibid: 
91). Since the earliest applications researchers have pointed to a number of errors and biases 
affecting the validity and reliability of contingent valuation estimates. The present section is de-
voted to the criteria for determining the quality of environmental value estimates and the discus-
sion of potential errors and biases in CVM surveys. 
Judging the quality of CVM data 
In his extensively cited overview article on contingent valuation Venkatachalam (2004) suggest-
ed two possibilities for testing the reliability of a CVM value estimate. The first option is to 
compare the result of a CVM survey to values obtained from alternative environmental valuation 
methods (TCM, hedonic pricing, etc.). Alternatively, researchers may repeat the same survey 
several times and compare the results obtained from the different datasets (test-retest method). 
Ideally, the value estimates for a particular environmental good derived from different method-
ologies or survey waves are approximately the same. Carson et al. (1996) conducted a meta-
analysis and compared CVM value estimates for a number of quasi-public goods to revealed 
preference-based values for the same goods. The authors found that CVM values were not statis-
tically different from those derived from revealed preference techniques and concluded that 
CVM estimates are reliable. The meaningfulness of comparing stated preference method esti-
mates with revealed method estimates is, however, to be questioned. Discrepancy between meth-
od-specific values may result from the methodological weakness of stated preference techniques 
but also from a lack of validity of revealed preference techniques (c.f. Freeman et al., 2014). 
Hence, the test-retest method represents a more accurate reliability test. Most of the published 
studies which used the test-retest procedure argued for the reliability of WTP estimates (c.f. 
Venkatachalam, 2004). 
 Reliability tests are relatively easy to conduct and can be used to show that CVM value esti-
mates are ‘reproducible’. However, reliability assessment gives no insight into the question 
whether the number assessed in a CVM survey represents the ‘true’ value of an environmental 
good, i.e. whether the value is unbiased and thus valid. Validity assessment of CVM measures 
is complicated by the fact that the true economic value of most environmental goods is unknown. 
Hence, the standard procedure of comparing the stated preference measure with an objective 
measure, like a good’s market price, is usually not feasible. For this reason, the validity of stated 
WTP needs to be investigated through less direct approaches. One possibility consists of com-
paring the stated value assessed in a CVM survey with the value observed in a simulated market 
study. Alternatively, validity can be assessed by asking whether the results are consistent with 
economic theory and whether the study was conducted in accordance with the general guidelines 
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of best practise (c.f. Freeman et al., 2014). These approaches focus on different types of validity 
which shall be introduced briefly now. 
 Criterion validity testing involves the comparison of a CVM value estimate to an alternative 
measure which is chosen as a criterion. Since the most frequently used criterion, market price, is 
unknown in the case of most environmental goods, researchers have turned to experimental 
methods where environmental goods are traded on simulated markets and participants make ac-
tual transactions (c.f. Freeman et al., 2014: 400-401). WTP assessed in the laboratory often 
serves as the criterion and is compared to hypothetical responses to WTP questions. In addition 
to that, some researchers investigated the validity of CVM values by means of comparative field 
experiments. Most of them made use of two independent samples, where respondents of one 
sample were asked to state their WTP for a particular good while the respondents of the other 
sample were asked to actually make a payment for the same good, for instance in the form of a 
donation (cf. e.g. Foster et al., 1997, Brown et al., 1996, Vossler and Evans, 2009). The results of 
criterion validity studies demonstrate that hypothetical payments are persistently higher than 
actual payments indicating an upward bias of CVM value estimates (see Freeman et al., 2014: 
401). A lack of criterion invalidity, which is often referred to as the ‘hypothetical bias’ in CVM 
surveys, is one of the main arguments against the use of stated preference methods for the esti-
mation of environmental values. 
 Another type of validity which has caused lots of debates concerning the methodological 
soundness of CVM is construct validity. Construct validity is fulfilled if the results of a CVM 
study are consistent with the underlying principles of economic theory (see Venkatachalam, 
2004: 91). Hence, WTP should be predicted by the variables that economic theory suggests be-
ing related to WTP and unaffected by variables that are irrelevant from the theoretical point of 
view. Perhaps the most essential relationship that can be deducted from economic theory is that 
the demand for a good should be responsive to its price. Accordingly, the probability of agreeing 
with a CVM referendum question should fall as bid levels rise. Checking for construct validity 
has become a standard element in empirical CVM studies. It involves the employment of econ-
ometric models where the WTP variable is regressed against a number of explanatory variables 
such as the price of the environmental good (i.e. the bid level in DC-based studies) and respond-
ents’ income. Other characteristics of the respondents, like their education, age, employment 
status, environmental attitudes, etc. are typically also considered. Once again, several studies 
provided rather puzzling results which have been cited as evidence for construct invalidity of 
CVM-based value estimates. For example, WTP has been often found to be unrelated to re-
spondents’ income. From a theoretical point of view, the absence of a positive income effect 
does not challenge the validity of the welfare measure (cf. Ahlheim, 1998a, Flores and Carson, 
1997 who demonstrate that the compensating variation does not refer to an individual’s actual 
income). Nevertheless, the fact that the magnitude of WTP often does not increase with income 
reveals that respondents tend to overlook their budget constraint when answering hypothetical 
WTP questions and exaggerate their actual WTP. 
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 In addition to income effects, sensitivity to scope is an indicator for construct validity. In line 
with economic theory, an increase in the quantity or quality of the environmental good of con-
cern should result in higher value estimates. Construct validity is therefore often assessed by 
means of a so-called scope test, a technique that consists of comparing respondents’ WTP for 
different quantities of the environmental good or different numbers of protection measures en-
compassed by the environmental project in question. A CVM study passes the scope test only if 
WTP increases with quantity. Prominent examples of CVM studies that applied scope-tests are 
those by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and Desvousges et al. (1993). These authors found that 
WTP estimates were insensitive to variations of the environmental good and concluded that 
CVM lacks criterion validity.  
 Finally, content validity has to be added to the list of criteria used to judge the quality of a 
CVM survey. Content validity refers to the question whether the CVM survey has been conduct-
ed conforming to the general guidelines of best practice (see Freeman et al., 2014: 408). The 
assessment of criterion validity involves an examination of the survey instrument, especially the 
design of the project and payment scenario as well as the elicitation question. Furthermore, pro-
cedural matters such as the sampling method, the sample size and issues related to the analysis of 
data need to be investigated (ibid). However, questions regarding the best practise for designing 
and implementing a CVM survey are not always simply to answer. As shown in section 2.3.1, 
there are multiple options concerning the questionnaire design, the interview and the sampling 
method. In spite of its advanced age, the guidelines formulated by the NOAA panel (Arrow and 
Solow, 1993) continue to be one of the most influential references. In the previous section sever-
al elements of the NOAA guidelines for the conduct of CVM surveys have already been men-
tioned. For example, the panel put emphasis on the use of probability sampling, personal inter-
views and highlighted the importance of pretesting the scenarios and visual material as well as of 
using debriefing questions concerning a respondent’s reasons of answering the value elicitation 
question in the way he or she did. While most studies (according to what is reported in publica-
tions) are conducted in line with the latter standards of best practise, there is a lot of discussion 
concerning some other issues related to the survey design. For example, different opinions about 
the choice of the payment vehicle and the elicitation format exist. The NOAA panel approved 
the use of referendum questions on tax increases but designing the payment scenario in that way 
is not always recommendable. As already mentioned, tax increases may cause strong objections 
of the respondents, especially when citizens have high levels of distrust towards their govern-
ment. Furthermore, the employment of referendum questions may complicate rather than simpli-
fy the value elicitation process when the survey population is not used to democratically voting 
on policy issues (cf. Whittington, 2002). Venkatachalam (2004) recommended that practitioners 
should be selective in using CVM guidelines, especially when conducting a survey in developing 
countries and in study sites where socioeconomic and institutional aspects are very different 
from western countries, where the NOAA guidelines and other manuals have their origins. 
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 Regarding the four quality criteria, criterion invalidity and construct invalidity appear to be of 
most concern in the case of CVM studies. Lacks of accuracy in terms of gaps between actual 
payments and hypothetical value statements as well as counterintuitive findings concerning the 
covariance of WTP measures and economic variables put into question the usefulness of CVM 
as a tool for putting monetary values on environmental goods. Implausible results of CVM stud-
ies are attributable to errors related to the survey design, the survey implementation, mistakes 
when analysing the gathered data as well as to biased value statements. 
Biases and errors in CVM surveys 
The lists of biases and errors in CVM surveys that a reader finds in environmental valuation 
manuals are impressively long. Bateman et al. (2002), for example, provide details on 22 poten-
tial biases in CVM studies. It is out of the scope of the present work to address all of them. In the 
following paragraphs, only the most frequently discussed biases as well as some issues which 
have attracted the interest of only a few researchers but which are considered as relevant for the 
topic investigated in this dissertation will be reviewed briefly. The occurrence of biased WTP 
statements and other undesirable response patterns can be, to at least some extent, reduced by a 
careful preparation of a CVM survey. However, even the most diligent practitioner should keep 
in mind the potential biases and response abnormalities when analysing CVM survey data. For 
this reason, some possibilities to enhance the validity of value estimates ex ante to collecting the 
data as well as ways how to identify misleading WTP values when analysing the gathered data 
will be addressed in the following paragraphs. 
 A frequently discussed issue is the so-called embedding effect. The environmental good to be 
valued by the participants of a CVM survey is usually part of a more inclusive good. For exam-
ple, an ecosystem restoration project in a particular region is part of the environmental protection 
policy of a country. Embedding occurs when a respondent’s value statement refers to the more 
inclusive good (e.g. environmental protection) instead of the environmental good of concern 
(e.g. a particular environmental project). Consequences of this effect are that the results of CVM 
studies turn out to be insensitive to variations of the quantity of the environmental good in ques-
tion or that two value estimates are approximately equal although one refers to a more inclusive 
and the other to a less inclusive project (see Venkatachalam, 2004: 96). Embedding affects con-
struct validity because it violates the fundamental assumption that a rational consumer always 
prefers higher quantities to lower quantities of the same commodity (cf. Desvousges et al., 
1993). Hence, embedding is the bias which relates to scope insensitivity of WTP estimates, 
which is one of the indicators of construct invalidity described above. The prominent critics of 
the method (e.g. Hausman, 1993, Hausman, 2012) often used the latter phenomena as one of the 
main arguments against the employment of CVM for the valuation of environmental goods. At 
the same time, more optimistic researchers like Mitchell and Carson (1989) highlighted that the 
problem of embedding can be reduced by adequately designing the project scenario describing 
the prospective environmental change in question. According to them, it is important that re-
spondents understand that they should state their WTP for one particular good, like a particular 
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environmental project, and not for environmental protection in general. Apart from the question-
naire design, the survey mode can critically affect the occurrence of unreliable results. As 
stressed by Venkatachalam (2004), embedding is less likely to occur when respondents are con-
centrated during the interview and take their time to think about the information provided by the 
questionnaire. This highlights again the advantage of personal interviews conducted at an ade-
quate spot compared to typically shorter telephone interviews or self-administered surveys where 
the researcher cannot control whether a respondent attentively reads the provided information. 
 An alternative explanation for the absence of scope effects focuses on a phenomenon that 
Andreoni (1990) introduced as the ‘warm-glow of giving’. Andreoni (1990) theorised that peo-
ple who make charitable donations may receive utility from the act of giving itself and not, or 
not only, from altruistic feelings towards the recipients of their donations. In line with this idea a 
respondent’s stated WTP may encompass a warm-glow component in addition to the welfare 
component accruing from the consumption of the environmental good in question. While the 
latter component of WTP is expected to vary with the scope of an environmental improvement, 
the warm-glow component is likely to remain stable across environmental projects of different 
magnitude (c.f. Nunes and Schokkaert, 2003). If WTP refers mainly to some ‘purchase of moral 
satisfaction’ (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) and to a lower or even negligible extent to the utili-
ty a respondent expects to gain from the environmental improvement to be valued, it is no won-
der that WTP estimates are insensitive to the scope of this improvement. There have been de-
bates regarding whether or not the warm-glow effect biases the outcome of CVM surveys. While 
some economists (e.g. Hausman, 1993, Arrow and Solow, 1993) argue that WTP statements 
which are motivated by the warm-glow of giving do not reflect genuine economic preferences, 
the warm-glow is considered as a legitimate component of WTP by others (e.g.Nunes, 2002, 
Ahlheim and Schneider, 1996, Carson et al., 2001). 
 The types of biases considered next refer to a respondent’s tendency to (intentionally) misre-
port WTP, i.e. to exaggerate or to understate his or her actual WTP. The most prominent candi-
date in this group is the hypothetical bias which is defined as the potential divergence between 
stated and true WTP (see Venkatachalam, 2004: 110). This divergence is often explained by the 
hypothetical nature of the payment commitment in CVM surveys (c.f. Bateman et al., 2002). 
Critics argue that participants of CVM surveys do not properly observe their personal budget 
constraints and maintain that respondents fail to consider the stated amount in terms of forgone 
market consumption (c.f. Ahlheim, 1998a). As explained before, divergence between hypothet-
ical and actual WTP threatens the criterion validity of a CVM value estimate. A first possibility 
to ameliorate the truthfulness of answers to value elicitation questions is the so-called ‘cheap 
talk’ script. Within the interview respondents are explicitly warned of the hypothetical bias of 
stated preference surveys and are asked to think about the hypothetical market as if it was real 
(c.f. Freeman et al., 2014). Another increasingly prominent approach consists of introducing el-
ements of realism and consequentiality into the payment question. Carson and Groves (2007) 
highlighted the importance of asking payment questions which respondents perceive as realistic 
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and relevant for policy decisions. The likelihood that respondents make misleading WTP state-
ments is expected to decrease when telling them, for example, that the survey results will be used 
by decision makers and that the future provision of the environmental good depends on the sur-
vey results. Furthermore, the CVM questionnaire should transmit the message that actual pay-
ments will be collected if the environmental project is implemented. 
 However, tackling the hypothetical bias by means of a consequential survey design and by 
making respondents believe that there will be actual payments may worsen another form of un-
desired response behaviour, namely strategic behaviour. In a CVM survey, strategic behaviour 
can take two forms: free riding and overpledging (c.f. Venkatachalam, 2004). Free riding means 
that an individual understates his or her true WTP in the hope that others’ WTP is sufficient to 
ensure the provision of the environmental amenity. Overpledging occurs when the individual 
believes that a) the provision of the environmental good is more likely when he or she states a 
very high WTP, and b) that he or she will never have to pay the stated amount (ibid: 112). Of 
course, a rational individual has an incentive to act strategically only if he or she perceives the 
payment question as realistic and consequential. If respondents viewed the payment question as 
purely hypothetical, free riding and overpledging would not make any sense. Strategic behaviour 
can be prevented by designing the value elicitation question in a way that respondents have an 
incentive to answer it truthfully (c.f. Carson et al., 2001). Elicitation formats which ensure that 
giving a true answer to the valuation question is the respondent’s best strategy are named ‘incen-
tive compatible’ in literature (see Boyle, 2003: 131). In terms of incentive compatibility the DC 
format has some advantages over alternative elicitation questions. In the standard variant re-
spondents are asked whether they would contribute €x (the randomly assigned bid) for the pro-
ject under investigation. Furthermore, the referendum format typically gives them the impression 
that the project’s implementation depends on the result of a majority vote by the survey partici-
pants and that final payments will be equal to the bid. Hence, if a respondent has a true WTP 
which is higher than the bid, his or her best strategy is to agree with the elicitation question be-
cause this increases the probability that the project is actually implemented. The contrary holds 
true for an individual whose WTP is lower than the bid (c.f. Heinke, 2013). Free-riding and over-
pledging is more likely to occur in CVM studies that use open-ended or payment card formats 
(see Carson and Hanemann, 2005: 878). Respondents, who fear that the final amount to be paid 
depends on their individual answer to the payment question, have an incentive to understate their 
true WTP if they believe that other people’s WTP is high enough to ensure the project’s imple-
mentation. Respondents, who believe that their answers are irrelevant for the final payment but 
matter for the outcome of the survey, have an incentive to overstate their true WTP since this 
alters the probability that the project is implemented. In her dissertation, Heinke (2013) demon-
strated that the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-method, which is an incentive-compatible payment 
mechanism, which is often used in experimental economics, helps to minimise the share of stra-
tegically motivated replies to open-ended WTP questions. The drawback of presenting an incen-
tive compatible payment scenario is that the explanation of the payment mechanism becomes 
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longer and typically also more complex. Hence, the risk of obtaining strategically-motivated 
WTP statements has to be weighed against straining the respondents’ patience. 
 Strategic behaviour is one reason for so-called elicitation effects. As already mentioned, sev-
eral studies showed that different elicitation formants yield values of different magnitude for one 
and the same environmental good (c.f. e.g. Desvousges et al., 1993, Brown et al., 1996, Ready et 
al., 1996, Blaine et al., 2005). The widespread observation is that the WTP values assessed by 
means of DC questions are generally higher than open-ended or payment card values. In a meta-
study Brown et al. (1996) found that the DC/open-ended ratio falls between 1 and 5, i.e. in the 
extreme case DC estimates were five times higher than estimates derived from open-ended for-
mats. This divergence is most likely a result of respondents’ tendency to strategically understate 
their true WTP when employing open-ended or payment card formats, on the one hand, and the 
absence of such understatements in the case of an incentive compatible referendum format, on 
the other (c.f. Venkatachalam, 2004). Furthermore, many respondents have a tendency to state 
lower WTP amounts when they perceive the valuation question as difficult, so that the lower 
estimates of cognitively more demanding open-ended formats compared to those derived from 
the simpler DC questions come as little surprise (c.f. Bateman et al., 2002). Finally, the issue of 
so-called yea-saying has been discussed as a reason for the relatively higher value estimates as-
sessed in CVM surveys using the DC format (c.f. e.g. Holmes and Kramer, 1995, Blamey et al., 
1999, Kanninen, 1995). Yea-saying refers to the tendency of agreeing with the specified bid to 
avoid the socially embarrassing situation to say ‘no’ (c.f. Bateman et al., 2002: 138). Hence, 
even if the bid is higher than the respondent’s true WTP he or she might agree with the payment 
in order to show his or her favourable opinion towards the environmental project, leading to an 
upwards bias of overall WTP. It is useful to test and discuss different elicitation formats with 
respondents during the preparation phase of the survey, since yea-saying, strategic behaviour and 
the ability to deal with a rather complicated valuation question are often determined by the cul-
tural background of the respondents. 
 Another type of answers which do not reveal a respondent’s true preferences for the environ-
mental project under investigation are so-called protest bids. CVM practitioners have observed 
that WTP statements often do not refer to the true value respondents attribute to the environmen-
tal improvement in question but are an expression of their rejection of some aspects of the hypo-
thetical market (c.f. Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006). Motivations underlying protest beliefs encom-
pass certain attitudes towards government, rejection of the payment vehicle, fairness or ethical 
considerations. Protesting often translates into WTP statements of zero (so-called zero bids) or 
item nonresponse. At the same time, protest bids can also take the form of statistical outliers, i.e. 
implausibly high bids that exceed a respondent’s true WTP (ibid.). Protest bids threaten the va-
lidity of CVM values if a significantly large share of respondents intentionally understates or 
exaggerates their WTP. In this case the sample’s average WTP may not reveal the true social 
value of the environmental project in question. There is extensive literature concerning the un-
derlying motivations, identification and treatment of protest bids in CVM surveys. Among oth-
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ers, the articles by Jorgensen et al. (1999), Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn (2007) and 
Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) provide good overviews of the topic. Similar to the hypothetical and 
the strategic bias, protest can be reduced by a careful survey design. During pretests, particular 
attention should be paid to the question how different provision scenarios, payment vehicles and 
elicitation formats are perceived by the respondents. However, like most sources of error and 
bias, protest beliefs can hardly be fully eliminated through a careful survey design. Therefore, 
the identification and treatment of protest bids is an essential element of the data analysis. As 
mentioned before, it is highly recommendable to integrate a set of debriefing questions into 
CVM questionnaires. Some of these questions help to detect protest responses when analysing 
the data. For instance, a zero WTP combined with a high level of agreement with a statement 
such as ‘It is unfair to be asked to pay additional money for a public good’ (Jorgensen and Syme, 
2000: 258) reveals protest. Nevertheless, the interpretation of protest responses is difficult and 
there is no well-established technique that allows for a clear differentiation between protest ze-
roes and true zeroes, i.e. separating the valid answers of respondents who expect that they would 
not benefit from the environmental project from invalid, protest-motivated answers. The treat-
ment of positive bids in combination with agreement to several attitudinal questions indicating 
protest beliefs is even more debatable. In addition to the problem of correctly identifying protest 
responses, their treatment when aggregating individual WTP remains an open question among 
CVM researchers (c.f. Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006). The exclusion of protest bids often implies a 
significant reduction of the sample size and may also affect the representativeness of the sample 
if protesting is more likely to occur among certain groups within the population than in others. 
Therefore, instead of excluding protest bids from the analysis, analysts should check whether 
protesting significantly affects the WTP estimate and let the recipients of the survey results know 
about it (ibid.). 
 Another issue which threatens the validity of CVM values estimates is the existence of survey 
participants who do not make trade-offs between the preservation of the environmental good in 
question and their income, for example because they believe that the environmental good has an 
absolute right to protection. Some researchers classify this kind of behaviour as a form of protest 
against the payment question. Others explore the choices of respondents who refuse to make 
trade-offs in terms of lexicographic decision rules (c.f. Haddad and Howarth, 2006). Protest is 
usually associated with giving untruthful responses on purpose. Employing lexicographic deci-
sion rules, in contrast, is a highly problematic but truthful expression of preferences. A respond-
ent who uses a lexicographic decision rule makes binary choices among alternatives thereby ex-
clusively focusing on the good he or she considers as most important regardless of what happens 
to other goods. For example, a respondent who thinks that environmental protection has absolute 
priority may refer to a decision rule such as ‘more environmental protection is always better than 
less, irrespectively what happens to my personal welfare’ (Edwards, 1986: 147); and a respond-
ent who is extremely stingy may behave according to the rule ‘more money is always better than 
less, irrespectively what happens to the environment’. The common characteristic of both stereo-
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types of man – the environmentalist on the one hand and the miser on the other – is that there are 
no two alternatives that leave them indifferent. No amount of money will compensate the envi-
ronmentalist for a decrease in environmental quality and no environmental improvement will 
compensate the miser for a decrease in his or her financial resources. The problem of respond-
ents refusing to play the game, i.e. unwillingness to make trade-offs between the environmental 
good and money, violates a fundamental assumption on individual preference orderings underly-
ing the utility function (the continuity axiom, c.f. e.g. Ahlheim and Rose, 1992: 250). This is 
extremely critical because the WTP statements of respondents whose preference ordering does 
not fit the standard microeconomic assumptions cannot be interpreted as meaningful welfare 
measures. Thus, if it is expected that a considerable number of respondents act in a way that is 
not in line with the microeconomic consumer model, the questionnaire should include some in-
strument that helps to identify these respondents when analysing the survey data. The relevance 
of lexicographic preferences in CVM surveys was highlighted by Edwards (1986) for the first 
time. He introduced the behavioural stereotype of a respondent with so-called ethical preferences 
who is motivated exclusively by an unselfish interest of preserving environmental goods. He 
stressed that in the lexicographic model, WTP for an environmental improvement cannot be in-
terpreted in terms of the compensating variation and that economists shall test whether the prob-
lem of respondents who employ lexicographic decision rules is of empirical matter. Practical 
approaches concerning the detection of the WTP statements of respondents with lexicographic 
preference structures can be found in Spash (1998), Rosenberger et al. (2003), Rekola (2003) and 
Veisten et al. (2004). These authors used sets of attitudinal statements to be ranked on agree-
disagree scales. A respondent’s agreement or disagreement with several statements was believed 
to indicate whether he or she employed a lexicographic decision rule when answering the pay-
ment question. Rosenberger et al. (2003), for example, asked respondents whether or not they 
agreed with the statements ‘Endangered wildlife species should be protected at any cost’ and 
‘Unique environments should be protected at all costs’. According to the outcome of these stud-
ies, the share of respondents with lexicographic preferences for environmental resources is of 
empirical importance; it amounts to approximately 25% in Stevens et al. (1991), 23% in Spash 
and Hanley (1995) and 8% in Veisten et al. (2004). 
 Furthermore, analysts found that the WTP statements of respondents who attaches absolute 
priority to the environmental good in question resemble protest bids, i.e. they are or extremely 
high, zero or missing. Unusually high WTP amounts are in line with the lexicographic model 
because an individual who considers the environmental good as immeasurably more important as 
any market good would offer his or her entire disposable income to get the environmental im-
provement realised. At the same time, if a respondent believes that the environmental resource 
has an absolute right to protection he may reject the valuation task by stating a zero WTP or re-
fusing to give any answer (cf. Haddad and Howarth, 2006). Similar to protest bids, there is no 
agreement on how to identify respondents with lexicographic preference structures and whether 
their WTP statements should be discarded from the data or not. Furthermore, it is to be noted that 
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the discussion of lexicographic preferences has been limited to preference orderings where the 
environmental good has absolute priority over other goods. No attention has been paid to the 
other side of the coin, namely to respondents who attach absolute importance to the accumula-
tion of financial resources. So far, the question whether the share of respondents fitting the be-
havioural stereotype of the miser, i.e. an individual who is exclusively focussed on money, is of 
empirical matter or not has never been asked. As a consequence, no method that allows for an 
identification of such respondents has been developed. This gap of research shall be reduced in 
the empirical part of the present work. 
 Finally, a subject of discussion that I will call the ‘numéraire effect’ shall be addressed be-
fore concluding this section. Apart from pointing to the existence of respondents who are unwill-
ing to make trade-offs between environmental goods and their financial resources, some re-
searchers have questioned whether money is actually an effective measuring rod for the assess-
ment of environmental values. Even though assessing WTP in terms of money is common prac-
tice among CVM analysts, the theoretical welfare measure underlying the WTP concept does not 
prescribe that WTP must be assessed in monetary terms. The central question to be answered by 
the respondents of a CVM survey is how much utility in terms of market consumption they 
would give up to obtain the utility they expect to experience thanks to the environmental im-
provement (c.f. Ahlheim et al., 2010b). Hence, WTP is merely a measure of forgone market con-
sumption and not directly of money spent. However, in order to make individual utility changes 
comparable and aggregate them, these utility changes need to be measured in common units. 
Therefore, a researcher has to define a so-called numéraire that measures the worth of all com-
modities in a single unit. In principle, any good an individual is willing to give up for having the 
environmental improvement in question could be employed as numéraire (see Freeman, 2003: 
12). However, employing monetary units to measure environmental values has several ad-
vantages. For example, to account for the golden rule that the payment scenario should resemble 
a real market situation as closely as possible, asking respondents to express their WTP in terms 
of money lies at hand. Furthermore, in view of cost-benefit assessments, it makes obviously 
sense to assess WTP directly in terms of money rather than assessing it in some alternative unit 
that needs to be translated into monetary units subsequent to the data collection. However, ask-
ing people to translate the benefit they expect to experience due to an environmental improve-
ment into monetary units is problematic when the CVM survey is conducted in very poor coun-
tries where household budgets are so tight that people are not able to express their appreciation 
of an environmental project in terms of a monetary contribution (c.f. Ahlheim et al., 2010b). 
Analogously, attitudes towards spending money may be critical for a respondent’s willingness 
and ability to express his or her appreciation of an environmental project in monetary units. Giv-
en that the CVM survey is perceived as realistic and the payment rule as consequential, it is ex-
pected that a person’s general money spending disposition matters for his or her answer to ques-
tions concerning a monetary contribution to an environmental good. Again, the WTP statements 
of people who tend to refuse to give up money for anything appear to be a case which is worth 
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investigation. Similarly to people who are obviously poor, misers are likely to more frequently 
state a zero WTP than other respondents, even if their utility increases due to the environmental 
improvement in question. 
 In the CVM literature some attention has been paid to the use of alternative, non-monetary 
numéraires. A number of CVM studies employed labour as the unit in which respondents had to 
make their value statements (‘willingness to work’, cf. e.g. Vondolia et al., 2014, Hung et al., 
2007, Swallow and Woudyalew, 1994, Echessah et al., 1997). These studies were conducted in 
developing countries and used a split sample design to compare the effect of a money numéraire 
and a labour numéraire on WTP. A common finding is that mean WTP for the same environmen-
tal good is higher when expressed in terms of labour as compared to mean WTP expressed in 
terms of money. Furthermore, these studies reported that the labour numéraire was usually better 
accepted by the respondents than the money numéraire. However, Ahlheim et al. (2010b) 
showed theoretically and empirically that the willingness to work concept is seriously flawed. 
The study points to the difficulties related to converting hours of labour into utility. Bergstrom et 
al. (2004) investigated whether tax reallocations represent an alternative to money payments 
when valuing environmental projects. In an exemplary CVM survey on groundwater quality a 
bundle of ‘all other public goods’ was used as numéraire. Respondents were asked whether they 
would support an environmental project given that the level of provision of all public goods pro-
vided by the government would decrease. The authors highlighted several problems related to 
asking the elicitation question in this way. The public goods numéraire may be understood dif-
ferently and loosely interpreted by respondents; some might think of a broad set of publicly pro-
vided goods and services, others may focus exclusively on one particular public good. Bergstrom 
et al. (2004) concluded that the use of tax reallocation in CVM studies should proceed with cau-
tion. Thus, there is nowadays no satisfying alternative to the assessment of WTP in monetary 
units. This means that the ‘numéraire effect’ needs to be tackled by indirect methods, for exam-
ple by employing follow-up questions concerning a respondent’s financial situation, ethical con-
cerns about trading money against environmental quality and a person’s money spending habits. 
Enhancing the quality of CVM surveys by means of participatory approaches 
Looking at the long but not even complete list of biases and other sources of errors which threat-
en the reliability and validity of stated WTP presented in this section it becomes clear that a 
CVM survey requires careful preparation and diligent analysis. Besides consultation of experts 
and pilot studies to test out the questionnaire, participatory approaches are a good method to in-
crease the quality of the survey. The primary references for the practical conduct of CVM sur-
veys (Bateman et al., 2002, Carson and Hanemann, 2005, Arrow and Solow, 1993) all recom-
mend using participatory approaches when preparing a CVM survey. The most prominent exam-
ple is the employment of focus groups (see Bateman et al., 2002: 153). A focus group is a small 
group of individuals, in many cases students, who discuss questions related to the survey design 
with a moderator during a meeting that runs approximately 90 minutes. In the context of CVM, 
focus groups are typically consulted at an early stage of the survey design. When discussing with 
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focus groups, researchers can gain useful information regarding, for example, the informational 
components and the payment scenario of the questionnaire. Subsequent to a focus group meet-
ing, the questionnaire should be revised based on the comments and suggestions made by the 
participants.  
 Another promising possibility to enhance a CVM survey’s quality consists of consulting so-
called citizen experts at several stages of the study (c.f. Ahlheim et al., 2010a). Citizen expert 
groups (CEGs) consist of ten to twelve citizens, i.e. common people without a particular scien-
tific or political background. Ideally, the group includes individuals with different socio-
demographic characteristics so that the population to be surveyed is adequately represented by 
the CEG. Unlike focus groups, which researchers consult only once, typically at the very begin-
ning of the survey preparation, citizen experts are invited several times during the research phase 
(cf. Figure 2-1).  
 During the different CEG meetings they learn about the theoretical background of CVM stud-
ies, gain insights into the environmental project to be evaluated and help the researcher to devel-
op a suitable, coherent questionnaire as well as to interpret preliminary and final results. The 
contributions of citizens, in addition to expert knowledge and experience gained from pilot sur-
veys, have turned out as very valuable. The discussions and interaction with citizen experts are 
particularly enlightening when it comes to questions concerning the comprehensibility of the 
questionnaire, the wording of text passages and questions, and the avoidance of sensitive topics. 
Several issues potentially affecting the validity of results can be addressed during CEG meetings, 
including the optimal amount of information that should be provided to the respondents, the 
choice of the payment vehicle and the elicitation format, the perceived relevance of the survey as 
well as resentments within the society that might provoke protest responses. Furthermore, all 
kinds of auxiliary questions can be discussed with the CEG. These questions typically address 
attitudes, personality traits, norms and values and hence culturally specific facets of life. Invento-
ries aimed to measure, for example, environmental attitudes or certain personality traits typically 
stem from western countries. In many cases these inventories have to be translated and potential-
ly also adapted to the specific social and cultural context of the study site. Assessing money atti-
tudes in the context of a CVM survey is a good example for these issues. Frequently used money 
attitude inventories, such as Furnham’s (1984) ‘Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale’, have been 
developed in English-speaking western countries and there is little experience regarding their 
performance in other cultural and social contexts. Like any other attitude, people’s disposition to 
spend money in general is culturally specific and socially constructed. Questions regarding, for 
example, spending and saving habits, may be misperceived or misunderstood by the members of 
societies with substantially different values and norms than western societies. For this reason, 
auxiliary questions, especially those addressing culturally sensitive issues, should be carefully 
discussed with the CEG before the data collection starts. Likewise, preliminary and final survey 
results, for example the plausibility of the distribution of answers to a particular attitudinal ques-
tion, can be addressed during a CEG meeting. 
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Figure 2-1: Involvement of Citizen Expert Groups at several stages of CVM studies  
(adapted from Ahlheim, 2014) 
 
Summary of chapter 2 
This chapter gave a general introduction to environmental valuation. Apart from a brief summary 
of the usefulness and the objectives of environmental valuation studies, several methods that 
practitioners apply to assess the monetary value of environmental goods were presented. Among 
these methods, Contingent Valuation is a particularly suitable technique for the assessment of the 
benefits of prospective environmental projects. Since CVM is also the valuation technique em-
ployed in the empirical part of this dissertation, the theoretical and practical aspects of this meth-
od were in the focus of the remaining chapter. In spite of its theoretical soundness and its wide-
spread use, CVM is controversially discussed in economic literature. Critics doubt that CVM 
surveys provide accurate measures of the true economic value of environmental goods. In view 
of the long list of biases that analysts have repeatedly identified in CVM studies, it is quite un-
derstandable that sceptical attitudes towards survey-based environmental valuation studies are so 
widespread. At the same time, and in contrast to other environmental valuation methods, these 
biases are well-understood and analysts are generally aware of the multiple aspects which may 
threaten the validity of survey-based WTP estimates. Hence, it is in the best interest of a CVM 
practitioner to carefully prepare the survey, to implement it diligently and to attentively analyse 
the collected data. 
 As highlighted in the last section of this chapter, it is hardly possible to eliminate all sources 
of error and bias when conducting a CVM survey. For example, even though this is likely to af-
fect the validity of the value statements of at least some respondents, utility gains accruing from 
environmental improvements have to be assessed in monetary units. This is because nowadays 
no suitable alternative exists; willingness-to-work, in-kind payments and other potential alterna-
tives have turned out to cause even more issues than standard payment intentions. Criticism ad-
dressed towards assessing the value people attribute to environmental changes in terms of money 
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mainly incorporates two arguments. There is concern that poor respondents are not able to make 
meaningful WTP statements because of their tight budget. The other aspect addresses some peo-
ple’s objection of putting monetary values on environmental goods because they believe that 
these goods have an immeasurable value that should not be monetised. A similar but so far over-
looked topic is the presence of misers in a sample, i.e. people who hate spending money in gen-
eral and limit their expenditures to an absolute minimum, although they have no obvious reason 
for doing so. As argued at the end of this chapter, such money retention is likely to be a useful 
predictor for WTP statements. A careful theoretical and empirical analysis of this psychological 
variable is promising, especially in view of the possibility that the WTP statements of misers are 
meaningless and threaten the validity of the overall survey outcome. 
 Before analysing the role of ill-founded attitudes towards spending money in the particular 
context of CVM, the role of money and miserliness shall be explored in a broader scientific con-
text. The focus of the next chapter therefore lies on the role of money in economics.  
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3 Money in economics 
Money is one of the most widely investigated topics in economics. The origin of money, the ad-
vantages of monetary economies over barter systems, people’s demand for money, its optimal 
supply by the money issuing authority and many other money-related questions have been ana-
lysed by economists for centuries. There are also multiple ongoing controversies in monetary 
economics, for example the diverging views of Keynesians economists on the one hand and 
Monetarists on the other, regarding the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In spite of such 
heated debates between economic schools, there are also a number of facts on which a vast ma-
jority of economists would agree, regardless of their economic tradition. For example, a chapter 
on money in an economic textbook typically starts by defining money as a medium of exchange, 
which is used to make payments in the economy. Regardless of the form it takes (coins, notes, 
bank cards, cheques or some positive number on one’s bank statement), people never desire 
money for its own sake but merely for the goods and services it can buy. Rational individuals do 
not derive utility from the possession of money; they only gain satisfaction when converting 
their financial resources into consumption, according to the neoclassical framework. Like many 
of the assumptions that economists employ in their theories and models, the empirical accuracy 
of this neutrality postulate can be questioned. Although the members of contemporary societies 
are mostly aware of the fact that not money as such but its ability to purchase practically every-
thing is what makes money desirable, strange monetary patterns exist. For example, rather than 
spending their money on the things they desire or investing it into profitable assets to build up a 
reserve for future needs and risks, some people appear to be extraordinarily stingy. The existence 
of misers, i.e. people who are extremely reluctant to spend even though they have no obvious 
reason for doing so, is sometimes mentioned in economic literature (cf. e.g. Niehans, 1978: 14, 
Keynes, [1936] 2009: 108). However, in most cases, researchers consider this phenomenon as 
too rare to be accounted for. Even in behavioural economics, the more recent branch of econom-
ics which deals with all kinds or irregularities and irrationalities in economic behaviour, miserli-
ness has attracted little attention. 
 The objective of this chapter is twofold: Firstly, it recaptures the standard approach regarding 
the role of money in economics. Secondly, the chapter also introduces some alternatives views 
regarding people’s preferences for possessing money and the way in which money affects eco-
nomic decisions like spending and saving. Naturally, the economic literature on money is by far 
too broad to be fully covered in this chapter. The following sections provide some insights of, for 
this dissertation relevant, money-related topics in economics. These topics – namely the history 
of money (section 3.1), money in micro- and macroeconomics (section 3.2) as well as the contri-
butions of some behavioural economists (section 3.3) – illustrate quite well how popular the neu-
trality postulate actually is across different economic branches. At the same time, it will become 
apparent that alternative views with regard to the aforementioned aspects exist while questioning 
the neutrality postulate.  
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3.1 The economic history of money 
In modern economies, money takes the role of a medium of exchange, which is used for all kinds 
of payments. Money can take different forms and the objects that have served as media of ex-
change have changed over time. A common characteristic of the objects which serve as money in 
contemporary economies – coins, notes or bank cards, for example – is that they have hardly any 
material value. The only reason why people accept money as a means of payment is their 
knowledge about the possibility of exchanging this money for all kinds of commodities they de-
sire. A question which has occupied economists for centuries is how it came to this general ac-
ceptance of coins, notes and other means of payment of hardly any intrinsic value.  
 When opening an economic textbook on money, a reader typically encounters an introductory 
chapter where the ‘history of money’ and the ‘functions’ which money fulfils in modern econo-
mies are described (cf. e.g. Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001: 511-513). The most popular ap-
proach to explain why and how money came into the economy can be traced back to Aristotle 
(cf. Gerloff, 1947, Meikle, 2000). According to the Greek philosopher, the origin of money lies 
in the drawbacks of a barter system in which goods have to be directly exchanged for goods. 
Economists explaining the origins of modern money frequently adapted this idea. Following the 
standard approach to introduce a chapter on money in economics, this section also rewrites the 
emergence of money as a medium of exchange. Naturally, the corresponding description is not 
meant to be historically accurate. The textbook-barter economy, which gives birth to money, has 
probably never existed and severe criticism has been addressed towards the traditional explana-
tion of money’s origins which economists have been propagating for centuries (c.f. e.g. Innes, 
1913, Innes, 1914, Knapp, 1924, Wray, 2014, Wray, 2004). However, the conjectural history of 
money which was firstly told by Aristotle, adapted by Hume (1742) and Smith ([1776] 2007) 
and revitalised at the end of the nineteenth century by Menger (1892) and Jevons (1896) can be 
considered as a ‘useful myth’ (Dowd, 2000: 139) because the origin of money becomes firmly 
grounded in its most important economic function, namely its roles as a medium of exchange. 
Even though one may question whether the exchange theory contributes to a better understand-
ing of the functioning of real markets, this theory definitely helps to grasp the role which money 
plays in neoclassical economic theory. 
3.1.1 From primitive barter… 
Advocates of the medium of exchange theory propose that people lived in small self-sufficient 
clans in early societies. In this model-like world each clan produces basic goods like food and 
clothes and does not depend on the supply of goods by any other entity. Over time, people dis-
cover the benefits of exchanging goods produced by their own clan against goods produced by 
other groups, for example because the latter are different or superior in their quality. Thus, the 
members of one clan take interest in exchanging goods with the members of another clan and 
start bartering. This form of primitive exchange progressively spreads and people become spe-
cialised in the production of certain goods; they produce articles in excess of their needs in an 
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attempt to exchange them for a more desirable combination of goods. With increasing levels of 
specialisation, individuals become gradually independent from their own clan but increasingly 
dependent on bartering to convert their self-made goods. However, they will face a number of 
problems due to the drawbacks of the direct barter system (cf. Jevons, 1896: 3-7). Most im-
portantly, finding a suitable trading partner can be extremely difficult in money-less economies. 
The chance that an individual A meets an individual B who offers the object that A desires and at 
the same time wants the product offered by A rarely happens in a pure barter system. As a con-
sequence, only a very narrow number of bargains can be concluded. To overcome this problem 
of the ‘double coincidence’ (Jevons, 1896: 8) of wants, trading partners start, by convention or 
by habit, to accept intermediate objects in exchange for their self-produced goods in a first act of 
exchange. In a later act of exchange, they exchange this intermediate object against the commod-
ity they ultimately desire. At the beginning of this development, multiple media of exchange 
coexist. However, certain commodities, for example precious metals, turn out to be more suitable 
as media of exchange than other goods and in the end there will only be one single medium of 
exchange which is used by all sellers and buyers. Similar to modern economies, the reason for 
accepting, for example, a silver bar in exchange for some other product is no longer rooted ex-
clusively in its usefulness as a consumption good but mainly results form a seller’s knowledge 
that other people will accept it as a means of payment. 
 A second drawback of a barter economy consists of the extensive information and time need-
ed to conclude a bargain. In a pure barter system, the two trading partners have to agree on the 
exchange ratio of the commodities in question. Some individuals will publish lists with the ex-
change ratios for all single commodities they are willing to accept in exchange for the goods they 
offer. In the absence of a yardstick in which the value of each single commodity can be ex-
pressed, such price lists are likely to become extensively long. However, the information and 
time needed to agree on the rate at which bargains are concluded shrinks when people agree on a 
common measure of value (a unit of account). The total number of exchange ratio and thus the 
length of any price list are narrowed down substantially when all exchange ratios are expressed 
in terms of a common denominator. Although the units of any commodity could be used for this 
purpose, it appears convenient to express all prices in terms of the units of the substance which is 
used to effectuate all kinds of payment. As highlighted by Jevons (1896), it saves trouble when 
prices are quoted and calculated in terms of the object which also serves as a means of payment.  
 An important difference between a pure barter system and an economy where one commodity 
has emerged as a generally accepted medium of exchange is that exchange is subdivided into two 
different acts, namely selling and buying. Unlike in a barter system, these two acts do not take 
place simultaneously and are often performed at different places and points in time. To become 
commonly accepted by the sellers, the medium of exchange must not lose value during the peri-
od between its sale and purchase. The generally accepted medium of exchange, which at the 
same time provides the unit in which all prices are cited, must also be a general form in which 
wealth can be stored. 
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3.1.2 … to monetary exchange 
In economics, money is defined as the object which simultaneously fulfils the function of a me-
dium of exchange and a store of value while providing the unit of account. This implies that the 
term money is used to describe two different things. On the one hand, money is the name of the 
object which circulates as a medium of exchange and which is at the same time an asset in which 
wealth can be stored. On the other hand, the term money refers to a more abstract concept: the 
measurement unit in which prices are quoted and economic variables like income, wealth or 
debts are expressed. Naturally, this somewhat ambiguous use of language is not limited to eco-
nomics but can also be found in other social sciences and, of course, in everyday language. For 
example, people use ‘money’ as a synonym for income and wealth because both variables are 
measureable in terms of the units of the money-object that circulates in an economy. 
 With the introduction of money as a medium of exchange that, ideally, does not lose value 
over time, it becomes notably easier to store purchasing power for later periods of life. People 
can easily delay consumption by saving part of their income, i.e. the money obtained in ex-
change for self-made products or labour. Economists often refer to the store of value function to 
explain why in the past certain commodities were more likely to be used as money than others. 
First of all, the object which emerges as money should be durable and stable in value. A perisha-
ble good like meat needs to be consumed immediately and its value diminishes with every addi-
tional day of storage. Other goods perform much better on these criteria. Precious metals, in par-
ticular, are durable, easy to store and their value does not greatly change over time. Furthermore, 
proponents of the medium of exchange theory explain the predominant role of precious metals in 
monetary history by several characteristics, which arise from money’s medium of exchange 
function. According to Menger (1892), the key determinant for a good to become a medium of 
exchange is its saleability, i.e. how easy it is to dispose of that good on the market. Even before 
traders started to employ precious metals as media of exchange, the members of most early soci-
eties highly desired these objects, among other things because of their beauty and usefulness for 
the fabrication of jewellery, weapons and tools. The value of precious metals has always been 
high in relation to their weight so that people faced rather low costs when carrying precious met-
als to the market place. According to the exchange theoretical theory, precious metals have 
emerged as money because of their durability, storability, stability in value, portability and their 
high intrinsic value. 
 Although the use of precious metals as media of exchange constitutes an important progress 
compared to a barter system, there is still room for increasing the efficiency of the economy. 
Exchange is complicated by the fact that traders have to assess the weight and the purity of the 
precious metal in use before realising a transaction. To overcome this inconvenience, some trad-
ers start to transform the metal bars into standardised metal pieces like rings or bars. The value 
of these pieces is more readily identifiable and time-consuming procedures like weighing be-
comes superfluous. Mints, specialised in the production of coins of standardised weight and 
fineness, start to develop (see Dowd, 2000: 144). 
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 The next important step in the history of money is the development of paper money. Since 
many people possess more gold or coins than they immediately need for their purchases, they 
have to store them. Some individuals will accept to store other people’s money. Those who have 
the capacity of treasuring coins or precious metals, for example goldsmiths, typically offer this 
service (see Lipsey, 2007: 447). In exchange for the obtained coin deposit they hand out a receipt 
indicating their obligation towards the depositor. People quickly recognise that carrying around 
light paper receipts instead of heavy metal coins further facilitates the act of buying and selling. 
Thus, the paper receipts start to circulate as means of payment. Occasionally a depositor asks for 
the coins he or she has stored at the goldsmith’s safe. In many cases, however, the paper receipts 
merely pass from one person to another and the goldsmiths recognise how unlikely it is that all 
depositors would request to convert their receipts into coins at the same time. Thus, similar to 
modern banks, goldsmiths start to lend out money against interest payments. To increase their 
profits, they issue a total of receipts which is higher than the amount of coins on deposit (c.f. 
Dowd, 2000: 144-145). This early form of fractional reserve banking causes a major problem, 
namely that many different kinds of banknotes circulate. Hence, with the development of banks 
the monetised economy loses again one of its main advantages over a barter system. There are 
multiple kinds of money which unnecessarily complicate the accounting system. In addition to 
that, uncontrolled fractional reserve banking often leads to an oversupply of money causing in-
flation and bank runs. As a consequence, the state monopolises part of the banking system; coins 
and notes are only issued by the government-owned central bank from this point on (see Lipsey, 
2007: 448). 
 The resource costs of money decrease throughout the conjectural stages of its development. In 
early stages, when commodities like gold or silver barren circulate, these costs are substantial. 
They get lower with the invention of coins with higher face value than metal value and converge 
to zero with the emergence of paper money. However, until recently, the coins and paper money 
issued by most monetary authorities in the world were convertible into gold or some other exter-
nal standard of value, which the issuing authority had to keep as a reserve. An ultimate efficien-
cy gain that has been realised in practically all industrialised countries is the abolishment of 
money’s convertibility into anything else. The contemporary monetary system is one of claims 
like coins, notes and bank deposits which have no fixed value in terms of any external standard. 
Modern money is merely backed by governments’ promise that all bills can be paid with it. 
 Since the medium of exchange function of modern money is so central and tangible in con-
temporary economies, it comes as little surprise that theorists have paid so much attention to 
money’s role as a medium of exchange. The exchange-theoretical explanation of money’s ori-
gins is certainly one of the reasons why neoclassical economists, including micro- and the mac-
roeconomic branches, treat money merely as some neutral means of payment and never as a de-
sirable commodity. 
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3.2 Money in micro- and macroeconomics 
3.2.1 Money in consumer theory 
Historical evidence backs the theory that money enhances the efficiency of the economy. It facil-
itates exchange and it presses ahead with specialisation. From an individual’s perspective, the 
existence of money is particularly beneficial because it makes accounting processes much easier 
as compared to a barter system. For example, the innumerable cost-benefit considerations con-
sumers have to make in purchasing situations would be extremely complicated if there were no 
money prices which provide information about the cost and the value of the commodities at 
choice. However, relative to its great significance in everyday life, money only plays a minor 
role in microeconomic theory. This does not mean that money is completely absent in the theo-
ries and models used to describe and predict the market behaviour of individual consumers. In-
come and price, which are two of the key variables in consumer theory, are typically expressed 
in dollars, euros or any other monetary unit. However, the existence of monetary units and some 
medium of exchange in which individuals are paid out their wage or salary does not affect indi-
vidual consumption choices; the optimal solution of the consumer’s utility maximisation prob-
lem in a money-less world with exchange ratios and incomes expressed in units of labour is iden-
tical to an economy with money prices and money incomes (see e.g. Richter, 1990: chapter 1). 
According to the theory, a rational consumer will opt for allocating his or her income in a way 
that the marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio. Since all prices are expressed in terms 
of the units of a numéraire good, these units simply cancel out in the optimum (ibid.). Hence, at 
the theoretical level, it does not matter whether money, a particular consumption good or a com-
posite commodity is employed as numéraire. 
 Since neoclassical theory postulates that a consumer desires exactly the same goods in a mon-
etised economy as in a barter system, money cannot appear in a consumer’s preference ordering. 
According to the standard assumptions, individuals have well-ordered preferences over con-
sumption goods and they are able to rank these goods, i.e. they know what they like best, what 
they like least and which goods or bundles of goods they enjoy equally. However, money never 
appears among the genuine consumption goods which make up the preference ordering. This is 
because in neoclassical economics the money-object which is used to effectuate payments is de-
fined as nothing more than a neutral medium of exchange. A certain amount of money represents 
the worth of the different combinations of commodities which consumers can buy with this 
amount of money. As highlighted more than 200 years ago by Adam Smith, ‘Goods can serve 
many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve no other purpose besides 
purchasing goods. (…) It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the sake of what 
they can purchase with it’ (Smith, [1776] 2007: 282). It is also worth noticing that, as highlighted 
by Niehans (1978), integrating money into the preference ordering poses technical problems. 
This is because preferences are defined independently of the price system in the standard model. 
This is to say that individuals are able to compare and rank alternative bundles of goods without 
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knowing the market prices of the goods in question. However, deciding whether a certain 
amount of money is better, worse or as good as some commodity in terms of utility is impossible 
as long as the price system is unknown. Since the value of a bank note is exclusively determined 
by the amount of commodities it can buy, people need to have some idea about the prices at 
which the commodities they desire are sold. 
 In microeconomic theory, an individual’s consumption choices are constraint by his or her 
budget. The higher an individual’s income is, the more desired things he or she can purchase; 
using everyday language, the more money, the better. There is a positive relationship between 
money and utility because utility is an increasing function of consumption and because a higher 
income enables the individual to consume more. Nevertheless, income as such does not generate 
utility; individuals gain utility only after they have exchanged their income for goods or services. 
To make this proposition clearer, let us think of two individuals with identical preferences and 
tastes. One of them disposes of a monthly income of €1,000 and spends this amount completely 
on the goods and services he likes. The other one earns €1,200, puts €200 into her piggy bank 
and spends the remaining money. At the end of a month these two individuals are equally well 
off, they reach the same level of utility, although one of them has a higher income than the other. 
The utility level of the ‘richer’ individual would only exceed the utility of the other one if she 
had spent the extra €200.  
 Another important proposition in neoclassical consumer theory is the absence of money illu-
sion. As argued in macroeconomics, an increase in the quantity of money will lead to a propor-
tional increase in prices and incomes, at least in the long run (cf. section 3.2.2). In microeconom-
ics, rational consumers are assumed to take account of this relationship. An individual ‘knows’ 
that if his or her nominal wage rate increases, prices will increase by the same proportion. By 
contrast, money illusion would be at work if individuals believed that an increase of their nomi-
nal income alters their purchasing power even though prices increase to a greater extent than 
nominal income has increased. According to neoclassical microeconomic theory, a consumer’s 
demand schedule and real expenditures depend only on relative prices and relative income. De-
mand and real expenditures are unaffected by the absolute price level and the nominal amount of 
money people obtain as income. Mathematically, the absence of money illusion is formalised by 
the homogeneity postulate. The utility function is homogenous of degree zero in prices and in-
come which means that proportional changes in these nominal variables do not affect the utility 
level (cf. Jehle and Reny, 2011). 
 Hence, in the standard model of consumer choice money takes the role of a medium of ex-
change without intrinsic value and as a medium of account in which prices and income are ex-
pressed. Unsurprisingly, there is no space for the third defining function of money in the single-
period case that has been considered in the previous paragraphs; money does not take the role of 
a store of value in the basic model. A rational consumer would never wish to store part of his or 
her income as long as there is no future period in which the money put aside could be used up for 
consumption. This assumption is, of course, not fully maintained in life-cycle theory which ex-
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plains an individual’s consumption and saving decisions in multiple periods. However, maintain-
ing the neutrality postulate, economists typically define the act of saving in terms of future con-
sumption, for example as ‘the accumulation of assets for future use’ (Lord, 2002: 1). There are 
several assets an individual can use for this purpose and money in the form of cash or saving 
deposits is one of them. Just as in the standard model described above, satisfaction merely ac-
crues from the act of consuming. Financial assets, including money, only yield utility when indi-
viduals deplete them to purchase things which yield genuine satisfaction. Life-cycle theory offers 
several explanations why people put aside part of their money income rather than depleting it 
completely in a particular period of time. In economics, the most prominent motive for saving is 
preparing for retirement. Furthermore, uncertainty about future income, future needs or the age 
at death as well as general precaution and bequest motives belong to the key determinants for 
people’s saving decisions. In any of these cases, the accumulation of financial assets is never an 
end in itself but a means to enhance one’s (or one’s heirs) future consumption possibilities. Tak-
en together, the neutrality postulate regarding people’s desire for money is paramount in microe-
conomic theory. 
3.2.2 Money demand theory 
The coins and notes circulating in contemporary markets have hardly any intrinsic value. Never-
theless, people use and accept these at first glance useless tokens as means of payment. The rea-
son for doing so is rooted in everybody’s belief that one can use this money for future transac-
tions. However, this system can only work if the purchasing power of money remains stable over 
time. People believe that the value of a euro, in terms of the commodities it can buy, remains 
approximately the same, regardless of whether the euro is used as a means of payment now or a 
few days later. If this was not the case people would be more hesitant in selling their labour or 
products for some worthless pieces of paper or metal. Hence, one of the central tasks of the mon-
ey issuing authority consists of keeping the value of money stable by controlling the quantity of 
money in circulation. 
 Ideally, the supply of money just satisfies the aggregate demand for money. Hence, from the 
macroeconomic perspective, it is of great importance to understand the factors which affect the 
demand for money in order to predict how changes in the quantity of money affect economic 
activity. The amount of money that everyone in the economy wishes to hold depends in first 
place on the total volume of transactions made in an economy; the more transactions are made 
the more money is needed. Furthermore, knowledge about the speed at which money circulates, 
the so-called velocity of money, is of central importance for the success of monetary policy. The 
latter variable depends on technical factors like a society’s payment habits as well as on people’s 
liquidity preference, i.e. their subjective desire to keep certain amounts of money in their wallets 
or bank accounts. Traditionally, there has been a lot of disagreement among different economic 
schools regarding the main determinants of people’s liquidity preference resulting in partly dif-
ferent demand for money theories. This section introduces the most popular among the many 
macroeconomic money demand theories. Furthermore, the concepts of money employed by John 
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Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, two twentieth century economists who extensively wrote 
about money and whose names may be most closely associated with monetary theory, will be 
discussed at the end of this section. 
The demand for money: From classical quantity theory to Friedman’s ‘restatement’ 
For a long time, economists were hardly interested in analysing the demand for money. Adam 
Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo and other Classical theorists strictly considered money 
as a medium of exchange. From this perspective, people cannot desire money for its own sake 
and it suffices to analyse money as a token which facilitates transactions. In the classical theory, 
households are assumed to hold no more than the amount of money they plan to spend in the 
period between the days on which they receive their wage or salary. The quantity of money cir-
culating in an economy affects neither relative prices nor real output. Changes in its quantity 
only affect the overall price level but leave any real variable (employment, production, real in-
come, etc.) unaffected. The so-called quantity equation, a simple tautology first formulated by 
Fisher ([1911] 1997), formalises this relationship. The famous equation MV=YP simply displays 
the Classical economists’ proposition that the stock of money (M) is determined by the speed at 
which money is spent (the velocity of money, V), the level of current output (Y) which deter-
mines the total number of transactions involved in exchange, and the price level (P). The Clas-
sics considered the velocity V as being determined by mainly technological factors, for example 
a country’s banking system, the frequency of receipts and payments as well as the length of 
payment periods. Therefore, they assumed V to be roughly constant (see Hosek and Zahn, 1977: 
107). Furthermore, the Classics considered output Y as independent from the quantity of mon-
ey.5 Accordingly, a change in the quantity of money can only affect the overall price level but 
has no lasting effect on neither real output nor real income in the classical theory. In other words, 
money is neutral with respect to the amount and the distribution of real income, but the Classics 
viewed increases in its quantity as one of the most important reasons for inflation (cf. Crockett, 
1981: 47-50). 
 Since the Classics assumed money to be merely wanted for the things it can buy and because 
they proposed that the amount of money people wish to hold relative to their income depends 
mainly on institutional factors which hardly change in the short run, it was relatively straightfor-
ward to determine the optimal supply of money. It sufficed to assess the transaction demand, i.e. 
the demand for money to be spent. Hence, the aggregate demand for money MD varies directly 
and proportionally with the price level; this relationship is formally expressed as 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝐶 ∙ (𝑌/𝑇), (3-1) 
where Y/V is a technically determined factor of proportionality. 
 
                                                 
5 The independence of output Y and the quantity of money M is a result of the full employment assumption made by 
the Classics. Market forces were assumed to bring the economy back to the state of equilibrium whenever resources 
were unemployed or goods left unsold. 
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In the 1930s, a group of Cambridge economists headed by Marshall (1927) suggested that not 
only the function of money as a medium of exchange but also its role as a store of value should 
be taken into account to correctly determine the aggregate demand for money. Marshall and col-
leagues viewed money as a temporary abode of purchasing power, a concept which Friedman 
(1956) adopted three decades later, too. They treated money as any other asset and modelled its 
demand in terms of individual choices and decisions. Hence, the Cambridge economists made an 
attempt to reformulate the classical quantity equation. However, the new version differed only in 
terms of the conception of the velocity of money as compared to the traditional quantity equa-
tion. They considered the proportion of income people desire to hold in the form of money as 
being determined by the transactions people plan to realise in a particular period and also by 
people’s subjective desire to store part of their wealth in the liquid form. Formally, the demand 
for money is determined by the desired ratio of cash balances to income labelled by the letter k 
(the ‘Cambridge k’), the level of current output and the price level: 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑘𝐶𝑌. (3-2) 
The Cambridge economists already recognised that the money holding coefficient k was more 
than just a technical factor but determined by individual preferences and expectations about the 
returns of non-monetary assets which are likely to change over time. Nevertheless, the Cam-
bridge economists still assumed k to be roughly constant. Accordingly, the traditional assump-
tion regarding the proportional relationship between the price level and the quantity of money 
demanded was maintained (cf. Hosek and Zahn, 1977). 
 Keynes’ liquidity preference theory, exposed in the General Theory (GT Keynes, [1936] 
2009), importantly draws from the Cambridge approach but also extends it. While the Cam-
bridge economists had focussed on analysing the effects of changes in income on the demand of 
money, Keynes extended their approach by also accounting for changes in the interest rate and 
expectations about such changes when analysing the demand for money. He emphasised that 
there are multiple factors which explain why individuals refrain from spending their income and 
why they opt for holding part of their wealth in the form of money. The three driving motives for 
holding money are, according to Keynes ([1936] 2009: 170), ‘(i) the transactions-motive, i.e. the 
need of cash for the current transaction of personal or business exchanges; (ii) the precautionary-
motive, i.e. the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of a certain proportion of total 
resources; and (iii) the speculative-motive, i.e. the object of securing profit from knowing better 
than the market what the future will bring forth.’ 
 The transaction demand for money (i) closely resembles the Cambridge variant of the demand 
for money theory. Money is held as an abode for purchasing power to facilitate planned and 
foreseeable transactions. It is determined by the price level and an individual’s income. Keynes 
([1936] 2009) suggested that the precautionary demand for money, which takes the role of a re-
serve for uncertain emergencies or opportunities, was positively related to an individual’s in-
come level, too. In later applications, researchers often lumped the transaction demand and the 
precautionary demand together (MDT), because, in the end, both represent a desire for money as a 
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medium of exchange which is influenced overall by the same factors, namely income and the 
price level. While the first two components of the demand for money appear to be mostly adopt-
ed from the Cambridge school, Keynes’ ([1939] 2009) main innovation was the speculative de-
mand for money (MDS). One can think of speculative cash balances as a piggy bank into which 
an individual may or may not put his or her money in surplus, i.e. money which people do not 
use to satisfy their transaction or precautionary needs. The latter decision is determined by an 
individual’s expectations about the return of other financial assets, the latter being related to the 
future interest rate on these assets. Keynes ([1936] 2009) merely considered two alternative as-
sets, namely cash and interest-bearing bonds. People hold money to avoid capital losses on 
bonds; or they invest their money into bonds in order to profit from capital gains on bonds. He 
theorised that the demand for bonds would increase with the interest rate. According to this theo-
ry, the probability that an individual empties the piggy bank and buys bonds is high when the 
current interest rate is high; therefore, the overall demand for speculative balances is low in the 
case of a high current interest rate. When the current interest rate is low the probability that an 
individual sells bonds and holds money is high; thus, the overall demand for speculative balances 
is high in the case of a low current interest rate. Finally, in the case of a very low current interest 
rate everybody hoards money in his or her piggy bank. According to Keynes ([1936] 2009), there 
is absolute liquidity preference in such a situation and the economy is in the ‘liquidity trap’, 
which means that an increase in the quantity of money has no effect on the economy’s activity. 
As expressed by equation 3-3, the overall demand for money is 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝐷𝐷 + 𝑀𝐷𝐷 = 𝑘𝑌𝐶 + 𝑓(𝑟), (3-3) 
where r is the market rate of interest based on which individuals form their expectations about 
the future interest rate (cf. Hosek and Zahn, 1977: 111). The demand for money thus proportion-
ally increases with income (which determines the demand for money for transaction purposes) 
and varies inversely with the interest rate (which determines the attractiveness of money as a 
store of value as compared to non-monetary assets). It is to be noted that the market interest rate 
does not only become a key variable in the demand for money function but that it is also concep-
tualised differently by Keynes ([1936] 2009) than by his predecessors. While the Classics con-
sidered the interest rate as encouraging individuals to forgo present consumption, 
Keynes ([1936] 2009) viewed interest income as a ‘reward of not-hoarding’, i.e. as a compensa-
tion for parting with liquidity by storing one’s wealth in less liquid assets than money. Further-
more, the proportion of income people wish to hold in the form of money becomes difficult to 
predict in the Keynesian world. It depends on multiple factors, including highly subjective, and 
hence hardly measurable, expectations about the future interest rate. Since the velocity of money 
is, according to Keynes ([1936] 2009) and his followers, neither constant nor stable, changes in 
the quantity of money have no predictable effects on the price level and real variables like real 
income, employment and the output of the economy (cf. Doppmann-Handschin, 1989: 135-137). 
An increase in the quantity of money does not necessarily translate into a proportional increase 
in prices, at least not in the short run, according to the Keynesian point of view. In contrast to the 
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Classical perspective, an increase in the quantity of money may lower unemployment and in-
crease real income. In that sense, money is not neutral in the Keynesian world (see e.g. Makinen, 
1981: 421-454 for a summary of the effects of money and monetary policy in the Keynesian 
theory of money). Last but not least, the traditional argument that money is never desired for its 
own sake does not hold under certain circumstances. The demand for money as a store of wealth 
may even become insatiable in the case of a very low interest rate, according to Keynes’ ([1936] 
2009) reasoning. 
 Subsequent to its publication in the General Theory the liquidity theory was heavily criticised. 
The major criticism was directed towards the somewhat artificial separation between different 
money holding motives, the consideration of merely two assets (bonds and money), the neglect 
of additional variables potentially affecting the demand of money like people’s degree of risk 
aversion, their expectations about future inflation rates and the question as to whether people’s 
overall wealth rather than their current income is the relevant predictor variable for their transac-
tion demand and precautionary demand for money. Several economists attempted to refine and 
formalise Keynes’ money demand theory. Hicks (1935), for example, treated the demand for 
money as a problem of asset choice and analysed it within the conventional rational choice 
framework. Tobin (1958) notably refined Keynes’ ([1936] 2009) framework on the speculative 
demand for money. To account for the criticism towards the demand for money function formu-
lated in the General Theory, the Keynesian economists extended the set of explanatory variables 
in the money demand equation. At the same time, they maintained the questionable dichotomisa-
tion of the demand for money into a transaction and a speculative demand. Furthermore, the ‘li-
quidity trap’ hypothesis, i.e. the situation where the market interest rate is extremely low and 
people get an insatiable appetite to accumulate cash, turned out to be at odds with empirical data 
(cf. Bronfenbrenner and Mayer, 1960, Laidler, 1966). 
 Modern theoretical and empirical work on the demand for money is based on Friedman’s 
(1956) ‘restatement’ of quantity theory (I will refer to this theory as ‘neo-quantity theory’ in the 
following paragraphs). Similar to Hicks (1935), Friedman treated the demand for money as a 
problem of asset choice. In contrast to the Keynesian theorists, however, he did not separate the 
demand for money into distinctive motives. In neo-quantity theory, money takes the role of a 
temporary abode of purchasing power, i.e. an asset which is used as a store of wealth but desig-
nated to be spent, a definition which combines money’s medium exchange and store of value 
function. As compared to Keynes, the proponents of neo-quantity theory consider a broader set 
of variables when explaining the demand of money, including the interest rates on other financial 
assets, the interest rate on the capital market, the rate of return on equities and individual prefer-
ences over the non-pecuniary advantage of holding money. These non-pecuniary benefits en-
compass, among other things, the convenience of not having to spend time and resources on 
converting non-money assets back into cash; the advantages of being liquid when there is a good 
opportunity to make a good bargain; and a feeling of safety resulting from having part of one’s 
wealth stored in an asset with a certain and riskless nominal return. The concept of non-
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pecuniary benefits resembles the concept of liquidity preference introduced by Keynes. The fac-
tors determining a society’s taste for money include, for example, people’s expectations about 
the future economic development. At an aggregate level, liquidity preference is particularly high 
in times when many members of a society have pessimistic expectations about their future in-
comes and rather low when expectations are, on average, optimistic (this idea can be found in 
Friedman, 1961). However, since this taste parameter is difficult to measure, macroeconomists 
typically opt for putting it aside from their analysis (see Lewis and Mizen, 2000: 158).  
 According to the proponents of neo-quantity theory, people’s total wealth rather than their 
current income constrains portfolio decisions, i.e. a person’s choice regarding how to hold his or 
her wealth. It is to be noted that Friedman (1956) defined wealth in a broader way than the pro-
ponents of Keynesian liquidity preference theory. In neo-quantity theory, the wealth variable 
encompasses human wealth and physical capital in addition to money and non-money financial 
assets (see Hosek and Zahn, 1977: 123). Friedman’s (1956) demand for money function is thus 
by far more complex than the one derived from the classical quantity equation and can be, based 
on Friedman and Schwartz (1982), expressed as 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑠, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑟𝑏,𝑇𝜋,𝑊) ∙ 𝐶, (3-4) 
where f(.) refers to the velocity of money which varies systematically in response to changes in 
different variables, including the return of several assets (e.g. return on money stored in interest-
bearing bank accounts rm; return on stock rs; return on bonds rb), the inflation rate (Eπ) and total 
wealth (W). In practice, permanent income mostly serves as a proxy for the wealth variable and 
the market interest rate r replaces the return variables included in equation 3-4. When thinking of 
f(.) in terms of the velocity of money, Friedman’s demand for money function closely resembles 
the original quantity equation presented at the beginning of this section. However, unlike the pre-
Keynesian theorists, Friedman did not assume the velocity of money to be constant. Neverthe-
less, by contrast to the Keynesian hypothesis, the velocity of money is a stable function of a few 
measurable variables which makes the effects of changes in the quantity of money again predict-
able (see Dostaler, 1997: 94). The opinion shared by most contemporary economists is that in the 
long run an increase in the quantity of money only affects the price level but has no consequence 
on the real sectors of the economy. In the short run, however, neo-quantity theory predicts that 
changes in the quantity of money affect real variables like real income and employment. The 
absence of any long-term effect is a result of the definition of money as a special asset which is 
never held for the sake of permanently possessing it. As soon as the quantity of money circulat-
ing in an economy increases, people will use the additional bank notes to buy financial assets and 
durable goods. Production rises, money incomes increase and people finally also start buying 
more consumption goods. This causes inflation leading to a number of feedback processes; for 
example, the demand for credits by firms, which expect that prices will increase even further, 
decreases, leading to lower levels of production and employment. In the end, all temporal real 
effects are offset by the increase in the general price level. In short, money is neutral. 
 
67 
 Naturally, monetary theory has not stopped developing since Friedman’s restatement of quan-
tity theory. However, the more recent models turned out to be neither more adequate in terms of 
making reliable predictions about people’s demand for money, nor do they attribute a different 
role to money as compared to neo-quantity theory. Starting in the 1960s, much work focussed on 
further refining Friedman’s (1956) version of the money demand function. Most notably, several 
economists attempted to provide ‘a sound micro-foundation’ (Laidler, 1993: 2) of the demand 
for money theory. The representatives of the corresponding stream of literature (Sidrauski, 1969, 
Clower, 1967, Hahn, 1982, McCallum and Goodfriend, 1987, Baumol, 1952, Tobin, 1956 to list 
but the most cited articles) aimed at explaining agents’ desire to hold money in terms of individ-
uals’ preferences and their budget constraints. They analysed the demand for money in the same 
way as the demand for genuine goods and services, i.e. as a utility maximisation problem. The 
probably best-known, and, as argued by Mankiw (2010: 559) still the leading model in contem-
porary theory of money demand is the Baumol-Tobin model of cash management. Baumol 
(1952) and Tobin (1956) treated money (i.e. currency and checkable deposits) as a creator of 
time; people can save time and resources by holding part of their income in the liquid form. 
When making a purchase their cash balances allow them to avoid time-consuming trips to the 
bank and to save the brokerage fees they would otherwise have to pay in order to convert wealth 
invested in profitable assets back into cash. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) analysed the de-
mand for money as a choice problem where individuals weigh the benefits of holding money (i.e. 
convenience) against the costs it implies (i.e. forgone interest income obtained from more profit-
able stores of wealth). In spite of the fact that many of the corresponding models are mathemati-
cally highly complex and therefore sometimes difficult to grasp, transaction theories provide 
only limited insight regarding people’s actual behaviour with money. As in classical economics, 
money merely takes the role of a neutral medium of exchange which has no other function than 
facilitating the act of paying. To a greater extent than before, transaction theories are of little 
help for the prediction of the amount of money people wish to hold nowadays. This is partly due 
to the multiple financial innovations during the last decades which complicate the analysis of 
people’s demand for money. Today, people can easily convert their money stored in an interest-
bearing savings account into cash and, up to a certain amount, banks do not charge brokerage 
fees. Furthermore, thanks to the development of online banking, moving resources from a sav-
ings account to a checking account is more convenient than in the past. Hence, arguing that 
money is a creator of time and holding it saves resources is less evident than before so that trans-
action theories like the one proposed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) appear rather obsolete. 
Furthermore, as stressed by Laidler (1993), none of the micro-founded demand for money mod-
els which have been developed in the second half of the twentieth century would correctly pre-
dict the sums of money that people actually hold in cash or the great amounts of money stored in 
saving accounts which earn little interest. Transaction demand theories tend to underestimate the 
amount of wealth held in liquid forms systematically. Taken together, correctly predicting peo-
ple’s demand for money remains a great challenge in economics. 
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Differing concepts of money in macroeconomics: Keynes vs. Friedman 
Some readers might have missed a sound definition of the assets that economists consider as 
‘money’ at the beginning of this chapter. Providing such a definition is, however, quite challeng-
ing. There seems to be no unambiguous definition of money among economists. Different au-
thors mean different assets (coins, notes, bank deposits, financial instruments) when employing 
the term money and analysing, for example, people’s demand for it. This issue is not limited to 
the differing concepts of money employed before the so-called Keynesian revolution and after-
wards but sometimes even appears within a single work written by the same author. Different 
concepts and the use of partly inconsistent definitions of money are particularly striking when 
reading and comparing the publications by Keynes and Friedman. These two economists exten-
sively wrote on money, on its history and both of them made recommendations which decisively 
shaped monetary policy. Money is a key concept in Keynes’ work; the term ‘money’ appears in 
the titles of his most cited publications (i.e. A Tract on Monetary Reform, 1923; A Treatise on 
Money, 1930; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936). Similarly to 
Keynes, Friedman’s name is frequently associated with money in economics, for example by 
recalling his popular ‘Money matters’ slogan or the famous analogy of the money-dropping heli-
copter (cf. Friedman, 1973). 
 Several economists have stressed that Keynes ([1936] 2009) employed the term money and 
analysed what was meant by it in a different way than the Classics did (see e.g. the different con-
tribution in Keynes and the Classics Reconsidered in Ahiakpor, 1998a). Rather than merely ana-
lysing the public’s demand for currency (i.e. coins and notes), as the proponents of the old quan-
tity theory did, Keynes also included bank deposits into his definition of the money stock (cf. 
e.g. Keynes, [1936] 2009: 194-195). However, as highlighted by Ahiakpor (1998b: 20), Keynes 
was not consistent in his definition of money. In most instances, he meant only cash (i.e. curren-
cy and checking deposits), especially when developing the liquidity preference theory (cf. GT, 
chapter 13). Sometimes, however, he referred to a broader definition of money and referred also 
to time deposits, financial instruments such a treasury bills and occasionally even credit agree-
ments when employing the term ‘money’ in the General Theory (cf. Keynes, [1936] 2009: 167, 
footnote 2). Friedman and Schwartz (1969) referred to an even broader set of assets when ana-
lysing the demand of money than Keynes did, namely to currency, plus demand deposits, plus 
time deposits. Hence, in spite of some inconsistencies in the General Theory, Friedman em-
ployed the term money in a broader way than Keynes did .6 
 Even more differences regarding their conceptions of money can be observed when compar-
ing how Keynes and Friedman wrote on its nature and people’s perception and uses of money 
(the following arguments are broadly adapted from Dostaler, 1997: 89-94). According to Keynes 
([1930] 1971: 13), money is an ‘essential element of civilisation’ and not just as a lubricant 
                                                 
6 Using the empirical definition of money which can be found in contemporary textbooks (cf. e.g. Samueslon, 2001: 
515) a reader may conclude that Keynes analysed money in the narrow sense (M1, including currency, demand 
deposits and other checkable deposits) and Friedman analysed broad money (M2, including saving accounts and 
time deposits in addition to M1). 
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which facilitates the exchange of goods and services. Therefore, money’s history, social conven-
tions, people’s habits and feelings have to be taken into account when analysing the role of mon-
ey in the economy. When reasoning about people’s desire to store wealth in a liquid rather than 
in an interest-bearing form, Keynes (1937: 116) highlighted that people have a feeling about 
money which is ‘partly (…) reasonable partly (…) instinctive’ and which ‘operates, so to speak, 
at a deeper level of motivation’. According to him, the possession of money settles people’s dis-
quietude about their future resources. Keynes thus pointed to a psychological dimension of mon-
ey which had never been addressed in economics. In the General Theory, he introduced two psy-
chological variables which determine, according to him, people’s consumption and saving deci-
sions: the propensity to consume and liquidity preference. As illustrated in the previous part of 
this section, the latter variable has attracted by far more interest than the former in macroeco-
nomics. The propensity to consume is, however, also interesting for an analysis of Keynes’ con-
cept of money. The propensity to consume refers to the share that people spend out of their in-
come. According to Keynes ([1936] 2009), it is determined by both ‘objective factors’ (cf. GT, 
chapter 8) and ‘subjective factors’ (cf. GT, chapter 9). While the first set of factors encompasses 
the traditionally considered variables like a person’s income level, the subjective factors include, 
among other aspects, ‘psychological characteristics of human nature’ (Keynes, [1936] 2009: 91). 
Keynes ([1936] 2009: 107-108) listed eight motives which lead individuals to retain part of their 
income, namely (i) precaution, (ii) foresight, (iii) enjoyment of interest income, (iv) enjoyment 
of gradually increasing expenditures, (v) independence, (vi) enterprise, (vii) bequest and (viii) 
avarice. Especially the fifth and eighth motives refer to a psychological, if not pathological di-
mension of people’s tendency to accumulate or hoard their financial resources. Not only people’s 
preference for future consumption motivates non-spending. In addition to the traditionally con-
sidered motives, irrational feelings ‘of independence and the power to do things, though without 
a clear idea or definite intention of specific action’ or even ‘pure miserliness, i.e. unreasonable 
but insistent inhibitions against acts of expenditures as such’ (Keynes, [1936] 2009: 108) drive 
non-spending. As stressed by Dostaler (1997) and Dostaler and Maris (2000), Keynes was ac-
quainted with the psychological literature on money of that time, especially with the theory of 
the love of money developed by Freud ([1908] 1976) and other psychoanalysts (cf. section 
4.1.1). Although he did not repeat the partly greasy theories that circulated in the psychoanalyti-
cal literature of that time, Keynes seemed to maintain the idea that hoarding behaviour was the 
outcome of some irrational love of money and that it had psychological roots (see Dostaler, 
1997: 91). 
 The philosophical and psychological foundations of money which a reader finds in Keynes’ 
work are absent in Friedman’s monetary analysis. In neo-quantity theory, money is an instrument 
which facilitates exchange and which is, as a temporary abode of purchasing power, sometimes 
used as an asset to store wealth. It is neutral when managed adequately by the governmental au-
thorities. In his ‘restatement’ of quantity theory, Friedman (1956: 21) went as far as to compare 
the uniform relationship between the quantity of money and the general price level to other   
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‘uniformities that form the basis of physical sciences’. As explained above, Friedman and other 
proponents of neo-quantity theory consider the demand for money as a stable function of a few 
objective variables (c.f. Dostaler, 1997: 93-94). People’s taste for money is assumed to be con-
stant over time and space. Friedman’s monetary theory and its variants developed in the second 
half of the twentieth century leave no space for miserliness, compulsions or untargeted asset ac-
cumulation. Today, Friedman’s functional approach rather than Keynes’ vision on money domi-
nates economic thought. Not even Keynes’ followers have put any effort into maintaining any of 
the psychological dimensions of people’s perceptions and behaviour with respect to money. 
 
Summing up, like in microeconomic theory, money appears as a neutral medium of exchange in 
the macroeconomic framework. Early twentieth century economists already recognised the im-
portance of money’s role as a store of wealth for explaining why people wish to hold cash. 
Keynes ([1936] 2009) and his followers explicitly accounted for this second function of money. 
Keynes even argued that people’s desire to accumulate cash may become insatiable in certain 
situations. However, this proposition was relatively quickly wiped out by a number of empirical 
studies, Friedman’s (1956) restatement of quantity theory and the reorientation towards the 
transaction demand for money since the 1960s. Furthermore, Keynes stressed the importance of 
psychological factors for people’s desire to hold money. However, these factors are neither in-
cluded in any of the stylised demand for money functions he described himself nor in the models 
developed by the Keynesian economists. Similar to Keynes, Friedman also acknowledged the 
effects of psychological factors like pessimistic expectations about future incomes and individual 
differences in the importance attached to the non-pecuniary services of money (i.e. liquidity, 
convenience and safety) on people’s demand for money. However, such subjective variables are 
typically absent in the aggregate demand for money function or the (neo-) quantity equation, 
presumably because they are difficult to assess empirically and because most researchers believe 
them to be of little importance at an aggregate level. 
3.3 Behavioural economists on money 
As stressed in the previous section, Keynes’ writings are full of arguments which point to the 
psychological dimensions of people’s perception and behaviour with respect to money. Howev-
er, individual attitudes or personality traits which Keynes suspected to affect people’s consump-
tion, saving and investment decisions are absent in mainstream economics, including both mac-
ro- and microeconomics. According to neoclassical economic theory, the pure accumulation of 
money never yields satisfaction; only the depletion of money and other financial assets increases 
a person’s utility. Surprisingly, not even behavioural economists seem to question the assump-
tion regarding the neutrality of money for people’s consumption and saving behaviour. Apart 
from the broad literature on money illusion (c.f. e.g. Shafir et al., 1997), behavioural economists 
have paid surprisingly little attention to the anomalies in people’s spending behaviour. The stud-
ies which demonstrate that people sometimes think in nominal rather than in real monetary    
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values are too numerous to be comprehensively reviewed in this section. Furthermore, money 
illusion appears to be of limited relevance for the present work which focuses on the role of 
money in contingent valuation studies. Aside from the case where researchers implement a CVM 
survey shortly after a currency change, it is unlikely that money illusion distorts the results of an 
environmental valuation study (cf. Mathieu and Riera, 2010 for an interesting investigation of 
the ‘euro illusion’ in CVM surveys conducted in Spain shortly after the introduction of the new 
currency). Instead of repeating the debates about significance or irrelevance of money illusion in 
real life, this section focuses on two less popular niches of behavioural economic research, 
namely empirical research in behavioural finance conducted in Germany in the 1950s and a more 
recent stream of literature regarding the psychological costs of parting with money. First, the 
early work of Günter Schmölders – a German economists who is mainly known for his work in 
finance and less for his contributions to behavioural economics – on the ‘psychology of money’ 
and its relevance for public finance will be introduced. The second part of this section focuses on 
the so-called pain of paying literature. 
3.3.1 Günter Schmölders’ pioneer work 
In 1966, Schmölders published the first edition of Die Psychologie des Geldes (Schmölders, 
1982). The Psychology of Money and Public Finance (Schmölders, 2006), an English translation 
of Schmölders’ work that appeared 50 years later, contains parts of this first publication to which 
non-German speakers had no access for a long time. However, even in Germany, economists are 
rarely familiar with Schmölders’ psychology-oriented work. The present section therefore focus-
es on introducing Schmölders’ alternative view on monetary economics, on the methods he em-
ployed to account for psychological variables when analysing people’s monetary behaviour as 
well as on some selected results of Schmölders’ pioneering empirical research. 
 In the two books on which this section is based, Schmölders’ (1982, 2006) criticism of the 
macroeconomic models which were used to make forecasts and policy recommendations in the 
1960s is paramount. It is especially expressed in the following citation, ‘The unfortunate state of 
affairs (…) is that authors not only waste much time and energy on such irrelevant considera-
tions as the formalization of money demand, velocity of circulation, income-expenditure formu-
las and the like but also block publication space by splashing their petty squabbles about the im-
portance of quite insignificant parameters or impractical variable definitions all over the pages of 
renowned journals’ (Schmölders, 2006: 94). Unlike most of his colleagues, Schmölders observed 
individual differences in handling money and theorised that there was a noticeable interplay of 
psychological variables and people’s spending, saving, borrowing and investment decisions. He 
considered one of the key assumptions that the proponents of monetary theory made at that time 
as particularly warranted, namely that all individuals in an economy act in the same way, in spite 
of their differences in income (see Schmölders, 2006: 97). According to Schmölders (2006: 91), 
understanding ‘how millions of individual decisions cause the figures of our bank statistics to 
swell or dwindle’ should be an essential element in public finance. ‘Attitudes towards money and 
its part as a symbol are the ‘sesame’ which opens the road to an understanding of inflation or 
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stagnation’ (Schmölders, 2006: 97, emphasis in original). He theorised that people’s behaviour 
with money is systematically affected by character traits and attitudes towards certain forms of 
monetary behaviour. He believed that accounting for groups of people with differing character 
traits and attitudes, including extreme types of consumers like pathological misers and spend-
thrifts, would alter the predictive power of economic models. To underpin his argument, he initi-
ated several household surveys on people’s decisions to spend, save and borrow money. 
Schmölders (1982) repeatedly cited the results of one of these surveys, namely the data from a 
representative sample of 1,050 households in the Federal Republic of Germany, gathered in 1959 
by the Cologne Research Centre for Empirical Social Economy together with the Allensbach 
Institute for Public Opinion Research, throughout three chapters of his first book (Schmölders, 
1982: chapter II, III and IV). 
 Based on this survey, Schmölders (1982) examined the question as to how individual attitudes 
towards saving, psychological character traits like extraversion and self-discipline as well as 
some of the popular character types discussed in the psychoanalytical literature at that time were 
related to people’s monetary behaviour. The associated questionnaire encompassed a great num-
ber of self-report statements which were used to classify respondents according to their attitudes 
towards saving and into clusters of individuals with similar character traits. Naturally, the survey 
also accounted for more than psychological variables, such as disposable household income, 
demographics and the social and economic environment of the respondents. The author was 
aware of the possibility that more objective factors (income, age, household size, etc.) compen-
sated or even completely mediated the psychological personality variables of interest. Therefore, 
he accounted carefully for these demographic variables when analysing the survey data (see 
Schmölders, 1982: 75). One of the key research questions that motivated his work relates to ana-
lysing the predictive power of psychological variables as compared to demographic and social 
variables for spending and saving behaviour and to identify the relationship between these two 
sets of variables (see Schmölders, 2006: 97). 
Elicitation of psychological variables7 
Schmölders’ (1982) accounted for an impressive number of attitudinal questions in his house-
hold surveys. Table 3-1 gives an overview of the items which he used to assess attitudes towards 
saving and the different personality characteristics he wished to identify. The four questions dis-
played in the first column of Table 3-1 were used to classify respondents into groups of people 
with similar levels of thrift. Based on the number of ‘thrifty’ answers a respondent had given, he 
or she fell into one out of five categories reaching from ‘very wasteful’ to ‘very thrifty’. It turned 
out that thriftiness was a decreasing function of income and that the level of thrift systematically 
                                                 
7 It is to be noted that the techniques which Schmölders’ (1982) employed to classify survey respondents according 
to their attitudes towards saving and character traits appear unnecessarily complex from today’s perspective. How-
ever, in the absence of sophisticated statistical software, in a time before the breakthrough of econometrics and be-
fore psychometric scales for the measurement of psychological variables became widespread, Schmölders and col-
leagues probably had no other choice than relying on these, from today’s perspective, partly obsolete methods. 
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increased with the number of people living in a respondent’s household. Hence, differences in 
income and household size had to be taken into account to analyse the effect of thrift on mone-
tary habit (cf. Schmölders, 2006: 73-74). In order to neutralise the correlation between thrift, 
income and household size, Schmölders (1982) applied group-specific rules to divide the sample 
into ‘free spenders’ and ‘penny pinchers’, the former having reported a below average level of 
thrift and the latter an above average level of thrift. For example, large households with a low 
household income had to answer more test questions positively in order to fall into the classifica-
tion of ‘thrifty’ households than small households with a high income. 
 Schmölders (1982) employed 19 items regarding a set of undesirable characteristics and 17 
items relating to virtues to measure personality traits. Each respondent had to tick all items 
which fitted his or her personality out of these two lists. Naturally, these lists did not simply con-
tain words like ‘resentful’, ‘meticulous’ or ‘avaricious’ displayed in Table 3-1; all 36 characteris-
tics were assessed by means of statements which paraphrased the meaning of the traits in a nicer 
sounding way. For example, rather than asking respondents whether they were ‘avaricious’, 
Schmölders (1982: 39, own translation) formulated the following sentence: ‘I allow myself too 
little, some people say that I am stingy’. In a similar way, he accounted for the personality trait 
‘extravagant’ by asking the respondents whether or not they agreed with the statement ‘I am 
somewhat wasteful, I spend my money easily’ (ibid.). It turned out that certain combinations of 
traits were chosen rather frequently across respondents (cf. Schmölders, 1982: 40). Schmölders 
(1982) used these repeatedly coinciding traits to build four broader personality dimensions, 
namely punctilious vs. easy-going, orderly vs. desultory, vigorous vs. weakly and introverted vs. 
extroverted psychological types. For each of these four pairs, he defined a particular classifica-
tion rule. For example, respondents who had ticked at least four items of the left list displayed in 
the second column of Table 3-1 (resentful, meticulous, avaricious, thorough, etc.) but less than 
two items of the right list (extravagant, inconstant, etc.) fell into the ‘punctilious’ cluster, while 
those who ticked more than two items from the punctilious-list list but less than three from the 
easy-going-list self-classified as ‘easy-going’. The eight cluster variables were used to conduct a 
number of statistical tests against other variables. 
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Table 3-1: Psychological variables analysed by Schmölders (1982, 2006) 
Attitudes towards saving Personality characteristics 
1. Would you think that thriftiness is an essential 
and desirable quality of character? 
 
2. Suppose you would like to see a particular movie. 
But as you get to the theatre all except the expen-
sive balcony seats are sold out. Would you still 
see the film or would you rather return some other 
night? 
 
3. Suppose you have just been to visit someone and 
as you want to return home you miss the bus. 
Your alternatives are to wait two hours for the 
next bus or to take a cab and pay about six D-
mark. What would you do? 
 
4. These are three opinions about saving? With 
which one would you agree? 
a. Saving? I think one should enjoy life now 
with the money one has. (…) 
b. In my opinion one should think twice be-
fore spending a penny, one should save as 
much as possible and if necessary give up a 
thing or two in life. 
c. I think it makes a lot of sense to save mon-
ey, but within limits. (…) 
Punctilious 
resentful 
meticulous 
avaricious 
thorough 
austere 
punctual 
vs. Easy-going 
extravagant 
inconstant 
untidy 
light-minded 
erratic 
Introverted  
resentful 
timid 
contemplative 
inward-looking 
vs. Extroverted 
talkative 
vain 
convivial 
Vigorous 
ruthless 
hot-tempered 
smart 
responsible 
energetically 
staunch 
vs. Weakly 
undecided 
compliant 
timid 
contemplative 
Orderly 
self-controlling 
persistent 
energetically 
staunch 
inward-looking 
vs. Desultory 
lazy 
capricious 
untidy 
talkative 
compliant 
hot-tempered 
mercurial 
unpunctual 
inconsistent 
 
Discussion of selected results 
There are at least two interesting outcomes of Schmölder’s (1982, 2006) work which are worth 
mentioning in this section. First, the descriptive statistics regarding the distribution of different 
attitudes towards saving, different personality traits and personality clusters give an impression 
regarding the relevance of a number of exaggerated if not pathological money-related habits in 
the German population in the late 1950s. Second, even though the statistical analysis appears 
somewhat rudimentary as compared to contemporary standards, the study shows that there are 
undeniable relationships between a number of psychological variables and people’s spending and 
saving behaviour. 
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 Regarding saving attitudes, Schmölders (1982: 47-48) derived six groups of consumers: the 
‘very thrifty’ (12%), ‘thrifty’ (19%), ‘wasteful’ (5%) and ‘very wasteful’ (6%) as well as a group 
situated in between of the two extremes (58%). The extreme cases, i.e. the ‘very thrifty’ and the 
‘very wasteful’ represent only small shares of the sample; however, these groups of people are 
also too big to be ignored. Schmölders (1982) did not go into details concerning the question as 
to how ‘very thrifty’ and ‘very wasteful’ consumers would fit the picture of the utility-
maximising consumer or whether they were likely to behave irrationally. For example, he did not 
discuss whether a great importance attached to the principle of thrift and saving was ill-founded. 
However, a reader easily reaches the conclusion that a ‘very thrifty’ individual, i.e. a financially 
well-off respondent who persistently revealed thrifty attitudes when answering the four test ques-
tions (cf. first column of Table 3-1) is likely to have some non-economic motives for saving and 
not just a pronounced taste for future consumption. Some of the ‘very thrifty’ respondents might 
not simply be disciplined savers, but individuals who attach unreasonable importance to the act 
of saving as such. 
 Concerning personality traits, it is noticeable that Schmölders (1982) identified a surprisingly 
high number of avaricious people. 14% of all respondents admitted that they behaved miserly. 
An even greater proportion of 20% described themselves as wasteful (see Schmölders, 1982: 39). 
Again, Schmölders (1982) did not argue that the behaviour of these misers or spendthrifts was 
irrational, unhealthy or even pathological. However, it is striking that the amount of misers – a 
group of people economists typically disregard – was that large in the household survey he con-
sidered. At the same time, these results should not be overestimated. Schmölders (1982) meas-
ured personality traits like miserliness or extravagance by single self-report items. Hence, there 
might be considerable measurement error in the corresponding variables. Some respondents may 
have interpreted the given characteristics differently; others could have mistakenly ticked an 
item that did not apply to their personality. Furthermore, a number of people probably wanted to 
display themselves in a certain way that they thought was desirable.  
 In addition to a detailed overview of descriptive results, Schmölders (1982) also reported the 
results of some inferential statistical tests and drew conclusions concerning the statistical rela-
tionship between attitudes towards saving, the surveyed character traits and trait clusters with 
other variables, including a number of behavioural variables. For example, he showed that the 
monetary habits of thrifty households importantly differed from the habits of their lavish coun-
terparts. As compared to the more wasteful half of the sample, thrifty households were more in-
clined to use calculation when planning their budget and applied more stringent rules for saving; 
they were more likely to look for bargains; and they tended to be generally opposed to taking out 
a credit or to borrow money from friends. In the words of Schmölders (2006: 85), ‘their psycho-
logical alarm is triggered more readily than others when their level of liquid funds falls’. These 
results are particularly interesting, given the fact that the income-adjusted ‘free spenders’ vs. 
‘penny pinchers’ classification was essentially unrelated to social and demographic variables, 
like a person’s residence, religion, gender or age. At the same time, Schmölders (1982) found 
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that attitudes towards saving were systematically correlated with many personality characteris-
tics. For example, high levels of thrift occurred particularly frequently among austere and con-
sistent respondents, while low levels were more frequent among the easy-going, extroverted and 
desultory individuals. Furthermore, the psychological factors systematically affected self-report 
attitudes towards gambling, running up debts and respondents’ self-perceived ability to handle 
their money. For example, people who had self-classified as avaricious and staunch mostly at-
tached high importance to saving, were opposed to gambling, would hardly ever apply for a 
credit and highlighted that they were particularly skilled in handling their money. People who 
had self-classified as wasteful, frivolous and untidy shared very different habits and attitudes. 
These people tended, on average, to behave generously with their money, attached little im-
portance to saving and were less opposed to the idea of borrowing money. Extravagant, shallow, 
untidy and inconsistent respondents more often pretended that they had not been able to put 
money aside during the last two months. By contrast, austere, punctual and efficient respondents 
more often belonged to the group of regular savers. Avaricious, austere and meticulous individu-
als tended to ‘think twice before spending anything, save as much as possible, and feel relaxed 
about denying yourself some things in life’ (cf. question 4 in Table 3-1). Opposed to that, a con-
siderable share of extravagant, easy-going, carefree, vain, inconsistent and lazy respondents stat-
ed that they saw no sense in the idea of saving. Taken together, the survey results show that psy-
chological traits predict money-related principals and habits, notably a household’s saving be-
haviour. Neither income nor age or any other demographic variable outdo these effects. 
 In sum, Schmölders’ (1982) survey results impressively demonstrate that spending, saving 
and borrowing habits greatly differ across the different clusters of consumers. These differences 
are particularly striking when comparing extreme cases like misers and spendthrifts or very 
thrifty and very wasteful individuals. They also indicate that potentially ill-founded attitudes 
towards non-spending, i.e. extreme thriftiness and miserliness, are more widely distributed in the 
general population than one may expect, given the complete negligence of such attitudes in 
mainstream economic theory. Schmölders (1982) found his expectations regarding the im-
portance of psychological factors for actual monetary decisions to be confirmed. He concluded 
that monetary behaviour was not a simple function of income but an expression of a broad set of 
psychological factors and even called for ‘a revision and gradual rewriting of monetary theory’ 
(Schmölders, 2006: 116). As everyone knows, such a revision has never taken place and Günter 
Schmölders’ research on the psychology of money is largely unknown in contemporary         
economics. 
3.3.2 The Pain of Paying 
While Günter Schmölders called for a revision of the macroeconomic framework, similar argu-
ments as those proposed by this German economist can be found in more micro-oriented behav-
ioural economic literature published in the U.S. several decades later. The observation that pur-
chasing decisions are not always made in the way as predicted by neoclassical economic theory 
gave space to extensive research in behavioural economics. From the neoclassical perspective, a 
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consumer who is faced with the situation of spending x€ on a particular good should compare the 
marginal utility accruing from the consumption of this good to the opportunity costs of the pur-
chase, i.e. the forgone benefit of spending x€ on something else. In practise, many consumers do 
not consider the opportunity costs of their choices spontaneously (cf. Frederick et al., 2009). 
Some behavioural economists have proposed that opportunity costs are often neglected because 
benefit-cost calculations are cognitively too demanding in many situations. Nevertheless, most 
people are able to manage their budget rather well. The stream of literature considered in this 
section suggests that many people rely on some negative feelings related to the act of spending 
money rather than explicitly thinking of opportunity costs when making purchases. The psycho-
logical cost of parting with money has become popular as the ‘pain of paying’ (PoP), a concept 
first proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998). The latter two authors based their hypotheses 
on Thaler’s (1985) framework on mental accounting, especially the concept of so-called ‘trans-
action (dis)utility’ (ibid: 210). Transaction utility refers to the perceived benefits of making a 
‘deal’, i.e. paying a particular price for a desired good. Transaction utility is detangled from any 
utility accruing from consuming this good and only ‘depends on the price the individual pays 
compared to some reference price’ (ibid: 205). Transaction utility will be high when individuals 
think that they have made a good deal, i.e. when the price they actually paid is substantially low-
er than the regular price that the individual expects to pay for the good in question (cf. Thaler, 
1999). Transaction utility will be negative when the actual price exceeds the reference price. The 
PoP evidently resembles the concept of transaction utility. Nevertheless, while the latter is 
viewed as being mainly determined by an individual’s perception whether or not the price of a 
desired good is ‘fair’ (see Thaler, 1985: 205), the PoP relates to more stable psychological fac-
tors, like an individuals’ personality and attitudes towards spending money in general. 
 Much research has focused on the question whether the psychological cost of spending causes 
consumers to behave rationally or whether it systematically distorts their consumption choices. 
Rick et al. (2008) suggested that the PoP is a good proxy for opportunity costs in many cases. In 
other words, relying on the PoP often leads to the same spending decision as thinking of the next 
best use of the amount of money necessary to be spent in order to obtain a particular good. How-
ever, some people have a chronic tendency to experience too much pain, i.e. they generally over-
estimate the opportunity costs. Others feel too little pain, i.e. they mostly underestimate the op-
portunity costs of their choices, according to Rick et al. (2008). The authors called those who 
feel high levels of pain when parting with money ‘tightwads’ and their counterparts ‘spend-
thrifts’. To make the degree of pain people experience when making purchases measurable and 
to test their hypothesis, they developed a short psychometric inventory. This tightwads-
spendthrift questionnaire, which is displayed in Table 3-2, has been employed in several empiri-
cal studies since its publication. Researchers have used the tightwad-spendthrift scale to classify 
respondents into different clusters of consumers (e.g. tightwads, spendthrifts and un-conflicted 
consumers, cf. Rick et al., 2008) or to construct a continuous variable that measures an individu-
al’s tendency to experience the PoP. 
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 In the initial study, Rick et al. (2008) classified 24% of almost 10,000 survey participants as 
tightwads, 15% as spendthrifts and the remaining respondents as un-conflicted consumers. Once 
again, these figures should not be overestimated because they critically depend on the assump-
tion regarding the cut-off levels, i.e. the score a respondent has to reach to fall into one of the 
three categories. Rick et al. (2008) employed a classification rule that may be too weak (strict), 
so that the reported share of tightwads is higher (lower) than the actual share. In spite of such 
methodological limitations, the study provides some interesting relationships between tightwad-
dism and a number of economic variables. Rick et al. (2008) showed that high levels of tight-
waddism predict higher saving-account balances but that scores on the tightwad-spendthrift scale 
are unrelated to income. Based on these results, Rick et al. (2008) concluded that the purchase 
decisions of tightwads are not constraint by their actual budget constraint but by their 
(mis)perceived ability to spend. In other words, tightwads tend to overestimate the magnitude of 
prices and to underrate their financial resources, causing them to act stingy. 
 Rick (2008) had a closer look at the level of psychological pain when making different kinds 
of purchases. Using the responses of 8,000 survey participants, he found that tightwads felt more 
pain than spendthrifts in the case of 21 out of 24 different types of expenditure. While tightwads 
reported to feel more pain when spending money for things like clothes, books, beverages, gifts, 
vacation or their favourite hobby, there was no significant difference regarding the level of pain 
perceived by tightwads on the one hand and spendthrifts on the other in the case of donations, 
health care and life insurance. These results indicate that although high levels of PoP predict 
frugal or zero spending across many situations, the effect of the psychological cost of parting 
with money may be out-done when it comes to investments (medical check-ups, buying insur-
ance) and altruistic behaviour (donations). In addition to the outcome of the two surveys cited 
above, the results of a number of brain scanning experiments have added to the relevance of the 
PoP. Knutson et al. (2007), for example, found that the region of the brain which is active when 
people experience distress is often also activated when people observe prices. In the case of its 
activation, participants of the brain scanning experiments were less likely to buy (i.e. to click on 
a ‘purchase’ button on a computer screen after having been shown a certain product and its 
price). These results add to the hypothesis that pain is at work when people decide on their pur-
chases and that this pain systematically influences spending decisions. 
 Apart from these insights, many questions regarding the PoP are still unanswered. For exam-
ple, it is not quite clear whether the PoP is constant for every purchase situation or if its intensity 
varies with the price of a product. As highlighted by Rick (2013), it is plausible that the PoP in-
creases with a good’s price. However, the results of brain-scanning studies contradict this hy-
pothesis; they reveal that the intensity of the PoP is individual- but neither price- nor situation-
specific. Furthermore, it is not clear how the consideration of opportunity costs and the PoP re-
late to each other. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) suggested that the PoP was a substitute for the 
consideration of opportunity costs. In other words, they proposed that a consumer thinks of the 
next best use of his or her money or relies on the PoP when making a purchase decision. The 
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results reported by Frederick et al. (2009) suggest, however, that people who score high on the 
tightwad-spendthrift scale are also more likely to actively think of opportunity costs. As argued 
by Rick (2013), tightwads might feel more inclined to perceive prices in terms of opportunity 
costs. Accordingly, the PoP seems to be a function of opportunity cost consideration. Further-
more, it may be the case that tightwads and spendthrifts systematically differ in terms of their 
preferences, for example that tightwads generally experience less pleasure from consumption 
than spendthrifts. Another and in terms of economic theory less compatible explanation could be 
that some pathologic attitude towards money is at work. Like a miser, a tightwad may attach 
anomalous importance to the accumulation of money and therefore behave extremely reluctant 
when it comes to spending money. 
Table 3-2: The tightwad-spendthrift questionnaire (Rick et al., 2008) 
1. Which of the following description fits you better? 
O O O O O O O O O O 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tightwad (difficulty spending 
money) 
About the same or neither 
Spendthrift (difficulty con-
trolling spending) 
 
2. [Description of A) a spendthrift and B) a tightwad] 
A) How well does the first description fit you? That is, do you have trouble limiting your spending? 
B) How well does the second description fit you? That is, do you have trouble spending money? 
O O O O O 
(1) 
Never 
(2) 
Rarely 
(3) 
Sometimes 
(4) 
Often 
(5) 
Always 
 
3. Following is a scenario describing the behavior of two shoppers. After reading about each shopper, please 
answer the question that follows. 
(…) Mr. A sees that the store has a “one-day-only-sale” where everything is priced 10-60% off. He realizes 
he doesn’t need anything, yet can’t resist and ends up spending almost $100 on stuff. 
(…) Mr. B sees that the store has a “one-day-only-sale” where everything is priced 10-60% off. He figures he 
can get great deals on many items that he needs, yet the thought of spending the money keeps him from buy-
ing the stuff. 
In terms of your own behavior, who are you more similar to, Mr. A or Mr. B? 
O O O O O 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mr. A About the same or neither Mr. B 
 
 
Taken together, the two streams of behavioural research presented in this section point to the 
existence of people with ill-founded attitudes towards spending money. Although Keynes (1936) 
touched upon similar topics, psychological variables like exaggerated thriftiness, greed, miserli-
ness or tightwaddism have never found their place in neoclassical economic theory. They are 
typically considered as ‘too psychological’ or even irrelevant because only an insignificant share 
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of the population can be expected to fall into the categories of consumers whose attitudes chal-
lenge the economic concept of money. However, the empirical research by behavioural econo-
mists shows that a person’s disposition to spend money in general, reaching from extremely 
wasteful to pathologically stingy, matters importantly for his or her spending and saving deci-
sions. Furthermore, the share of people with potentially abnormal attitudes towards spending 
money appears to be small but is significant in the empirical studies reviewed in this section. As 
already mentioned, these studies are likely to overestimate the actual share of misers within the 
general population. Nevertheless, accounting for individual differences in the disposition to 
spend money in general may contribute to a better understanding of people’s money-related be-
haviour as compared to the standard approach, which consists of analysing economic decisions 
in terms of representative households that differ merely in terms of their financial resources. 
 
Summary of chapter 3 
This chapter illustrated the economic perspective on money. As stressed throughout the different 
sections, economists have traditionally treated money as a neutral medium of exchange. Accord-
ing to the exchange theory on the origins of money, that most students in economics get to know 
during their first study term, money emerged as a universally accepted means of payment which 
reduced the inconveniences of a barter economy. Although historical facts do not fully sustain 
the medium of exchange theory and alternative explanations regarding the origins of money have 
been proposed, this theory still dominates economic literature on money. Similar to the receipts 
emitted by the goldsmith-bankers in the medium of exchange theory, the value of modern money 
does not arise from its material value but is rooted in the fact that people can exchange it against 
virtually any desired object. Economic theory correctly accounts for this technical fact and pos-
tulates that rational individuals would never value the possession of money as such but merely 
the things that money can buy. Money is neutral in the sense that it does not affect an individu-
al’s preferences over goods and services. This neutrality postulate is a key element in both mi-
croeconomic and macroeconomic theory. In microeconomics, money takes the secondary role of 
a numéraire in which prices and income are expressed. Individuals exchange their money income 
in order to satisfy their needs and wishes, but they do not gain any utility when leaving their fi-
nancial resources untouched. From the macroeconomic perspective, neutrality means that a 
change in the quantity of money has no lasting effects on the real variables such as output, real 
income and employment. An increased supply of coins and notes by the central bank, for exam-
ple, can only result in an increase in the general price level and higher nominal incomes, because 
rational economic agents will spend these coins and notes. In macroeconomics, many debates 
have centred on the question as to how people’s demand for money can be correctly determined. 
Although there are diverging views regarding the key determinants of people’s choice to hold a 
certain proportion of their wealth in the liquid form, researchers typically employ some simple 
function of a few objective variables, most importantly income levels and interest rates, to assess 
monetary demand. 
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 One of the first economists who openly expressed his criticism towards the macroeconomic 
framework was Günter Schmölders. This German economist called for analysing individual de-
cisions in more detail in order to make more correct predictions regarding people’s money-
related behaviour. Using data from representative surveys of Western German households in the 
1950s, he showed that attitudes towards saving, personality characteristics like miserliness and 
broader traits such as conscientiousness had by far more explanatory power for people’s spend-
ing and saving decisions than disposable income and other variables which had been traditionally 
considered in economic analysis. More recent empirical research adds to the relevance of 
Schmölders’ arguments. The pain of paying literature, for example, impressively shows how 
individual differences in the psychological cost of parting with money affect people’s consump-
tion behaviour. In line with the results of Schmölders’ surveys in post-war Germany, Scott Rick 
and other representatives of the pain of paying literature found a relatively large share of people 
within the general population who seem to attach unconventionally high importance to non-
spending. Based on these recurring empirical findings, it can be speculated that the neutrality 
postulate – money is never desired for its own sake but for the sake of the things it can buy – 
does not always hold in practise. Misers, penny-pinchers or tightwads may violate this postulate 
in the sense that they tend to hoard their liquid funds, that they save for the sake of saving and 
that their utility increases with the amount of money they retain rather than with the amount of 
money they spend. The psychological literature on money introduced in the next chapter further 
adds to this supposition. Personality theorists and social psychologists have extensively investi-
gated money-related topics such as ill-founded perceptions of money and wealth and some peo-
ple’s neurotic tendency to retain their financial resources.  
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4 Money in psychology 
In this chapter the psychological perspective on money will be introduced. The main focus lies 
on two psychological paradigms that have been applied to people’s perception of and behaviour 
with money, namely psychoanalysis and social psychology. Before entering into more detail 
regarding the role of money in these two branches of psychology, the scope and history of psy-
chological research on money as well a number of definitions, including the psychological con-
cept of money, shall be narrowed down. 
 Nowadays research on money appears to be as popular among psychologists as among econ-
omists. Recent volumes of the Journal of Consumer Psychology or the Journal of Consumer 
Research contain plenty of articles which explore people’s perceptions of currency and prices, 
people’s behaviour with their financial resources and people’s money-related emotions (cf. e.g. 
Garbinsky et al., 2014, Lasaleta et al., 2014, Lee and Tsai, 2014, Hansen et al., 2013, Muro and 
Noseworthy, 2013, Su and Gao, 2014, Xie et al., 2014). However, this great interest in money-
related topics seems to be a rather recent development. The first comprehensive book on money, 
The Psychology of Money by Adrian Furnham and Michael Argyle, was published in its first 
edition in 1998 only. In the very first section of this book the two authors point to the lack of 
systematic research concerned with money in psychology at that time. They also highlight that 
there is no grand psychological theory of money. Rather than having developed specific theories 
and models as can be found in economics, researchers applied several psychological paradigms 
to money and used them to describe people’s behaviour with and their perceptions of money (see 
Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 7). Psychoanalysis and Piagetian development theories, for example, 
have been applied to analyse the psychological underpinning of money-related pathologies and 
to develop personality typologies; in experimental psychology people’s perception and reactions 
to currency, prices, monetary rewards and money reminders have been investigated; social psy-
chologists have paid attention to the classification and measurement of money-related attitudes, 
beliefs and habits (ibid). These fields of research are of course interlinked. The classification and 
measurement tools, for example, were developed based on psychoanalytical theories, on clinical 
reports and results from experiments concerning children’s and adults’ perceptions and behav-
iour with respect to money. Furthermore, the validity of a number of psychoanalytical theories 
and typologies have been tested and further developed based on empirical evidence from survey 
research. 
 Furnham and Argyle (2000: 34) describe the purpose of psychological research on money as 
follows, ‘Psychological theories of money neither assume monetary rationality nor rejoice in the 
countless examples of the ir- and a-rationality of ordinary people with respect to their money. 
They have, however, set themselves the task, of trying to understand how ordinary people ac-
quire and demonstrate their everyday monetary attitudes, beliefs and behaviours.’ Hence, the 
authors highlight that most psychologists do not aim to refute the economic concept of money. 
However, as will be shown in the following sections, certain forms of behaviours and attitudes 
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which are explored in the psychological literature on money are at odds with the economic con-
cept of money as a neutral medium of exchange.  
 Moreover, the purely functional definition of money used in economics is often criticised and 
expanded (c.f. e.g. Furnham and Argyle, 2000, Belk and Wallendorf, 1990, Mitchell and Mickel, 
1999, Lane, 1993). Psychologists generally agree with economists that people perceive and use 
money mainly as a medium of exchange, a store of value and a unit of account; but many of 
them highlight that there are also other ‘sides of the coin’ (Furnham, 1984: 501, Goldberg and 
Lewis, 1978: 81), ‘more emotional, qualitative meanings of money’ (Belk and Wallendorf, 1990: 
36) or that money should be treated ‘as a symbol as well as a sign pointing to price or exchange 
value’ (Lane, 1993: 114) to better understand people’s spending and saving behaviour. While 
many people perceive money as a pure tool – a medium of exchange and store of value – money 
may symbolise things like security, power, love or freedom in addition to its economic uses for 
others, according to the psychological literature on money (cf. Lea and Webley, 2006). In that 
sense, money is mainly worth what it can buy, but it also has great symbolic value. 
 The symbolic meaning of money is reflected in a person’s attitudes towards money and some-
times translates into pathological forms of behaviour such as compulsive saving, obsessive and 
uncontrolled spending. These forms of uncommon behaviour are often called ‘irrational’ in psy-
chological literature (see e.g. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978). It is to be noted that although the term 
‘irrational’ is frequently used in the psychological literature on money, its meaning is rarely ex-
plained. It can be speculated that in the psychological literature the word is used in a broader 
sense than in neoclassical microeconomic theory. In microeconomics an individual is said to 
behave rationally as long as its choices are consistent and certain assumptions concerning an 
individual’s preference ordering are met.8 Similar definitions are mostly absent in the psycholog-
ical literature. Lane (1993), however, who addressed the question whether certain money atti-
tudes interfere with the economic concept of the rational consumer, proposed a definition of psy-
chological rationality. He defined consumption choices which lead to long-term satisfaction as 
rational and those that merely yield ‘neurotic gains’ (Lane, 1993: 104) but preclude long-term 
satisfaction as irrational. This psychological definition of rationality is partly different from the 
economic one. Addiction, for example, typically translates into consistent choices and therefore 
falls into the class of rational choices in economics. At the same time, addiction typically does 
not yield long-term satisfaction; therefore, an addict has to be put into the category of irrational 
individuals when applying the psychological definition of rationality. Note that; in what follows 
in this section, I will broadly adapt the psychological terminology, rather than using the word 
‘irrational’ in the economic sense. 
                                                 
8 In the standard consumer theory an individual’s tastes or preferences are described by a set of axioms. If the three 
‘rationality axioms’ (Frör, 2007: 53), namely reflexivity, completeness and transitivity, hold, an individual is said to 
make consistent choices among alternative consumption bundles, i.e. his or her ranking of alternatives is logically 
consistent. Illogical behaviour such as choosing coffee over tea, tea over juice but juice over coffee are ruled out by 
the transitivity axiom. 
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 As already mentioned, the psychological research on money-related behaviour and its psycho-
logical underpinnings has a relatively short history. There is hardly any literature prior to the 
1970s available. An exception is Freud’s ([1908] 1976), certainly disputable, perspective on 
money within his description of the anal character and the work of his fellow-travellers (see sec-
tion 4.1.1). However, the relevance and the validity of the so-called theories developed by psy-
choanalysts in the first half of the twentieth century must be doubted. Early psychoanalytical 
studies on money all lack a sound empirical underpinning; they are based on clinical reports and 
case-studies, but their validity has, in most cases, never been assessed in large-scale population 
surveys. More systematic research on people’s money-related attitudes is a recent development. 
Some authors attempted to provide explanations for the former lack of research on money in 
psychology. A number of researchers described money as a ‘taboo topic’ in psychology (c.f. 
Trachtman, 1999, Furnham and Argyle, 2000, Yamauchi and Templer, 1982). This does not 
mean that psychologists had some inhibition against addressing the topic of money but mainly 
refers to many people’s reluctance towards talking about money-related issues like disclosing 
their income or admitting socially inacceptable money-related habits. Accordingly, doing empir-
ical research on money, especially by means of interviews, is complicated by the fact that many 
people dislike talking about money. Furthermore, some researchers stressed that in the past many 
psychologists tended to assume that the analysis of money-related behaviour belongs to the do-
main of economists (c.f. Lindgren, 1999, Furnham and Argyle, 2000). A similar assertion was 
made by the German economist Schmölders (1982) who was very familiar with the psychologi-
cal research at the time. According to him, the majority of (twentieth century-) psychologists 
lacked a deeper understanding of economic theory so that they hesitated to approach the presum-
able economic topic. Nowadays, the latter kinds of arguments sound rather obsolete. Behavioural 
economics and economic psychology have become widely recognised scientific branches and 
students enrolled in economics or psychology usually have to take seminars in the sister disci-
pline. The rapprochement of the two disciplines in the last decades is certainly one of the reasons 
why money has become such a popular topic in psychology. 
 The present chapter introduces selected psychological literature on people’s perceptions of 
and behaviour with money. This literature review is limited to those psychological traditions 
dealing with individual difference in money-related personality variables and attitudes, because 
the latter are of particular interest from the microeconomic perspective. Firstly the work of a 
number of clinicians on money pathology will be reviewed. Such a detailed consideration of the 
obviously constable psychoanalytical literature is considered as indispensable for this disserta-
tion. This is because research on money attitudes in the general population, presented in the sec-
ond part of this chapter, greatly draws from the reports, theories and typologies which have been 
developed by personality researchers with psychoanalytical background. As will become clear 
over the course of this chapter, the work of social psychologists interested in the topic of money 
consists to great extent of empirically verifying the theories and typologies proposed by clini-
cians. 
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4.1 Money pathologies 
4.1.1 Psychoanalysis of money: theories and methods 
Psychoanalysis was the very first psychological tradition that was applied to explore people’s 
behaviour with money (see Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 47). It consists of identifying and de-
scribing types of people that differ in their habits of making and using money and explaining 
why they do so. Psychoanalytical research on money follows theories and techniques that were 
originally developed by Sigmund Freud (c.f. Lea et al., 1987). 
 According to the Freudian perspective, behaviour is always motivated but motivations are 
often unconscious. Neurotic symptoms and pathological behaviour are viewed as consequences 
of early childhood experiences. Based on intensive research on people suffering mental disor-
ders, Freud developed a theory of general personality characteristics (see Gerrig and Zimbardo, 
2010: 515). This theory postulates that character traits are rooted in primitive biological impuls-
es. Freud viewed adult attitudes as a product of eroticism and of obsessional beliefs people de-
velop during childhood (see Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 133). Later on, psychoanalysts largely 
abandoned Freud’s reasoning. They focussed less on sexual drives and on childhood experiences 
but highlighted the importance of social variables and experiences at all stages of life for person-
ality development (see Gerrig and Zimbardo, 2010: 521). A similar development can also be 
observed when reviewing the psychological literature on money. While contemporary research 
focusses on circumstantial factors as the main determinants of people’s money attitudes, primi-
tive impulses and childhood experience were in the centre of debates at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
 Freud ([1908] 1976) propagated a first psychoanalytical theory of money in his famous article 
Character and Anal Erotism. A particularly popular element of the Freudian theory of the love 
of money is the symbolic equation ‘money = faeces’. One may agree with Gourgé (2001) who 
noted that it is no wonder that psychological approaches to money have been ignored in other 
disciplines, and especially in economics, due to this fairly shocking notion. Other scholars 
stressed that it is ‘somewhat strange’ that the Freudian theory of the love of money ‘which gave 
rise to many discussions and controversies among psychoanalysts and other social scientists, is 
almost completely ignored by economists’ (Dostaler, 1997: 91).9 Even though Freud’s theory of 
money has been broadly ignored in other sciences, it did have considerable impact on more sys-
tematic money-related psychological research in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
following paragraphs therefore provide a brief summary of this theory. 
 As summarised by Lea et al. (1987) the main idea of the psychoanalytical approach to money 
consists of relating money-related pathologies to children’s anal behaviour. Psychologists ob-
served that when parents start toilet-training with their offspring the child gains, for the first time 
in life, some control and power over them: The child gets praise for clean defecation and can 
                                                 
9 By ‘almost ignored’ Dostaler (1997) makes reference to Keynes whose work was evidently influenced by Freud 
(see also Dostaler, 2000). 
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provoke angry reactions of its parents by behaving inappropriately with its faeces, for example 
by retaining them. Freud ([1908] 1976) theorised that these two forms of anal behaviour translate 
into financial behaviour at later stages of life. Thrift is an unconscious outcome of the pleasure of 
retaining faeces and wasteful spending is related to a child’s pleasure of eliminating its first pos-
session, i.e. faeces, according to this theory. Furthermore, attraction to money stems from a 
child’s fascination about its faeces. As noted by Furnham and Argyle (2000) the Freudian ap-
proach suggests that pathological forms of monetary behaviour stem from an early traumatisa-
tion during toilet-training. Hoarding behaviour of misers is compared to a child’s refusal to defe-
cate when asked to do so by its parents. Spendthrifts, in contrast, recall the praise they got from 
their parents when appropriately eliminating their faeces. They wastefully spend their money in 
the hope of winning other people’s affection such as they experienced it when submitting them-
selves to parental authority. Thus, Freud’s theory states that money is an unconscious equivalent 
of faeces and establishes a link between money and psychopathology (c.f. Trachtman, 1999). 
 Freud’s ideas are questioned and criticised by most contemporary psychologists (see Gerrig 
and Zimbardo, 2010: 520). Freud never made an attempt to empirically verify the propagated 
effects of child rearing practise on people’s behaviour with money. Still, certain components of 
the Freudian theory of the love of money have had considerable impact on the development of 
personality theories (ibid.). In the course of the twentieth century, Freud’s theory of the love of 
money has been further developed, especially by Freud’s close associate Ferenczi ([1914] 1976), 
and has become more plausible and acceptable than in its initial ‘money=faeces’ form. As sum-
marised in Yamauchi and Templer (1982) and Yamauchi (1982) there has been always some 
agreement with Freud’s claims among personality theorists. Many of them reported that some 
people feel inclined to hoard their money to overcome feelings of anxiety and of inferiority; that 
wealth accumulation is related to the wish of experiencing the same sense of power and respect 
one has experienced as a child; and that behaviour with money reflects a person’s need for 
achievement. In the 1970s and 1980s personality theorists continued to stick to the Freudian tra-
dition of explaining differences in people’s behaviour with money as being rooted in early child-
hood experiences (cf. section 4.1.2). According to them, a child’s relationship with its parents, 
learnt behaviours and taboos particularly matter for the development of attitudes towards money 
in later periods of life. Furthermore, and also in line with the Freudian approach, studies of 
pathological behaviour have been frequently used to formulate theories that explain more com-
mon behaviour with money. 
4.1.2 Typologies of money pathologies 
A potentially more convincing and useful concept than Freud’s theory of the love of money are 
money-related personality-typologies. A number of psychologists made attempts to categorise 
people into several ‘money-types’. Based on clinical observations, they investigated what money 
symbolises to people and how this symbolism translates into different attitudes and habits. Two 
frequently cited examples for money-related personality typologies are those proposed by 
Goldberg and Lewis (1978) and by Forman (1987). Goldberg and Lewis (1978) introduced sev-
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eral money-types such as the ‘compulsive saver’, the ‘manipulator’, the ‘love buyer’ and the 
‘freedom buyer’ to categorise various money-related pathologies. Forman (1987) distinguished 
between the ‘miser’, the ‘spendthrift’, the ‘tycoon’, the ‘bargain hunter’ and the ‘gambler’ to 
describe neurotic money-types. According to Furnham and Argyle (2000), both typologies are 
evidently inspired by the psychoanalytical (Freudian) approach to money. It should be noted, 
however, that these typologies were published in books whose titles reveal that they were written 
for the broad public and not exclusively for scientific purpose: Money Madness: The Psychology 
of Saving, Spending, Loving, and Hating Money (Goldberg and Lewis, 1978) and Mind over 
Money: Curing your Financial Headaches with Moneysanity (Forman, 1987). Still, these two 
typologies build the basis for subsequent research on money attitudes in the general population. 
Due to their great relevance for the development of psychometric money attitude measures the 
respective taxonomies will be introduced in more detail in this section. 
Goldberg and Lewis’ typology 
Based on clinical observations Goldberg and Lewis (1978) identified four common psychologi-
cal meanings of money, namely security, power, love and freedom. Security, power, love and 
freedom are common needs that people try to satisfy. According to the authors, many people 
associate these needs immediately with financial security, financial power, financial freedom and 
the supposed possibility to buy other people’s appreciation and love. Money therefore works as a 
tool to fulfil these needs. Some people use money to promote or satisfy a feeling of security, for 
example by accumulating it (ibid: 85). Money can also be used to buy importance, domination, 
control and hence works as a means to acquire power (ibid: 88). Furthermore, certain people use 
money to overcome their feeling of being unloved by trying to buy other people’s affection (ibid: 
93). Finally, and maybe most plausibly, money symbolises freedom to people. Money is often 
seen as the means that allows people to satisfy their dreams, to buy and to do what they want to 
do (ibid: 96). Some people have an unusually strong want to satisfy one particular need. The 
exaggeration of one specific need can translate into irrational10 habits in acquiring, spending or 
saving money. In the psychoanalytical tradition Goldberg and Lewis (1978) stressed that beliefs 
and behaviour with respect to money are rooted in unconscious infantile feelings. According to 
the authors, abnormal attitudes towards money are particularly likely to be found among people 
who have experienced emotional hardship during their childhood. For example, exaggerated 
needs for security and power often stem from unconscious fear of being left alone and feelings of 
helplessness. People who were offered gift and money rather than affection and love by their 
parents are more likely to develop a more intensive need for love than others. Finally, strong 
dependence on the parents experienced during childhood may translate into the wish to be finan-
cially independent from others, according to the authors. 
                                                 
10 Like many other psychologists, Goldberg and Lewis (1978) lack to provide a proper definition of this term. Later 
interpretations of their book suggest that a person’s behaviour should be classified as irrational when it leads to 
immediate neurotic gains but not to long-term satisfaction (cf. Lane 1993).  
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 Goldberg and Lewis (1978) proposed a typology that classifies people according to the domi-
nant meaning they attach to money and into subcategories based on their money-related habits. 
In the following, the four meanings of money introduced in Money Madness will be considered 
in more detail and some of the corresponding money-types11 shall be briefly introduced. 
 
Money as a symbol for security: Goldberg and Lewis (1978) refer to people who exaggerate 
their need for financial security as so-called security collectors. They describe this type of person 
as follows: ‘Distrust is the cornerstone of the security collector – distrust of people, of the world, 
of the future. The possible exception is money. Money is considered the most trustworthy of all 
commodities; not because one can depend on its purchasing power but because the possession of 
it makes the anxious owner feel safer. The frightened, insecure person needs most of all to feel 
safe. If dependency upon parents or others in authority does not provide a feeling of protection 
and security, the child learns to distrust people and to seek something else to rely on. Frequently, 
that something else is money. If having money reduces anxiety by making the person feel less 
dependent on others, money may replace people as a potential source of security’ (Goldberg and 
Lewis, 1978: 102-103, emphasis added). 
 Furthermore, people who see the possession of money as a form of security live in permanent 
fear of financial loss (ibid: 103). Fear and distrust prevent these persons from enjoying goods 
and services money could otherwise buy. Instead, they behave with their money in a way to fight 
their feelings of emotional insecurity. Often, but not always, they minimise their spending to an 
unusual extent and hoard as much money as possible. More precisely, Goldberg and Lewis 
(1978), referring to multiple case studies of patients suffering emotional insecurity, differentiate 
between the following three security-obsessed types: 
 The compulsive saver (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 104-108) is the first stereotype of a 
security-obsessed person. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) describe the corresponding behaviour as 
an obsessive preoccupation with money and an illogical extreme of miserliness. The habits of the 
compulsive saver differ from usual saving behaviour. Money is not saved for realistic emergen-
cies; neither is it saved for future purchases. Instead, saving money is ‘an end in itself’ (ibid: 
104). Retaining their money makes compulsive savers feel relieved while spending money 
makes them anxious. In any situation, and independently of the purchase, spending money is a 
painful experience for the compulsive saver. Furthermore, the compulsion to save money is insa-
tiable. The amount of money saved is never enough to make the person feel emotionally secure; 
the more money is acquired, the higher the fear of losing it gets. People who compulsively save 
their money are mostly unhappy and sometimes physically ill persons. According to the authors, 
                                                 
11 Goldberg and Lewis (1978) define two to four money-types for each psychological meaning of money. These 
money-types are described with different degrees of precision and not all of them appear to represent an uncommon 
view or use of money. For example, the authors list the ‘fanatical collector’ as one of the stereotypes in the security 
category. This type of person tends to collect all kinds of items in order to satisfy his or her need for emotional secu-
rity. However, it is not quite clear how money is linked to this form of pathological behaviour. For this reason, only 
some of the money-types, namely those who directly use their financial resources to bolster a particular feeling, will 
be considered in this section. 
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the paramount preoccupation of losing money prevents them from enjoying life. Furthermore, 
compulsive savers hardly have friends. Their compulsion can go as far as losing sight of their 
health. Although they actually have enough money, they are even parsimonious when it comes to 
basic needs such as nourishment and medication. 
 The Self-denier (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 108-111) is the second pathological type 
within the security category. At first glance, the behaviour of the self-denier appears to be similar 
to compulsive saving. Like compulsive savers, self-deniers tend to neglect their personal health, 
are extremely thrifty in terms of personal consumption and suffer from a permanent preoccupa-
tion with saving money. Again, their saving habits are by no means rational; even in retirement 
self-deniers do not use up the amounts of money they have saved over the years. However, and 
in contrast to compulsive saving, self-denying often goes together with rather generous behav-
iour towards others. While self-deniers are extremely reluctant to spend money for personal con-
sumption, they may spend even considerable sums of money on family members, friends or give 
it to good causes. Spending money on oneself is a painful experience because the self-denier 
feels guilty over exorbitantly enjoying his or her life; spending money on others, in contrast, can 
be enjoyed. Thus, unlike compulsive saving, the mostly miserly behaviour of self-deniers does 
not result from an addiction to money possession but from a feeling of guilt of personally con-
suming goods that money can buy. In contrast to compulsive savers, self-deniers may enjoy 
spending money under certain circumstances, namely when they purchase gifts for other people. 
 Finally, an exaggeration of the security meaning of money can translate into compulsive bar-
gain hunting (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 111-114). This third form of behaviour consists of 
extreme price awareness in combination with an ignorance of the quality or usefulness of objects 
purchased. The bargain hunter retains his or her money fiercely but spends it frivolously after 
having successfully negotiated the price. Satisfaction of a purchase does not relate to the com-
modity bought but exclusively to the amount of money saved when acquiring it (the difference 
between the announced price and the paid price). The bargain hunter tends to spend a lot of time 
looking for offers he or she considers as good deals, like products at sale. The decision of mak-
ing a particular purchase is hardly motivated by a trade-off between usefulness of a commodity 
and its cost but linked to an exclusive consideration of price. ‘Such a person may buy six shirts at 
five dollars apiece and hardly ever wear them because of their poor quality rather than buy two 
fifteen-dollar shirts that are well-made and would look attractive for a long time. The feeling of 
triumph accompanying such a purchase validates the irrationality of the act’ (ibid: 112). Emo-
tional security is thus altered by the satisfaction the person gains from making bargains. 
 According to Goldberg and Lewis (1978: 103), the common point of compulsive savers, self-
deniers and bargain hunters is that these people find ‘a feeling of safety in money to offset a feel-
ing of emotional insecurity’. Compulsive savers fight their feelings of emotional insecurity by 
hoarding money. Self-deniers bolster their feelings of safety by abstaining from spending money 
on personal consumption. Bargain hunters do so by spending money on products which are re-
duced in price. The authors also highlight that the individual security-oriented money-types are 
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not mutually exclusive. Persons that suffer from emotional insecurity frequently show character-
istics of more than one type. Thus, it is possible that a person tries to minimise his or her expend-
itures to an unusual extent but occasionally spends huge sums of money on things that are on 
sale or on gifts. 
 
Money as a symbol of power: Power-oriented people feel strong and powerful when having and 
spending a lot of money. Losing money, on the other hand, makes them feel weak and helpless 
(see Goldberg and Lewis 1978: 26). According to Goldberg and Lewis (1978: 27) so-called 
power grabbers have trouble in dealing with others, they tend to react ‘mechanically or superfi-
cially’ towards their social environment. A common characteristic of power grabbers is their 
wish to dominate people in their social sphere and to explore the weaknesses of others while at 
the same time denying any kind of personal weakness. Money serves them as a means to control 
and dominate other people. The authors describe, for example, the following personalities within 
the group of people who share an irrational view on money as a source of power: 
 The manipulator (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 127-136) tends to take advantage of others, 
breaks promises or even lies to get more money without feeling any guilt about these socially 
undesirable forms of behaviour. By breaking social rules many manipulators become quickly 
powerful and wealthy, but their need for even more power and more money is hardly ever satis-
fied. Because of their permanent drive for financial power many people within this group do not 
only break social rules but also laws. Manipulators are mostly unable to form social relations and 
often become lonely and unhappy when they grow older. 
 A second type of person who strives for power is the so-called empire builder (cf. Goldberg 
and Lewis 1978: 136-142). The authors describe empire builders as aggressive and ambitious 
people but, in contrast to so-called manipulators, they operate within social rules and laws in 
their struggle for financial power. They have an ‘overriding sense of independence and self-
reliance’ (ibid: 136). Empire builders are described as hard workers who prefer to be leaders 
rather than followers. They acquire money, property and other resources to become more power-
ful. A filled bank account, business and estates help the empire builder to fight his or her feeling 
of helplessness. However, satisfying one’s need for power comes at the cost of work obsession, 
isolation and a lack of time and opportunities to enjoy one’s fortune. As in the case of most other 
money-types, the behaviour of manipulators and empire builder appears to be irrational because 
it yields no long-term satisfaction. The need for financial power will be never satisfied but in-
creases the more money these people dispose of and spend. 
 
Money as a symbol for love: Some people associate money with love. These people use money 
to overcome their feelings of being unloved and to express their love towards others. Love-
starved people try to please others by being generous. They feel loved when receiving money 
from others, while not obtaining financial rewards is interpreted as a sign of not being loved. 
Same as in the case of other money-types, the financial habits of people who associate money 
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with love are, according to Goldberg and Lewis (1978), rooted in early childhood experiences. 
Children learn early that money can buy desirable things and therefore quickly associate money 
with pleasure. Since children tend to think that their parents’ money supply is unlimited, they 
often interpret their parents’ refusal of giving them money as a sign of punishment and a lack of 
love. When they grow older most children learn that love cannot be bought and sold, however, 
some people never stop making the association of love and money. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) 
describe several stereotypes of so-called love dealers, among others the following two types: 
 Lover buyers (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 161-166) use money as a means to make other 
people happy. By being generous they try to buy other people’s affection and recognition. For 
example, love buyers often make large contributions to charity in the hope of gaining the admira-
tion of recipients and of their social environment. They insist on paying the check at the restau-
rant and give large tips to waiters. Spoiling one’s children with monetary rewards and expensive 
gifts is another exemplary behaviour of the love buyer personality. Other people often exploit 
this generosity; love buyers frequently become victims of ‘manipulators and unscrupulous 
salesmen’ (ibid: 165). 
 People who feel unloved but lack sufficient financial resources to buy other people’s affection 
are classified as love stealers (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 173-178). These people often suf-
fer a compulsion to steal money. Among other examples, the authors describe the case of an em-
ployee who felt unappreciated by his boss and started stealing money from the company to fight 
his feeling of being unlovable. The tragedy of love buyers, love stealers and other money-types 
in the group of people who associate money with love is that their need for love is never satis-
fied, irrespective of how much money they spend, obtain or steal. 
 
Money as a symbol for freedom: The last common meaning of money listed in Money Madness 
is freedom. People who associate money with freedom have in common that they worship auton-
omy and financial independence. However, the struggle for autonomy and financial independ-
ence can take very different forms. The first stereotype that Goldberg and Lewis (1978) intro-
duce is the freedom buyer (cf. Goldberg and Lewis, 1978: 187-192) who accepts that making and 
saving money is necessary to achieve a certain degree of autonomy to fulfil one’s needs and 
dreams. The second type is the freedom fighter (ibid: 187-199) who rejects the importance of 
money and society’s worship of money. 
 Freedom buyers see the accumulation of money as a means to buy the things they wish to 
possess and to do the things they enjoy doing. Money gives the freedom-seeking person the feel-
ing of not having to depend on others’ favour or on a regular job, once he or she has accumulated 
sufficiently large amounts of money. In some cases, the desire for independence can take ex-
treme forms; some freedom buyers take high risks to obtain money and often experience signifi-
cant financial loss.  
 Freedom fighters are the ‘anti-money contingent’ (ibid: 192) of the population; they consider 
money and material possession as unimportant. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) put several political 
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and social groups into this category; among others they list communists, socialists, adherents of 
the commune movement and revolutionary. Freedom fighters often come from privileged fami-
lies but motivations underlying the rejection of money (e.g. a high income) and material posses-
sion differ. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) mention the rejection of one’s parents’ lifestyle as one 
reason and feelings of guilt about one’s own affluence as another. According to the authors, the 
rejection of money is rarely a lifelong attitude but weakens or disappears as people grow older 
and become more conservative. 
 
Goldberg and Lewis (1978) referred to several case studies to illustrate the behaviour of the dif-
ferent money-types. Furthermore, they provided a list of statements revealing an ‘irrational use 
or view of money’ (ibid: 100-101). Based on this list, readers can self-diagnose whether they 
suffer from pathological money-related syndromes or not. In this list, the habits of security col-
lectors are, for example, described by the following statements referring to several money-
related behaviours within this group: ‘You buy things you don’t need or don't want because they 
are on sale’ and ‘You feel compelled to argue or complain about the cost of almost everything 
you buy’ are forms of behaviour that are typical for bargain hunters; ‘Even when you have suffi-
cient funds you feel guilty about spending money for necessities such as a new pair of shoes’ and 
‘You automatically say, ‘I can’t afford it,’ whether you can or not’ reflect the habits of compul-
sive savers. Other statements such as ‘You use money as a weapon to control or intimidate those 
who frustrate you’ reflect the behaviour of power-oriented people. ‘You insist on paying more 
than your share of restaurant checks or bar bills just to be appreciated or to make sure that you do 
not feel indebted to anyone’ refer to the behaviour of love buyers. Interestingly, none of the 
statements listed by Goldberg and Lewis (1978) seem to relate to the freedom meaning of mon-
ey. Based on the fact that freedom-oriented people are left out in the list of examples which point 
to ‘an irrational use of view of money’ (ibid: 100) it can be speculated that the authors them-
selves considered the association between money and freedom as rather common and less irra-
tional than viewing money as a symbol for security, power and love. 
Forman’s typology 
The Canadian psychologist Forman (1987) developed another often cited typology for neurotic 
behaviour with money thereby classifying people in terms of five stereotypes, namely misers, 
spendthrifts, tycoons, bargain hunters and addictive gamblers. Following his American col-
leagues, Forman (1987) explained the existence of disordered money beliefs and behaviours by 
emotional connotations people have with money. According to the author, money represents, in 
addition to the goods and services it can buy, love, self-worth, freedom, power and security. A 
healthy way of relating to one’s money (i.e. income and wealth) is, according to the author, to 
value money for merely the things it can buy (see Forman, 1987: 5). Neurotic behaviour with 
money, by contrast, is particularly widespread among people who value their money for the psy-
chological needs it represents (love, power, etc.). Just like Goldberg and Lewis (1978), Forman 
(1987) developed questionnaires that should help his readers to self-diagnose their money-related 
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problems. Forman’s (1984) questionnaire consists of several ‘Money Pathology Scales’ referring 
to five neurotic money-types he described in his book. The five neurotic money-types introduced 
in Mind over Money as well as examples for the corresponding sets of self-diagnose statements 
shall be briefly presented now. 
 Misers are extremely stingy people and this meanness is related to the security meaning peo-
ple attach to money. Possessing money helps the miser to reduce his or her feelings of anxiety; 
spending money puts the miser in states of fear and panic (see Forman, 1987: 7). Misers tend to 
be extraordinarily preoccupied with money-related issues and to compulsively hoard their mon-
ey. They are exaggeratedly anxious of losing funds or being taken advantage of in situations in-
volving money. Furthermore, they are hardly able to enjoy their purchases and other benefits 
they could obtain when spending their money (ibid: 17). Like other neuroses, miserliness is root-
ed in early childhood experiences, according to Forman (1987). Children who feel weak and 
dependent during their childhood start to accumulate money in their piggy banks which makes 
them feel stronger, more powerful and less anxious. A miser is supposed to agree with state-
ments like ‘One of my greatest pleasures with money is saving it all the time. I really hate to 
spend any of it’ (ibid: 12); ‘I often hold on to funds rather than spend them, even though there is 
no particular reason to do so’; and ‘I have terrible fear of losing funds and of being taken ad-
vantage of financially’ (ibid: 20-21). 
 Emotional connotations of money with security and love sometimes translate into compulsive 
bargain hunting. Bargain hunters gain satisfaction from outsmarting sellers and paying a lower 
price for a purchase than other people did (see Forman, 1987: 47). Bargain hunters enjoy the 
thrill they get from negotiating the price but tend to overlook the quality and usefulness of the 
things they purchase. They interpret a seller’s act of lowering the price as a sign of care and love, 
which are things that bargain hunters typically missed during their childhood. Symptoms of this 
second money neurosis are reflected by the following exemplary statements: ‘When I buy some-
thing, I look for the best bargain I can get, even if the workmanship is not great’ (ibid: 43); 
‘When I shop, I must feel that I’m saving money and that the price was less than usual’; and ‘I 
can’t resist a sale of almost any kind and I often end up buying things just because they are bar-
gains. Many of these purchases get little or no use’ (ibid: 49). 
 Spendthrifts enjoy the act of spending money for its own sake (c.f. Forman, 1987: 29). Due 
to their compulsive spending behaviour they are unable to put any money aside and are likely to 
run into debt, irrespective of their incomes. Similar to bargain hunters, spendthrifts often end up 
with purchases they neither need nor use. They spend money on things for themselves and ex-
pensive gifts for others in order to contain feelings of anxiety they have developed in early 
childhood. Usually, spendthrifts have low self-esteem, are anxious and make themselves de-
pendent on others by borrowing money (ibid: 29). People who were (financially) spoilt and 
overprotected by their parents are particularly likely to develop the spendthrift symptoms. Also, 
children who receive little money and miss their parents’ affection may become spendthrifts in 
their later life. Statements applying to a stereotypical spendthrift include ‘At the end of the 
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month I am always in debt’ (ibid: 24) or ‘I can’t stop myself from spending, even though I feel 
guilt or shame afterwards’ (ibid: 32). 
 So-called tycoons are obsessed with making money. They are workaholics who are fascinated 
about watching their fortune increasing (see Forman, 1987: 39). Other people often praise them 
as money-making genies so that tycoons seldom recognize that their money-building behaviour 
is obsessive. Tycoons are, according to Forman (1987), often driven by the power symbolism of 
money; the accumulation of money gives them a feeling of superiority which is reinforced by the 
admiration they receive from others. Similar to misers, having money is more important than 
spending it for tycoons. As other money pathologies, obsessive money making is assumed to be 
the outcome of early childhood experience. Forman (1987) provides the example of the son of a 
successful business father who overtook his fathers’ habit to sacrifice family life on behalf of the 
business. This person has always been fascinated about the idea of building his own fortune and 
to become more affluent than his father (ibid: 38). A tycoon would agree with statements like ‘I 
am not very interested in spending money but I love to amass it’; ‘Even when I have more mon-
ey than I need, I still work at increasing my stockpiles’ and ‘Money is the best way to gain pow-
er, status, and approval’ (ibid: 40-41). 
 The last money-related neurosis discussed by Forman (1987) is addictive gambling. In con-
trast to people who occasionally gamble for enjoyment or those who earn a living with it, the 
compulsive gambler is an addict who believes that he or she can control the probability of win-
ning and who experiences unusual exhilaration by taking risks (ibid: 54-55). Unlike in the case 
of other money-types, the author neither clearly states which of the different connotations with 
money (power, love, etc.) may be responsible for this psychological problem nor does he relate 
compulsive gambling to early childhood experiences. Statements which presumably describe the 
personality of a compulsive gamblers are, for example, ‘Placing a bet makes me feel exhilarated 
and optimistic’ and ‘When I gamble I feel a sense of power, as if each win is a major victory’ 
(ibid: 57). 
4.1.3 Discussion 
When comparing the two typologies presented in section 4.1.2 a reader will discover several 
similarities. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) and Forman (1987) all have psychoanalytical back-
ground. They developed their taxonomies based on their clinical experience with clients from the 
middle-class, following the psychoanalytical tradition of explaining neurosis with early child-
hood experiences and provided questionnaires their readers can use to self-diagnose whether or 
not they suffer from money-related pathologies. The terminology and the description of the dif-
ferent forms of money-related behaviours are also very similar in both books. Forman’s (1987) 
miser resembles the compulsive saver described by Goldberg and Lewis (1978); spendthrifts can 
be viewed as the opposite pole of misers or compulsive savers and also resemble, to at least 
some extent, so-called love buyers. Tycoons resemble the money-types described by Goldberg 
and Lewis (1978) in the group of power-oriented people. The bargain hunter is a money-type 
which appears in both typologies and addictive gamblers bring to mind Goldberg and Lewis’ 
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(1978) freedom fighter who tends to take huge risks to satisfy his or her need for financial auton-
omy. Other taxonomies, including older and updated variants developed based on clinical data 
collected in different cultures and countries (e.g. Kaufman, 1956, Mellan, 2001, Furnham, 2014), 
encompass very similar money-types, too. These additional typologies will not be further con-
sidered in this dissertation; however, it is interesting to observe that certain money-types appear 
in virtually all published taxonomies. This overall resemblance indicates that the two typologies 
presented above are, to at least some extent, accurate and relevant. Money-types like misers, 
spendthrifts and power-obsessed money-makers have been identified based on independent clin-
ical data by several personality theorists from different countries. 
 One may agree with Furnham and Argyle (2000) who described personality typologies as 
useful for the simplification of complex processes of human behaviour. This argument especially 
holds for the analysis of money-related behaviour. The two personality typologies cited in this 
chapter point to a number of reasons why people strive for money, why some people spend it in 
rather unusual ways and why others fiercely retain it. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) and Forman 
(1987) brought together many money-related patterns that are well-known from everyday obser-
vations. When thinking of one’s family, friends and colleagues there are doubtlessly some cases 
of people who fanatically hoard their money, who spend an unusual amount of their time looking 
for bargains, people who permanently try to appear generous and also some idealists who deny 
the importance of money. From the economic perspective the description of multiple stereotypes 
is enlightening because the typologies point to the issue that the meaning of money and people’s 
behaviour with it appears to be more complex than economic theory suggests. However, the role 
that money plays for the money-types described in the typologies and the degree to which a 
money-type’s view of and behaviour with money contradicts the economic concept of money 
differ. The behaviour of several money-types, including the self-denier, the manipulator, the love 
buyer and the freedom-seeker, is relatively similar to what economic theory suggests. In many 
instances money appears as a means to an end, as a token to buy other things like gifts, material 
possessions or time which helps a person to satisfy their feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, 
dependence or of being unloved. For some groups, for example compulsive savers, misers and 
maybe also empire builders and tycoons, however, the accumulation of money appears to be an 
end in itself. There is no space for such money-types in standard consumer theory because for 
the rational individual money is worth only the things it can buy.  
 At the same time, the usefulness of money-related personality typologies for the prediction of 
financial behaviour can be questioned. The common characteristic and the biggest shortcoming 
of the research on money pathology, including Freud’s theory of money and the work of person-
ality theorists, is that the existing theories and personality typologies were formulated based on 
clinical case studies only. These case studies are, of course, not representative for the general 
population. In the literature reviewed in this section, the common practise consists of describing 
and documenting extreme cases, which are interesting and memorable but probably rather excep-
tional. Pathological uses of money, such as miserliness or obsessive spending, are likely to be 
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rather extraordinary cases of financial behaviour and it can be doubted that they matter at a mac-
ro level (see Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 151). The psychoanalytical literature gives no insights 
how likely pathological uses of money are to occur in a society, in other words whether they 
matter for the prediction of financial behaviour in the general population or not (ibid.). Further-
more, due to the strong impact of Freud’s writings on money, psychoanalytically-orientated au-
thors tend to trace all money-related problems back to early childhood experience, thereby ne-
glecting situational factors such as the social, cultural and economic environment of a person 
(ibid.). In fact, the impact of child rearing practice on money-related pathologies like miserliness 
seems to be rather unimportant compared to other factors, as shown in a recent study by Hur et 
al. (2011).  
 As mentioned previously, Money Madness and Mind over Money were written for the broad 
public rather than for scientific purpose. A reader may perceive Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) and 
Forman’s (1987) popular writing styles and their approach to categorise several forms of unusual 
money perceptions and money-related behaviour as fanciful but superficial. The selection of the 
particular money-types which are described in detail often appears somewhat random. In addi-
tion to that, the degree of precision in defining and describing the different types greatly varies. 
For example, while Goldberg and Lewis (1978) dedicated nine pages of their book to the de-
scription of the power-obsessed manipulator but merely five pages sufficed to depict the freedom 
buyer. It remains, however, an open question whether those types which are treated rather briefly 
are as relevant as the more carefully portrayed money-types. 
 Certainly, the existence of money pathologies in the general population can be expected to be 
rather low, but the actual share of certain neurotic money types is not specified in the corre-
sponding literature. However, the authors of money-related typologies provided questionnaires 
which might be useful measures to identify neurotic money-types like misers or tycoons in the 
general population. Still, these questionnaires are also merely based on clinical experience and 
were not psychometrically validated by their authors. Hence, key criteria for the validity of a 
psychometric inventory, for instance sufficiently high correlations between statements referring 
to one particular money-type, may be not fulfilled in the case of these questionnaires. This con-
cern was partly confirmed in a study conducted by Furnham (1996) who made an attempt to val-
idate Forman’s (1987) five money-type questionnaires. The questionnaires that had been formu-
lated to identify misers, bargain hunters, spendthrifts, tycoons and gamblers were filled in by 180 
representatively selected subjects. The survey data was then analysed statistically in order to 
verify whether the five money-types could be adequately measured, i.e. whether the items refer-
ring to one money-type were sufficiently correlated. Based on the results of an explanatory factor 
analysis, Furnham (1996) concluded that the gambler- and spendthrift-subscales showed good 
internal consistency, but he reported considerable overlap between the miser- and the bargain 
hunter-subscales. Furthermore, the tycoon-items were ambiguously correlated with several items 
of the other factors. Furnham (1996) explained the overlap between the miser and the bargain 
hunter constructs by the poor psychometric properties of the inventory. At the same time, this 
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overlap is in line with one of Goldberg and Lewis (1978) observations: Miserliness and bargain 
hunting are not mutually exclusive but belong to the same category of money-related patholo-
gies, namely the category that refers to the security meaning of money. 
 Finally, it is to be noted that from an economist’s point of view, the word ‘money’ is often 
employed in a misleading way in psychoanalytical literature. To be more precise, Goldberg and 
Lewis (1978), Forman (1987) and other psychologists should have replaced the word ‘money’ by 
income or wealth in many cases. For instance, so-called tycoons are certainly not obsessed with 
filling their piggy bank with notes and coins but strive for high incomes. Furthermore, freedom-
fighters would probably not favour the idea of abolishing money as a means of payment but crit-
icise other people’s obsession with earning high incomes and condemn the unequal distribution 
of wealth.  
 In spite of the criticism which can be directed towards psychoanalytical theories and typolo-
gies on money-related behaviour, they give some interesting insights into people’s money-
related emotions and habits. A remarkable point made by psychoanalysts is that money is not 
only a neutral means of payment but also an emotionally laden object that influences people’s 
behaviour (c.f. Belk and Wallendorf, 1990). For some people spending is accompanied by strong 
feelings stemming from the pure act of giving away money. Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) com-
pulsive saver and Forman’s (1987) miser appear to be useful personality categories that explain 
some of the irrationalities in people’s every-day behaviour with money. Individual differences in 
people’s general disposition to spend money may explain why some rich people are extremely 
stingy, why people get satisfaction from looking at their cash balances, although they do not plan 
to deplete them or why some childless old people live poor and die wealthy. Furthermore, as will 
be argued in chapter 5, individual difference in the general disposition of spending money may 
also explain respondents’ answers to willingness to pay questions in survey-based environmental 
valuation studies. Finally, as shown in the next section, Freud’s psychoanalytical theory of mon-
ey and Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) typology have had a considerable influence on concepts de-
veloped in other psychological disciplines, especially when it comes to the measurement of 
money-related attitudes in surveys. 
4.2 Measurement of money attitudes 
4.2.1 Money attitudes: definition and development of inventories 
Whereas the psychoanalytical approach to money mainly consists of observing, describing and 
explaining money-related personality traits and attitudes, social psychologists and psychometri-
cians are interested in measuring these variables of individual difference in surveys (see 
Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 44). The topic of money has entered survey research through the 
investigation of personality traits and attitude testing. Personality traits are characteristics of a 
person; they manifest themselves in consistent patterns of behaviour across different situations 
(see Gerrig and Zimbardo, 2010: 507). An attitude can be defined as favour or disfavour towards 
an ‘attitude objective’, i.e. a person, an item or beliefs. In psychology, three components of an 
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attitude towards an attitude object are usually considered: an affective, a behavioural and a cog-
nitive component (the ‘ABC model’). The affective component is about the feelings a person has 
concerning the attitude object; the behavioural component is related to a person’s behaviour with 
the attitude object; and the cognitive component of an attitude refers to a person’s beliefs when 
reminded of the attitude object in question (ibid.). Like personality traits, attitudes are not direct-
ly observable and sometimes people are not aware of their attitudes. Still, attitudes can influence 
a person’s behaviour (ibid.). Compared to personality traits, attitudes are less stable because they 
are often influenced by situational and circumstantial factors (c.f. Stumm et al., 2013).  
 Even though personality traits and attitudes are conceptually different variables, personality 
research and attitudinal research frequently overlap when it comes to the statistical analysis of 
people’s beliefs and behaviour with respect to money. Most survey-based studies on money look 
at the relationship between personality and money-related attitudes rather than exclusively focus-
sing on the one or the other concept. In spite of its direct relationship with personality research, 
the psychological work on money which employs quantitative methods is often simply summa-
rised under the name of ‘money attitudes’ (see e.g. Furnham and Argyle, 2000). Stumm (2013: 
344) defines money attitudes as ‘individual differences in the motivation for obtaining and 
spending money’. This definition leaves room for interpretation since it does not unambiguously 
state whether the motivation for obtaining and spending money is a stable personality trait or 
affected by situational and circumstantial factors. In the following the common terminology is 
overtaken, i.e. the term ‘money attitudes’ (or ‘attitudes towards money’ respectively) will be 
used to describe or stable personality traits or more context-dependent attitudes. 
 Since the 1980s, a number of self-report questionnaires have been constructed in order to 
measure money attitudes. These inventories help to capture people’s perception of money and 
their behaviour with money, i.e. how they acquire, spend and save it. When developing a new 
money attitude inventory, psychologists typically collect a number of statements referring to 
people’s perception of money, their money-related emotions and financial habits from different 
sources. These sources include, for example, clinical reports, money-related personality typolo-
gies and already existing attitude inventories. In many cases, clinical literature and especially the 
theories and typologies developed by personality theorists with psychoanalytical background 
have served as a key reference for the collection and formulation of different items (see 
e.g.Yamauchi and Templer, 1982, Furnham, 1984, Furnham et al., 2012). In the succeeding step 
researchers develop a questionnaire containing these items and empirically test it, by asking sur-
vey participants to express their personal agreement with the money attitude statements on rating 
scales, so-called Likert scales. Subsequent to the survey, statistical methods, most prominently 
explanatory factor analysis, are employed in order to determine correlations between several 
statements and to define a number of dimensions or facets of the money attitude construct. Ideal-
ly, these sub-constructs reflect the theoretical concept proposed in the sources from which the 
different statements have been extracted. For example, a researcher who wants to develop an 
inventory to measure the money attitudes of security-orientated and power-obsessed people 
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hopes to obtain a statistical outcome which reflects a security and a power dimension. However, 
in many cases the results of the factor analysis do not exactly reflect the theoretically defined 
money attitude dimensions. Psychometricians typically interpret the statistically defined factors 
and give them names which resemble the theoretical terminology (power, security, etc.). The 
items encompassed by each factor then form a subscale measuring a particular dimension of 
money attitudes. The authors of a money attitude scale typically conduct validity and reliability 
tests of the subscales in the initial study. All subscales which pass the consistency check are kept 
within the overall inventory and can be used by other practitioners to empirically measure the 
corresponding money attitude facet. Hence, what is commonly described as a particular money 
attitude or a facet of money attitudes is a theory-based but in the end statistically defined con-
struct. 
 In the following sections, the three most frequently used money attitude measures which are 
Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) ‘Money Attitude Scale’, Furnham’s (1984) ‘Money Beliefs and 
Behaviour Scale’ and Tang’s (1992) ‘Money Ethic Scale’ will be introduced. In addition to that, 
a more recently developed money attitude measure, namely Klontz et al.’s (2011) ‘Money Script 
Inventory’ will be presented and discussed. 
4.2.2 Overview of existing measures 
One of the best-known instruments for the measurement of money attitudes is the Money Atti-
tude Scale (MAS) developed by Yamauchi and Templer (1982). The MAS consists of 29 items 
referring to a person’s habits in spending and saving money. Survey participants rate these items 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ‘always’ and ‘never’ as endpoints. The MAS was conceptual-
ised and based on the writings of psychoanalysts and personality researchers. Yamauchi and 
Templer (1982) adopted several concepts from the psychoanalytical literature on money; items 
of the scale refer to viewing money as a source of security, pathological money retention and 
using money to acquire power and status. The initial survey was carried out in Los Angeles and 
Fresno, California. 300 voluntary subjects took part in this survey. An explanatory factor analy-
sis of the data revealed four clear factors of money attitudes: Power-Prestige, Time-Retention, 
Distrust and Anxiety. The dominant factor12, Power-Prestige, encompasses items pointing to the 
habit of using money to impress and manipulate others and to viewing one’s income and wealth 
as a sign of success (e.g. ‘I use money to influence other people to do things for me’; ‘I must 
admit that I purchase things because I know they will impress others’; ‘I must admit that I some-
times boast about how much money I make’). Time-Retention consists of items referring to a 
person’s saving habits and concern for future financial security (e.g. ‘I do financial planning for 
the future’; ‘I put money aside on a regular basis for the future’; ‘I save now to be prepared for 
my old age’). Items belonging to the Distrust dimension of the MAS refer to a hesitating and 
suspicious purchasing behaviour (e.g. ‘I argue or complain about the cost of things I buy’; ‘I 
                                                 
12 In a factor analysis factors are ordered according to their eigenvalues. The dominant factor is the one with the 
highest eigenvalue and it explains most of the total variance in all the variables included in the factor model. 
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automatically say, ‘I can’t afford it,’ whether I can or not’; ‘I hesitate to spend money, even on 
necessities’). The last sub-construct, Anxiety, contains items referring to a compulsive need to 
spend money (‘It’s hard for me to pass up a bargain’; ‘I spend money to make myself feel bet-
ter’) and also items describing worries linked to fears of lacking money (‘I show signs of nerv-
ousness when I don’t have enough money’; ‘I worry that I will not be financially secure’). Based 
on these four factors, subscales of five to nine items were defined in order to measure the four 
facets of money attitudes. The four subscales showed adequate internal consistency13; the au-
thors reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.80 for the power-subscale, 0.78 for the retention-subscale, 
0.73 for the distrust-subscale and 0.69 for the anxiety-subscale. A test-retest comparison con-
firmed the psychometrical soundness of the MAS and its subscales. Yamauchi and Templer 
(1982) tested the validity of the MAS by relating the four facets to several psychological con-
structs that appeared to be similar to Power-Prestige, Time-Retention, Distrust and Anxiety. For 
instance, all four facets were positively related to status concern and two of them, namely Time-
Retention and Distrust, were positively correlated with the personality trait obsessionality. Fur-
thermore, the authors highlighted that none of the four attitudinal facets was essentially correlat-
ed with a person’s income. Over the last three decades, the full MAS or selected MAS-subscales 
have been used in many empirical studies. The measure was translated into several languages 
and was used in different countries. Many studies confirmed its structure but quite often the Dis-
trust and the Anxiety facets were highly correlated and interpreted as one single facet (cf. Medina 
et al., 1996). In spite of its advanced age the MAS still enjoys the reputation of a reliable and 
valid instrument for measuring money attitudes (cf. Wiepking and Breeze, 2012, Durvasula and 
Lysonski, 2010). 
 Another widely used psychometric measure is Furnham’s (1984) Money Beliefs and Behav-
iour Scale (MBBS). Furnham (1984) constructed the MBBS two years after the MAS thereby 
explicitly referring to the ‘shortcomings’ (ibid: 502) of the latter measure: ‘Although the authors 
[Yamauchi and Templer (1982)] obtained a large and fairly heterogeneous sample they failed to 
investigate any demographic differences (…). Secondly, their partial validation seemed overcon-
cerned with psychopathological correlates of money attitudes rather than on normal social beliefs 
and attitudes. Finally, the study makes no attempt to trace the aetiology of these beliefs’ 
(Furnham, 1984: 502). The MBBS is an inventory of 60 items that respondents rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale with ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ as endpoints. Furnham (1984) assembled these items 
from three sources, namely Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) MAS, attitude statements listed in 
Goldberg and Lewis (1978) book on Money Madness (cf. section 4.1.2) and on a questionnaire 
on money perceptions developed by Rubenstein (1981, cited in Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 45-
47). Unlike the MAS, the MBSS does not only contain behavioural statements but also money 
belief statements (e.g. ‘I firmly believe that money can solve all my problems’; ‘I believe that 
                                                 
13 Internal consistency or reliability is commonly assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. The alpha provides an estimate 
that indicates how well the items form a common unit. It can range from 0 to 1; the higher the alpha, the greater is 
the internal consistency of the scale. A scale used for group comparison should have an alpha of at least 0.5 (cf. 
Switzer et al., 1999).  
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money is the root of all evil’). The initial survey was carried out in Great Britain. Furnham 
(1984) surveyed 256 subjects differing in their socio-demographic characteristics, voting patterns 
and religious affiliation. Factor analysis yielded six interpretable sub-constructs: Obsession, 
Power/Spending, Retention, Security/Conservative, Inadequate and Effort/Ability. Although the 
labels of the factors recall Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) findings, the composition and inter-
pretation of the subcontracts is mostly different. The dominant factor, Obsession, encompasses 
statements referring to an unusual importance a person attaches to ‘all aspects of money’ 
(Furnham, 1984: 503): ‘I feel that money is the only thing that I can really rely on’; ‘I am proud 
of my financial victories – pay, riches, investments, etc. – and let my friends know about them’; 
‘I would do practically anything legal for money if it were enough’. Power contains items that 
reflect a person’s habit to spend money on status symbols or to use it to acquire importance (e.g. 
‘I sometimes buy things that I don’t need or want to impress people because they are the right 
things to have at the time’; ‘I sometimes ‘buy’ friendship by being very generous with those I 
want to like me’). Items reflected by the Retention factor exclusively belong to Goldberg and 
Lewis’ (1978) list of statements referring to pathological penny pinching (e.g. ‘I often say ‘I 
can’t afford it’ whether I can or not’; ‘Even when I have sufficient money I often feel guilty 
about spending money on necessities like clothes etc.’; ‘I often have difficulty in making deci-
sions about spending money regardless of the amount’). In contrast to this neurotic tendency to 
retain one’s money Security/Conservative contains statements describing more coherent attitudes 
towards saving (e.g. ‘I always know how much I have in my saving account’; ‘I am proud of my 
ability to save money’). Statements belonging to Inadequate reveal a person’s feeling of lacking 
money, especially in comparison to his or her reference group (e.g. ‘Most of my friends have 
more money than I do’; ‘The amount of money I have saved is never quite enough’). Finally, 
Effort/Ability describes whether or not a person perceives his or her wage or salary as fair (e.g. ‘I 
believe that my present income is about what I deserve, given the job I do’). Furnham (1984) 
reported several correlations of the six facets of money attitudes with demographic and socio-
economic variables. Among other things, a respondent’s age had a significant impact on four out 
of five money attitudes: Older respondents reached higher scores on the Power, the Retention, 
the Security and the Effort/Ability; income was positively correlated with Obsession, Power and 
Effort/Ability. Furthermore, education showed very similar relationships as income. Appropriate 
levels of internal consistency were reported for the overall scale. Furnham (1984) reported an 
alpha of 0.84 for the overall instrument; in a follow-up study Wilhelm et al. (1993) found alphas 
ranging from 0.75 to 0.82 for the individual subscales. The six factor structure obtained from the 
initial survey was reproduced in further empirical applications of the MBBS, confirming the reli-
ability of the inventory. Instead of employing the full set of items, several studies used only se-
lected subscales of the MBBS to measure particular facets of money attitudes. In empirical ap-
plication the Obsession sub-construct enjoys particular popularity. An often cited example is a 
cross-cultural study of money attitudes by Lynn (1992). This study explored people’s importance 
attached to money, income and wealth in 43 countries using Furnham’s (1984) Obsession sub-
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scale. Just as the MAS, the MBBS has been used extensively during the last three decades, and 
also in recent studies (cf. e.g. Wiepking and Breeze, 2012). 
 A third frequently used money attitude inventory is the Money Ethic Scale (MES) (Tang, 
1992). Tang (1992) generated several money attitude statements based on the psychoanalytical 
literature on money (money a means to satisfy different needs, see section 4.1), a survey by 
Wernimont and Fitzpatrick (1972) who aimed at determining how the concept of money is per-
ceived by different groups of the population, as well as the money attitude inventories developed 
by Yamauchi and Templer (1982) and Furnham (1984). In the initial study, 249 subjects with 
full-time work experience completed a 25-page questionnaire encompassing a long list of mon-
ey-related statements. The final measure consists of 30 items that respondents answer on a 7-
point agree-disagree Likert scale. The MES encompasses six facets which Tang (1992) labelled 
Good, Evil, Achievement, Respect, Budget and Freedom. The dominant factor Good contains 
mainly items describing people’s feelings when thinking of money and reveals positive associa-
tions people have when thinking of the concept of money (e.g. ‘Money is good’ and ‘Money is 
important’). In contrast to that, the second factor (Evil) reveals negative emotions (e.g. ‘Money is 
the root of all evil’). Achievement, Respect and Freedom reflect certain associations with money 
(e.g. ‘Money represents one’s achievement’; ‘Money makes people respect you in the communi-
ty’ and ‘Money gives you autonomy and freedom’). Budget is the only factor referring to a per-
son’s behaviour with money. High scores on this factor point to a rather prudent approach when 
it comes to spending money (e.g. ‘I use my money very carefully’). The scale showed adequate 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha for each of the subscales reached from 0.71 to 0.81). Cor-
relations of the six factors with demographic variables and personality variables as well as plau-
sible correlations with economic, political and religious values confirmed the validity of the 
MES and its sub-constructs. The questionnaire was translated into several languages and applied 
in empirical studies around the world. Du and Tang (2005), for example, conducted a survey in 
mainland China, Tang and Chiu (2003) used the MES in Hong Kong and Tang et al. (2000) car-
ried out a cross-cultural comparison of money attitudes. A considerable number of empirical 
studies employing the MES have focussed on linking money attitudes to work-related concepts 
such as job and pay satisfaction, helping behaviour and unethical behaviour at the workplace 
(e.g. Tang and Chiu, 2003, Tang and Gilbert, 1995, Liu and Tang, 2011). Several empirical stud-
ies confirmed the factor structure of the MES. Hence, the reliability of the scale and its validity 
in measuring a multidimensional construct referring to the concept of attitudes towards money 
was repeatedly confirmed. Nevertheless, Tang and his associates also presented several modifi-
cations of the MES. In recent times Tang and colleagues have abandoned working with the com-
plete MES and focused on the ‘Love of Money Scale’ instead (Tang and Chiu, 2003), which is a 
subscale of the MES. Hence, compared to the two older money attitude inventories, Yamauchi 
and Templer’s (1982) MAS and Furnham’s (1984) MBBS, the MES has been modified to a con-
siderably larger extent. The reformulation of individual statements, the elimination of certain 
items and the refinement of the money attitude facets may have led to a continuous improvement 
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of the scale. At the same time, the permanent modification of the inventory might also point to a 
lack of consistency and accuracy of the overall measure. It is also to be noted that Tang himself 
was involved as a co-author in virtually all published studies which employed a variant of his 
original money attitude scale. Hence, the quality of the inventory cannot be judged very easily. 
 More recently, Klontz et al. (2011) proposed an instrument to measure disordered money be-
liefs. These authors developed the Klontz-Money Script Inventory for studies in the clinical 
context to ‘assess potentially problematic attitudes of clients that may interfere with accomplish-
ing financial goals’ (Klontz et al., 2011: 17). The items of the inventory stem from clinical ob-
servations along eight themes: money worship, anti-rich, money is bad, money mis-
trust/openness, frugality/fiscal responsibility, money anxiety, money status and money is unim-
portant. 422 respondents took part in a web-survey and rated 72 money-statements on a six-point 
disagree-agree Likert scale. The authors found four clearly interpretable factors that they labelled 
Money avoidance, Money worship, Money status and Money vigilance. The dominant factor 
Money avoidance reflects a tendency to negate the importance of being wealthy (e.g. ‘Rich peo-
ple are greedy’, ‘Good people should not care about money’). Money worship points to positive 
attitudes towards having ‘more money’ and viewing money as a source of happiness (e.g. 
‘Things would get better if I had more money’; ‘More money will make you happier’). Money 
status encompasses statements that reflect a person’s association of people’s wealth and income 
with status and success (e.g. ‘Most poor people do not deserve to have money’; ‘Money is what 
gives life meaning’). Finally, Money vigilance contains a set of items that indicate whether a 
person wants to keep his or her money issues private and also the importance somebody attaches 
to being financially prepared for the future by saving money (e.g. ‘You should not tell others 
how much money you have or made’; ‘Money should be saved not spent’; ‘I would be a nervous 
wreck if I did not have money saved for an emergency’). According to the authors, a high score 
on the Money vigilance scale reveals an approach to money that encourages saving and frugality 
and may also reflect excessive levels of anxiety regarding financial danger. The authors reported 
high levels of reliability of all four subscales (Cronbach’s alpha ranged between 0.70 and 0.84 
for the four subscales) and found several correlations between the four factors and other varia-
bles. Interestingly, while the first three factors were correlated with several socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, including age, ethnicity, education and income, Money vigi-
lance showed no relationship with any of these variables.  
 As highlighted by Klontz et al. (2011) their inventory serves as an update to the MAS 
(Yamauchi and Templer, 1982) and the MBBS (Furnham, 1984). Besides being more topical 
than the MAS and MBBS, little can be said regarding the quality of this recently developed 
measure. In spite of articles referring to the initial survey study, no further empirical application 
of the inventory has been published yet. Still, some conclusions can be drawn from Klontz et 
al.’s (2011) work: Three out of the four sub-constructs of the scale are similar to those that have 
been identified in the 1980s. Money worship is similar to Furnham’s (1984) Obsession factor. 
Money status resembles Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) Power-Prestige dimension of money 
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attitudes. Money vigilance contains items that are very similar to those of the Securi-
ty/Conservative subscale of the MBBS. Money vigilance also contains a number of statements 
that resemble the rather neurotic state of being unwilling to spend money indicated by the Dis-
trust dimension of the MAS and the Retention dimension of the MBSS. Furthermore, same as in 
studies using the older measures, no strong connection between a person’s income and money-
related attitudes could be established. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In this section four psychometric measures for money attitudes have been reviewed. As com-
pared to the money-related typologies presented in section 4.1, the money attitude framework 
has some clear advantages. Instead of classifying people into categories on an all-or-nothing ba-
sis, money attitude scales measure intensities of different money-related habits and beliefs. Re-
searchers can employ these money attitude inventories to gain more insights into the question as 
to how widespread certain money attitudes are among common people. They also allow for a 
finer graduation between people who obviously suffer from a money-related pathology (e.g. mi-
sers), those who show no abnormalities when dealing with and thinking of money and those who 
are located somewhere in between the pathological and the healthy case. In contrast to the self-
diagnose questionnaires published by the authors of money-related personality typologies, the 
money attitude inventories reviewed here had been carefully tested and validated before being 
published. Established measures like the MAS or the MBBS have satisfactory psychometric 
properties and continue to produce reliable results.  
 What should be kept in mind is that the psychological concept of money attitudes in general 
and the existing psychometric scales in particular are statistical constructs. Although money-
related personality theories and typologies have had a considerable impact on the research deal-
ing with common people’s monetary behaviour and perception with respect to money, the di-
mensions or facets of what has become commonly known as ‘money attitudes’ have been de-
rived from factor analysis of survey data. Although the labels of several money attitude sub-
constructs like ‘power’, ‘retention’ or ‘obsession’ bring to mind the money-types described by 
personality theorists, these sub-constructs do not always refer to particular money pathologies. 
Still, there are some similarities between these statistical constructs and the personalities de-
scribed in the psychoanalytical literature on money. For example, all four inventories reviewed 
above encompass at least one dimension which refers to money as a symbol of power. Also, 
careful budgeting and neurotic money retention, i.e. behavioural components of money attitudes 
which clinicians often explain by the security meaning of money, is accounted for by most mon-
ey attitude measures. By contrast, neither viewing money as a symbol for freedom nor the oppo-
site attitude internalised by so-called freedom fighters, play a role in the established money atti-
tude inventories. Also, exaggeration of the need for love by compulsively spending money on 
oneself or on others has hardly turned out as a separate money attitude facet; it is usually part of 
the power-dimension of a money attitude inventory. 
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 Furthermore, many different psychometric money attitude inventories have been published 
over the last decades. Instead of developing the existing measures further and refining them, 
even the famous representatives of contemporary money attitude research like Thomas Li Ping 
Tang have continuously proposed new money attitude scales. The list of money attitude 
measures presented in this section could be extended by at least ten more inventories which cir-
culate in the psychological literature of money. Hence, the question arises which inventory a 
researcher who is interested in the topic of money attitudes should choose for his or her survey 
study. Furnham and Argyle (2000) recommend that researchers should base their choice on the 
following three criteria: (1) the psychometric properties of the measure, especially its reliability 
and validity; (2) the precise money attitude facet to be measured; and (3) practical questions such 
as the length of the questionnaire (see Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 53). In terms of reliability and 
validity the two older measures, the MAS and MBBS, appear to be preferable to other invento-
ries because the reliability and validity of these measures has been confirmed in many empirical 
studies. The second criterion is typically of most concern for a researcher interested in measuring 
a particular facet of money attitudes. However, in the case of several inventories it is difficult to 
capture what precisely is measured by the many subscales. The labels of the subscales are little 
help and often even confusing. For example, both the MAS and MBBS encompass subscales 
labelled ‘power’ and ‘retention’, but the corresponding items describe very different money-
related habits and beliefs. Regarding the third criteria, money attitude inventories generally con-
sist of a considerable number of statements. Most existing inventories encompass 30 items or 
more. As a consequence, employing the entire inventory is time-intensive and might not be fea-
sible in several cases. For example, the employment of all 60 items of the MBBS certainly poses 
problems in intercept surveys where respondents typically dispose of little time. A pragmatic 
solution to this issue consists of employing only the subscale which refers to the attitude facet a 
researcher is interested in. However, polling mostly similar items to measure one single attitude 
facet instead of covering more diverse money-related topics in a survey may bore the respond-
ents and cause them to answer monotonically (e.g. by always choosing the same interval of the 
Likert scale). 
 Finally, like clinicians, the authors of the money attitude scales tend to use the word ‘money’ 
in an ambiguous way, at least from the economic perspective. To be more precise, many of the 
statements these scientists employ to measure money attitudes would have to be reformulated. 
For example, the statement ‘Most of my friends have more money than I do’ (Furnham, 1984) is 
not very meaningful from the economic perspective. Strictly speaking, this item states that a per-
son’s friends have more notes and coins in their wallets, a fuller piggy bank or more savings. 
However, the idea that this item is ought to capture is, most probably, that a respondent thinks 
that his or her friends have higher incomes and are more affluent. To conclude, social psycholo-
gists took great effort to systematically measure people’s attitudes towards money. At the same 
time, the large variety of money attitude facets they identified and the considerable number of 
different inventories to measure the overall construct of money attitudes creates the impression 
 
106 
that the research on money attitudes lacks precision and a golden thread. There seems to be no 
agreement on the number of facets of money attitudes and the way in which these facets should 
be interpreted (see Furnham and Argyle, 2000: 60). However, the research on money attitudes 
shows that certain attitudes which Freud and his associates had described long time ago can be 
reliably measured and that these attitudes are of relevance not only among the clients of psycho-
therapists but also in the general population. 
 
Summary of chapter 4 
This chapter introduced selected psychological literature on money. In this literature money is, in 
contrast to the economic tradition, not merely analysed as a neutral means of payment but also as 
a symbol for power, security, love and freedom. Researchers with psychoanalytical background 
and social psychologists have extensively explored how people perceive money and how they 
deal with their financial resources. The literature on money pathology reveals some interesting 
money-related patterns which call into question the presumably neutral role of money for peo-
ple’s spending and saving decisions. For example, the stereotype of the miser described by sev-
eral personality researchers or the survey respondent who agrees with seemingly irrational 
statements such as ‘Even when I have sufficient money I often feel guilty about spending money 
(…)’ (Furnham, 1984) challenge the neutrality postulate which is paramount in economic      
literature.  
 However, the psychological framework on money has its limitations. Most strikingly, psycho-
analytical research is case-study based and provides no information regarding the relevance of 
money pathologies in the general population. The survey-based literature on money is more pre-
cise in accurately measuring and analysing common people’s attitudes towards money-related 
issues. Many different validated money attitude scales have been proposed and research on mon-
ey attitudes has become increasingly popular during the last decades. Although money attitude 
dimensions resemble the money pathologies that psychoanalysts described, money attitudes are a 
very different concept. Money attitude facets are statistical constructs; the associated psychomet-
ric scales encompass different kinds of components and mix together both behavioural and affec-
tive money-related statements; some of these statements reflect pathological habits; others ap-
pear very common and reasonable. While the psychological framework on money pathologies is 
quite clear cut, money attitudes are difficult to grasp. The meaning of the psychological variables 
measured by the multiple money attitude scales discussed in literature remains somewhat nebu-
lous. 
 A more general observation is that some terms that are strictly defined and separated in eco-
nomics, for example wealth, income and money, are regularly mashed up in psychological litera-
ture. Many scientists with psychological background adopt everyday speech when writing on 
money pathology or money attitudes. A reader frequently encounters sentences in psychological 
papers that are inaccurate from the economic perspective. ‘Making lots of money’ instead of 
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‘earning a high income’ is only one of many examples. Inevitably, this partly imprecise termi-
nology had to be employed also in the present chapter and I will occasionally use the word 
‘money’ to refer to wealth and income also in the following chapters. 
 The psychological literature on money reviewed in this chapter partly challenges the econom-
ic concept of money. In the next chapter the economic approach and the psychological approach 
to analyse money shall be further compared. Most importantly, the chapter addresses the ques-
tion as to how money attitudes challenge the validity of environmental values assessed in contin-
gent valuation surveys. 
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5 Money attitudes and environmental valuation 
5.1 Economics vs. psychology: Reconcilable or contradictory con-
cepts of money? 
As explained in chapter 2, monetary values for environmental goods are typically assessed based 
on observations of consumption choices individuals make on markets which are somehow relat-
ed to the environmental good in question (revealed preference techniques) or on contingent mar-
kets (stated preference techniques). Just as in the case of market goods, the amount of money a 
person is willing to give up in exchange for a particular environmental good is interpreted as the 
value he or she attaches to it. Thus, the decision of spending money – actually spending it or 
pretending that one would spend it – is a key element in any environmental valuation study. As 
argued by several psychotherapists, personality researchers, social psychologists and also by 
some behavioural economists, people’s decisions to spend money are likely to be influenced not 
only by their preferences for different commodities and their budget constraints but also by their 
money attitudes (cf. chapter 3.3 and chapter 4). Several researchers with psychological back-
ground stressed that the absence of money attitudes in standard economics is due to economists’ 
ignorance of the so-called symbolic dimensions of money (see e.g. Furnham and Argyle, 2000, 
Lea et al., 1987, Lane, 1993). However, as will be shown in the following section, this claim is 
not fully justified. 
5.1.1 Money symbolism in economic literature 
The psychological literature on money suggests that the way in which people think of money and 
how they acquire and use it is highly impacted by the symbolism inherent to money. Money does 
not exclusively represent the goods and services it can buy but also symbolises psychological 
needs like security, power and freedom, according to the psychological point of view. It is to be 
noticed that buzzwords like freedom, security and power can also be found in economic litera-
ture. However, unlike in psychological literature, these concepts are mostly associated with a 
person’s level of wealth or income and not with money in the strict sense. This difference re-
flects the definition of money as a medium of exchange in standard neoclassical theory. In a nar-
row sense, an economic agent’s money is the amount of coins and notes held in his or her wallet 
and the balance of his or her checking account. An economic agent’s wealth is, of course, 
measureable in terms of money but encompasses more assets than just the most liquid ones. As 
already mentioned, the term money is used in a broader way in other behavioural sciences, in-
cluding psychology. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the main representatives of psycho-
logical research on money like Goldberg and Lewis (1978) or Furnham (2014) often employ the 
term ‘money’ when referring to a person’s wealth in general, regardless of whether this wealth is 
held in liquid forms (cash and bank deposits) or in other forms (e.g. shares, bonds, insurance, 
property, etc.). Keeping these conceptual differences in mind, there are still some similarities 
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between the symbolic meaning of money discussed in psychological literature and the economic 
concepts of freedom, security and power. 
 Freedom, for example, is a fundamental value in democratic societies and one of the central 
objectives of market economies (cf. e.g. Berg et al., 2007). Freedom can be interpreted as indi-
viduals’ possibility of independently deciding on their economic lives. In this sense, freedom is 
immediately associated with wealth and money. In a market economy, individuals have, as ex-
plained for example by Simmel ([1907] 1982) a century ago, the possibility to sell their produced 
goods and services to anybody and to use the money they obtain in exchange for their sales for 
the purchase of commodities offered by completely different persons. This would not be the case 
in a barter economy, where exchange can only take place when the wants of two individuals co-
incide (cf. section 3.1.1). Freedom, as a fundamental objective in market economies, implies that 
people should have the possibility to earn income and to decide freely on the different possible 
uses of their income, i.e. spending, saving and investing. Security brings to mind some theories 
of monetary demand developed in the twentieth century. Pigou (1917), for instance, highlighted 
that ‘everybody is anxious to hold enough of his resources in the form of titles to legal tender 
[i.e. money] both to enable him to effect the ordinary transactions of life without trouble, and to 
secure him against unexpected demands, due to a sudden need, or to a rise in the price of some-
thing that he cannot easily dispense with. For these two objects, the provision of convenience 
and the provision of security, people in general […] elect to hold [part of their wealth] in the 
form of titles to legal tender’ (Pigou, 1917: 41, emphasis added). The security or precautionary 
motive for holding money is, of course, also recognised and considered as one of the central de-
terminants for an individual’s demand for money in contemporary macroeconomics. Further-
more, even the association between money and power sometimes appears in economic literature. 
As pointed out by Keynes ([1936] 2009), the enjoyment ‘of a sense of independence and the 
power to do things, though without a clear idea or definite intention of specific action’ (Keynes, 
[1936] 2009: 108, emphasis added) is one of the subjective reasons why consumers wish to save 
part of their income. Finally, Bernholz (2014) recently stressed the social consequences of the 
characteristics and people’s perceptions of money. ‘As a consequence of the fact that money can 
buy almost everything, rich people are considered to be very powerful. ‘They have much mon-
ey,’ because their wealth is calculated in terms of money’ (Bernholz, 2014: 56, emphasis added).  
 Thus, it would be wrong to argue that the ‘symbolic meaning’ of money (and wealth) has 
been completely overlooked by economists. Emotional association of money with freedom, secu-
rity and power arise from the economic functions which money fulfils in market economies. At 
first glance, the psychological definition of money as a medium of exchange with symbolic 
meanings does not seem to contradict or challenge the economic concept of money. However, as 
pointed out by several clinicians and social psychologists, some people, often unconsciously, 
deal with money in a way which would not be predicted by economic models of rational choice 
in which money plays no role at all for individual behaviour (cf. chapter 4). 
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5.1.2 Money attitudes and consumer theory 
Section 4.1 explored the psychoanalytical approach to explain pathological uses of money as an 
outcome of an irrational need for security, power, love and freedom. It has also been noted that 
the behaviour of certain money-types appears to be incompatible with the economic concept of 
money. Unfortunately, the reviewed theories and typologies are purely descriptive which makes 
it difficult to systematically analyse these different concepts. In order to get a deeper understand-
ing of the different money-types, to verify to what extent they are represented in the general 
population and to check whether their money attitudes indeed represent an irrational view and 
use of money, these money-types would have to be identified empirically. This could be done, 
for example, by means of population surveys which encompass a suitable psychometric measure. 
While personality theorists like Goldberg and Lewis (1978) have described and analysed dozens 
of money-related pathologies without providing validated psychometric measures, social psy-
chologists have developed the related and more measurable concept of money attitudes (cf. sec-
tion 4.2). Money attitudes are multidimensional, meaning that they involve different attitude 
components. Although no consensus has been reached regarding the most relevant dimensions of 
money attitudes, there are three facets that appear in almost all of the existing money attitude 
inventories. Established money attitude inventories (e.g. Yamauchi and Templer, 1982, 
Furnham, 1984) as well as recently developed measures (e.g. Klontz et al., 2011) all encompass 
a facet which is related to people’s association of money and power. The two other facets, which 
virtually always appear in money attitude research, are both related to the security meaning of 
money; one of them describes a forward looking person who carefully budgets for present and 
future consumption; the second facet refers to a more pathological view and use of money which 
has been described as miserliness or compulsive saving in clinical literature. In the following, 
these three money attitude dimensions shall be analysed with respect to their potential impact on 
the results of environmental valuation studies. A money attitude facet is likely to have an effect 
on a person’s WTP for environmental goods if this facet is systematically related to a person’s 
overall spending behaviour. Furthermore, the question whether the three money attitude facets 
considered here might translate into behavioural patterns that are at odds with economic theory 
shall be explored. 
 When using money attitude inventories in surveys, respondents are typically asked to express 
their agreement with these attitude statements on Likert scales; the higher the agreement with the 
individual statements is, the higher is the overall score on the subscale will be. The following 
paragraphs are dedicated to the interpretation of high scores on several money attitude subscales 
which refer to three commonly mentioned components (power, budgeting and miserliness). For 
each of the three common facets, it will be examined whether high scores on the corresponding 
scale reveal that the attitude in question may systematically affect a person’s consumption deci-
sions and whether a high score points to some form of monetary behaviour which contradicts the 
economic motives for spending or retaining one’s financial resources. The analysis is limited to 
the most frequently used money attitude inventories, which are Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) 
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Money Attitude Scale (MAS) and Furnham’s (1984) Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale 
(MBBS). 
Money as a symbol for power: posers and money-obsessed people  
The MAS and MBBS both encompass subscales which measure an attitude facet which resem-
bles the financial habits and beliefs of power-obsessed people. The subscale most accurately 
resembling Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) description of people who associate money with power 
are the MAS power-subscale and the MBBS obsession-subscale. These two inventories are dis-
played in Table 5-1. 
 The items of both scales can be classified in three categories: the habit to bribe others (item 1 
of the power-subscale; item 6 of the obsession-subscale); the habit of boasting about one’s in-
come, wealth and material possessions (item 2, 5 of the power-subscale; item 2 of the obsession-
subscale) and the tendency to show more respect towards affluent people than towards the less 
well-off (item 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the power-subscale and item 8 of the obsession-subscale). In 
addition to that, the obsession-subscale contains several items which point to an unusual im-
portance attached to ‘making money’ and ‘having money’ (item 1, 3, 4, 5, 7). This latter set of 
statements closely resembles the kind of person which Forman (1984) named a ‘tycoon’ and 
which Goldberg and Lewis (1978) discussed as ‘empire builders’. 
 Bribing others may be viewed as using money as a tool to purchase some particular services 
offered by other people. From this perspective, using ‘money to influence other people to do 
things for me [oneself]’ does not contradict the economic concept of money as a medium of ex-
change. Although the purchased ‘things’ like favours or approval do not belong to the kind 
commodities serving as examples in economic textbooks, money is simply used as a means to an 
end. Boasting about one’s money and judging people by the amount of money they have or make 
is in accordance with the economic paradigm as well. One of the key economic functions of 
money is its role as a unit of account. A price expressed in terms of money indicates the value of 
a commodity, a particular wage or salary the value of a certain type of work. People who agree 
with the statements of the power- or the obsession-subscale seem to apply the same principle 
when judging themselves and other people. Of course, economic theory does not suggest that 
people should think in monetary units when assessing how successful, important, lovable or 
powerful their fellow citizens are. However, given that value is expressed in terms of money in 
so many aspects of life, it comes as little surprise that some people tend to apply this concept to 
interpersonal relationships.  
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Table 5-1: Subscales for power-obsessed money-types 
Power-subscale (Yamauchi and Templer, 1982)  Obsession-subscale (Furnham, 1984, Wilhelm et al., 
1993)1 
7-point Likert scale 
‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (7) 
7-point Likert scale 
‘disagree’ (1) to ‘agree’ (7) 
(1) I use money to influence other people to do 
things for me. 
(2) I must admit that I purchase things because I 
know they will impress others. 
(3) In all honesty, I own nice things in order to im-
press others. 
(4) I behave as if money were the ultimate symbol 
of success. 
(5) I must admit that I sometimes boast about how 
much money I make. 
(6) People I know tell me that I place too much 
emphasis on the amount of money a person has 
as a sign of his success. 
(7) I seem to find that I show more respect to peo-
ple with money than I have. 
(8) Although I should judge the success of people 
by their deeds, I am more influenced by the 
amount of money they have. 
(9) I often try to find out if other people make 
more money than I do. 
(1) I feel that money is the only thing that I can re-
ally count on. 
(2) I am proud of my financial victories - pay, 
riches, investments, etc. - and let my friends 
know about them. 
(3) I would do practically anything legal for mon-
ey if it were enough. 
(4) I firmly believe that money can solve all my 
problems. 
(5) Compared to most people I know, I believe that 
I think about money much more than they do. 
(6) I often use money as a weapon to control or in-
timidate those who frustrate me. 
(7) I believe that time spent not making money is 
time wasted. 
(8) I sometimes feel superior to those who have 
less money than I regardless of their ability and 
achievement. 
1 In the initial study three additional items loaded on the obsession factor and were included into the scale. The list 
presented here is limited to those items which were confirmed in a follow-up study by Wilhelm et al. (1993). 
 
The question whether the obsession with making and having money (or, more correctly: earning 
high incomes and being wealthy) systematically affects people’s spending decisions cannot be 
answered straightforwardly. Unfortunately, the statements of the power-subscale and the obses-
sion-subscale do not contain any information concerning the purpose, such as consumption, in-
vestment or simply the accumulation of funds, for which money is desired. Since only a few 
items of the two subscales refer to behavioural components of money attitudes it is also impossi-
ble to assess whether or not the spending and saving habits of a person who attributes extraordi-
nary importance to wealth and a high income systematically differ from other people’s financial 
behaviour. However, when looking at the structure of the overall money attitude inventory rather 
than merely interpreting the items of the subscale, at least some conclusions regarding the spend-
ing and saving behaviour of people who score high on the power- or obsession-facet can be 
drawn. Being the result of the factor analysis of dozens of money-related statements, neither the 
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power- nor the obsession-subscale shows any significant correlation with other dimensions of the 
MAS and MBBS inventory, including budgeting or stinginess. Thus, people who view money as 
a symbol of power are most likely neither particularly thrifty nor stingy. However, there is some 
empirical evidence that wasteful behaviour systematically relates to the power-dimension of 
money attitudes. Hanley and Wilhelm (1992) and Khare (2014), for example, found that compul-
sive buying was positively related to the power-facet of money attitudes. Hence, it can be specu-
lated that the power-variable is positively correlated with expenditure levels. 
Security-orientated money-types: budgeting and planning 
Psychoanalysts and other personality researchers have highlighted that people differ in terms of 
thriftiness (cf. chapter 4). While many individuals place much importance on present consump-
tion and mostly deplete their monthly income, others are more concerned about their living 
standard in future periods of life and regularly put part of their current income aside. Having 
some money saved for emergencies and retirement gives them a feeling of security. It is to be 
noted that the attitude dimension considered here is not to be equalled with the beliefs and be-
haviour of a pathological miser. The variable in question refers to different levels of importance 
attached to budgeting and financial planning, or in economic jargon, different rates of time pref-
erence. Attitudes towards thrift and saving are an element of all money attitude inventories, in-
cluding the MAS and MBBS. The corresponding subscales are displayed in Table 5-2. 
 In Yamauchi and Templer’s (1982) initial study on money attitudes, seven items referring to 
an individual’s attitudes towards financial planning and saving loaded on a factor which the au-
thors labelled Time-Retention. All statements included in corresponding subscale describe the 
behaviour of people who wish to prepare financially for the future. Individuals scoring high on 
this dimension ‘could be described as placing great value on the process of preparation as well as 
the goal of security in the future’ (Yamauchi and Templer, 1982: 523). Furnham (1984) identi-
fied a similar factor which he named Security. The security-subscale covers, in addition to sever-
al items reflecting great concern for financial planning (item 1, 2, 3 and 6), a statement revealing 
a person’s dislike of talking about money-related issues (item 4) as well as an item referring to 
an individual’s parents’ money attitudes (item 5). While the simultaneous occurrence of great 
concern for financial security and the consideration of money-related questions as a taboo topic 
has been frequently observed and described by psychotherapists (cf. e.g. Trachtman, 1999), the 
fifth item appears to be more difficult to reconcile with the overall theme of the security-factor. It 
can be speculated that attitudes towards thrift are more likely to be learnt and imitated from 
one’s parents than other money-related attitudes.  
 Dealing carefully with one’s financial resources and saving money for later periods of life is 
perfectly in line with intertemporal theory of consumer choice. If a person’s attitudes towards 
thrift and saving translate into actual market behaviour, it can be expected that people who score 
high on the time-retention- or the security-subscale spend less and save more money in compari-
son to people with a low score, given their income levels and preferences for goods and services. 
Thus, there might be an effect of this particular money attitude facet on overall spending.    
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However, there is no reason to believe that attitudes towards thrift and saving systematically dis-
tort a person’s spending decisions. Refraining from spending money on present consumption 
neither represents an ill-founded perception nor an uncommon use of money but most likely re-
flects the importance an individual attaches to future consumption. 
 
Table 5-2: Subscales for security-oriented money-types (foresight) 
Time-retention-subscale (Yamauchi and Templer, 1982)  Security-subscale (Furnham, 1984)1 
7-point Likert scale 
‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (7) 
7-point Likert scale 
‘disagree’ (1) to ‘agree’ (7) 
(1) I do financial planning for the future. 
(2) I put money aside on a regular basis for the fu-
ture. 
(3) I save now to prepare for my old age. 
(4) I keep track of my money. 
(5) I follow a careful financial budget. 
(6) I am very prudent with money. 
(7) I have money available in the event of another 
economic depression. 
(1) I always know how much I have in my savings 
account. 
(2) I am proud of my ability to save money. 
(3) I know almost to the penny how much money I 
have in my purse, wallet or pocket at all times. 
(4) I believe that it is rude to enquire about a per-
son’s wage/salary. 
(5) My attitude towards money is very similar to 
that of my parents. 
(6) I prefer to save money because I’m never sure 
when things will collapse and I’ll need the 
cash. 
1 Items which had a factor loading of ≤0.400 in the initial study are not displayed. 
 
Security-oriented money-types: miserliness 
In addition to the statements referring to a rational and common concern for future financial se-
curity, MAS and MBBS encompass items that were originally formulated by Goldberg and 
Lewis (1978) in an attempt to describe people who strive for emotional security by accumulating 
their financial resources (so-called ‘security collectors’ which encompass the sub-group of stingy 
‘compulsive savers’, cf. section 4.1.2). These items are elements of the MAS distrust-subscale 
and of the MBBS retention-subscale (cf. Table 5-3).  
 The items of the distrust-subscale can be classified into two categories, namely items describ-
ing a consumer who is mistrustful towards salespersons (item 1,2, 3, 5 and 7) and items referring 
to a person’s unwillingness to spend money in principle (item 4 and 6). Making up a single mon-
ey attitude facet these items must be highly correlated. In other words, people who are mistrust-
ful towards salesmen are often at the same time tight with their money. This relationship is in 
line with the psychoanalytical literature on money retention and miserliness. Goldberg and Lewis 
(1978) and Forman (1987) described people who hate spending and tend to hoard their money as 
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extremely distrustful. The overall factor can thus be interpreted as a person’s tendency to feel a 
sense of conflict over spending money. The authors of the distrust-subscale proposed the follow-
ing interpretation: A high score on the distrust-subscale indicates that a person has ‘hesitant, sus-
picious, and doubtful attitudes’ (Yamauchi and Templer, 1982: 524).  
 
Table 5-3: Subscales for security-oriented money-types (miserliness) 
Distrust-subscale (Yamauchi and Templer, 1982)  Retention-subscale (Furnham, 1984)1 
7-point Likert scale 
‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (7) 
7-point Likert scale 
‘disagree’ (1) to ‘agree’ (7) 
(1) I argue or complain about the cost of things I 
buy. 
(2) It bothers me when I discover I could have got-
ten something for less elsewhere. 
(3) After buying something, I wonder if I could 
have gotten the same for less elsewhere. 
(4) I automatically say, ‘I can't afford it,’ whether I 
can or not. 
(5) When I buy something, I complain about the 
price I paid. 
(6) I hesitate to spend money, even on necessities. 
(7) When I make a major purchase, I have the sus-
picion that I have been taken advantage of 
(1) I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or 
not.  
(2) Even when I have sufficient money I often feel 
guilty about spending money on necessities 
like clothes etc. 
(3) I often have difficulty in making decisions 
about spending money regardless of the 
amount. 
(4) I prefer to save money because I’m never sure 
when things will collapse and I’ll need the 
cash. 
(5) I often buy things that I don’t need or want be-
cause they are in a sale or reduced in a sale or 
reduced in price. 
  
1 In the initial study a an additional item was reported: ‘I often feel inferior to others who have more money than 
myself, even when I know that they have done nothing of worth to get it’. This item loaded ambiguously on both the 
obsession-factor and the retention-factor and was therefore excluded from the scale in most subsequent studies that 
made use of the retention-subscale. 
 
Regarding the retention-subscale all but the last item fit the description of a miser. Three items 
refer to a general unwillingness to spend money (item 1, 2, 3) and one item describes a para-
mount fear of financial loss (item 4). The wording of the fifth item (‘I often buy things that I 
don’t need (…)’), stems from Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) description of the compulsive bargain 
hunter. Again, the correlation of items referring to one stereotype within the category of security-
oriented people with an item describing another money-type within the same category is in line 
with several personality theorists’ observations. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) highlighted that 
compulsive saving and bargain hunting were two forms of behaviour that are not mutually exclu-
sive. Furthermore, Furnham (1996) came to a similar conclusion when validating Forman’s 
(1987) money sanity scale. This validation study showed that miserliness and bargain hunting 
could hardly be isolated in a factor analysis, meaning that people’s answers to the miser-items 
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were highly correlated to their answers to the items referring to bargain hunting (cf. section 
4.1.3). Taking the retention subscale as a whole, high scores can be interpreted in a similar way 
as high scores on the distrust scale, namely as a person’s tendency to feel a sense of conflict over 
spending money. However, the retention-subscale contains more items than the distrust-
subscales that reflect some form of neurotic behaviour. Given the similarity of several statements 
with the habits of pathological misers, Furnham’s (1984: 504) interpretation of high scores on 
the retention-subscales as ‘the attitudes of the people who are very careful with money’ sounds 
too weak to be accurate. Rather than being careful consumers, people scoring high on this scale 
are likely to have the pathological tendency to accumulate their financial resources. In line with 
this impression, the authors of later studies interpreted the retention-variable in that way (c.f. e.g. 
Lea et al., 1987, Lane, 1993, Lim and Teo, 1997, Wiepking and Breeze, 2012). 
 Economic theory postulates that the possession of money as such is useless. Its value is de-
termined solely by the things it can buy. Hence, retaining one’s money is unreasonable unless an 
individual plans to spend it in the future. The behaviour of a miser who finds ‘happiness in own-
ing money without ever getting round to the acquisition and enjoyment of particular objects’ 
(Simmel, [1907] 1982: 327) is typically classified as irrational in economic literature (cf. e.g. 
Niehans, 1978: 14). Agreement with a statement like ‘Even when I have sufficient money I often 
feel guilty about spending money on necessities like clothes etc.’ or ‘I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ 
whether I can or not’ may indicate that a person belongs to the group of irrational misers who 
enjoy accumulating money and hate spending. At the same time, a person who agrees with the 
statements of the distrust scale, especially items 1, 2 and 3, might be just a price-conscious con-
sumer who aims to get the best out of his or her budget. Furthermore, a person who wishes to be 
secured against emergencies and saves a considerable part of his or her income may also reach a 
high score on most attitude statements of the distrust and the retention scale. In contrast to miser-
liness, price-consciousness and precautionary saving are compatible with the economic concept 
of the rational consumer, who maximises (life-time) utility through consumption and aims to 
minimise expenditures. Hence, in order to answer the question of whether the attitudes of this 
second category of security-oriented money-types challenges the economic concept of the ra-
tional consumer, one needs to know what kind of attitude the distrust and the retention scale ac-
tually measure. Goldberg and Lewis (1978) stressed that the behaviour of people with an ex-
traordinary need for financial security differs from what an economist would call saving. Ac-
cording to the authors, compulsive savers do not save for consumption during retirement or 
emergencies; they are driven by a compulsion to retain their money (ibid: 104). When observing 
the structure of several money attitude inventories, this affirmation seems to be confirmed. 
Yamauchi and Templer (1982) and Furnham (1984) both found separate sub-constructs reflect-
ing a desire for future financial security (the time-retention dimension of the MAS and the secu-
rity dimension of the MBBS which have been already analysed) in addition to the money attitude 
facet referring to a person’s unwillingness to spend money on anything. Thus, the money hoard-
ing sub-construct may indeed describe a phenomena that is different from a person’s concern for 
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future financial security. If money retention is neither motivated by a lack of financial resources 
nor by the concern for future consumption, high scores on the distrust or the retention-subscale 
are likely to be an outcome of miserliness. 
 An apparent illogicality is that both subscales involve statements referring to both stinginess 
and acquisition. The question arises why these two behavioural patterns, that are at first glance 
opposites, represent one single psychological variable. A rather obvious explanation of this issue 
is that even extremely stingy people need to spend some money on basic consumption such as 
food, clothes and housing. It seems plausible that in the exceptional case of spending money a 
miser complains about the price paid, tries to bargain and gets angry when he or she discovers 
that there would have been better deals. The second explanation has been already mentioned and 
is based on the money-related personality typologies in which miserliness appears. Goldberg and 
Lewis (1978) described three types of personalities that share a common ground, namely being 
very tight with money in most but not in any situation: the compulsive saver, the self-denier and 
the bargain hunter (cf. section 4.1.2). It is expected that all three types of persons would agree 
with statements like ‘I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or not’ although they are moti-
vated by different desires. The compulsive saver strives for money for the sake of accumulating 
it, the self-denier enjoys self-imposed poverty and the bargain hunter acts stingy in the hope of 
getting a desired good for a lower than the announced price. Furthermore, a statement such as ‘I 
often buy things that I don’t need or want because they are in a sale or reduced in price’ can be 
speculated to be denied by compulsive savers and self-deniers but accepted by bargain hunters. 
Consequently, if there are a considerable number of bargain hunters within the surveyed popula-
tion, items pointing to stinginess and items referring to acquisition are necessarily positively  
correlated. 
 To sum it up, the distrust and retention scale contain items reflecting the attitudes of misers, 
which are typically classified as irrational individuals in economic literature. Unlike the other 
money attitude facets explored in this section, it appears likely that miserliness systematically 
affects a person’s spending behaviour. Compared to other consumers, individuals who reach 
high scores on the corresponding money attitude subscale are expected to generally spend a low-
er proportion of their income and more often refrain from spending money at all. Based on the 
case studies published by several psychotherapists, it seems very probable that money retention 
distorts an individual’s consumption decisions. Due to their ill-founded compulsion to accumu-
late money and the psychological pain they experience when spending money, misers may un-
derestimate the benefit accruing from the consumption of goods and services they could pur-
chase with their financial resources. 
 
Considering the different facets of money attitudes which have been explored in the present sec-
tion, only one facet has been identified as unambiguously affecting and potentially distorting a 
person’s spending behaviour. The facet which poses a problem refers to behaviour of the stereo-
type of a miser who fiercely retains his or her money. In contrast, neither the power-dimension 
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nor the budgeting and planning facets of the two most commonly used money attitude invento-
ries obviously challenge the economic concept of the rational consumer who values money ex-
clusively for the things it can buy. Only extreme miserliness is likely to systematically influence 
a person’s consumption patterns and even distort spending decisions. Since spending decisions – 
either actual or hypothetical – are key elements of an environmental valuation study, the phe-
nomena of miserliness merits more attention in this context. The goal of the next section consists 
of scrutinising the consequences of this particular money attitude for the definition of the welfare 
measures which build the theoretical basis of environmental valuation studies (cf. section 2.2.1). 
5.2 Money retention and welfare measures 
In this section two approaches of integrating attitudes towards spending money into the econom-
ic framework are presented. The first approach consists of introducing money into the neoclassi-
cal utility function. The second approach recurs to an alternative variant of preference orderings 
discussed in economic literature, namely lexicographic orderings. Both approaches yield similar 
conclusions regarding the amount of money a miser would be willing to give up in exchange for 
an environmental improvement. However, these two approaches have different implications for 
the validity of the WTP figures assessed in survey-based environmental valuation studies. 
5.2.1 Money as an argument in the utility function 
For the stereotypical miser money becomes an object of consumption. The miser accumulates 
money for an undefined purpose and derives pleasure from amassing more and more cash. Mon-
ey thus receives the character of a good and the pure possession of money alters the miser’s utili-
ty. If money is desired for its own sake, an individual’s preferences can be described by means of 
a direct utility function which is monotonically increasing in market consumption (xh), the 
amount of money held (mh) and the public good environmental quality (z), yielding to a utility 
function of three arguments uh(xh, mh, z). Like an ordinary consumer, a miser maximises his or 
her utility with respect to an exogenously given income Ih. While part of this income is spent on 
market goods, the remaining part is retained for psychological reasons, for instance because stor-
ing money in his or her piggy bank bolsters the miser’s feeling of security. The constrained max-
imisation problem then becomes 
max. 𝑢(𝑥ℎ,𝑚ℎ, 𝑧) subject to 𝐼ℎ = 𝑝𝑥ℎ + 𝑚ℎ; 𝑧 = 𝑧𝑘; (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻), (5-1) 
where p is a vector of market prices including the price of money which is set to one and where 
income Ih equals the amount of money the individual spends on market consumption (pxh) plus 
the amount of money held (mh). In line with the standard expression that was introduced in sec-
tion 2.2.1, the utility change accruing from an isolated change in environmental quality can be 
expressed as  
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∆𝑈ℎ
01 = 𝜐ℎ(𝑝, 𝑧1, 𝐼ℎ) − 𝜐ℎ(𝑝, 𝑧0, 𝐼ℎ) ; (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻) (5-2) 
In the case of an environmental improvement, an individual’s utility increases, irrespectively 
whether the individual is tight or loose with his or her money. Accordingly, in the new situation 
even an extremely stingy person could give up some market consumption or part of his or her 
money holdings without being worse off than in the initial situation. This reflects the implicit 
assumption that also a miser is generally willing to trade environmental quality against money. 
Same as in the standard case, where money is not treated as an argument of the utility function, 
the Hicksian Compensation Variation corresponds to the income variation that would exactly 
compensate an environmental improvement in terms of utility. Similar to the usual interpretation, 
the CV can be approximated by a person’s maximum willingness to pay for the environmental 
improvement, i.e. the maximum decrease in his or her money holdings and/or market consump-
tion that he or she would tolerate to maintain the same level of utility as in the status quo: 
𝜐ℎ(𝑝, 𝑧1, 𝐼ℎ −𝑊𝑇𝐶) = 𝜐ℎ(𝑝, 𝑧0, 𝐼ℎ) ; (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻) (5-3) 
Hence, inserting money as an additional argument into the utility function hardly changes any-
thing. Individual welfare measures like the CV can be defined; however, their interpretation is 
slightly different as compared to the standard case. Rather than understanding the CV merely in 
terms of market consumption an individual could give up in exchange for the environmental im-
provement, it has now to be interpreted in terms of forgone market consumption or as the sum of 
money that could be deducted from an individual’s cash holdings or as a combination of both. 
For this reason, not only an individual’s preferences for market consumption and environmental 
quality but also his or her attitudes towards spending money will matter for the amount of in-
come he or she is willing to give up to obtain an environmental improvement. It is expected that, 
ceteris paribus, the higher a person’s psychological need to accumulate money is, the lower his 
or her WTP will be. It is important to note that an individual’s WTP can still be interpreted as a 
valid welfare measure for the utility accruing from improved environmental quality in the case 
considered here. So far, from a theoretical point of view, preferences for accumulating money for 
some undetermined purpose do not seem to pose a problem for environmental valuation studies. 
5.2.2 Lexicographic decision rules 
Another possibility for describing the behaviour of a miser consists of employing the concept of 
lexicographic preferences. Lexicographical preference orderings are usually disregarded in 
standard consumer theory because economists consider them as a rare exception. The textbook 
examples for lexicographic preference orderings are people who are addicted to the consumption 
of a particular good, for example junkies or alcoholics. Since such extreme consumption patterns 
are uncommon, they are of little concern for the prediction of ordinary consumption decisions. In 
the present study, however, the spending decisions of people who suffer a particular compulsion, 
namely a pathological tendency to accumulate money, are of particular concern. Naturally, it 
cannot be assumed that misers never spend money. According to the psychoanalytical literature 
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on money retention, these people do spend some money on necessities such as housing and food. 
However, lexicographic preferences appear to be a suitable concept for describing and predicting 
the behaviour of stingy people when it comes to spending money on less essential things, like 
environmental goods. One may think of misers as people who group, as postulated by Thaler 
(1985, 1999), their budget into different ‘mental accounts’. Misers have at least two such ac-
counts, namely an account for crucial expenditures (e.g. food, clothes, housing) and an account, 
where they hoard their remaining funds (e.g. a savings account or a piggy bank). While misers 
occasionally spend money out of the former account they will never touch their hoarding account 
voluntarily. Accordingly, the standard model of consumer choice, which is based on the concept 
of neoclassical preferences, applies to situations involving crucial expenditures. Lexicographic 
decision rules, as described in the following paragraphs, apply to a miser’s hoarding account. 
 Following the traditional meaning of the concept, individuals with lexicographic preference 
orderings make binary choices among alternative bundles of goods based on a particular rule. 
Formally, this rule is a linear order which indicates the relative importance an individual attrib-
utes to the different goods contained in the bundles at choices. Choices among two alternative 
bundles of goods are always dominated by an individual’s preference for the good which comes 
first in this linear order. In contrast to a standard neoclassical preference ordering, an individual 
does not consider all goods contained in alternative bundles when making a choice; in the lexi-
cographic case, an individual considers one particular good as absolutely important. Only if both 
bundles contain the same quantities of the primarily important good, the second most important 
good is relevant for the choice. If both alternatives do neither differ in the first nor the second 
most important good, the third most important good matters and so on. A particular feature of 
lexicographic preferences is that individuals are never indifferent when having the choice of two 
alternatives. In other words, there are no two bundles of goods which yield the same level of 
utility when consumed, unless these two bundles contain exactly the same kinds and quantities of 
goods. As can be inferred from the name of this concept, lexicographic orderings resemble the 
arrangement of words in a lexicon; based on the alphabetical rule, no two words which are 
spelled differently can occupy the same rank in a dictionary (c.f. Edwards, 1986). 
 Same as standard neoclassical preferences, lexicographic preferences satisfy the three ration-
ality axioms (completeness, transitivity and reflexivity) and the axiom of non-satiation. Howev-
er, neither the continuity nor the convexity axioms apply in the case of lexicographic preferences 
(c.f. Lockwood, 1996). As a consequence, there are no indifference relationships for this kind of 
preference structure and, as shown by Debreu (1954), no continuous utility function exists. For 
this reason, welfare measures, which presuppose the existence of a continuous utility function, 
cannot be defined. Hence, the WTP for an environmental good of a person with lexicographic 
preferences cannot be interpreted in terms of the Hicksian Compensating Variation (c.f. 
Edwards, 1986). 
 The economic concept of lexicographic orderings can be transferred to the psychological con-
cept of miserliness. Like addicts, stereotypical misers act according to a particular decision rule 
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which says that more money is always preferred to less, irrespectively what happens to other 
aspects of life, like their health, other people’s wellbeing, the state of the environment, etc. Mon-
ey ranks first in the linear order of goods; its accumulation is immeasurably more important than 
the consumption of any other good. When choosing among alternatives which imply changes of 
different magnitude in a person’s cash balance, the miser will always opt for the alternative 
which implies the highest money balance, regardless of all remaining attributes in which these 
alternatives differ. For example, when asked to make a choice between donating a certain 
amount of money for a good cause and keeping the money, the miser will always prefer the latter 
option, regardless of the purpose of the donation. Formally, binary choices involving an envi-
ronmental good z provided at different levels and different amounts of money m can be defined 
in terms of lexicographic preferences such as (𝑚1, 𝑧1) is preferred to (𝑚0, 𝑧0) iff 
𝑚1 > 𝑚0 or 
𝑚1 = 𝑚0 and 𝑧1 > 𝑧0, 
The choice between two alternatives (mk, zk) is primarily determined by the quantity of money m 
and only secondarily by the quantity and quality of the environmental good z. Thus, whenever 
the two alternatives differ in terms of money, the alternative which implies more money is pre-
ferred (cf. second line of the formal expression). Only in the case that both alternatives do not 
differ in terms of money, the quantity or quality of the secondarily important good, environmen-
tal quality in the case considered here, is decisive (cf. third line of formal expression). As high-
lighted by Fishburn (1974: 1446), small but perceptible differences in the quantity or quality of a 
good may be disregarded in practise. Thus, if two alternatives differ only slightly in terms of 
money, for example by a few cents but imply significantly different levels of environmental 
quality, even a miser may make his or her choice on the basis of the environmental good. How-
ever, as soon as the loss of money becomes palpable, the environmental good does not affect the 
miser’s choice at all. 
 What follows from the simple model introduced here is that a miser who employs a lexico-
graphic decision rule which assigns absolute priority to money completely ignores the environ-
mental good when choosing among alternatives which significantly differ in terms of the loss of 
money they imply. As soon as an alternative would lead to a significant reduction of his or her 
money holdings, the miser refrains from choosing it and opts for the alternative which leaves his 
or her money balance unaffected. It can be inferred that a miser who is confronted by the typical 
kind of choice presented in an environmental valuation study, namely keeping his or her money 
and forgoing an environmental improvement or giving up some amount of money to obtain an 
environmental improvement (i.e. m1<m0 and z1>z0), will always opt for the status quo situation, 
regardless of what happens to the state of the environment. In the strict sense of the concept, a 
miser’s choice is exclusively determined by the consideration of his or her money balance and 
completely unrelated to the kind, scale and scope of the environmental good in question.  
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 In the case of stated preference surveys, the WTP statements of misers, who exclusively focus 
on the money attribute of an alternative but fully neglect its environmental attributes, are mean-
ingless. The true WTP of a miser must be zero, or extremely low, irrespective of the environ-
mental improvement in question. For example, assuming that stated WTP reflects true WTP, a 
miserly respondent will always tick zero on a payment card or consistently answer ‘no’ when 
being asked a referendum question during a CVM interview. Similarly, when participating in a 
choice experiment a miser will always select the cheapest option from a choice set and ignore all 
other attributes of the alternative policy options presented on each choice card. Things change 
when applying the weaker variant of lexicographic orderings and allowing for the disregard for 
small differences. Even a miser may tolerate to give up a very low amount of money to obtain 
the environmental good. For example, in a CVM survey, a miser may tick a very low amount on 
a payment card or answer ‘yes’ to a referendum question when assigned a very low bid. In con-
trast, a miser is expected to return to the strict lexicographic decision rule as soon as the amount 
of money to be paid becomes tangible. Obviously, WTP statements which are, aside from the 
exceptions just mentioned, completely unrelated to the environmental good in question cannot be 
considered as valid measures for the utility change accruing from an improved provision of that 
good. Furthermore, if the share of respondents that applies money-focused lexicographic deci-
sion rules is of statistical importance, average WTP and hence the estimated social benefit accru-
ing from an environmental project might dramatically underestimate the actual social value of 
that project. As a consequence, the outcome of cost-benefit assessments would be misleading. 
 
To conclude, irrespective of the way of describing the behaviour of misers theoretically, there is 
always a negative relationship between people’s attitudes towards spending money and WTP. 
The money-in-the-utility function approach and the model of lexicographic preferences yield 
similar predictions about the amount of money that stingy people are willing to give up in ex-
change for an environmental improvement: this amount must be zero or extremely low. Hence, 
WTP can be expected to be a decreasing function of money retention. 
 However, the two approaches of integrating attitudes towards spending money into the eco-
nomic framework have different implications for the validity of theoretical welfare measures. 
While treating money as an additional argument of the utility function has merely any effect re-
garding the definition and interpretation of the Hicksian compensating variation, lexicographic 
preferences challenge one of the key assumptions underlying the economic valuation of envi-
ronmental changes, namely that individuals are willing to substitute environmental quality for 
money. Hence, the existence of misers in the general population may bias the results of survey-
based environmental valuation studies. Yet, it might be the case that the share of misers in a so-
ciety is so small that their presumably meaningless zero WTP statements do not matter at an ag-
gregate level. Even if all interviewed misers have stated a zero WTP that is completely unrelated 
to the environmental good of concern, the sample’s average WTP, and hence the social value of 
this good, will not be significantly affected in the case that only a few misers exist in the        
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surveyed population. Doubts regarding the meaningfulness and the interpretability of the survey 
results arise only if the share of misers within a population is of statistical relevance. According-
ly, before theorising on the impacts of money attitudes on the results of contingent valuation 
surveys, the question whether or not miserliness matters at an aggregate level needs to be ad-
dressed. In addition to that, it is not clear whether or not attitudes towards spending money, 
which are typically measured on self-report psychometric scales and therefore vulnerable to bias, 
have an observable impact on actual economic behaviour like buying, saving, investing, etc. If it 
turned out that self-reported money retention had no effect on real market behaviour, it would be 
rather implausible that this money attitude facet affects hypothetical spending decisions. Fur-
thermore, it may be the case that attitudes towards spending money are merely a function of a 
number of other individual characteristics like income, education and age, so that the assessment 
of this attitudinal variable becomes redundant. In an attempt of getting more insight into these 
still open questions, empirical studies on money retention will be scrutinised next. 
5.3 Money retention: empirical evidence 
Psychoanalysts and other clinicians extensively wrote about some people’s tendency to fiercely 
retain their financial resources (cf. section 4.1). Most psychometric measures for money attitudes 
encompass a list of items referring to a state of unwillingness to spend money, a phenomenon 
that is usually called ‘retention’ in psychoanalytical literature. Several of the corresponding items 
have been adapted from the description of misers that can be found in Goldberg and Lewis’ 
(1978) and Forman’s (1987) books on money pathology and in Freud’s ([1908] 1976) article on 
money retention. A few economists, especially those involved in behavioural finance, have 
pointed to the relevance of money spending dispositions for the explanation of individual con-
sumption behaviour (cf. section 3.3). Schmölders (1982), for example, showed that thrift and 
miserliness matter for people’s spending and saving decisions. Furthermore, Prelec and Loewen-
stein’s (1998) concept of the ‘pain of paying’ strongly resembles the kind of psychological bur-
den towards spending money that has been comprehensively described in the psychological liter-
ature on money. 
 Although money retention is extensively discussed in the psychological literature, it is still an 
open question as to how widespread the phenomenon actually is in the general population. In 
economics the phenomenon is usually completely disregarded, especially when it comes to mi-
serliness which is, if at all, merely mentioned as an example of irrational behaviour. Psychome-
tricians have attempted to make money spending dispositions measurable and to analyse them 
empirically by means of money attitude scales. Analysts can use the attitude statements encom-
passed by these scales to identify misers in surveys. This section focuses on empirical research 
on money spending dispositions in general and miserliness in particular. A number of difficulties 
related to the measurement of people’s money spending dispositions and the identification of 
misers shall be illustrated. Afterwards empirical studies that have linked money retention to so-
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cio-demographic variables, personality traits and actual spending and saving behaviour will be 
reviewed. 
5.3.1 Difficulties related to identifying misers in surveys 
Like any other personality trait or attitude, miserliness can hardly be observed directly. To make 
individual characteristics measurable psychologists and social scientists employ self-report ques-
tionnaires that include statements referring to the attitude or personality trait to be measured. 
Based on an individual’s agreement with one or several statements, a variable indicating the 
strength of an individual’s attitude is generated. In statistical analysis this variable can then be 
linked to the personality, demographic and socio-economic status of a person and to actual be-
haviour (c.f. Hanley and Wilhelm, 1992). Some researchers attempted to identify misers with 
one or several dichotomous (yes/no) questions (e.g. Schmölders, 1982, Forman, 1987). However, 
the more widespread approach consists of employing a money attitude inventory which encom-
passes multiple items referring to hoarding behaviour, extreme stinginess and paramount fear of 
losing money. As explained in chapter 4 most money attitude inventories encompass items 
which describe the behavioural pattern of exaggeratedly retaining one’s money instead of spend-
ing it. Out of the four inventories which have been reviewed in section 4.2.2 three encompass 
attitude statements referring to a person’s feelings of conflict over spending money. The reten-
tion-subscale of the MBBS (Furnham, 1984), the distrust-subscale of the MAS (Yamauchi and 
Templer, 1982) and the more recent money attitude measure (Klontz et al., 2011) all include 
such items. However, none of these inventories offers a subscale that exclusively and unambigu-
ously measures miserliness. Because of the partly similar habits of misers, compulsive bargain 
hunters, price-conscientious people and other types of consumers, not only misers are likely to 
score high on these scales. For this reason, researchers who want to identify people who fiercely 
retain their money should treat a high score on these scales with some caution. 
 Another difficulty related to identifying misers is the observation that self-report tightness 
with money does not always translate into non-spending. Goldberg and Lewis (1978), for exam-
ple, highlighted that compulsive saving, bargain hunting and self-denying were not mutually 
exclusive. Hence, a person who fits the stereotype of a miser in most situations may occasionally 
spend considerable amounts of money on items sold at reduced price or on gifts. Tatzel (2002) 
therefore suggested that tightness with money should be combined with other variables of indi-
vidual difference in order to predict spending decisions more accurately. She proposed an inte-
grated model of consumption patterns that combines tightness with money and materialism. In 
this model different combinations of the two variables predict different forms of behaviour. For 
example, tightness with money plus high materialism foretells bargain hunting; tightness with 
money combined with low materialism predicts non-spending. Tatzel’s (2002) approach of 
crossing money attitudes with personality variables seems to be a useful way to understand the 
consumption pattern of so-called self-deniers, too. Tightness plus high levels of individualism 
may predict non-spending. Tightness combined with low levels of individualism may result in 
self-denying behaviour, i.e. being extremely reluctant to spend money on oneself and at the same 
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time foolishly spending money on gifts, charitable donations, etc. Thus, a pure miser (a non-
spender) must fulfil at least three requirements: being tight with money; being indifferent of ma-
terial possessions; and being individualistic. Hence, an ideal survey study on miserliness would 
measure all three personality variables. However, accounting for two additional attitudinal varia-
bles means that the survey participants have to answer more test questions. Thus, obtaining a 
more accurate measure for miserliness typically comes at the cost of increasing the length of the 
questionnaire. As will be seen in the following section, none of the existing empirical studies on 
money retention has followed Tatzel’s (2002) suggestion. Likewise, integrating three groups of 
attitudinal questions into a CVM questionnaire would be difficult, given that the length of a 
standard CVM interview already exceeds the patience and receptivity of many respondents.  
 Apart from the problem of finding an appropriate measure, researchers may face difficulties 
when asking money attitude questions in surveys. Many therapists have stressed that their clients 
are reluctant to talk about their money-related pathologies (see e.g. Trachtman, 1999, Goldberg 
and Lewis, 1978). Hence, survey respondents may also be unwilling to answer questions about 
their penny-pinching habits, especially in face-to-face interview situations. The factor structure 
of the Money Script Inventory (Klontz et al., 2011), introduced in section 4.2.2 for example, 
points to this potential difficulty in identifying penny-pinchers with the help of self-report ques-
tionnaires. The composition of the vigilance-subscale reveals that people who tend to retain their 
money (‘Money should be saved not spent’) are at the same time unwilling to talk about money-
related issues (‘It is not polite to talk about money’). The existence of a correlation between a 
person’s reluctance to talk about spending and saving habits and his or her disposition to spend 
money in general further complicates the identification of misers in surveys. Keeping in mind 
these difficulties related to the identification of misers via attitude statements, empirical studies 
employing the MAS distrust-subscale and/or the MBSS retention-subscale are reviewed next. 
5.3.2 Review of empirical studies on money retention 
The objective of this section is to get more insights into differences in people’s general money 
spending disposition. By means of a comprehensive literature review the question as to how 
common extreme tightness with money in the general population is shall be addressed. Further-
more, the relationship between money retention and socio-demographic characteristics, personal-
ity and cultural difference will be explored. Last but not least, empirical evidence regarding the 
influence of money retention on actual behaviour is in the focus of this section.  
 The results of several empirical studies that made use of the MAS distrust-subscale or the 
MBBS retention-subscale have been reviewed. In an attempt to comprehensively summarise the 
research on money retention over the last 30 years, 18 empirical studies have been identified and 
analysed. A summary of these studies can be found in Table 5-4 at the end of this section. A first 
issue to be noted is that the majority of research is based on rather small convenience samples, 
most prominently student samples. For this reason, the results of most of these studies cannot be 
generalised. Furthermore, reported figures like mean scores on a money attitude scale are not 
strictly comparable. This is because different authors selected different numbers and combina-
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tions of items from the MAS and/or the MBBS. In addition to this, dissimilar answer scales were 
used in the empirical applications that are listed in Table 5-4; there is little consistency in the 
number of answer options and the endpoints of the Likert scales used. 
 Despite the long list of empirical studies on money attitudes, the question as to how common 
extreme forms of money tightness actually are in society cannot be easily answered. Unfortu-
nately, none of the reviewed studies provides information concerning the distribution of answers 
to the money attitude statements pointing to miserliness. It would be useful to know how many 
respondents expressed high levels of agreement to statements such as ‘Even when I have suffi-
cient money I often feel guilty about spending money on necessities like clothes etc.’ (MBBS) or 
ticked ‘always’ as their answer to the statement ‘I automatically say, ‘I can’t afford it,’ whether I 
can or not’ (MAS). However, a few authors reported mean values for the score on the retention- 
or distrust-subscales. These mean scores range from 2.8 (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1992 using the 
MBBS-retention subscale) to 5.3 (Medina et al., 1996 using items from the MAS-distrust 
subscale) out of 7 points. In general, average scores are higher in studies that used MAS distrust-
statements compared to studies that employed MBBS retention-statements. As already stressed 
in section 5.1.2, the number of items pointing to miserliness is higher in the case of the retention-
subscale compared to the distrust-subscale. The distrust-subscale contains a considerable number 
of items referring to a person’s distrust in salesmen in addition to the miser-items. The generally 
higher average scores on the distrust-subscale reveal that distrust is a more common money atti-
tude than miserliness. The highest scores on MBBS-items were reported for surveys conducted 
in Asian countries (Hoon and Lim, 2001). This result is particularly interesting in view of the 
empirical part of the present work that is based on a survey study in People’s Republic of China. 
As argued in the introduction, money retention may be of greater relevance in countries with 
Confucian tradition than in the western world. Furthermore, in most cases, the average score is 
lower than the midpoint of the Likert scale, i.e. below 4. This finding reveals that the different 
items indicating tightness with money were rejected rather than accepted by most respondents.  
 In addition to the mean scores reported by several researchers who made use of a money atti-
tude inventory, some more insights regarding the distribution of extremely stingy people in the 
general population can be gained when looking at the results of empirical studies where the phe-
nomena of miserliness was assessed in a more direct way, for example by means of a dichoto-
mous question. For instance, 14% of the respondents who participated in Schmölders’ (1982) 
household survey, conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s, were classified 
as misers. Empirical research on money pathology carried out by Furnham and colleagues 
(Furnham, 1996, Furnham and Okamura, 1999, Furnham et al., 2014) also gives some insights 
concerning the occurrence of penny-pinching in the general population. Furnham (1996) report-
ed the following statistics for a self-administered pick-up survey: 22% of the 277 British re-
spondents said ‘yes’ when asked ‘Do you hold on, or hoard yoru money’; 14% agreed with the 
question ‘Do you lie awake at night trying to figure out a way to spend less money and save 
more, even though you are already saving money?’. The same two questions were also part of a 
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recently implemented large-scale online survey; in this study average agreement with the two 
questions was significantly higher (35% and 22%, respectively, cf. Furnham et al., 2014), possi-
bly because of the somewhat more anonymous interview situation. Taken as a whole, the results 
reported by analysts who attempted to account for personal differences in money spending habits 
reveal that miserliness is a side issue in society. However, all studies reported a significant share 
of survey participants who agreed with the items used to identify misers. Hence, although the 
true share of misers in the general population is certainly low, it seems to be of statistical im-
portance. Another and maybe the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the review 
of existing studies on miserliness is that most of these studies are hardly elaborated and make use 
of poorly collected and low quantity survey data. Accordingly, the question whether the phe-
nomenon of miserliness is of statistical relevance remains to be explored. 
 Several authors paid attention to factors potentially predicting tightness with money. A num-
ber of studies found gender to be correlated with the score on the retention- and the distrust-
subscale. Females had significantly higher scores than men on the retention facet in two samples 
(Wilhelm et al., 1993, Lim et al., 2003). In contrast, females scored significantly lower than men 
on the distrust facet in two studies (Roberts and Sepulveda, 1999a, Baker and Hagedorn, 2008). 
Interpreting high scores on the retention facet in terms of miserliness and high scores on distrust 
facet in terms of suspicious attitudes towards salesmen, the first attitude seems to be more typical 
for women while men appear to be more likely to complain and bargain when making a pur-
chase. There is mixed evidence on the relationship between age and tightness with money. 
Furnham (1984) found a positive correlation between age and the retention score, Baker and 
Hagedorn (2008) reported a negative correlation between age and a score that was based on an-
swers to items selected from the retention- and the distrust-subscale. Six studies which focussed 
on the relationship between income and tightness with money have been identified (Yamauchi 
and Templer, 1982, Furnham, 1984, Roberts and Sepulveda, 1999a, Baker and Hagedorn, 2008, 
Hayhoe et al., 2012, Wiepking and Breeze, 2012). In all six studies income is a weak and often 
insignificant predictor of a respondent’s score on the retention or the distrust-subscale. Yamauchi 
and Templer’s (1982: 528) early finding that tightness with money is ‘essentially independent of 
a person’s income’ was thus reproduced in several other surveys. This means that people who 
are objectively better off or even affluent are not automatically less tight with their money than 
their counterparts. This result also suggests that misers can be found in both poor and wealthy 
groups of society. 
 A few researchers investigated the relationship of tightness with money and other psychologi-
cal variables. Among other things, the score on the retention-subscale was found to be positively 
correlated with conservatism (Furnham, 1984) and face concern (Lim, 2003). Wilhelm et al. 
(1993) concluded that subjects scoring higher on the retention-subscale reported lower levels of 
financial satisfaction. Shafer (2000) looked at several personality variables and their relationship 
with money attitudes. To account for different dimensions of money attitudes the author em-
ployed three different inventories (MBBS, MAS and MES). Unfortunately, there is insufficient 
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information concerning the exact items that constituted the money attitude facets analysed in this 
paper. Shafer (2000) reported significant effects of the Big Five personality traits extroversion, 
conscientiousness and neuroticism on two somewhat nebulous money attitude variables labelled 
‘Distrust Money is Evil’ and ‘Anxiety Worry’. Furthermore, he found a negative relationship 
between generosity and these two variables. Tatarko and Schmidt (2012) scrutinised the relation-
ship of several money attitude facets and social capital. The authors found that among all consid-
ered money attitude variables the retention facet had the strongest negative effect on levels of 
individual social capital. They concluded that greater levels of social capital may decrease a per-
son’s desire to accumulate money. 
 Curiously, there is only little research concerning the effect of self-report money retention on 
actual behaviour. Hanley and Wilhelm (1992) found that compulsive buyers scored slightly 
higher on the money retention-subscale than so-called normal consumers. Khare (2014) also re-
ported that high scores on the distrust-subscale were positively related to a repetitive urge to 
shop or spend. These results anew point to an issue discussed in the previous section, namely 
that self-report tightness with one’s financial resources does not always result in non-spending. 
Based on questions regarding money attitudes and saving habits, Lim and Teo (1997) discovered 
that respondents scoring higher on the retention variable were more likely to save money regu-
larly. Hayhoe et al. (2012) found a similar result when comparing scores on the distrust-subscale 
to statements about saving habits. Finally, the biennial ‘Giving in the Netherlands Survey Panel’ 
encompasses several statements of the MBBS. Wiepking and Breeze (2012) showed that the 
score on the retention-subscale had a significant negative effect on the total amount donated to 
charitable organisations in 2007. Using an OLS regression model they showed that the retention 
variable was a more powerful predictor for donations than actual financial resources (home own-
ership, after-tax household income and income from wealth). They concluded that ‘money per-
ceptions should be considered as important dispositional characteristics for predicting donations’ 
(Wiepking and Breeze, 2012: 21). 
 In sum, the results of most empirical studies on money attitudes show that the miser is an un-
common character in society but that individual difference in spending vs. hoarding one’s money 
are substantial. The reviewed survey data provides mixed results regarding the factors which 
influence a person’s self-reported tightness with money. Some studies found gender, national 
origin, personality traits and other psychological constructs to be correlated to this facet of mon-
ey attitudes, but there seems to be no simple and systematic relationship between money spend-
ing dispositions and demographic or other psychological variables. Tightness with money mostly 
decreases with higher income levels but most researchers reported only a weak relationship be-
tween a person’s actual financial resources and his or her score on the relevant attitude items. 
Unfortunately, even after having carefully collected and scrutinised the results of dozens of em-
pirical studies, little can be said concerning the relevance of self-report miserliness on actual 
behaviour. However, Wiepking and Breeze’s (2012) analysis of the impact of money attitudes on 
charitable giving, which is based on a large random household sample, points to the relevance of 
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this psychological variable for the prediction of actual spending decisions. Since the MBBS-
retention variable has a significantly negative effect on annual donations in this study it is ex-
pected that a similar result would be obtained for other decisions and acts involving money. As 
argued in the next section, tightness with money may be a useful predictor variable for respond-
ents’ answers to the payment question in contingent valuation surveys. 
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Table 5-4: Surveys on money retention (1982-2014) 
Empirical studies Scale and items 
used1 
Mean money 
attitude score2 
Sample 
size 
Subjects Location Relationship with other variables Correlation 
with income 
Yamauchi and 
Templer (1982) 
MAS 
(1)-(7) 
4.119 300 
 
Diverse Los Angeles and 
Fresno, California 
Paranoia (+), Machiavellianism (+), 
status-concern (+), time competence (-), 
obsessionality/anal character (+) 
-0.060 
Furnham (1984) MBBS 
(1)-(6) 
3.417 256 College stu-
dents 
Great Britain Age (+), Alienation (+), Protestant 
Work Ethic (+), Conservatim (+)  
Not sig. 
Hanley and Wilhelm 
(1992) 
MBBS 
(1)-(7) 
Compulsive 
buyers: 2.780 
Others: 2.440 
143 Diverse Arizona, Colorado, 
Detroit, Michigan 
Compulsive buying (+) N/A 
Wilhelm et al. 
(1993) 
MBBS 
(1), (2), (3), (7) 
N/A 559 Household 
heads 
Arizona and Califor-
nia 
Female (+), Financial satisfaction (-) N/A 
Medina et al. (1996) MAS 
(1)-(4), (6), (7) 
Anglo-
American: 
5.28 
Mexican: 5.26 
1,132 Mexican-
American and 
Anglo-
American for-
mer students 
 No significant relationship with ethnic 
background 
N/A 
Lim and Teo (1997) MBBS 
(1)-(3) 
N/A 152 College stu-
dents 
Singapore Ability to save money (+), anxiety (+) 
No relationship with financial hardship 
N/A 
Roberts & Sepul-
veda (1999a,b)    
MAS 
(1), (3), (5), (6) 
N/A 275 Diverse Monterrey, Mexico Female (-), compulsive buying (+) Not sig. 
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Empirical studies Scale and items 
used1 
Mean money 
attitude score2 
Sample 
size 
Subjects Location Relationship with other variables Correlation 
with income 
Hayhoe et al. (1999) MBBS 
(4), (7) 
& MAS 
(5) 
N/A 426 College stu-
dents 
Kentucky, Oneonta, 
Iowa, Rhode Island 
Possession of a credit card (-)  N/A 
Shafer (2000) MBBS 
MAS 
N/A 200 College stu-
dents 
California Big Five traits extroversion (-), consci-
entiousness (-) and neuroticism (+); 
generosity (-), status concern (+) 
N/A 
Hoon and Lim 
(2001) 
MAS 
(1) 
MBBS 
(3) 
Singaporeans 
before and 
after crisis: 
3.57/3.640 
Thais after 
crisis: 4.020 
325 College stu-
dents with 
previous work 
experience 
Singapore and 
Bangkok 
No relationship with nationality and 
economic recession 
N/A 
Lim et al. (2003) 
Lim (2003) 
MBBS 
(1)-(3) 
N/A 305 Singaporean-
Chinese work-
ing adults 
Singapore Female (+), Face concern (+), Confu-
cian work ethic (-) 
N/A 
Masuo et al. (2004) MBBS  
(1), (2) 
Asians: 4.920 
Asian Ameri-
cans: 3.675 
290 Asian and 
Asian-
American col-
lege students 
Kora, Japan, U.S. National origin N/A 
Watson et al. (2004) MAS 
(1), (3), (5), (6) 
Men: 3.304 
Women: 
3.201 
418 College stu-
dents 
Tennessee Narcissism (+), Religiousness (+)  N/A 
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Empirical studies Scale and items 
used1 
Mean money 
attitude score2 
Sample 
size 
Subjects Location Relationship with other variables Correlation 
with income 
Baker and Hagedorn 
(2008) 
MAS 
(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) 
MBBS 
(1), (2), (5) 
N/A 200 Diverse (ran-
dom telephone 
survey) 
Canada Education (-), Age (-), Female (-) -0.150* 
Hayhoe et al. (2012) 
Hayhoe and Gutter 
(2012) 
MAS 
(1), (3), (6), (7) 
4.389 749 Diverse 
 
U.S., nation-wide Financial management (+), saving regu-
larity (+) 
Not sig. 
Wiepking and 
Breeze (2012) 
MBBS 
(1)-(4) 
 
3.584 1,866 
 
Representative 
household sam-
ple 
Netherlands Amount donated to charity(-) -0.119* 
Tatarko and Schmidt 
(2012) 
MBBS  
(1), (3), (7) 
N/A 634 Diverse Russia Social capital (-), Age (+), education (-) N/A 
Khare (2014) MAS 
(1), (5), (6), (7) 
N/A 409 Diverse (Mall-
stop survey) 
India Compulsive buying (+) N/A 
 
1 MAS items: (1) I argue or complain about the cost of things I buy. (2) It bothers me when I discover I could have gotten something for less elsewhere. (3) After buying some-
thing, I wonder if I could have gotten the same for less elsewhere. (4) I automatically say, ‘I can't afford it,’ whether I can or not. (5) When I buy something, I complain about the 
price I paid. (6) I hesitate to spend money, even on necessities. (7) When I make a major purchase, I have the suspicion that I have been taken advantage of  
MBBS items: (1) I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or not. (2) Even when I have sufficient money I often feel guilty about spending money on necessities like clothes 
etc. (3) I often have difficulty in making decisions about spending money regardless of the amount. (4) I prefer to save money because I’m never sure when things will collapse 
and I’ll need the cash. (5) I often buy things that I don’t need or want because they are in a sale or reduced in a sale or reduced in price. (6) I often feel inferior to others who have 
more money than myself, even when I know that they have done nothing of worth to get it. (7) In making any purchase, for any purpose, my first consideration is the cost. 
2 Mean attitude score: A person’s score on the distrust facet or the retention facet is calculated as the sum of his or her answer choices on the Likert scale and divided by the num-
bers of items. Using a 7-point Likert scale the score’s range reaches from 1 ‘completely disagree’ to 7 ‘completely disagree’ for studies using the MBBS and from 1 ‘never’ to 7 
‘always’ for studies using the MAS. In the table scores have been converted to a 7-point format whenever the original study employed a different response format (e.g. 5-point 
Likert scale). 
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5.4 Consequences for CVM studies 
In section 5.2 the question how a person’s disposition to spend money in general might affect his 
or her WTP for environmental goods was approached from a theoretical perspective. It has be-
come evident that, under certain circumstances, money attitudes affect the meaningfulness and 
interpretability of WTP estimates. This would be the case if a considerable number of people 
applied lexicographic decision rules that preclude any trade-off between money and environmen-
tal goods. The WTP of these individuals is well-defined, i.e. it is zero, but not interpretable in 
terms of the utility accruing from the environmental project in question. However, the concept of 
lexicographic preferences fits, if at all, the stereotype of a miser, i.e. a strict non-spender. The 
results of empirical studies on money attitudes reveal that the share of extremely stingy people in 
the general population is rather low but that it is of statistical importance. Therefore, miserliness 
should not be neglected in survey-based environmental valuation studies. Furthermore, an indi-
vidual’s disposition to spend money in principle appears to be a personality variable of its own 
right which is expected to affect the way in which people act in situations involving money. 
There is at least some empirical evidence that this attitudinal variable matters for people’s saving 
and spending habits. In view of the growing interest in psychological research on economic be-
haviour, it appears somewhat surprising that money attitudes have never been discussed in the 
context of contingent valuation. Given this paucity of research, the relevance of money spending 
dispositions for the results of CVM studies shall be discussed in this section. 
5.4.1 Relevance of money retention for stated WTP 
At first glance, the hypothesis that the WTP statements of stingy people differ from the WTP of 
generous people appears to be quite plausible. Given the everyday experience, it can be expected 
that there is a negative relationship between stated WTP and miserliness. It would be rather sur-
prising if a person who fiercely retains his or her money in everyday life suddenly agrees to con-
tribute a high amount of money to an environmental project. At the same time, the effect of 
money spending dispositions in general and miserliness in particular on the answers to payment 
questions, i.e. hypothetical spending, can also be doubted. It is to be noted that the good which is 
‘sold’ in a CVM interview differs from the goods traded in real markets, i.e. the commodities for 
which people spend money in everyday life; they are (quasi) public goods. Due to the particular 
payment mechanism through which environmental goods are provided in a CVM project scenar-
io, a person’s decision of spending money does not only have an effect on his or her personal 
utility but also on other people’s wellbeing. Well-designed CVM surveys typically give respond-
ents the impression that their personal contribution alters the probability that the environmental 
project of concern is realised. Thus, unlike in the case of refraining from spending money on 
private goods, a person’s refusal to contribute money to an environmental project decreases the 
probability that other people can enjoy the benefits accruing from that project. Hence, a stingy 
person who is concerned about his or her fellow citizens’ wellbeing may act differently when it 
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comes to the contribution to a public good than in common purchase situations. Given several 
psychotherapists’ reports, it can hardly be assumed that all people who neurotically hold on to 
their financial resources are unsocial egoists who do not care about other people’s wellbeing (see 
for instance Goldberg and Lewis’ (1978) description of the self-denier, section 4.1.2). For this 
reason, it can be hypothesised that the public good characteristics of environmental projects con-
found a person’s usual spending habits. The psychological pain that misers experience in usual 
purchase situations may be mediated or even offset by feelings of altruism, including pure or 
impure forms of it (e.g. the so-called warm-glow of giving, cf. section 2.3.2). Furthermore, the 
presence of an interviewer in face-to-face CVM surveys makes the decision of spending or not 
spending different from a real market situation. With the presence of an interviewer a miser has 
to disclose his or her inhibition against spending money by actively stating that he or she is un-
willing to contribute money to the environmental project in question. It can be speculated that 
speaking out loud that one’s WTP is zero is a more embarrassing experience than simply leaving 
the supermarket with an empty trolley or closing down the website of an online store. Similarly, 
willingness to please the interviewer, social norms and fears of giving answers which are consid-
ered to be incorrect by the supposed sponsors of the survey (i.e. the government in many cases) 
may prevent a miser from admitting his or her true, presumably zero WTP. 
 Finally, and most importantly, the payment situation in a CVM interview is hypothetical. Re-
spondents are simply asked to state how much money they would give up in exchange for an 
environmental improvement but no actual transactions are made. Thus, it may be the case that 
money attitudes do not matter at all for people’s choices on contingent markets. A miser who 
hardly ever spends money on actual markets might state a positive WTP because he or she does 
not believe that there will be an actual payment subsequent to the survey. Similar to the fact that 
many CVM studies fail to identify a significant income effect, it may be the case that money 
spending dispositions do not affect respondents’ answers to WTP elicitation questions. At the 
same time, the absence of an income effect in multiple CVM studies could also be an indicator 
of the limited relevance of people’s objective financial situation for their (un)willingness to pay 
money for environmental goods and calls for the analysis of psychological variables such as 
money attitudes. As pointed out by behavioural economists as well as social psychologists, not 
only a person’s ability to spend money, i.e. disposable income and wealth but also, and perhaps 
to an even larger extent, a person’s disposition to spend money in general matters for individual 
consumption, saving and investment decisions. From this perspective, it can be speculated that 
the money attitude facet considered here is at least on an equal footing with the income variable. 
Moreover, the argument regarding the hypothetical nature of the payment situation in a CVM 
interview can be partly refuted. It has become a broadly accepted guideline that the payment 
scenario should be realistic, that it should resemble a real market situation as closely as possible 
and that respondents should perceive the CVM survey as consequential (c.f. Carson and Groves, 
2007, Arrow and Solow, 1993). Thus, in the case of a well-designed CVM survey it is reasona-
ble to expect that most respondents perceive the payment situation in a way that resembles an 
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actual purchase situation. Naturally, respondents still give hypothetical answers to hypothetical 
questions but this does not necessarily mean that they completely ignore their feelings related to 
spending money. 
 Hence, although there are a number of arguments which put in question the relevance of mon-
ey attitudes for WTP statements, there are also good reasons to stick to the hypothesis that mon-
ey retention affects the results of CVM surveys. In principle, there are three possibilities regard-
ing the impact of money attitudes on the answers to a WTP elicitation question: (1) People be-
have the same way as in situations involving actual spending. This to say that a person’s WTP is 
negatively related to his or her tendency to retain his or her money. (2) Since no actual transac-
tions are made during a CVM interview, money attitudes do not matter at all for a person’s WTP. 
A miser, for example, may not feel the usual conflict over spending money and will state a WTP 
which reflects his or her appreciation of the environmental improvement in question. (3) Money 
attitudes are in conflict with other factors which are irrelevant for most spending decisions in 
everyday life. Some of these factors are directly related to the environmental good in question 
(altruism, environmental attitudes, etc.), others are merely a by-product of the interview situation 
(e.g. the wish to save face in front of the interviewer). Depending on which factor dominates, 
money attitudes may or may not have an observable effect on stated WTP. For example, a person 
who attaches great importance to accumulating money but who wishes to hide his or her miserly 
attitudes from the interviewer might state a positive WTP. In contrast, there may be people with 
very positive environmental attitudes, who are in favour of any environmental protection project. 
However, they are too stingy to tolerate any loss of money so that they will always state a zero 
WTP. As will be shown in the following section, none of the three possible outcomes is desirable 
in terms of the validity of CVM data. 
5.4.2 Validity of CVM data 
As concluded in the previous section, individual differences in the willingness to spend money in 
general may or may not affect people’s answers to hypothetical payment questions. The question 
arises whether the validity of individual WTP statements and the validity of CVM data as a 
whole are affected in the one or the other case. As explained in section 2.3.2, validity refers to 
the degree to which value estimates assessed in stated preference surveys measure the true value 
that individuals assign to the environmental improvement in question. Validity assessments usu-
ally consist of checking the content, convergent and criterion validity of the results derived from 
a particular CVM survey. While omitting the aspect of content validity14, the role of money atti-
tudes for construct and convergent validity of stated WTP as well as for the overall quality of 
CVM data will be analysed next. 
                                                 
14 Since this form of validity merely refers to the degree to which a CVM study has been conducted in line with the 
general guidelines for a satisfactory questionnaire design and survey implementation, it will not be further consid-
ered in the present section. No attempt will be made to question or revise the widely accepted recommendations 
concerning the questionnaire design, survey mode, sampling issues and data analysis, regardless of whether money 
attitudes matter for the outcome of a CVM survey or not.  
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 One of the key assumptions in CVM research is that answers to valuation questions are de-
termined by respondents’ preferences and that these preferences are consistent with standard 
economic theory (see Bateman et al., 2002: 297). WTP for a prospective environmental im-
provement is interpreted as the amount of market consumption an individual could give up with-
out being worse off than in the status quo situation. Due to the fundamental assumption that en-
vironmental quality can be substituted for market consumption (and hence for money represent-
ing the worth of various commodities) in terms of utility, an individual’s preferences can be rep-
resented by indifference surfaces which show the different combinations of market goods and 
environmental goods which generate identical levels of utility. Accordingly, there is always 
some amount of money which could compensate for a change in environmental quality in terms 
of utility and there is always some level of environmental quality which could compensate for a 
change in income. Indifference about alternatives is, however, a particularity of the kind of pref-
erence ordering on which contemporary welfare economics are based. In contrast to that, substi-
tutability among the components of different bundles of goods is not always given for other con-
cepts of preferences and choice. Most importantly, the concept of lexicographic orderings, which 
appears suitable to theoretically describe the behaviour of misers, precludes the case that indi-
viduals are indifferent about alternatives, i.e. that they are willing to make trade-offs between 
goods like environmental quality and money. Hence, given the possibility that there is no envi-
ronmental improvement that would compensate a miser for a loss of money, the question arises 
what this implies for a miser’s answer to a valuation question in a CVM interview. As theorised 
in section 5.2.2, a miser who applies a strict lexicographic rule will always state a zero WTP (or 
‘no’ in the case of a referendum question). More realistically, it is expected that even a miser 
ignores minimal changes in his or her money balance, meaning that the person may state an ex-
tremely low but positive WTP amount (or answer ‘yes’ when asked to pay a very low amount of 
money). In both cases, stated WTP reflects the miser’s true WTP which must be, given the lexi-
cographic ordering in which money precedes environmental quality, (close to) zero. Neverthe-
less, although being true expressions of preferences, WTP statements which are based on lexico-
graphic decision rules threaten the construct validity of WTP data because they do not measure 
what a CVM practitioner intends to measure. Same as in the case of an individual with standard 
neoclassical preferences, a miser may be better off subsequent to an environmental improve-
ment. However, his or her answer to the payment question does not reveal this potential increase 
in utility. The miser’s WTP will be (close to) zero, irrespective of how large the prospective 
utility increase would be. 
 Miserliness, in the sense of addictive behaviour, may also affect several indicators for the 
construct validity of WTP estimates, such as their responsiveness to price and scope. A lexico-
graphic decision rule implies that an individual only focuses on one particular component of an 
alternative; all other components are irrelevant for his or her choice. This means that the WTP of 
a person who is exclusively focussed on the monetary attribute of the two alternatives to which 
the valuation question of a CVM survey refers to (the status quo, i.e. no environmental           
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improvement and no payment vs. the project scenario, i.e. environmental improvement and pay-
ment) is completely unrelated to the environmental project to be valued, including the scope and 
scale of the project. Furthermore, in spite of very low, impalpable amounts of money, it is ex-
pected that a miser’s answer to a referendum question is unaffected by the bid level, too. This is 
because the lexicographic decision rule implies that misers will state ‘no’ as soon as they per-
ceive the loss of money implied by their choice as significant, regardless of whether this loss is 
small or huge. 
 Lexicographic decision rules as well as WTP statements’ irresponsiveness to bid levels and 
scope would be reasons for discarding the answers of misers before calculating the sample’s av-
erage WTP. However, in addition to the general issues of discarding the answers of certain 
groups of respondents from the data, such as decreasing the sample size and reducing the sam-
ple’s representativeness, correcting for the ‘miser bias’ is likely to negatively affect the conver-
gent validity of WTP estimates. As explained before, researchers commonly test for convergent 
validity by comparing the average value assessed in a CVM survey to the average value assessed 
in a simulated market experiment. Clearly, observing a negative effect of money retention on 
WTP appears to be more plausible in a simulated market experiment than in a hypothetical CVM 
interview. This is because actual transactions are only made in the former setting but not in the 
latter. Thus, a relatively weaker effect of this money attitude facet on stated WTP could be one 
of the reasons for the frequently reported divergence of values assessed with the help of hypo-
thetical questions and those assessed in experimental settings. Since the WTP statements of most 
misers are, presumably, very low or zero, discarding them would increase the gap between actual 
and stated WTP and hence threaten the convergent validity of the CVM data. From this perspec-
tive, deleting the answers of stingy respondents is not recommendable. Rather than discarding 
part of the collected data, CVM practitioner should treat money attitudes in a similar way as pro-
test bids and other potential biases. In a first step, they should check whether attitudes towards 
spending money significantly affect the WTP estimate; and in a second step, they may inform 
the recipients of the survey results about this possibly biasing effect. 
 Finally, the existence of respondents with a strong inhibition against spending money in gen-
eral may also affect the overall quality of the information gathered in CVM interviews. In psy-
chological literature, money-related questions are often described as a taboo topic (cf. e.g. 
Trachtman, 1999, Goldberg and Lewis, 1978, Furnham, 2014). Many people dislike talking 
about money-related issues, especially those suffering some money-related pathology. For ex-
ample, Klontz et al. (2011) found that people who tend to hoard their money are also more likely 
to consider money-related questions as private and impolite. For this reason, it may be the case 
that respondents with strong inhibitions against spending money perceive the key question of a 
CVM questionnaire, namely the elicitation question regarding their willingness to contribute 
money to a certain environmental project, as inappropriate, embarrassing or even insulting. Re-
fusing to answer the payment question and/or breaking off the interview after having been asked 
the payment question is therefore expected to happen more frequently in the case of misers than 
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for respondents with more common money spending dispositions. In addition to that, protest 
against the payment scenario is expected to be more widespread in the group of misers. For ex-
ample, misers may perceive the idea of collecting money from ordinary people in order to fi-
nance an environmental project as more unfair than respondents who do not feel such great pain 
of paying. Furthermore, it can be speculated that a miser’s motivation to answer further ques-
tions decreases subsequent to the payment question. The anger about being asked to give up 
money for some environmental project may persist when having to answer those questions which 
typically follow the elicitation question, namely debriefing questions, questions regarding a re-
spondent’s household and auxiliary questions. It can be speculated that misers, compared to oth-
er respondents, are less willing to think deeply about follow-up questions, become impatient and 
use strategies to end the interview as soon as possible. For example, monotonic answering or not 
following the instruction given by the interviewer (e.g. answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ instead of con-
sidering some precise answer options) is expected to be of particular concern in the group of 
misers. Taken together, there are several reasons to doubt that a person who generally hates 
spending money is a very pleasant respondent of a CVM interview. In addition to giving the in-
terviewer a hard time, the answers given by stingy respondents may be less consistent and less 
accurate as compared to other survey participants’ responses. These issues add to the importance 
of treating the answers of misers with particular caution when analysing the data of CVM sur-
veys. 
 So far, only the most extreme case of money retention has been considered. However, miser-
liness is likely to be an exceptional case. Given everyday experience and the outcome of empiri-
cal studies on money attitudes, the share of respondents who feel no conflict over spending mon-
ey at all is likely to be greater than the proportion of misers in the general population and the 
majority of people are likely to be situated somewhere in between of the two extremes. For this 
reason, looking at money spending dispositions as a continuous variable which can take different 
levels reaching from generous to stingy appears to be of greater relevance than simply scrutinis-
ing the extreme, pathological case. Intuitively, one would expect that different levels of willing-
ness to spend money in general do have an effect on WTP. Ceteris paribus, the more generous a 
respondent is, the higher is his or her WTP will be. Thus, not discovering a negative relationship 
between money retention and stated WTP would not be consistent with intuitive expectations 
and may be interpreted as an indicator of a lack of validity. 
 All in all, money spending dispositions in general and miserliness in particular appear to be an 
interesting phenomenon in the context of CVM research. Neither the existence nor the absence 
of a relationship between money attitudes and WTP statements is desirable in terms of the validi-
ty of the values assessed in CVM surveys. No relationship between a person’s attitudes towards 
spending money in general and his or her WTP may be the result of a poor, i.e. unrealistic and 
implausible, design of the payment scenario. A negative relationship between money retention 
and stated WTP appears to be plausible and hence desirable at first glance. However, the group 
of extremely stingy respondents within the overall sample merits, although it might be rather 
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small, particular attention. The WTP statements of misers will be systematically biased in the 
case that these people use lexicographic decision rules when answering the payment question. 
Furthermore, it is expected that misers are somewhat awkward respondents whose answers may 
threaten the overall quality of the data gathered in a CVM survey. The analysis of money atti-
tudes is also interesting in view of the fact that many CVM studies lack a significant income ef-
fect. Given the results of existing studies which focussed on the effect of money attitudes on fi-
nancial behaviour it may be the case that psychological factors like a person’s attitudes towards 
spending money confound, mediate or even dominate the effect of any variable referring to a 
person’s objective ability to spend money, like disposable income or wealth. 
5.4.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
Research on money attitudes has become increasingly popular in social psychology over the last 
decades. By contrast, the topic of how people differ in their perceptions of money and their hab-
its in using it has attracted hardly any attention in economics. There are, however, an increasing 
number of theoretical and empirical contributions which stress the importance of money attitudes 
on decisions involving money, like spending and saving (e.g. Wiepking and Breeze, 2012, 
Hayhoe et al., 2012, Rick, 2008). As explained at the beginning of this chapter, certain facets of 
money attitudes are likely to matter for the results of CVM surveys. Given the paucity of re-
search on money attitudes in economics in general and the presumably interesting role of money 
attitudes for WTP statements in CVM surveys in particular, a comprehensive empirical analysis 
of the role of money attitudes in CVM surveys shall be provided at the end of this dissertation. 
The focus lies on the money attitude facet which has been identified as the one which appears to 
be the least compatible with economic theory, namely neurotic money retention. In addition to 
scrutinising the effect of this attitudinal variable on WTP statements, particular attention will be 
paid to the extreme case of money retention, which is miserliness. In the empirical application 
presented in the next chapter, the following research questions shall be answered: 
 
a) How common is pathological behaviour with money in a representative population 
sample? 
b) How does money retention relate to demographic and socio-economic variables? 
c) Are misers more likely to hold negative attitudes towards the environmental project 
and the associated payment mechanism presented during a CVM interview than other 
respondents? 
d) Are misers less motivated during a CVM interview as compared to other respondents? 
 
In addition to this general analysis of the role of money retention in CVM surveys, the following 
research questions regarding the relationship of this facet of money attitudes and stated WTP 
shall be explored: 
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e) Does money retention systematically relate to stated WTP? 
f) What is the magnitude of the (potential) effect of this money attitude facet on WTP as 
compared to more objective variables like disposable income? 
g) How robust is the (potential) effect of money retention on WTP? 
 
These research questions will be answered based on the results of a representative CVM survey 
conducted in Beijing in 2013. Money spending dispositions were measured by means of a modi-
fied variant of Furnham’s (1984) money retention scale. Scores on this scale will be used to con-
struct a money attitude variable which can be integrated into the econometric analysis of WTP 
statements. Furthermore, the relationship between the money attitude variable and other factors, 
such as attitudes towards the environmental project, the related payment as well as a respond-
ent’s overall motivation during the interview will be explored. 
 Furthermore, based on the theoretical considerations presented in section 5.2 and the empiri-
cal studies which have been reviewed in section 5.3, several hypotheses shall be formulated and 
tested. Regardless of the way of modelling the preference for accumulating money, WTP is, the-
oretically, positively related to an individual’s disposition to spend money in general. Further-
more, empirical studies provide at least some evidence that stingy people are less likely to en-
gage in actual transactions and spend, on average, significantly less money on diverse purposes, 
including for example donations to charity. It is expected that similar results will also be ob-
tained in a well-designed CVM survey with a credible and realistic payment scenario. Further-
more, as theorised in section 5.2, the WTP of most people with an extreme inhibition against 
spending money in general should be (close to) zero. Accordingly, money retention is expected 
to not only affect the amount of money somebody is willing to contribute to an environmental 
project but also the likelihood of stating some positive amount at all. Finally, predictions regard-
ing the answer behaviour of the group of respondents with an extremely strong inhibition against 
spending money can be made. As explained in section 5.2.2, the concept of lexicographic prefer-
ences represents the binary choices made by a stereotypical miser very well but poses problems 
in terms of the interpretability of WTP statements. This theoretical model predicts that a miser’s 
WTP is always zero, irrespective of the kind and magnitude of the environmental improvement 
and the associated monetary fee. Thus, if most misers act in line with a lexicographic decision 
rule, which assigns absolute priority to increasing one’s money holdings, when answering the 
contingent valuation question, the WTP of misers must be, on average, zero. These expectations 
lead to the following three hypotheses: 
 
(H1) WTP is lower the higher an individual’s tendency to retain his or her money. 
(H2) Higher levels of money retention increase the likelihood of stating a zero WTP. 
(H3) The WTP of misers is, on average, not significantly different from zero. 
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The first two hypotheses are quite intuitive. Hence, finding no evidence for them would be 
somewhat troubling in view of the validity of a CVM survey. If the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected neither in the case of H1 (i.e. no negative effect of money retention on the stated WTP 
amount) nor of H2 (i.e. no negative effect of money retention on the probability of stating some 
positive amount) overall WTP risks to be biased. This is because the complete absence of a nega-
tive impact of money retention on stated WTP is likely to be the consequence of an implausible 
and unrealistic payment scenario. Naturally, besides a poorly designed payment scenario, the 
absence of this effect could also be due one or several of the other aforementioned reasons, such 
as the public good characteristics of environmental goods and the presence of an interviewer. 
 Finding evidence for the third hypothesis would be of great concern, too. An overall WTP of 
zero within the group of misers would contradict one of the key assumptions underlying the the-
oretical concept of environmental valuation, namely the idea that all people consider money and 
environmental quality as substitutes. If misers do not ‘play the game’, this is to say if they refuse 
to make a trade-off between money and environmental quality, their stated WTP cannot be inter-
preted in the usual way and the overall value estimate may be biased. As already mentioned, the 
question whether or not the WTP statements of misers imply a downward bias of overall WTP 
critically depends on the distribution of misers in a population. Although most existing empirical 
studies on miserliness reported a statistically significant share of misers in the populations under 
considerations (i.e. greater than 5%), it may still be the case that the proportion of misers is neg-
ligible in some other populations. In the next chapter the research questions presented above 
shall be answered and the three hypotheses will be analysed based on a large and representative 
sample of the residents of urban Beijing. 
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6 Empirical application 
As argued in the previous chapter, a person’s disposition to spend money is likely to influence 
his or her answer to the WTP question in a CVM survey. Miserliness has been identified as a 
particularly problematic extreme of this attitudinal variable and is expected to affect the validity 
of individual WTP statements. At the same time, the relevance of money spending dispositions 
in general and miserliness in particular for CVM surveys can also be doubted. This is mainly 
because the payment scenario presented in a CVM interview is purely hypothetical. Typically, 
respondents are simply asked whether or not they would be willing to contribute a certain 
amount of money to the environmental project in question. Since no actual transactions are made 
a person’s money spending disposition may be irrelevant for his or her answer to the elicitation 
question. In addition to that, the share of misers in the general population may be insignificantly 
small. At the same time, these arguments against the relevance of money spending dispositions 
are purely speculative. So far, money attitudes have, to my best knowledge, never been systemat-
ically investigated in the context of environmental valuation. Moreover, there are only a few 
empirical studies analysing the effect of money retention on economic behaviour and hardly any 
of them have used representative population samples. This lack of research adds to the relevance 
of measuring and analysing people’s attitudes towards spending money in a stated preference 
study. This chapter investigates the role of money spending dispositions in CVM surveys empir-
ically. The research questions and hypotheses presented in section 5.4.3 will be analysed based 
on the results of a CVM survey conducted in Beijing in 2013. This survey was part of a Sino-
German research project on sustainable oasis management in the Tarim Basin. Section 6.1 intro-
duces the background of this project. In section 6.2 the preparation and implementation of the 
CVM survey will be described in more detail. The focus of section 6.3 lies on the general survey 
results, followed by a comprehensive analysis of money spending dispositions in section 6.4. At 
the end of the chapter, the empirical findings regarding the role of money attitudes in CVM sur-
veys will be discussed. 
6.1 Environmental valuation of more sustainable oasis management 
in the Tarim Basin 
The statistical analysis which will be presented in the following sections is based on data which 
was collected in the context of the Sino-German research cooperation SuMaRiO (Sustainable 
Management of River Oasis along the Tarim River / China, BMBF-Funding Measure ‘Sustaina-
ble Land Management’, LLA2-02). The overall goal of the SuMaRiO project is the elaboration 
of alternative land use strategies for a water-scare region in Northwest China in order to facilitate 
a more sustainable development of the region. The researchers involved in subproject 5.1.4 
‘Contingent valuation of more sustainable oasis management in the Tarim Basin’ jointly led by 
Prof. Dr. Michael Ahlheim (University of Hohenheim) and Prof. Dr. Oliver Frör (University 
Koblenz Landau), carried out a CVM survey on the social benefit of more sustainable oasis 
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management in the Tarim Basin. I was responsible for the fieldwork in China thereby enjoying 
the support of our Chinese partners Prof. Dr. Jiang Tong (Chinese Meteorological Administra-
tion) and Luo Jing Ph.D. (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). The next sections provide some 
general information on the project area as well as an introduction to SuMaRiO and the associated 
contingent valuation survey. 
6.1.1 The Tarim Basin: social, economic and environmental facts 
The Tarim Basin owes its name to the Tarim River which is the longest continental river in Cen-
tral Asia. The Tarim Basin is the world’s most remote area from the oceans and the local climate 
is extremely arid with little precipitation and high evaporation rates (c.f. Huang et al., 2010). 
Since rainfall is extremely rare in this area, the Tarim River and its tributaries are the major wa-
ter source for all kinds of human activity and for the natural ecosystems in the Tarim Basin (c.f. 
Thevs, 2011). The Tarim Basin comprises the southern part of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, China’s largest administrative division located at the borders of Afghanistan, India, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan. In spite of the enormous size 
of Xinjiang – 1.66 million km2, which is about one sixth of China’s landmass – less than 5% of 
the region is habitable; the remaining 95% are covered by deserts and mountains. Land is partic-
ularly scarce in the Tarim Basin which is dominated by the Taklimakan Desert so that about half 
of the eight million inhabitants live in oasis cities along the Tarim River. 
 There are unique but highly vulnerable dryland ecosystems along the Tarim River. The ser-
vices provided by riparian forests, reed beds, grasslands and shrub vegetation enhance the living 
conditions of the inhabitants of the Tarim Basin. Most importantly, the riparian forests build a 
‘green corridor’ which prevents that the Taklimakan Desert merges into the southern part of the 
Gobi Desert (c.f. Halik et al., 2005). Furthermore, farmers use the riparian forest and the grass-
lands as pasture for hay-making to feed sheep and goats. The riparian forests and shrubs also 
protect the cities and villages in the Tarim Basin from dust and sandstorms. Certain herbs grow-
ing in the grasslands are traditionally used as natural medicines. The flooded areas of the riparian 
forests and reed beds contribute to the recharge of groundwater with fresh river water, which 
local people use as drinking water and for irrigation. Furthermore, the riparian forests attract 
visitors from all parts of China and therefore have high touristic and educational value. Taken 
together, the dryland ecosystems of the Tarim Basin provide a considerable number of valuable 
ecosystem services to the Chinese society. 
 Traditionally, the Tarim Basin was populated by Muslim Turkic speaking farmers that are 
today known as the Uighur people. At the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese troupes occu-
pied the area which the Uighurs called ‘Eastern Turkestan’ by that time. The Chinese annexed it 
to the state territory of the Middle Kingdom and former Eastern Turkestan obtained its Chinese 
name ‘Xinjiang’, which means ‘new border’. In the first half of the twentieth century, Uighur 
separatists made several attempts to become independent again. The Independent Republic of 
Eastern Turkestan was established twice (1933 and 1944) but Mao Zedong’s troupes put an end 
to Uighur nationalism in 1949 when People’s Republic of China was founded (c.f. Dillon, 2004). 
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At that time, the Tarim Basin was scarcely populated and, compared to other parts of China, 
economically underdeveloped. Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has promoted the eco-
nomic development of Xinjiang, accompanied by an enormous influx of Han Chinese settlers. 
Population growth, the expansion of agricultural activities, especially the water-intensive cotton 
production, and industrial development have caused a substantial loss of water resources in the 
lower reaches of the Tarim River leading to severe environmental deterioration. An increasing 
number of sandstorms, dust days, progressing desertification of the landscape and loss in biodi-
versity are the result of the advancing deterioration of the natural riparian ecosystems (c.f. Thevs, 
2011, Ahlheim et al., 2013b). Although the impact of global warming on the region is debated 
among researchers, several climate experts predict rising temperatures, changes in seasonal pre-
cipitation and melting of glaciers (cf. Chen et al., 2013). Under these circumstances, the Tarim 
River may dry out completely. A complete desiccation of China’s longest inland river would 
have disastrous consequences because it would imply that the Taklimakan Desert and the south-
ern part of the Gobi Desert grow together. Hence, the realisation of more sustainable water man-
agement and land use strategies in the Tarim Basin is of national concern and has attracted the 
interest of the international scientific community since long. 
6.1.2 SuMaRiO – a Chinese-German research cooperation 
SuMaRiO is a multidisciplinary research project involving 11 German and 6 Chinese universities 
and research institutes. The project was initiated in 2011 and is funded by the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research of Germany. The consortium of researchers aims to develop practical 
solutions to the economic, social and environmental issues arising from the ongoing loss of water 
resources in the Tarim area. Of central concern is the preservation of the natural vegetation along 
the Tarim River, which has been traditionally subordinated to the economic development of the 
region. An explicit goal of SuMaRiO is the integration of the natural ecosystem services into 
land and water management decisions (cf. SuMaRiO, 2015, Rumbaur et al., 2015). 
 The SuMaRiO research project is organised in different groups of scientists, which have fo-
cused on several interrelated fields of research. During the project’s research phase (2011-2014), 
a first group of researchers investigated issues of future water availability by observing and 
modelling changes in the cryosphere like glacier melting, forecasting precipitation and estimat-
ing the impact of climate change on water discharge of the Tarim River. Another group was con-
cerned with the improvement of the irrigated farming systems by analysing water demand and 
water quality in the region. A third research team dealt with the identification and quantification 
of the services of the natural ecosystems in the Tarim area. Finally, a group of social scientists 
collected information concerning the perceptions of alternative water and land use strategies by 
stakeholders, including representatives of governmental organisations, scientists, farmers and 
ordinary people. The findings of all research teams will be accumulated in a so-called Decision 
Support System (DSS), a software tool designed for policy makers which shall facilitate more 
sustainable water and land management in the region. This software will show, for example, 
how, under several climate scenarios, changes in the agricultural production and the installation 
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of more efficient irrigation technologies would affect future water supply and the natural vegeta-
tion. In the same way, the DSS will provide information concerning technical and political 
measures needed to secure water supply and to preserve the natural ecosystems along the Tarim 
River. Hence, the DSS is expected to be used by public authorities to design more sustainable 
water and land management strategies that would lead to an improvement of the environmental 
conditions in the region. Calculating the costs of such an environmental project is rather straight-
forward. To decide whether the environmental project is worth these costs, however, one im-
portant figure is still missing: the social benefit accruing from the restoration of the natural vege-
tation along the Tarim River. 
6.1.3 Social benefits of more sustainable oasis management 
The restoration of the natural vegetation along the Tarim River will have immediate effects on 
the wellbeing of local people since their living conditions are directly impaired by water shortage 
and all kinds of environmental problems like dust, sandstorms, soil erosion and soil salinization. 
Even more than the present generation, future generations are expected to be the main beneficiar-
ies of more sustainable oasis management because the latter would mediate the local impacts of 
climate change. In addition to that, benefits may also accrue to people living in other parts of 
China. This is due to the non-use values of the prospective environmental restoration project. 
Both local people and people living in outside areas may feel great relief from knowing that a 
complete desertification of the Tarim area will be prevented and that water supply security will 
enhance the living conditions of future generations. In the same way, both groups of stakeholders 
might gain satisfaction from simply knowing of the existence of rare plant and animal species in 
the Tarim area. Furthermore, people from other parts of China may wish to preserve the option 
of visiting the Tarim area one day and of enjoying a pleasant climate, the beauty of poplars and 
other goods and services provided by the riparian ecosystems. Finally, altruism towards their 
fellow citizens in Northwest China may be another reason why benefits also accrue to people 
who are not directly affected by water shortage and the destruction of the riparian ecosystems 
along the Tarim River. Taken together, the total economic value of the Tarim project is likely to 
encompass both use and non-use values. Since non-use values are likely to contribute considera-
bly to the TEV of this environmental project, stated preference methods are most suitable for a 
comprehensive assessment of the overall social benefit accruing from the restoration of the natu-
ral vegetation in the Tarim area. Environmental valuation methods which are based on utilisation 
behaviour like the travel cost method or hedonic pricing, in contrast, may substantially underes-
timate the project’s actual social benefit (cf. Ahlheim et al., 2013b) Hence, the researchers in-
volved in the socio-economic SuMaRiO-subproject decided to assess the social value of the en-
vironmental project by means of a CVM study. 
 As explained in chapter 2, CVM surveys ask randomly selected respondents to directly state 
their WTP for a specific environmental project. Given that the sample is representative for all 
households affected by the environmental project, the social benefit can be calculated by multi-
plying the sample’s average WTP by the total number of households affected. Due to this      
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aggregation procedure, the monetary value derived from a CVM survey depends both on the 
magnitude of the sample’s average WTP and also on the number of households which fall into 
the definition of ‘being affected’ by a particular environmental improvement. It is to be noted 
that in spite of the immense population growth in the last decades, the Tarim Basin is still rela-
tively scarcely populated. It is inhabited by approximately 10 million people, corresponding to 
merely 0.07% of China’s population. Therefore, even if the direct benefit accruing from the res-
toration of the natural vegetation was adequately captured by the results of a representative CVM 
survey of the local population, the environmental project may not pass the cost-benefit test. Oth-
er public projects to be implemented in less remote areas of China would most probably outper-
form the Tarim project. However, the overall social benefit of the preservation of the natural 
vegetation in the Tarim area is expected to increase considerably when broadening the definition 
of the population affected by the prospective environmental improvement. As argued in the pre-
vious paragraph, people living in other parts of China may also welcome this environmental pro-
ject. If the non-use value of the environmental improvement indeed increased their wellbeing, it 
can also be expected that these people would be willing to contribute financially to environmen-
tal restoration in the Tarim Basin. If this was the case, not only local people should be surveyed; 
ideally, WTP would be assessed by means of a nation-wide survey. Nevertheless, before imple-
menting such a large-scale and thus costly survey, the hypothesis concerning the ‘long-distance 
value’ of more sustainable oasis management in the Tarim Basin needs to be tested. 
 The CVM survey carried out in the context of the SuMaRiO subproject 5.4.1 served as an 
empirical test of the existence of nation-wide non-use values, i.e. whether or not the project’s 
benefits are also perceived by people living far away from the project site. This exemplary CVM 
survey was carried out in China’s capital, the city of Beijing. Some general results of this survey 
have already been published (Ahlheim et al., 2013b, Rumbaur et al., 2015, Ahlheim et al., 
2015b, Ahlheim et al., 2015c). Besides the empirical objective of testing the existence of a long-
distance benefit accruing from the implementation of more sustainable water and land use strate-
gies in the Tarim area, several methodological objectives were in the focus of this environmental 
valuation study. Most importantly, the involved scientists aimed to improve the validity and reli-
ability of WTP estimates in general and of values assessed in CVM surveys conducted in Chi-
nese megacities in particular. Among other things, the effect of monetary incentives on the par-
ticipation rate and on respondents’ motivation to answer interview questions was tested. For this 
purpose, different variants of the questionnaire had been developed and used in different split 
samples. In addition to these field experiments, the questionnaire contained several psychometric 
inventories relating to certain attitudes and personality traits, which had been identified as poten-
tially relevant for WTP statements in general and for the answers of Chinese citizens in particu-
lar. Most of these methodological research questions are unrelated to the overall objective of this 
dissertation and will therefore not be discussed in further detail. 
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6.2 A CVM survey in Beijing 
6.2.1 Preparation of the CVM survey 
The preparation of the CVM survey started at the beginning of the year 2012. To get more in-
sights into the social, economic and environmental situation in the Tarim Basin, the preparation 
phase started with a number of expert interviews. A field trip to the Tarim River was part of this 
preparation phase, too. During this trip in-depth interviews with local scientists and citizens from 
Korla, an oasis city located at the middle reaches of the Tarim River, were carried out. Further-
more, to get a clearer picture of ordinary people’s previous knowledge and impressions about 
water shortage and environmental problems in the Tarim Basin, a considerable number of semi-
standardised interviews were conducted with randomly selected citizens in Beijing. Based on the 
inputs of scientists and the contributions by common people from Xinjiang and Beijing, a first 
version of the CVM questionnaire was developed. This questionnaire was then translated into 
Chinese, pretested in several series of face-to-face interviews, discussed during four citizen ex-
pert group meetings and continuously revised. 
 During the in-depth interviews and the first pretests in Beijing it became obvious that the ma-
jority of respondents had relatively little previous knowledge about the Tarim Basin. Most inter-
viewees said that they had already heard of the Tarim River but had never been there and only a 
few were aware of the pervasive water shortage, desertification and other environmental issues 
in the Tarim Basin. Hence, prior to presenting the environmental restoration project to be valued, 
relatively detailed information about the natural vegetation and the impact of water shortage on 
the environmental conditions in the Tarim area had to be provided to the respondents. Subse-
quent to a comprehensive description of the status quo situation, the interviewer read out a spe-
cific project scenario to the respondents. Initially, several concrete measures of the ‘Tarim Envi-
ronmental Preservation Plan’ (TEPP), a hypothetical government program to restore and pre-
serve the natural vegetation along the Tarim River, were presented. These measures encom-
passed, for example, the introduction of water-saving agricultural methods with efficient irriga-
tion methods, reforestation of the riparian forests, enhancement of the water distribution infra-
structure as well as measures to strengthen the local water and land use monitoring system. 
However, many respondents perceived these rather technical aspects as too complex. When 
asked whether they were willing to contribute financially to the TEPP, several respondents said 
that they were not able to judge the effectiveness and usefulness of such a complex environmen-
tal project. For this reason, the final questionnaire encompassed a detailed description of the sta-
tus quo situation and only a brief depiction of the environmental project to be valued. The inter-
viewers handed out visual material, including maps and photographs, so that the respondents had 
vivid impressions of the state of the environment in the Tarim Basin before being confronted 
with the project and payment scenario. 
 The formulation of the payment scenario posed similar issues. Respondents were told that 
existing public funds were insufficient to cover the costs related to the realisation of the TEPP. 
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Therefore, the central government had to collect additional money from households all over Chi-
na. Initially, a payment card was used to elicit people’s WTP. Respondents had to select the 
maximum amount their household would accept to contribute monthly to a particular fund, es-
tablished to finance the TEPP, from this payment card. To avoid that respondents understated or 
overstated their WTP for strategic reasons, the payment rule was formulated in a way that re-
spondents had an incentive to give an honest answer.15 However, having designed the payment 
scenario in accordance with the state-of-the-art CVM guidelines came at the cost of lengthening 
the interview. The interviewers reported that many respondents became impatient when listening 
to the payment scenario. A considerable number of participants admitted that they had difficulty 
in performing the valuation task and asked the interviewer to explain again what they were sup-
posed to do. In view of these issues, the research team finally decided to abandon the payment 
card format and employed a variant of the dichotomous choice format instead. As highlighted in 
section 2.3.1, a main advantage of DC over alternative elicitation formats is that most respond-
ents perceive the payment question as simple and easy to answer. However, the main argument 
against the DC format is that many respondents may wish to express their favourable attitude 
towards the environmental project in question even though their actual WTP is lower than the 
amount of money they are asked to pay. Thus, because of the potentially large number of polite 
‘yes’ responses, average WTP may be biased upwardly. To tackle this issue, the so-called tri-
chotomous choice, initially developed and recommended by Loomis et al. (1999), was em-
ployed. 
 In the final version of the questionnaire (cf. appendix 8.2), respondents were told that the 
TEPP would have to be financed through a surcharge on the value-added-tax. This tax increase 
would lead to higher monthly expenditures for every Chinese household. Respondents were 
asked whether they supported the implementation of the TEPP although this project would in-
crease their monthly expenditures by an average amount corresponding to a randomly assigned 
bid of 10, 25, 50, 75, 100 or 200 RMB16. The bid design was based on the results of a 200 pretest 
survey. During this pilot study 10 RMB was rejected by approximately 20% of the respondents 
and therefore chosen as the lower bound of the range of bids. 80% of the respondents rejected to 
pay 200 RMB so that, following Kanninen’s (1995) rule-of-thumb (cf. section 2.3.1), this 
amount was defined as the highest bid. After having been asked the referendum-style elicitation 
question, the respondents could choose from three answer options, including a ‘no, but’-option 
reflecting a person’s general support of the environmental project but a rejection of the bid. In 
addition to allowing the respondents to show their favourable attitudes towards the environmen-
tal project even though their WTP is lower than the proposed bid, the trichotomous choice for-
mat has advantages over the standard DC format because it enables an analyst to identify zero 
WTP statements. It is expected that a respondent whose WTP is zero ticks the unconditional 
                                                 
15 The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-method, an incentive-compatible payment mechanism which is often used in 
experimental economics, was used to measure WTP. 
16 In September 2013 the RMB-Euro exchange rate was 0.123. The lowest bid thus amounts to €1.23 and the highest 
bid to €24.60, corresponding to approximately 0.1% and 2.4% of an average household’s monthly income. 
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‘no’-option (i.e. ‘No, my household does not tolerate any increase of its monthly expenditures in 
order to get the TEPP realised’ in the survey considered here). The latter aspect is particularly 
useful in view of analysing the supposedly zero WTP of respondents with a strong inhibition 
against spending money. Table 6-1 displays the final version of the project scenario, the payment 
scenario and the trichotomous choice payment question. 
Table 6-1: Project and payment scenario 
Project scenario 
Scientists have developed a program with the overarching goal to improve the living conditions in the area along 
the Tarim River for man and nature. This program is called the Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan (TEPP) 
and implies a science-based water management that ensures that more and more water arrives in the lower reach-
es of the Tarim River, so that the riparian forests and grasslands can recover there. Once the river and its natural 
environment will have fully recovered, the area will be less exposed to sandstorms and dust; typical animals and 
plants will survive; also, the living conditions of future generations will improve. 
Payment scenario 
In order to get the Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan financed, Central Government needs to transfer more 
money to the Tarim area. In order to finance these transfer payments government would have to increase taxes if 
TEPP was realized. This would lead to rising monthly expenditures for households. Economists estimate that the 
proposed program would increase an average Beijing household’s monthly expenditures by approximately [BID] 
RMB. 
We would like to find out whether Beijing citizens support the implementation of the Tarim Environmental 
Preservation Plan although it implies an increase in their monthly expenditures.  
Payment question 
 
Considering that your monthly household expenditures would 
increase by approximately [BID] RMB through the program 
would you personally be willing to support it? 
 Yes 
 No, but if the amount was lower, 
my household would support the 
TEPP 
 No, my household does not toler-
ate any increase of its monthly ex-
penditures in order to get the 
TEPP realized 
 
 
 
Apart from a number of challenges which had to be solved when designing the questionnaire, 
finding an adequate sampling strategy was particularly difficult. It turned out at the very begin-
ning of the field work that conducting interviews with randomly selected households would be 
hardly feasible in Beijing. According to experienced social scientists, the access to official 
household registration lists is exclusively reserved to government representatives in China. 
Hence, even Chinese scholars and commercial survey institutes usually have to work without 
such lists when conducting surveys. In addition to that, Beijing residents are extremely reluctant 
to open their doors to strangers so that the conduct of interviews at people’s homes appeared to 
be unpromising. Subsequent to a very limited number of household interviews, mainly with 
friends of the Chinese project partners and research assistants, the research team switched to an 
intercept survey mode. The representativeness of the intercept survey was ensured by using a 
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quota sampling approach, thereby controlling for gender, age and education. Information con-
cerning these three demographic characteristics was obtained from the Beijing Statistical Year-
book (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2012, 2013). Naturally, changing the sampling 
strategy had consequences for the course of the interview. Most obviously, the questionnaire had 
to be shortened since the usual length of a CVM household interview, 40 to 60 minutes, exceed-
ed the patience of most respondents. Several elements of the questionnaire, including the short-
ening of the project scenario and the simplification of the payment question, partly resulted from 
the new sampling mode. In addition to that, only a few cognitively demanding and therefore 
time-intensive attitudinal questions could be asked during an interview. 
 Moreover, the definition of the population to be surveyed had to be reconsidered. The munic-
ipality of Beijing has, according to the latest official estimate in 2011, a population of 20 million 
(c.f. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Beijing has a land area of 16,411 km2 and is 
divided into 16 districts and counties. Most of these administrative units still consist of mainly 
rural areas with a low population density. Conducting intercept interviews in scarcely populated 
rural areas and asking contingent valuation questions to rural people, who mostly have low in-
comes at their disposal and relatively low levels of education, turned out to be difficult. In addi-
tion to that, the municipality of Beijing was simply too large for conducting a representative in-
tercept survey, given the capacities, time and the budget of the research team. It was therefore 
decided to focus on urban Beijing which encompasses the six districts with the highest level of 
urbanisation, namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chaoyang, Fengtai, Shijinshan and Haidian. Accord-
ingly, the area that had to be covered reduced to 1,368 km2 only. However, even though this area 
makes up 8.3% of Beijing’s total land only, the number of people living in this region is still 
relatively high as compared to the total population of the municipality. The registered population 
of urban Beijing is 8 million people (or 2.8 million registered households). The official number 
of permanent residents, including temporary residents, amounts to 12 million (Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013: 56). However, due to the high influx of migrant workers into the capi-
tal the actual number of people living in the urban districts of Beijing is likely to be even higher. 
 As displayed in Figure 6-1, participatory approaches were employed over the entire course of 
the CVM study. A group of twelve Beijing residents, who had been recruited during the first 
pretests, was gathered several times during the course of the research agenda. These citizen ex-
perts, mainly students and young professionals, assisted the Chinese-German research team by 
improving the questionnaire and interpreting the preliminary and final results. The input of the 
CEG was particularly fruitful for the revision of the different text passages read out during the 
interviews, such as the description of the ecosystems along the Tarim River. Furthermore, the 
CEG members judged the comprehensibility and appropriateness of several attitudinal questions 
and made suggestions about how to adapt them to the particular cultural and social context of the 
study. Finally, subsequent to a total of 700 pretest interviews, four CEGs, a careful analysis of 
the preliminary results and a continued revision of the questionnaire, the main survey was im-
plemented at the end of August 2013. 
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Figure 6-1: Involvement of Citizen Expert Groups during the CVM study in Beijing 
6.2.2 Measuring money attitudes 
As argued in the previous chapter, attitudes towards spending money are likely to affect WTP 
statements. To test the three hypothesises and to answer the research questions presented in sec-
tion 5.4.3 respondents’ attitudes towards spending money were assessed in the CVM survey 
conducted in urban Beijing. This section introduces the set of questions used to measure Beijing 
residents’ money attitudes. 
 The retention-subscale of Furnham’s (1984) Money Believes and Behaviour Scale, introduced 
in section 4.2.2 and 5.1.2, provides a suitable tool for measuring a respondent’s money spending 
disposition or, more precisely, his or her inhibition against spending money in general. This in-
ventory encompasses several items which describe the attitudes and habits of misers and was 
therefore adapted to account for Beijing residents’ level of stinginess and to test the effect of the 
derived variable on stated WTP. 
 The set of questions used in the present study is mainly based on Furnham’s (1984) money-
retention-inventory, both in its initial form and also as reported in a later validation study by 
Wilhelm et al. (1993). However, several modifications had to be made in order to adapt the scale 
to the social and cultural context of the present CVM study. Participatory approaches and pre-
tests contributed to the development a suitable inventory to measure the money attitudes of the 
participants of the intercept survey on sustainable oasis management. In summer 2012 the origi-
nal set of items developed by Furnham (1984), translated into Mandarin Chinese, was integrated 
into the preliminary questionnaire and tested during a small round of pretests (25 interviews). 
The interviewers read out six items and asked the respondents to indicate how well the individual 
items described their everyday behaviour with money on a five-point Likert scale reaching from 
‘completely wrong’ to ‘completely true’ with ‘unsure’ as midpoint. It is to be noticed that most 
former studies had employed seven-point disagree-agree scales. The reason for deviating from 
this standard approach was that a five-point wrong-true scale was also employed for other de-
briefing and follow-up questions contained in the CVM questionnaire. Hence, sticking to a tried 
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and tested response format was preferred to introducing a new answer scale. No major problems, 
like negative reactions to these questions or monotonic answering were encountered during the 
pretests. The pretest results were subsequently discussed with the members of the CEG gathered 
in August 2012. During this CEG meeting the citizen experts learnt more about the psychologi-
cal concept of money attitudes in general and money retention in particular. After some open 
questions (e.g. How do you personally feel about money? How do most Chinese people feel 
about money?) the participants were introduced to the Chinese translation of the retention scale 
that had been used during the pretests. They were asked to judge the scale’s comprehensibility. 
Furthermore, in order to account for possible taboo topics, the CEG members were asked wheth-
er the inventory contained any items that may irritate or upset Chinese respondents. The CEG 
criticised the translation of several items, suggested to change the midpoint of the Likert scale 
from ‘unsure’ to ‘partly wrong, partly true’ and emphasised that one of the original items, name-
ly ‘I often buy things that I don’t need or want because they are in sale’ does not make much 
sense because sales are very unusual in China. Based on these advises, the translation of the 
items, the Likert scale and the contents of the retention scale were adapted. The unsuitable item 
was dropped and replaced by the statement ‘Money should be saved not spent’ (Klontz et al., 
2011). The adapted money attitude inventory was anew tested during 100 pretest interviews in 
spring 2013.  
 Another CEG meeting took place in April 2013 to discuss the results of the previously com-
pleted round of pretests. During this meeting the citizen experts backed my supposition that re-
spondents’ money attitudes mattered for their answers to the payment question asked during the 
CVM interview. They were also presented a number of unexpected results, like the surprisingly 
large number of pretest participants (45%) who had approved the statement ‘Even when I have 
sufficient money I often feel guilty about spending money on necessities like clothes etc.’ The 
citizen experts found these results plausible because, according to them, clothes did not count as 
‘necessities’ in China. The complement ‘like clothes etc.’ was therefore deleted. Regarding the 
item ‘I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the cost of almost everything I buy’ one partici-
pant commented that bargaining was not an expression of miserliness in China but a very com-
mon shopping strategy. Nevertheless, this item was maintained, especially because of its strong 
correlation with the remaining statements. Subsequent to this second CEG meeting on money 
attitudes, no major changes were made anymore. The final set of modified statements and the 
original items are displayed in Table 6-2. 
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Table 6-2: Modified money retention scale 
Items used in the present study  Original wording and source of items 
5-point Likert scale 
‘completely wrong’ (1), ‘predominantly wrong’ (2), 
‘partly wrong, partly true’ (3), ‘predominantly true’ (4), 
‘completely true’ (5) 
7-point Likert scale 
‘disagree’ (1) to ‘agree’ (7) 
I often have difficulty to bring myself to spend money 
regardless of the amount. 
I often have difficulty in making decisions about spend-
ing money regardless of the amount (Furnham, 1984) 
In making any purchase, for any purpose, spending 
money is painful for me. 
In making any purchase, for any purpose, my first con-
sideration is the cost (Furnham, 1984) 
I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or not. [not 
modified] 
I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or not 
(Furnham, 1984, Wilhelm et al., 1993) 
Even when I have enough money I often feel guilty if I 
spend money on necessities. 
 
Even when I have sufficient money I often feel guilty 
about spending money on necessities like clothes etc. 
(Furnham, 1984) 
 
I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the cost of 
almost everything I buy. [not modified] 
I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the cost of 
almost everything I buy (Furnham, 1984, Wilhelm et al., 
1993) 
Money should be saved not spent. [added] Money should be saved not spent (Klontz et al., 2011) 
 
For the purpose of econometric analysis, a variable referring to respondents’ attitudes towards 
spending money has been constructed based on their answers to the six money retention items. In 
line with previous studies on money attitudes, this variable has been built by summing up the 
item-specific scores and dividing the result by the total number of items. Since respondents had 
to indicate their level of agreement with the six statements on a five-point Likert scale, the de-
rived interval variable can take values from one to five; the higher the score, the greater is a sub-
ject’s unwillingness to spend money in principle. Naturally, before constructing this variable, the 
validity and reliability of the psychometric measure had been carefully tested (see section 6.4.1). 
 A potentially weak point of the modified money attitude inventory is that none of the six 
items pointing to a single attitude is reversed. As a consequence, individuals might answer mon-
otonically, for example by always choosing the same interval on the Likert scale, rather than 
thinking deeply each time they are confronted with a new statement. To tackle this issue, three 
statements concerning a person’s habits when spending money on others were mixed among the 
money retention items (‘I often spend money, even foolishly, on others but grudgingly on my-
self’ (Furnham, 1984); ‘I am very generous with people I love’ (Furnham et al., 2012); ‘I get a 
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good feeling from contributing money to all kinds of good causes’ (adapted from Nunes and 
Schokkaert, 2003)). 
6.2.3 Implementation of the CVM survey 
During the main survey approximately 2,500 residents living in the urban areas of Beijing had to 
be interviewed. The data collection started at the end of August 2013 and was completed at the 
end of September 2013. 52 sociology students from the Minzu University of China worked as 
interviewers during these six weeks. All of them had been trained in interview techniques for 
standardised face-to-face interviews prior to the fieldwork. Many students had already been in-
volved in the different series of pretests and were therefore quite experienced in conducting 
CVM interviews. The students worked in groups of three to six interviewers. On each interview 
day these groups were assigned to different locations in different parts of the city, so that resi-
dents from all six urban districts had the chance to enter the sample. The interviewers were free 
to choose suitable places to conduct interviews (public parks, residential communities, cafés, 
etc.) in the surrounding of the locations they had been assigned to. They stopped people random-
ly but had to make sure that the subject who agreed to participate in the survey also fulfilled the 
required quota, that this person was living in one of the six urban districts and that he or she had 
been living in Beijing for at least five years. The latter criterion was employed to avoid that tour-
ists, migrant workers and other people who were not permanently living in Beijing entered the 
sample. To ensure the data quality, some older master students supervised the groups of inter-
viewers. In addition to that, all interviewers were equipped with MP3 players and had to record 
their interviews. 
 All interviews were based on the standardised CVM questionnaire that is displayed in the 
appendix 8.2. In line with this questionnaire, an interview consisted of the following parts: First-
ly some basic demographic characteristics like a respondent’s age, ethnicity and marital status 
were assessed. Afterwards the environmental site was introduced to the respondents. Several 
questions regarding a respondent’s background knowledge and experience with the Tarim Basin 
were asked. In the subsequent part, respondents obtained detailed information about the endan-
gered ecosystems in the Tarim area. Afterwards, the environmental project and the related pay-
ment mechanism were presented, followed by the trichotomous-choice-style elicitation question. 
Subsequently, the plausibility of the WTP statement was assessed by means of two sets of de-
briefing questions. The first set of questions contained protest-statements which were adapted 
from examples in environmental valuation textbooks such as Bateman et al. (2002) and from 
former CVM surveys conducted in China (e.g. Ahlheim et al., 2015a). The second inventory was 
a modified variant of a procedure proposed by Baker et al. (2012) to identify the factors that re-
spondents had taken into account when making their WTP statement; among other things, re-
spondents were asked whether or not they had considered their budget, the opportunity costs of 
their choice as well as several non-use benefits accruing from the environmental project before 
answering the referendum questions. Afterwards, the respondents had to answer questions re-
garding the economic situation of their household (household size, disposable household income, 
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etc.) and their saving habits. The questionnaire also contained different inventories borrowed 
from psychology, including the modified version of Furnham’s (1984) money retention scale 
which has been presented in the previous section. In addition to that, the interviewers had to fill 
in questions concerning the interview process, like the number of rejections before finding a re-
spondent, duration of the interview, the interview spot and questions concerning a respondent’s 
behaviour during the interview. 
 At the end of September 2013, a total of 2,472 interviews were completed. 34 interviews had 
to be dropped because of missing information on age, home districts or because the respondents 
did not fulfil the selection criteria of having been living in Beijing for at least five years. For the 
remaining 2,438 valid observations the quota on gender, age and education are well fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the respondents’ home districts represent approximately proportionally the popula-
tion of the six urban districts at the time of the survey. Hence, although the common CVM 
guidelines, which prescribe random sampling and household interviews, could not be followed, 
the sample closely reflects several key characteristics of Beijing’s urban population. 
6.3 General results of the CVM survey 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
As already mentioned, the overall survey encompassed different variants of the questionnaire. 
Only two of these variants contained the money attitude inventory presented in section 6.2.2. The 
following illustrations are therefore limited to only two splits of the overall sample, correspond-
ing to 1,193 interviews. Furthermore, several interviews had to be dropped because of missing 
answers to relevant questions. The most frequently missing variables included household income 
(14 missing answers), answers to debriefing questions (51 missing answers) as well as answers 
to several items of the money attitude inventory (80 missing answer). After having discarded 123 
interviews in total, the final sample size reduced to 1,070 observations. 
The interview process 
Regarding the sometimes criticised intercept interview technique which had to be employed in 
the present survey, it appears to be of particular interest to investigate the general behaviour of 
the interviewees in the first place. Critics may argue that a person’s motivation to take part in a 
CVM interview and to carefully answer more than 50 questions would be rather low when 
stopped suddenly and without a warning on the streets of a Chinese megacity. To address such 
concerns, a number of questions regarding the response rate, the duration of an interview and 
respondents’ behaviour during the interview, which were filled in by the interviewers subsequent 
to each interview, shall be analysed briefly.  
 Based on the information reported by the interviewers, 2.6 individuals had to be approached 
on average to find a person who was willing to participate in the interview. This corresponds to a 
quite satisfactory response rate of approximately 38.5%. An interview took 23 minutes on aver-
age. This figure may appear low when comparing it to the length of a standard CVM household 
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interview, but it is a considerable amount of time in the case of an interview conducted in public. 
To get some insights to how the time-intensive CVM interview was perceived, the interviewers 
had to rate the respondents’ motivation and reactions to certain questions on a five-point Likert 
scale. The average ratings for several relevant items are displayed in Table 6-3. In general, the 
interviewers were very positive about the respondents’ attentiveness, seriousness and motivation 
during the interview. Hastiness was not reported as a frequent problem either. All in all, these 
results cast a positive light on the interview process. 
Table 6-3: Respondents’ behaviour during the interview 
Statement Mean1 
(standard deviation) 
The respondent listened carefully to the information on the Tarim 
area. 
4.251 
(0.725) 
The respondent took the interview very seriously. 4.225 
(0.757) 
The respondent was highly motivated during the interview. 3.965 
(0.887) 
The respondent wanted to end the interview as fast as possible. 2.088 
(1.039) 
1 Average score on a 5-point Likert scale: ‘completely wrong’ (1), ‘predominantly wrong’ (2), ‘partly wrong, partly 
true’ (3), ‘predominantly true’ (4), ‘completely true’ (5) 
 
Characteristics of the sample population 
Table 6-4 shows the official characteristics of Beijing’s urban population and the sample charac-
teristics. The sample resembles the official data in terms of most of these characteristics. 51.9% 
of the respondents in the sample are male, they are on average 39 years old and 41.0% have a 
university degree (college graduate or higher). In terms of these three variables, the characteris-
tics of the general population have been well reproduced. The size of the respondents’ house-
holds exceeds the official average household size by approximately 0.3 household members. 
Most respondents are Han Chinese, but the share of ethnic minorities is higher than officially 
reported. It is to be noted that all interviewers were recruited from the Minzu University, which 
is designated for ethnic minorities in China and that one third of them were ethnic minorities. 
People with non-Han background may have felt more concerned when asked whether they would 
like to participate in a survey on environmental problems in a region which is the home of sever-
al ethnic minorities conducted by students of the Minzu University. Hence, the overrepresenta-
tion of ethnic minorities is likely to be a result of both the survey’s topic and the ethnic back-
ground of the interviewers. Comparing the sample’s characteristics with the official figures, the 
most peculiar difference is disposable household income. Based on the data gathered in autumn 
2013, the average monthly disposable household income amounts to 8,871 RMB. This estimate 
is significantly higher than the official number of 7,640 RMB, which was measured in the 2011 
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census. However, this at first glance substantial difference may simply reflect a general income 
increase from 2011 to 2013. When observing the official numbers reported in the Statistical 
Yearbook, an increase of 16% in that period appears plausible.17 
Table 6-4: Characteristics of the sample 
Variable Official data1 Sample (N=1070) 
 mean mean [95% conf. int.] 
Gender (1=male; 0=female)  0.504 0.519 [0.489; 0.549] 
Age (in years) 38 39 [38; 40] 
Ethnicity (1=Han; 0=minority) 0.959 0.909 [0.892; 0.927] 
Education (1=higher; 0=middle or lower) 0.382 0.411 [0.381; 0.440] 
Household size (persons) 2.567 2.909 [2.825; 2.993] 
Monthly disposable household income (in 1,000 RMB)  7.640 8.871 [8.371; 9.367] 
1 Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2013) 
 
 
Histograms for the categorical variables referring to the home provinces and the occupational 
situation of the respondents are displayed in Figure 6-2. Merely 36.0% of the respondents indi-
cated Beijing as their home province. This result comes very close to the official share of non-
native residents published the Statistical Yearbook, which is 36.8%. These figures reflect the 
high influx of people from other parts of the country into the capital. The relatively high number 
of respondents from the neighbouring province Hebei is also plausible. Furthermore, many re-
spondents come from Henan and Shandong which are, in terms of residents, China’s second and 
third most populated provinces. Concerning different occupational situations, most respondents 
are employees (38.2%), followed by the groups of self-employed (25.4%) and retired people 
(15.1%). Taken as a whole, the sample is diverse and, in spite of some minor dissimilarity in 
terms of ethnic groups and household size, representative for the general population.  
 The survey results also confirm one of the observations made during the pretests, namely that 
Beijing residents are relatively unacquainted with the Tarim area. Very few respondents (3.9%) 
had ever been to the Tarim area. However, most people (69.5%) reported that they had already 
heard about the Tarim River before participating in the survey. Still, a considerable share of re-
spondents was completely ignorant of the project site (26.8%). Given the little experience Bei-
jing residents have with the Tarim area, one may doubt that they would be willing to financially 
support an environmental project carried out in that region. 
 
                                                 
17 Just for comparison: family gross income increased by 11.3% and annual disposable per capita income by 13.2% 
from 2010 to 2011 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2013). 
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Figure 6-2: Home provinces and occupations of the respondents  
Answers to the elicitation question and debriefing questions 
As explained before, WTP for the so-called ‘Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan’ was as-
sessed by means of a referendum question. Respondents had to choose their preferred out of 
three answer options. They were randomly assigned one out of six bids, ranging from 10 to 
200 RMB. Regarding the construct validity of the CVM value estimate, unconditional agreement 
(i.e. the share of ‘yes’ answers) should decrease when the bid is increased. Furthermore, it is 
expected that the share of ‘no, but’ answers, i.e. the share of respondents with a WTP greater 
than zero but lower than the assigned bid, increases with the bid level. Finally, the effect of the 
bid on the probability that a respondent chooses the third answer option is not quite clear. In the 
present study the third answer option indicates a zero WTP (‘No, my household does not tolerate 
any increase of its monthly expenditures in order to get the TEPP realised’). It is expected that 
people who derive no utility from the TEPP, those who cannot afford to give up any money for 
this environmental project and people who reject the idea of paying for it for ethical reasons, 
fairness aspects or because of some psychological motive like miserliness choose this uncondi-
tional no-option. On the one hand, it is plausible that the share of zero WTP statements remains 
constant over different bid amounts because the number of respondents who would not benefit, 
who are too poor or too stingy to pay can be expected to be independent of the bid. On the other 
hand, higher bids may increase the likelihood that respondents choose the no-option, for example 
because they perceive the payment as increasingly unfair. 
 Merely two out of the 1,070 respondents did not answer the elicitation question. The respons-
es of the remaining 1,068 respondents are displayed in Figure 6-3. Conforming to prior expecta-
tions, the fraction of ‘yes’ responses decreases for higher bids. The share of respondents who 
chose the second answer option (‘no, but’) also behaves as expected. The higher the bid was, the 
more respondents expressed a conditional agreement. Finally, the share of zero WTP constantly 
increases up to the bid of 150 RMB but slightly decreases from 150 to 200 RMB. It is to be not-
ed, however, that the relative number of zero WTP statements is not significantly higher for 150 
RMB than for 200 RMB (32.4% and 38.2% respectively). As already noted, the general increase 
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of ‘no’ responses with the randomly assigned bid amount may result from increasingly negative 
attitudes towards the payment scenario. From this perspective, it appears interesting to gain more 
insights into the factors influencing the probability of stating ‘no’ rather than choosing one of the 
two answer options that reveal a positive WTP. The econometric analysis presented in section 
6.4.3 shows that, unlike most socio-demographic respondent characteristics, higher levels of 
money retention heavily influence the likelihood of choosing the ‘no’-options, i.e. stating a WTP 
of zero. 
 
Figure 6-3: Relative distribution of responses to the referendum question 
 Due to the referendum format of the elicitation question, the sample’s average WTP cannot be 
directly computed at this stage. Nevertheless, the descriptive analyses indicate that the WTP of 
most respondents is substantially higher than zero. A vast majority agreed to pay 10 RMB for the 
realisation of the TEPP and almost one third (30.0%) of the respondents who were assigned to 
the highest bid stated that they would tolerate a 200 RMB increase of their monthly expendi-
tures. According to these results, an average Beijing resident is, in spite of his or her previous 
unawareness of the environmental problems in Northwest China, willing to make a surprisingly 
high financial contribution to the restoration and preservation of the natural vegetation along the 
Tarim River. 
 To better understand the motivation underlying the answers to the elicitation question, the 
respondents were asked a number of debriefing questions (cf. matrix question 20 of the ques-
tionnaire displayed in the appendix, 8.2). Their reactions to three protest statements are presented 
in Table 6-5. 75.0% of the respondents said that the central government should bear the entire 
costs arising from the realisation of the TEPP. 73.2% objected the payment vehicle and 67.4% 
disliked that all households, including the poor, would face increased monthly expenditures if the 
TEPP was implemented. Regarding the generally strong objection of the payment scenario it is 
even more surprising that so many respondents still voted in favour of the environmental project 
and the related payment. This at first glance counterintuitive result was also discussed during the 
final CEG meeting in October 2013. In contrast to the German researchers, the citizen experts 
were little astonished about the widespread protest against the payment scenario. According to 
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them, it was simply common sense among Beijing residents that taxes were already too high, that 
the central government was wasting money and that poor households should be exempted from 
any additional charge. However, sharing this point of view was not necessarily a reason for op-
posing the TEPP, according to the citizen experts. Hence, the overall high levels of protest do not 
immediately threaten the validity of the WTP estimate. Furthermore, as section 6.4.4 will show, 
protest against the payment scenario is related to respondents’ money attitudes. The present 
study unambiguously illustrates that stingy respondents are more likely to protest against the 
payment scenario than respondents who behave less miserly with their financial resources. Ac-
cordingly, rather than being the outcome of a poorly designed payment scenario, widespread 
protest can be explained by some more general attitudes towards different aspects of life. 
Table 6-5: Agreement with protest statements and considerations of non-use values 
Statement Agreement 
Poor households should not have to pay for the TEPP. 67.4% 
Not households but central government alone should pay for the TEPP. 75.0% 
Taxes are already so high that increasing taxes is not a good way to finance the program. 73.2% 
 
Did you consider… 
 
… the TEPP’s positive effects for plants and animals? (XV) 53.0% 
… the TEPP’s positive effects for future generations? (BV) 
 
62.0% 
… the TEPP’s positive effects on the living conditions of local people? (AV) 44.0% 
… your chances of visiting the Tarim area some day in the future? (OV) 40.4% 
 
To gain more insights concerning the motivations underlying individual reactions to the WTP 
question, the second set of debriefing questions included in the questionnaire shall be explored as 
well (cf. matrix question 21, appendix 8.2). Since an overwhelming majority of Beijing residents 
are only indirectly affected by the environmental project in question, positive WTP statements 
can, according to economic theory, be interpreted as the benefit an individual expects to gain 
from the non-use aspects of the TEPP. To test the theory, respondents were asked whether they 
had indeed considered the existence value, the bequest value, the altruistic value and the option 
value of the project before answering the referendum question. The figures presented in Table 
6-5 show that the bequest value is the most frequently considered aspect of the environmental 
project in question, followed by the existence value of plants and animals. A relatively smaller 
share of respondents said that they had considered the project’s altruistic value and its option 
value. The first two results come as little surprise given that the TEPP would mainly enhance the 
living conditions of future generations and because of the detailed description of the deteriora-
tion of the natural vegetation along the Tarim River which had been presented to the respondents 
before asking the payment question. Little importance attached to preserving the option of visit-
ing the environmental site in the future is plausible as well, given the relatively low popularity of 
southern Xinjiang as tourist destination among Beijing citizens (as reported above, merely 3.9% 
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of the respondents had ever been there). The respondents’ comparatively little concern for local 
people, however, requires explanation. A pretty bold but possibly plausible assertion would be 
that this result reflects the resentments of Han Chinese people towards the inhabitants of the Ta-
rim Basin, who are mainly Uighurs, an ethnic minority which is nowadays known for ethnic un-
rest and terror in China. Finally, it is also worth noticing that only 21.4% of the respondents ad-
mitted that they had considered none of the four kinds of non-use values. These results reveal 
that most respondents perceived the ‘long-distance benefits’ of the environmental project. It is 
interesting to note that, unlike protest, the perception of the long-distance benefits hardly varies 
across respondents that hold different money attitudes. As demonstrated econometrically at a 
later stage of this chapter, stingy respondents are as likely to account for non-use values as 
wasteful respondents. The consequences of this indifference with regard to the validity of the 
WTP stated by stingy respondents will be discussed in section 6.4.4. 
6.3.2 Econometric analysis  
So far, the investigation of the results of the CVM survey conducted in Beijing has been limited 
to a descriptive analysis. In order to assess the sample’s average WTP and to gain more insight 
into the factors which explain an average respondent’s answer to the referendum question, econ-
ometric techniques need to be applied. This section provides some details concerning the basic 
econometric techniques which CVM researchers commonly use to analyse respondents’ answers 
to dichotomous choice questions. The trichotomous choice format, which has been used in the 
CVM survey explored in the present chapter, is just a variant of the standard DC format. The 
econometric techniques presented in this section are also suitable for trichotomous choice data 
and will be applied to the data gathered in Beijing. The basic model to analyse DC responses was 
developed by Hanemann (1984). Apart from Hanemann’s (1984, 1989) framework, the present 
section is mainly based on Haab and McConnell’s (2002) more recent publication on parametric 
models for DC questions. 
Econometric model for dichotomous choice data 
DC questions are typically formulated in a way such as ‘Would you vote for a program to per-
manently increase environmental quality from z0 to z1 if it increased your taxes by €t for this 
year?’ (cf. Freeman et al., 2014: 390). A rational individual will agree with such a question if he 
or she expects to be at least as well off in the prospective situation (the situation where environ-
mental quality has increased from z0 to z1 and the individual’s income Ih has been reduced by an 
amount of t) as compared to the initial situation. In other words, a rational respondent will an-
swer ‘yes’ to a DC question if the project’s net utility exceeds his or her utility of the status quo. 
Haab and McConnell (2002) represent this trade-off by means of two indirect utility functions: 
𝜐1(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ, 𝑧1, 𝑠ℎ, 𝜀ℎ1) > 𝜐0(𝐼ℎ, 𝑧0, 𝑠ℎ, 𝜀ℎ0), (6-1) 
where Ih is the respondent’s household income, zk the state of the environment, sh a vector of 
household characteristics and other attributes (household size, age of the respondent, question-
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naire variations, etc.) and εhk a component of unobserved preferences.
18 Since the random part of 
preferences εhk is unknown, researchers can only make a probability statement about an individu-
al’s response to the DC question. The probability of a ‘yes’ response corresponds to the likeli-
hood that the respondent thinks that he or she will be better off when the proposed project is real-
ised, even though he or she has to make the specified payment. Equation 6-2 expresses this prob-
ability: Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = Pr [𝜐1(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ, 𝑧1, 𝑠ℎ, 𝜀ℎ1) > 𝜐0(𝐼ℎ, 𝑧0, 𝑠ℎ, 𝜀ℎ0)]. (6-2) 
One possibility of estimating equation 6-2 consists of constructing a parametric model. Several 
assumptions concerning the functional form of the indirect utility function and of the error term 
have to be made for this purpose. For the sake of simplification, analysts define the indirect utili-
ty function as additive separable in its observable and unknown elements, so that the indirect 
utility function is the sum of all deterministic components of interest (i.e. Ihk, zkand shk) and the 
stochastic component (εhk). Based on this specification, the probability statement becomes: Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = Pr [𝜐1(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ, 𝑧1, 𝑠ℎ) + 𝜀ℎ1 > 𝜐0(𝐼ℎ, 𝑧0, 𝑠ℎ) + 𝜀ℎ0)]                    = Pr [𝜐1(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ, 𝑧1, 𝑠ℎ) − 𝜐0(𝐼ℎ, 𝑧0, 𝑠ℎ) > 𝜀ℎ0 − 𝜀ℎ1]. (6-3) 
As displayed by equation 6-3, the probability that the household’s utility increases when the pro-
ject is realised, even though its income is decreased by an amount of th, corresponds to the prob-
ability that the change in observable utility exceeds the difference in the stochastic components 
of preferences. But this equation is still too general to be estimated econometrically, so that the 
notion needs to be further rearranged. The empirically unobservable difference in error terms can 
be summarised as one single random term, i.e. ε ≡ εh1 − εh
0  (see Haab and McConnell, 2002: 26). 
Furthermore, a cumulative density function of the stochastic component of preferences has to be 
defined. This cumulative density function Fε(. ) then describes the probability to a ‘yes’ response 
(c.f. Hanemann, 1984: 338): Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = F𝜀 [𝜐1(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ, 𝑧1, 𝑠ℎ) − 𝜐0(𝐼ℎ, 𝑧0, 𝑠ℎ)] = 𝐹𝜀Δ𝜐����. (6-4) 
A simple and common way to estimate equation (6-4) consists of constructing a random utility 
model with a linear utility function.19 Doing so, the following statistical model is generated: 
Δ𝜐���� = �𝛼1 + 𝛽(𝐼ℎ − 𝑡ℎ)� − (𝛼0 + 𝛽𝐼ℎ)) = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑡ℎ, (6-5) 
with 𝛼 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼0. The vector α consists of parameters embracing the respondent’s observable 
characteristics sh; β indicates the marginal utility of income. The probability statement then be-
comes: 
                                                 
18 Prices are assumed to be constant so that the vector of market prices is omitted. 
19 The linear model employed here suffers from the very strong assumption of constant marginal utility of income 
across individuals. In addition to this most simple way of estimating the random utility model, alternative functional 
forms that are more realistic in terms of the underlying assumptions have been suggested; see for example Haab and 
McConnell (2002), chapter 2 for more details. 
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Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = Pr (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑡ℎ + 𝜀ℎ > 0). (6-6) 
Under the assumption that the random error term is independently and identically distributed 
with mean zero and a variance of 1 (εh~N(0,1)), the probability of answering ‘yes’ can be rep-
resented by the following probit model (Haab and McConnell, 2002: 27): Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = Φ(𝛼𝜎 − 𝛽𝜎 𝑡ℎ), (6-7) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density. Alternatively, a logistically distributed error 
term provides a logit model, i.e. (ibid.): Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠ℎ) = 1 + exp (−( 𝛼𝜎𝐿 − 𝛽𝑛ℎ𝜎𝐿 ))−1. (6-8) 
Maximum likelihood techniques, that are nowadays available in all econometric software pack-
ages, provide a convenient possibility of estimating the parameters of probit or logit models. The 
two estimation approaches typically yield very similar results. The simple linear probit model is, 
however, the most commonly employed parametric model and provides, as shown by Crooker 
and Herriges (2004), more robust results in estimating average WTP than alternative economet-
ric models.  
 The parameters of the probit or logit model provide the basis for estimating the sample’s av-
erage WTP. A single household’s maximum WTP, i.e. the amount of money that makes the 
household just indifferent between the status quo and the environmental improvement, can be 
integrated into the random utility model of the probability statement. This yields the following 
equality (c.f. Haab and McConnell, 2002: 33): 
𝛼1 + 𝛽(𝐼ℎ −𝑊𝑇𝐶ℎ) + 𝜀ℎ1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝐼ℎ + 𝜀ℎ0. (6-9) 
Maintaining the assumptions concerning the error terms (ε ≡ εh1 − εh
0) and the respondent’s ob-
servable characteristics (α = α1 − α0), it follows that 
𝑊𝑇𝐶ℎ = 𝛼𝛽 + 𝜀𝛽. (6-10) 
Assuming a standard normal distribution of the error term ε allows to construct the following 
measure for mean and median WTP (c.f. Hanemann, 1989: 1058, Haab and McConnell, 2002: 
34): 
𝑇𝜀(𝑊𝑇𝐶ℎ|𝛼,𝛽) = 𝛼𝛽. (6-11) 
Using maximum likelihood techniques (cf. e.g. Wooldridge, 2010) the relevant parameters can 
be estimated. In STATA this is done by using the probit or logit command to regress the dichot-
omous choice variable against the bid. STATA provides a coefficient for the model constant as 
well as a coefficient capturing the bid amount. The estimates obtained correspond to α and −β in 
equation 6-11. In models without explanatory variables α corresponds to the coefficient associat-
ed to the constant term and β is the coefficient that captures the bid amount. Accordingly, aver-
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age WTP is equal to the negative ratio of the coefficient of the constant term and the coefficient 
of the bid variable (cf. Lopez-Feldman, 2012). 
 In order to observe the factors which determine an average respondent’s answer to the DC 
question, the simple model displayed in equation 6-5 has to be extended by including the vector shj , capturing a household’s j observable characteristics, for example demographic variables 
(gender, age, ethnicity, etc.), socio-economic variables (financial situation, number of household 
members, role of the respondent within the household, etc.), psychological variables (attitudes, 
personality traits, etc.) and questionnaire variations (e.g. treatment dummies). In functional 
terms: 
Δ𝜐���� = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝑗𝑠ℎ𝑗. (6-12) 
The parameter vector γj is associated to the explanatory variables captured by shj. Coefficient 
estimates and standard errors of the parameter β and of each parameter γj are reported by all 
econometric software packages so that the main challenge remains the interpretation of the re-
sults of the econometric model. In logit and probit models the magnitude of the coefficients can-
not be directly interpreted. However, the sign and the level of significance of the coefficient es-
timates provide relevant information. For example, a positive sign of the coefficient estimate γ�1 
of a statistical significant characteristic sh1 is interpreted as a positive partial effect of that char-
acteristic on the probability of answering ‘yes’ to the DC question (i.e. WTP); the contrary holds 
true for a negative sign. Naturally, the sign of the coefficient estimate β� should be negative and 
statistically significant, since the probability of accepting the assigned bid is expected to de-
crease for higher bid levels.  
 In the case of implausible effects or the absence of certain expected effects, the validity of the 
WTP estimate has to be questioned. As explained in section 2.3.2, CVM practitioners commonly 
check the plausibility of WTP statements by testing whether certain respondent characteristics, 
questionnaire variations and the bid have the expected partial effect on the response probability. 
Furthermore, the identification of the household characteristics that affect the response to the 
WTP question is useful when an analyst wants to make policy recommendations. If it turns out 
that an increase in a particular variable, for example a respondent’s age, alters the probability of 
voting in favour of a particular environmental project, researchers conclude that this project 
would be particularly beneficial for elderly people. Following the same logic, the effect of any 
other variables of interest, like money attitudes, on WTP can be assessed. 
Average WTP and overall determinants 
The econometric techniques presented above shall now be applied to the results of the CVM sur-
vey conducted in urban Beijing. For this purpose, the responses to the referendum question 
needed to be recoded into a binary dependent variable. As explained before, unlike in the case of 
a standard DC format, where respondents can answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the questionnaire em-
ployed in the present study contained three answer options, namely an unconditional ‘yes’ 
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( WTPh ≥ th) , a polite ‘no, but’ ( 0 < WTPh < th) , and an unambiguous ‘no’-option       
(WTPh = 0). ‘Yes’ replies were coded 1 and all other replies were coded 0, regardless of wheth-
er the actual answer was ‘no, but’ or ‘no’. For the estimation of the sample’s average WTP, the 
latter two options are treated in the same way because both kinds of responses indicate that a 
respondent’s maximum WTP is lower than the specified bid.  
 As explained previously, the sample’s average WTP can be estimated by a probit model 
where only the binary response variable and the randomly assigned bid (BID) are included. The 
results of this basic regression model, as rounded figures, are summarised in Table 6-6. As ex-
pected, the coefficient of BID is negative and highly significant. Hence, the likelihood of agree-
ing with the payment question decreases when the bid is increased. Based on the coefficient es-
timates of the model constant (CONSTANT) and the bid (BID), the sample’s average WTP has 
been computed. An average Beijing household’s maximum WTP amounts to 101.06 RMB per 
month (€12.50). This amount corresponds to approximately 1.1% of an average household’s dis-
posable income. Given that households in Beijing are only indirectly affected by the environ-
mental project in question and in view of the unlimited duration of payment, this value appears 
to be quite high. 
Table 6-6: Probit regression model underlying the average WTP estimate 
Dependent variable: WTP1   
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
CONSTANT 0.670*** 0.066 
BID -0.007*** 0.000 
Log-Likelihood -673.055  
Pseudo R2 0.088  
N 1068  
Notes: ***p≤0.01 
 
As highlighted in section 2.3.2, critics argue that CVM surveys yield upwardly biased estimates 
because of the hypothetical nature of the payment question. In view of this criticism, the plausi-
bility of the relatively high WTP estimate obtained in the present application should be further 
verified. For this purpose, the factors which affect a respondent’s answer choice shall be deter-
mined. It is expected that several demographic characteristics are systematically related to a re-
spondent’s WTP. Furthermore, the consideration of the project’s non-use values as well as pro-
test towards the payment scenario are likely to impact a respondent’s WTP. To account for these 
potential effects, the basic probit regression model displayed in Table 6-6 is extended by a set of 
eight explanatory variables. Most of these variables have already been presented in the descrip-
tive part of this analysis (cf. section 6.3.1). Moreover, an overview of all explanatory variables 
used in the following applications can be found in the appendix, section 8.3. 
 
 
166 
Table 6-7: Determinants of WTP 
Dependent variable: WTP1 Model 1  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
CONSTANT 1.081*** 0.312 
BID -0.007*** 0.001 
TREAT 0.186** 0.085 
MALE 0.174** 0.083 
AGE 0.004 0.003 
EDU 0.085** 0.035 
INCOME 0.006 0.006 
HH_SIZE 0.039 0.031 
NONUSE 0.483*** 0.120 
PROTEST -0.378*** 0.052 
Log-Likelihood -621.448  
Pseudo R2 0.158  
N 1068  
Notes: **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
Conforming to prior expectations, the negative effect of BID on the likelihood of agreeing with 
the referendum question remains robust in the extended model. TREAT is a treatment dummy 
which takes a value of 1 for respondents who received a gift of money (i.e. an envelope contain-
ing 40 RMB) as an incentive to participate in the interview and 0 for those who were not offered 
such a gift. The positive and significant effect of this variable is plausible but will not be further 
explored in the present work (for a discussion of the effects of monetary incentives on 
respondent behaviour in CVM surveys see e.g. Ahlheim et al., 2013a). Among the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents, gender (MALE) has a significant effect on the 
likelihood of answering ‘yes’ to the referendum question. Men have a higher WTP than women, 
ceteris paribus on other factors. Furthermore, a respondent’s level of education (EDU) has a pos-
itive effect on WTP, meaning that people with higher levels of education appreciate the envi-
ronmental project more than others. The latter effect is plausible as well, given that environmen-
tal awareness is likely to be particularly widespread among people with higher education levels. 
Neither INCOME nor HH_SIZE have a significant impact on WTP. At first glance, the absence 
of an effect of these two household variables, especially the missing income effect, is disturbing 
in view of the construct validity of the WTP estimate. While the regression coefficient of IN-
COME takes the expected sign in the model considered here, the effect is far from being signifi-
cant. It is to be noted that INCOME has a positive and significant effect in a probit model with 
BID as the only control variable. However, this effect is mediated as soon as additional control 
variables, especially AGE and EDU, which are significantly correlated with INCOME, are in-
cluded into the model. Hence, the missing income effect in the extended probit model is not pri-
ma facie evidence of construct invalidity but shows that a respondent’s objective financial situa-
tion matters less than other factors for his or her WTP. Finally, the two attitudinal variables 
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NONUSE and PROTEST point to the validity of the survey data. The NONUSE variable takes 
higher values, the more non-use components of the environmental project a respondent has con-
sidered. The positive sign of the corresponding coefficient indicates that WTP increases with the 
awareness of the project’s non-use values. Furthermore, higher scores on the PROTEST variable 
are negatively related to a respondent’s WTP. In other words, respondents who oppose the pay-
ment scenario (‘government alone should pay (…)’ etc.) are less likely to agree with the payment 
question. 
 Overall, the relationship between the explanatory variables and the answers to the referendum 
question (i.e. WTP) are convincing. However, the presumably essential relationship between 
income and WTP could not be detected in the extended econometric model. In contrast, more 
subjective variables concerning a respondent’s perception of the project’s non-use values and 
attitudes towards the payment scenario are powerful predictors for WTP. Given the missing in-
come effect on the one hand and the plausible impact of the two attitudinal variables on the oth-
er, it seems to be very possible that the inclusion of other relevant psychological variables will 
alter the explanatory power of the econometric model. Specifically, attitudes towards spending 
money may affect respondents’ WTP for the TEPP. 
6.4 Analysis of money attitudes 
6.4.1 Scale validity and distribution of misers in the sample 
In the present study, money spending dispositions have been measured by means of a modified 
version of Furnham’s (1984) money retention scale. To assess the scale’s validity and reliability 
in measuring the construct of interest a number of statistical tests and methods shall be applied to 
the obtained data. As already mentioned, 80 respondents (6.7%) failed to complete the set of 
money attitude questions. In most cases, the respondents had broken off the interview before 
having reached the relevant part of the questionnaire. The reasons for cancelling the interview 
are unfortunately unknown; however, it does not seem to be the case that respondents dropped 
out because they disliked the questions concerning their monetary habits. In view of the reasona-
bly low item non-response rate, it is concluded that the money attitude questions were well ac-
cepted by the respondents and that their integration into the questionnaire did not disturb the pro-
cess of the CVM interview. An analysis of 50 randomly selected MP3 records of the actual in-
terviews further sustained this impression. The majority of respondents took the six money atti-
tude items seriously, took reasonable time to think about their answers and did not seem to be 
annoyed or intimidated by the relevant questions. Nevertheless, the survey outcome may be af-
fected by the self-selection of the respondents who completed the money attitude inventory. Av-
erage scores on the money attitude scale, for example, will be biased if the answers of respond-
ents differ from the potential answers of those who broke off the interview. The existence of 
such a non-response bias can be tested by comparing the group of non-respondents to the group 
of respondents who completed the money attitude inventory. For this purpose, several demo-
graphic characteristics of the two groups have been compared. Mean values and the results of a 
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group means comparison test are shown in Table 6-8. The respondents who completed the mon-
ey retention scale are significantly younger and have higher levels of education than those who 
dropped out. In terms of income, household size and gender the null hypothesis of equal means 
cannot be rejected. The systematic exclusion of older individuals with lower levels of education 
has to be kept in mind when analysing the survey results. At the same time, the fact that the 
mean values of all other variables which may impact a person’s answers to the money attitude 
questions, especially income, are broadly the same in both groups is a satisfactory result. 
Table 6-8: Non-response bias and money attitudes 
Variable 
Non-
respondents 
(N=80) 
Respondents 
(N=1113) 
T-test of equal 
means across 
groups 
 mean mean1 p-value 
Male 0.425 0.517 0.114 
Age 43.700 39.087 0.007 
Han nationality 0.963 0.911 0.112 
Higher education 0.288 0.417 0.023 
Household size 3.088 2.907 0.271 
Monthly disposable household income in 1,000 RMB  8.026 8.865 0.393 
1 Mean in the relevant split-samples before discarding questionnaires with missing information 
 
In a next step, one needs to verify that the six items of the modified money retention scale meas-
ure a single construct. This is done by calculating Cronbach’s alpha, which is a commonly used 
indicator of internal consistency of a psychometric scale. The alpha of the modified money reten-
tion scale is 0.817, indicating that the covariance of the six items is high. Scales with alphas 
above 0.800 are usually interpreted as being highly reliable; at the same time, high alphas may 
also indicate a redundancy among items in the inventory (c.f. Switzer et al., 1999). Looking at 
the correlations among the six statements there is indeed a strong statistical relationship between 
several of these items. As indicated by the correlation coefficients reported in Table 6-9, there is 
a close association between the first and the second item as well as between the second and the 
fourth item. 
 
 
169 
Table 6-9: Correlations among items of the money attitude inventory 
Items Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q1 I often have difficulty to bring myself to spend 
money regardless of the amount. 
     
Q2 In making any purchase, for any purpose, 
spending money is painful … 
0.637     
Q3 I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or 
not. 
0.410 0.472    
Q4 Even when I have enough money I often feel 
guilty if I spend money… 
0.440 0.526 0.432   
Q5 I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the 
cost of almost everything I buy. 
0.393 0.451 0.320 0.406  
Q6 Money should be saved not spent. 
 
0.414 0.447 0.296 0.394 0.367 
Note: All p<0.01 
 
Furthermore, a principal component factor analysis has been undertaken to verify the relation-
ship among the six items. It is expected that all six items form a one-dimensional construct, 
namely the degree to which a person dislikes spending money in principle. In view of the out-
come of the correlation analysis, the result of the factor analysis displayed in Table 6-10 comes 
as little surprise; all items clearly load on a single factor. This result points to the construct valid-
ity of the measure. Besides the results of the factor analysis, mean scores on the single items as 
well as the sample’s average score on the money retention scale are shown in the same table. 
With the exception of the fifth item all average scores are lower than 3 (‘neither agree nor disa-
gree’) and thus below the midpoint of the Likert scale. In other words, an average respondent 
disagreed with most money attitude statements. The relatively higher mean score of the fifth item 
is plausible since the statement refers to the habit of bargaining about prices, which is, in con-
temporary China, still normal in many purchase situations. In addition to observing mean scores, 
insights into the distribution of misers in the sample can be gained from observing the share of 
respondents who agreed with the single items, i.e. who chose either ‘predominantly true’ or 
‘completely true’ from the answer scale. As expected, only a minority of respondents agreed 
with the different items. However, all item-specific proportions are of statistical importance. 
Agreement with the six items ranges from 19.4% to 39.2%. Even the apparently irrational state-
ment ‘Even when I have enough money I often feel guilty if I spend money on necessities’ was 
approved by one fourth of the respondents. Regarding the entire money attitude inventory, an 
average score of 4 and higher indicates that a respondent has, on average, agreed with all six 
statements. Scores of 4 and higher are rare but still of statistical importance. Taking an average 
score of 4 and higher as an indicator for a person’s pathological tendency to retain his or her  
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financial resources, it is concluded that approximately 11.2% of the respondents fall into this 
category. 
 In order to judge the plausibility of these results the sample’s average score on the modified 
money attitude inventory shall be compared to mean scores reported in other studies which have 
employed a similar set of money attitude questions. In virtually all existing surveys, an average 
respondent scored just below the midpoint of the Likert scale (cf. section 5.3.2, Table 5-4). 
Wiepking and Breeze (2012), for example, reported a mean score of 2.6 out of 5 points for a rep-
resentative sample of Dutch households. Hoon and Lim (2001) published a score of 3.6 out of 7 
points for Singaporean respondents, which corresponds to a score of approximately 2.6 on a 5-
point scale. Even though these studies were conducted in very different socio-cultural contexts 
than the present survey, the resemblance of the results from Beijing with previous surveys on 
money attitudes can be viewed as further evidence for the validity and reliability of the employed 
measure. 
Table 6-10: Money attitude structure from principal component factor analysis 
Items Agreement1 
(%) 
Mean Std. dev. Factor load-
ing 
Q1 I often have difficulty to bring myself to 
spend money regardless of the amount. 
34.7 2.883 1.347 0.771 
Q2 In making any purchase, for any purpose, 
spending money is painful … 
21.0 2.458 1.248 0.831 
Q3 I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or 
not. 
19.4 2.419 1.187 0.665 
Q4 Even when I have enough money I often feel 
guilty if I spend money… 
26.5 2.594 1.278 0.742 
Q5 I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the 
cost of almost everything I buy. 
39.2 3.083 1.302 0.663 
Q6 Money should be saved not spent. 
 
24.2 2.625 1.125 0.664 
Average score2 11.23 2.679 0.918  
1 Proportion of respondents who ticked ‘(4) predominantly true’ or ‘(5) completely true’ on the Likert scale 
2 The average score generally equals the sum of item-specific scores divided by the total number of answered items. 
If the answer to one single item was missing, the average score was calculated based on the five remaining items. 
3 Share of respondents with an average score of ≥4 
 
Another possible way of assessing the validity of the money attitude measure consists of observ-
ing interrelationships of the measure with other variables. For this purpose, the money attitude 
score has been regressed against several respondent characteristics. Based on psychological theo-
ry and the results of former studies, it is expected that the score on the money attitude scale sys-
tematically varies with certain demographic variables such as gender and age. Furthermore, the 
score should be essentially unrelated to a respondent’s objective financial situation, like         
 
171 
disposable household income and household size. The results of the OLS regression model used 
to verify these hypotheses are displayed in Table 6-11. 
Table 6-11: Determinants of the money attitude score  
Dependent variable: 
MONEYATT 
Coefficient Standard error 
CONSTANT 3.527*** 0.134 
MALE -0.094*** 0.050 
AGE 0.005*** 0.002 
EDU -0.208*** 0.020 
INCOME -0.019*** 0.003 
HH_SIZE 0.035* 0.019 
 R2=0.185  
 N=1100  
Note: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
The regression coefficients of almost all demographic variables are highly significant. Conform-
ing to prior expectations, the money attitude score is related to respondents’ gender (MALE). 
Women reach higher scores on the scale than men, ceteris paribus on other factors. Similar re-
sults were also reported in previous studies (e.g. Furnham, 1984, Lim et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
AGE has a significant effect on the money attitude score. The finding that money retention is 
more common in the older generation than in the younger is plausible, given the context of the 
present study. Many elderly people in China have experienced pervasive poverty during the 
years following the Cultural Revolution. Since it is reasonable to believe that the preference for 
non-spending is more developed among those who lived in poverty in the past (cf. Lim et al., 
2003), the effect of age on the money attitude score is not surprising at all. In addition to that, 
traditional Chinese values like thrift and frugality can be expected to be more widespread among 
the older generations. Another key determinant of the money retention score is a respondent’s 
level of education (EDU). The score decreases by approximately 0.2 points with each of the sev-
en different levels of education assessed in the survey. In contrast to many previous studies on 
money attitudes, there is a significant negative effect of INCOME on the score on the money 
retention scale. Furthermore, the money attitude score increases with the number of people living 
in a respondent’s household (HH_SIZE). While the relationship between a person’s age and 
gender is in line with initial expectations, the effects of education, household size and income are 
somewhat troubling, given the theory underlying the psychological construct and the results of 
previous studies. In the present application, the preference for non-spending seems to be a func-
tion of several socio-economic characteristics, especially of those that are obviously related to 
respondents’ welfare, and not an independent personality trait. In view of this result, the question 
arises how to correctly interpret high scores on the modified money attitude inventory. Rather 
than indicating that a respondent suffers from a compulsion to retain his or her money, high lev-
els of agreement with the six money attitude items may simply reflect that a person is not able to 
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spend money in most purchase situations due to his or her limited financial resources. Accord-
ingly, a high money retention score does not necessarily point to miserliness. 
 When observing the correlation of the six items underlying the overall money attitude varia-
ble with the demographic characteristics of concern, it is to be noticed that the correlation coeffi-
cients are of differing magnitude. This is especially the case for the variable of most concern in 
terms of the interpretability of the money retention score, which is a respondent’s disposable 
household income. As reported in Table 6-12, there is a relatively high correlation between IN-
COME and the first two items of the modified money attitude inventory. The correlation coeffi-
cient is, however, smaller than 0.2 in the case of the remaining four items. This means that 
agreement with the first two items, i.e. ‘I often have difficulty to bring myself to spend money 
(…)’ and ‘In making any purchase, for any purpose, spending money is painful for me’, is par-
ticularly likely to reflect a respondent’s inability to spend a lot of money rather than a pathologi-
cal tendency to retain his or her financial resources. By contrast, agreement with the remaining 
six items may be a more genuine expression of miserliness. 
 
Table 6-12: Correlations of money attitude items and demographic variables 
Items Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
 MALE AGE EDU INCOME HH_SIZE 
Q1 I often have difficulty to bring my-
self to spend money… 
-0.083*** 0.232*** -0.366*** -0.268*** 0.088*** 
Q2 In making any purchase, for any 
purpose, spending money is painful … 
-0.075** 0.152*** -0.349*** -0.238*** 0.036 
Q3 I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether 
I can or not. 
-0.031 0.098*** -0.220*** -0.188*** 0.051* 
Q4 Even when I have enough money I 
often feel guilty… 
-0.092*** 0.055* -0.236*** -0.194*** 0.027 
Q5 I feel compelled to argue or bargain 
about the cost… 
-0.087*** 0.110*** -0.246*** -0.177*** 0.008 
Q6 Money should be saved not spent. 
 
-0.021 0.112*** -0.268*** -0.139*** 0.053* 
MONEYATT -0.092*** 0.177*** -0.391*** -0.279*** 0.061** 
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
To explore the content validity of the modified money retention inventory further, the scale was 
discussed during three CEG meetings, namely in the two sessions before the main survey and in 
the session following the main survey. In addition to adapting the wording and the contents of 
the scale to the Chinese context (cf. section 6.2.2), particular attention was paid to the question 
whether the six items indeed measured the money attitude facet they were supposed to measure. 
Most importantly, the citizen experts were asked to give their opinion how to interpret high 
money retention scores. The CEG members generally agreed that the six items described the 
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rather uncommon tendency to systematically refrain from spending money on anything. They 
also approved my hypothesis that respondents’ attitudes towards spending money in general in-
fluenced their WTP statements in CVM interviews. They said that people who found spending 
money painful in everyday purchase situations would also feel uncomfortable when agreeing to 
pay a particular amount of money for the ‘Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan’. When pre-
sented the results of the main survey, which clearly show that respondents’ attitudes towards 
spending money in general affect their answers to the payment question (cf. section 6.4.3), the 
citizen experts were not surprised at all. They found it very plausible that high-scorers were less 
likely to agree with the payment question than others. One participant stressed that he had ex-
pected that even more misers would have refused to make a financial contribution to the TEPP. 
However, there was disagreement concerning the interpretation of high scores on the modified 
retention scale. According to several citizen experts, agreement with the relevant items sould be 
viewed as an indicator of miserliness only in the case of respondents who dispose of sufficient 
financial resources. In the case of poor respondents, however, a high score on the scale most 
likely reflects a person’s inability to spend money and not his or her tendency to refrain from 
spending for the sake of miserliness, according to the CEG. Other citizen experts did not ques-
tion the validity of the attitudinal variable but emphasised that most misers in Beijing had good 
reasons for acting stingy – namely an extremely tight budget. 
 In brief, the modified money attitude inventory used to measure money spending dispositions 
in the CVM survey carried out in Beijing performs well regarding the common indicators for a 
psychometric scale’s reliability and validity such as internal consistency and construct validity. 
However, there are also a number of issues which have to be taken into account when analysing 
the survey outcome. Firstly, there is sample selection; the fact that lower educated and elderly 
people are systematically excluded from the analysis because they did not answer the set of 
money attitude questions affects the representativeness of the results. For example, the sample’s 
average score on the money retention scale is likely to be downwardly biased since age is posi-
tively and education negatively correlated with this score. Secondly, a person’s score on the 
money attitude scale turned out to be systematically related to several demographic characteris-
tics as well as to the financial situation of a respondent’s household. The results of the present 
study show, in contrast to many former applications, that money retention systematically relates 
to disposable household income. Hence, merely exploring the effect of money retention scores 
on WTP and other variables of interest would be misleading. The variables that are immediately 
related to a respondent’s score on the money attitude inventory always need to be controlled for 
when assessing the effect of the money attitude variable on a dependent variable econometrical-
ly. Furthermore, a researcher may think of using only those money attitude items which show the 
lowest relationship with the income variable in order to obtain a more genuine measure of miser-
liness. However, constructing the money attitude variable based on a lower number of items goes 
along with decreasing levels of the measure’s internal consistency. Therefore, the six-item-
variant has been maintained for the econometric analysis presented in the next sections. To    
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explore the robustness of the key results of the following applications, a sensitivity analysis has 
been conducted as well. All models used to explore the effect of money retention on WTP have 
been replicated using a shortened, less income-sensitive variant of the money attitude variable. 
The psychometric property of this variable as well as the results of this sensitivity analysis can 
be found in the appendix, section 8.1. 
6.4.2 Money retention and monetary habits 
Before exploring the effect of money attitudes on stated WTP, the relationship between this vari-
able and everyday situations involving money shall be scrutinised. To get a better understanding 
of how miserliness affects people’s economic behaviour in general, the answers to several ques-
tions concerning spending and saving habits have been regressed against the money attitude var-
iable. Table 6-13 shows the results of the different regression models. In line with former studies 
on money retention, the money attitude variable (MONEYATT) has a significant impact on sev-
eral habitudinal variables, even when controlling for gender, age, education, income and house-
hold size. 
 The first dependent variable of interest is FINMGMT which takes higher values the better a 
respondent judged the financial situation of his or her household (‘How well would you say your 
household is managing financially these days?’). Ceteris paribus, people with a higher money 
retention score are more pessimistic regarding their household’s financial situation. In other 
words, stingy respondents are the less likely to judge their households’ financial situation as ‘re-
ally good’. On the one hand, these pessimistic attitudes may reflect a miser’s insatiable desire to 
accumulate money and permanent dissatisfaction with his or her income and wealth. On the oth-
er hand, this result could also indicate that people with high money retention scores are financial-
ly worse off as compared to low-scorers, thereby further adding to the concerns regarding the 
scale’s content validity. 
 Further, the relationship between the money attitude variable and a person’s saving habits is 
of central interest. From the economic perspective, not spending is interpreted as saving for fu-
ture consumption. From the psychological perspective, not spending either reflects a person’s 
desire to financially prepare for the future, i.e. saving in the economic sense, or presents a patho-
logical tendency to retain one’s financial resources, i.e. miserliness. To get more insights regard-
ing the meaning of the money attitude variable used here, people’s reported saving habits have 
been regressed against their scores on the money retention scale. The likelihood that a person 
saves part of his or her income on a regular basis (SAVE) is unaffected by the money attitude 
variable. Regarding different saving strategies (‘Concerning your saving habit, which description 
fits?’), the most popular way of saving, namely to ‘save the money that is left over at the end of a 
month’ (SAVE_RESIDUAL) is unaffected by a person’s money attitude. Stingy people are as 
likely as those with un-conflicted attitudes towards spending to pursue this saving strategy. 
However, saving ‘as much as possible’ (SAVE_AMAP) is more popular among misers than 
among other respondents. The likelihood that a respondent chose ‘I save as much as possible’, as 
the item which describes his or her saving habits best, significantly increases with the money 
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retention score. In contrast to that, saving ‘a fixed amount each month’ (SAVE_FIXEDA) is 
largely unrelated to a person’s attitudes towards spending. When comparing the latter two saving 
strategies, saving ‘a fixed amount’ may reflect rational planning for future consumption. Saving 
‘as much as possible’, in contrast, might be an irrational outcome of miserliness. At the same 
time, saving ‘as much as possible’ could also represent the only feasible way of saving when a 
person has an extremely tight budget. Although it is possible that individual respondents inter-
preted the meaning of this item differently, it is still conspicuous that this potentially ill-founded 
saving strategy is significantly more popular among misers than among respondents with a low 
score on the money retention scale.  
 In addition to querying saving regularity and saving strategies, the questionnaire also con-
tained a number of questions regarding different saving purposes, such as precautionary saving, 
saving for one’s children or saving for retirement (‘Why do you save money? How are you going 
to spend your savings?’). Since no significant relationship between a person’s money retention 
score and the different saving purposes has been detected, the corresponding regression models 
are not reported in this section. Taken together, the survey results show that money retention is 
mostly unrelated to saving habits. Misers are as likely as other consumers to regularly save parts 
of their income and saving purposes hardly differ across the two groups. Merely the rather un-
common saving strategy to save ‘as much as possible’ is more common among high-scorers than 
among other respondents. 
 Apart from different saving practices, attitudes towards spending money on others is of par-
ticular interest for the present study. This is because stated WTP for environmental projects has 
some similarity with donating money to charities or even buying gifts for other people. In CVM 
surveys, similarly to the case of donations and gift-giving, altruism and/or the feeling of warm-
glow are likely to matter for a respondent’s stated WTP. Several psychologists argued that many 
people perceive spending money on others differently from spending money on themselves, pre-
sumably because of altruistic feelings mediating their stingy attitudes. Goldberg and Lewis 
(1978), for example, extensively discussed the attitudes and habits of the so-called ‘self-denier’, 
a type of person who behaves miserly in situations involving personal consumption but who 
tends to act generously towards others (cf. section 4.1.2). According to the authors, self-deniers 
generally refuse to spend money on things they would enjoy personally but are often willing to 
buy gifts for their friends and to make generous donations to charity. To test whether a person’s 
score on the money retention scale is related to spending money on others, the results of survey 
questions on generosity and donation behaviour are analysed next. As displayed in Table 6-13, 
the money attitude variable is a significant predictor of self-report generosity (GENEROUS: ‘I 
am generous with people I love’) and the warm-glow variable (WARMGLOW: ‘I get a good 
feeling from contributing money to all kind of good causes’). In both cases, MONEYATT has a 
significantly negative effect on the dependent variable. This is to say that misers are less gener-
ous than low-scorers; and that they are less likely to experience the warm-glow of giving when 
contributing money to good causes. Hence, the argument made by some psychologists regarding 
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the existence of so-called self-deniers seems to be of limited concern in the present study. While 
the theory postulates that people with strong preferences for non-spending are not necessarily 
stingy when it comes to spending money on others, the survey results indicate that misers are, on 
average, also less generous with other people. Accordingly, the proportion of self-deniers in the 
sample must be rather low. Hence, the hypotheses regarding the negative impact of stinginess on 
stated WTP still sounds plausible. The next section focuses on the effect of the money attitude 
variable on people’s answers to the WTP elicitation question. 
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Table 6-13: Money retention and monetary habits 
Dependent  
variable: 
FINMGMT SAVE SAVE_RESIDUAL SAVE_FIXEDA  SAVE_AMAP WARMGLOW GENEROUS 
Regression model: OLS Probit Multinomial  
Probit1 
Multinomial  
Probit1 
Multinomial  
Probit1 
OLS OLS 
Variables Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
CONSTANT 2.971*** 
(0.166) 
-0.677** 
(0.270) 
-1.557*** 
(0.405) 
-1.405*** 
(0.476) 
-2.148*** 
(0.496) 
3.488*** 
(0.235) 
4.252*** 
(0.184) 
MALE 0.000 
(0.049) 
-0.137* 
(0.080) 
-0.205* 
(0.119) 
-0.121 
(0.139) 
-0.207 
(0.143) 
-0.015 
(0.069) 
0.003* 
(0.054) 
AGE 0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
EDU 0.052** 
(0.021) 
0.098*** 
(0.034) 
0.101** 
(0.051) 
0.126 
(0.059) 
0.083 
(0.061) 
-0.055* 
(0.030) 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
INCOME 0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
HH_SIZE 0.004 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.030) 
0.033 
(0.044) 
-0.004 
(0.052) 
-0.042 
(0.054) 
0.056** 
(0.026) 
0.027 
(0.020) 
MONEYATT -0.176*** 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.095 
(0.071) 
0.015 
(0.087) 
0.287*** 
(0.087) 
-0.097** 
(0.042) 
-0.081** 
(0.032) 
N 1064 1070 1067 1067 1067 1053 1057 
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
1 The categorical variable SAVING_STRAT is used as dependent variable in the multinomial probit model. ‘Not saving at all’ is used as the base category. The coefficients refer 
to the likelihood of choosing the category of interest, i.e. SAVE_AMAP, SAVE_FIXEDA or SAVE_RESIDUAL, over the base category. 
 
178 
6.4.3 Money retention and WTP 
In a first step, attitudes towards spending money in general will be analysed as an additional re-
spondent characteristic which is expected to affect a person’s stated WTP. To test the first hy-
pothesis (H1), i.e. whether or not money retention affects the likelihood of agreeing with the 
referendum question asked in the CVM survey considered here, the money attitude score 
(MONEYATT) derived from the modified money retention scale is integrated into a probit mod-
el to assess the validity of the WTP data. Regression coefficients, standard errors and marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables are shown in Table 6-14. 
Table 6-14: Money retention and WTP 
Dependent variable: 
WTP1 
 
Model 2   Model 3   
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx 
CONSTANT 1.919*** 0.359  1.251*** 0.392  
BID -0.007*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.002 
TREAT 0.195** 0.086 0.063 0.162* 0.088 0.051 
MALE 0.157* 0.084 0.051 0.167* 0.086 0.053 
AGE 0.006* 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 
EDU 0.033 0.037 0.011 0.034 0.038 0.011 
INCOME 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 
HH_SIZE 0.049 0.031 0.016 0.039 0.032 0.012 
NONUSE 0.484*** 0.121 0.157 0.390*** 0.124 0.123 
PROTEST -0.363*** 0.053 -0.117 -0.333*** 0.055 -0.105 
MONEYATT -0.255*** 0.051 -0.083 -0.251*** 0.053 -0.079 
WARMGLOW    0.187*** 0.040 0.059 
SAVE    0.075 0.089 0.024 
Log-Likelihood -608.939   -586.619   
Pseudo R2 0.175   0.192   
N 1068   1051   
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
 The coefficient of MONEYATT is negative and highly significant in the first model (Model 2 
in Table 6-14). Thus, keeping the bid, income, household size and all other control variables 
constant, the likelihood of agreeing with the payment question decreases when the money reten-
tion score increases. The marginal effect of MONEYATT indicates that the likelihood of agree-
ing with the payment question decreases by 8% when the money retention score increases by one 
point. Hence, respondents with a higher tendency to retain their money have a lower WTP. The 
effect of MONYATT remains robust when including additional, potentially intervening variables 
into the regression model. In Model 3, a variable indicating the level of agreement with the 
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warm-glow question (WARMGLOW) and a dummy variable indicating whether or not a re-
spondent regularly saves money (SAVE) are added (cf. Table 6-14, Model 3). In line with the 
results of previous CVM studies, WARMGLOW has a positive and highly significant effect on 
WTP. The sign of the coefficient for SAVE is also positive but saving habits do not significantly 
affect a person’s WTP. The significance level and the marginal effect of MONEYATT remain 
broadly the same in the extended model, indicating that money retention is not mediated by good 
feelings resulting from the act of contributing money to a good cause. Thus, even after including 
two supposedly confounding variables, the effect of MONEYATT remains robust. These results 
indicate that there is indeed a negative relationship between tightness with money and WTP. 
 To verify the second hypothesis, which states that the probability of stating a zero WTP is 
related to a person’s disposition to spend money in principle (H2), two additional regression 
models have been estimated. Just as in the models considered before, the dependent binary vari-
able analysed in models 4 and 5 refers to a respondent’s answer to the referendum question. 
However, the dependent variable (WTP2) takes a value of 1 for ‘yes’ and ‘no, but’ replies; and 0 
for no-replies. Hence, these two models give more insights into the key determinants of a posi-
tive WTP statement, i.e. a person’s general willingness to contribute money to the TEPP. 
 In spite of the treatment dummy, a respondent’s gender and age, the determinants for a per-
son’s general WTP are the same as the variables that have a significant effect on the likelihood 
of answering ‘yes’ to the referendum question, which has been analysed in the previous models. 
BID and PROTEST have significant negative effects; NONUSE increases the likelihood of stat-
ing a positive WTP. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient for INCOME is negative but, as be-
fore, this effect is not significant.  
 In contrast to this somewhat puzzling role of INCOME, the variable MONEYATT behaves in 
the expected way. The higher a respondent’s score on the money retention scale, the lower is the 
probability of stating a positive WTP. As before, the effect of MONEYATT remains robust 
when additional control variables are included into the model (cf. Table 6-15, Model 5). Interest-
ingly, a respondent’s saving habits (SAVE) have a positive effect on general WTP. Respondents 
who reported to save regularly are more likely to state a positive WTP than their counterparts. 
This effect may be rooted in the fact that people who attach great importance to financially pre-
paring for the future are, on average, also more concerned about the future state of the environ-
ment. Therefore, the finding that regular savers are more likely to support the Tarim project than 
others is plausible. This result also shows that thrift, in the sense of saving for future needs, af-
fects people’s general WTP in the opposite way than miserliness. 
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Table 6-15: Money retention and zero bids 
Dependent variable: 
WTP2 
 
Model 4   Model 5   
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx 
CONSTANT 3.090*** 0.405  2.587*** 0.437  
BID -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 
TREAT -0.047 0.091 -0.013 -0.085 0.094 -0.023 
MALE -0.007 0.090 -0.002 0.002 0.092 0.001 
AGE 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
EDU 0.015 0.039 0.004 -0.002 0.040 -0.001 
INCOME -0.007 0.006 -0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 
HH_SIZE 0.055 0.035 0.015 0.044 0.036 0.012 
NONUSE 0.510*** 0.129 0.142 0.407*** 0.133 0.109 
PROTEST -0.463*** 0.062 -0.129 -0.447*** 0.064 -0.120 
MONEYATT -0.251*** 0.054 -0.070 -0.237*** 0.055 -0.064 
WARMGLOW    0.149*** 0.042 0.040 
SAVE    0.315*** 0.094 0.085 
Log-Likelihood -528.110   -502.763   
Pseudo R2 0.119   0.138   
N 1068   1051   
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
All in all, the results of the regression analysis support the two hypotheses concerning the effect 
of money spending dispositions on WTP: WTP is lower the more unwilling a person is to spend 
money in principle. In addition to that, money retention negatively affects the likelihood of stat-
ing a positive WTP. In the present CVM study, attitudes towards spending money in general, 
measured with the help of the modified money retention scale, is as a useful and highly signifi-
cant predictor for people’s answers to the WTP elicitation question. Unlike disposable household 
income, which has no significant effect on respondents’ answers to the referendum question as 
soon as some basic control variables are included into the regression models, the money attitude 
variable affects response behaviour in a consistent and robust way. 
 Finally, the third hypothesis regarding the average WTP of misers merits attention. Since the 
likelihood of agreeing with the referendum question decreases with an individual’s score on the 
money retention scale, it can be inferred that average WTP in the group of high-scorers is lower 
than in the group of low-scores. However, the question whether or not the WTP of people with 
high levels of money retention is zero cannot be answered at this stage. To test the third hypothe-
sis (H3), group-specific average WTP20 has been calculated. 
                                                 
20 Computing group-specific average WTP from DC-data poses some problems. Firstly, the number of observations 
per group is actually too low to obtain statistical efficient WTP estimates. Secondly, agreement with the referendum 
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 As reported in Table 6-16, mean WTP is the highest in the group of respondents with the low-
est scores on the money retention scale and the lowest in the group of respondents with the high-
est scores. This difference is statistically significant and also remains obvious when comparing 
group-specific average WTP as a share of group-specific average income. While those respond-
ents who disagreed with all six items of the money attitude inventory are willing to contribute 
approximately 1.4% of their monthly disposable household income, this figure shrinks to 0.9% 
for the group of respondents who agreed with the entire set of items. Average WTP of high-
scorers significantly differs from the sample’s average WTP, too. Respondents with money re-
tention scores of 4 and higher stated to pay 60 RMB less than an average respondent. Another 
conspicuous difference across the four groups is the proportion of zero bids. The share of re-
spondents with a zero WTP increases only slightly when comparing the group with the lowest 
money retention scores to the two groups with intermediate scores. However, there is a veritable 
jump in the proportion of zero WTP statements from the intermediate clusters to the group of the 
stingiest respondents. In this group, the share of zero bids amounts to 46.3%, which is almost 
twice as high as the share of zero bids in the overall sample. Nevertheless, the group’s average 
WTP of 41 RMB per month is positive and statistically different from zero. Hence, the third hy-
pothesis turns out to be wrong in the case of the data analysed here. In the present study, the 
WTP of misers is low but positive. 
 Furthermore, the argument that the WTP statements of misers is irresponsive to price (cf. sec-
tion 5.4.2) must be partly refuted. As can be inferred from the coefficients referring to the bid 
variable displayed in the first row of Table 6-16, the answers of all respondents, including the 
group of very stingy respondents, are affected by the bid level. The corresponding coefficient is 
negative and highly significant across all groups of respondents. In terms of its magnitude, the 
effect of the bid variable on WTP is even the highest in the group of misers. However, in line 
with initial expectations, it can be shown that this effect becomes insignificant when disregard-
ing the two lowest bids (10 and 25 RMB). Hence, as predicted, the answers of misers are unre-
lated to the ‘price’ of the environmental project whenever this price is significantly high. How-
ever, it cannot be excluded that stingy respondents who were assigned one of the higher bids (i.e. 
50 to 200 RMB) rejected the referendum question because they could not afford to pay rather 
than because of their distorted money attitudes. 
                                                                                                                                                             
question does not follow an optimal distribution in certain of the groups. For example, in the group of respondents 
with the highest money retention score, agreement with the lowest bid is too low and rejection of the highest bid is 
too high. The partly huge confidence intervals displayed in Table 6-16 reflect these issues. 
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Table 6-16: Money retention and average WTP  
Money retention score 1 to <2 2 to <3 3 to <4 4 to 5 Total sample 
N 221 471 255 121 1068 
β (coefficient of BID) -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
Mean WTP (in RMB) 163 109 74 41 101 
95% confidence interval1 [126; 249] [93; 127] [42; 100] [2; 68] [89; 114] 
WTP/INCOME 1.43% 1.10% 1.10% 0.85% 1.13% 
WTP=02 18.6% 21.4% 26.7% 46.3% 24.9% 
Notes: ***p≤0.01 
1 Calculated with the Krinsky and Robb procedure (cf. Haab and McConnell, 2002: 110-113)  
2 Share of respondents who ticked ‘No, my household does not tolerate any increase of its monthly expenditures in 
order to get the TEPP realized’ 
  
Taken together, it is still not clear whether the WTP statements of respondents with high scores 
on the money retention scale are a genuine expression of the utility change that these individuals 
would experience if the environmental project in question was realised. The fact that the WTP of 
misers is positive indicates that the majority of respondents in this group were willing to make a 
(hypothetical) trade-off between money and environmental quality, at least when asked whether 
they would tolerate to pay a relatively low amount of money (i.e. less than 50 RMB). Hence, the 
data analysed here provides little evidence that stingy people make lexicographic choices when 
answering the WTP elicitation question during a CVM interview. If the preference ordering of 
such people is not lexicographic but in line with neoclassical theory, the WTP statements of mi-
sers can be interpreted in the common way. This is to say that the significantly lower average 
WTP of misers reveals that this group of people would benefit less from more sustainable oasis 
management in the Tarim Basin than other Beijing citizens. The next section explores whether or 
not the latter interpretation makes sense. 
6.4.4 WTP statements of misers: A genuine expression of preferences? 
The results of the CVM survey conducted in Beijing show that money retention has a strong im-
pact on stated WTP. However, it is still an open question whether or not the presence of misers 
in the sample affects the validity of the overall WTP estimate. On the one hand, the low WTP of 
stingy respondents might reveal an ill-founded view and use of money which prevents these per-
sons from expressing the true value they attribute to the TEPP in monetary units. In this case, 
WTP would not be an expression of the utility increase accruing from this environmental project 
but would merely reflect the disutility of depleting one’s piggy bank. On the other hand, the 
group of respondents with high scores on the money retention scale may gain little or no utility 
from the TEPP, for example because these people do not believe in the project’s effectiveness or 
because they do not perceive its non-use values. Furthermore, it could be the case that high-
scores are simply more careful when it comes to spending, even in hypothetical situations. High-
scorers might be more likely to take into account their budget constraint than others and to think 
more deeply about the opportunity costs of their consumption choices. Naturally, preferring to 
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spend one’s financial resources for other purposes than contributing them to the TEPP is a valid 
reason for rejecting the referendum question. Accordingly, if it turns out that respondents with 
high money retention scores derive less utility from the environmental improvement than from 
other goods, which they could purchase with the same amount of money, their WTP statements 
represent unbiased welfare measures. To analyse which of the two explanations is more plausi-
ble, the present section explores the relationship between the money retention score and several 
debriefing questions. For this purpose, the relationship between money spending dispositions and 
a number of valid reasons for rejecting the payment question shall be analysed in a first step. 
Afterwards, more problematic variables will be explored.  
 Different variables that have been constructed based on respondents’ answers to questions 
regarding their motivation of voting in favour or against the TEPP have been regressed against 
the money attitude variable and several control variables. Table 6-17 shows the results of seven 
econometric models. MONEYATT is a predictor of merely two of the seven dependent variables 
under consideration, namely of the variable NODOUBT, which reflects the level of agreement 
with a debriefing statement regarding the project’s effectiveness (‘Environmental conditions in 
the Tarim area will improve through the TEPP’) and the dummy variable OPPCOST, which 
takes the value of 1 if a respondent has considered the opportunity costs of his or her choice and 
0 otherwise (‘Did you consider other things that you could buy for … RMB?’). Hence, people 
with higher money retention scores have more doubts about the effectiveness of the TEPP and 
are also more likely to think about the next best use of the amount of money they are asked to 
give up in exchange for the environmental improvement. As explained above, both motivations 
represent valid reasons for rejecting the payment question. However, questioning the effective-
ness of the TEPP may indicate protest against this environmental project and the related payment 
rather than serious doubts regarding the planned policy measures. A more careful weighing of 
the benefit of the environmental project against the costs of paying money for its implementation 
seems to be a more plausible reason why the WTP of misers is relatively low. Survey partici-
pants who think carefully about the consequences of their choice before answering the WTP elic-
itation question are, of course, highly desirable from the perspective of a CVM researcher and 
there is no reason for questioning the validity of the WTP statements of such respondents.  
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Table 6-17: Money retention and debriefing questions 
Dependent  
variable: 
OV1 AV1 BV1 EV1  NODOUBT2 AFFORD1 OPPCOST1 
Regression  
model: 
Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit 
Variables Coefficient  
(Standard error) 
CONSTANT -0.087 
(0.272) 
-0.284 
(0.268) 
-0.307 
(0.272) 
-0.168 
(0.268) 
4.645*** 
(0.207) 
0.357 
(0.268) 
-0.936 
(0.275) 
BID -0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
MALE 0.122 
(0.079) 
-0.045 
(0.078) 
-0.002 
(0.079) 
0.036 
(0.078) 
-0.039 
(0.060) 
0.104 
(0.078) 
0.139* 
(0.080) 
AGE -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
EDU 0.077** 
(0.034) 
0.063* 
(0.033) 
0.082** 
(0.034) 
0.070** 
(0.033) 
-0.106*** 
(0.026) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
0.022 
(0.034) 
INCOME 0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.055) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
HH_SIZE 0.020 
(0.029) 
0.056* 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.029 
(0.029) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
-0.025 
(0.025) 
0.056* 
(0.030) 
MONEYATT -0.061 
(0.061) 
-0.081* 
(0.047) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.034 
(0.047) 
-0.082** 
(0.036) 
-0.070 
(0.047) 
0.295*** 
(0.048) 
N 1070 1070 1070 1070 1066 1068 1070 
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
1 Dummy variable (1=yes, 0=no) 
2 Measured on a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
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At the same time, the money attitude variable has hardly any impact on the perception of the 
project’s long-distance benefits, i.e. its non-use values. There is no indication that misers are less 
likely to perceive the project’s option, bequest or existence value (OV: ‘Did you consider your 
chances of visiting the Tarim area some day in the future?’ BV: ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s 
positive effects for future generations?’ EV: ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects for 
plants and animals?’). However, people with high money retention scores are less likely to per-
ceive the altruistic value of the environmental project (AV: ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s posi-
tive effects on the living conditions of local people?’). The latter result fits the picture of a stere-
otypical miser drawn by psychotherapists, namely that of an egoistic self-focused person who 
does not care about his or her social environment. Moreover, the money attitude variable does 
not significantly affect the likelihood of considering one’s budget constraint before answering 
the payment question (AFFORD). It is to be noticed that only half of all respondents answered 
‘yes’ when asked ‘Did you consider whether your household can afford to pay higher taxes?’ and 
that the likelihood of agreement is unaffected by the bid level. This result reveals that many re-
spondents overlooked their budget constraint or perceived the randomly assigned bid amount as 
insignificant. It is, however, odd that the probability of considering one’s budget constraint is 
unrelated to a person’s score on the money retention scale. One explanation for this result would 
be that two opposing effects are at work. Some misers may have thought carefully about their 
household’s actual ability to pay; other misers may have followed their habit of refusing to spend 
money on anything without thinking of their household’s objective ability to pay. If this explana-
tion holds true, the effect of the money attitude variable on AFFORD will cancel out. 
 Apart from valid reasons for stating a low or zero WTP, the relationship between the money 
retention score and several motivations for rejecting the referendum question that pose issues in 
terms of the validity of the WTP data have been explored. In addition to the genuine reasons 
considered above, negative attitudes towards the payment scenario and the CVM interview as a 
whole are expected to explain why some respondents made low or zero WTP statements. In con-
trast to the reasons considered previously, the presence of respondents with such negative atti-
tudes may threaten the validity of the CVM survey (cf. the discussion on protesting in section 
2.3.2). In order to explore whether misers are particularly likely to share negative attitudes to-
wards the payment scenario and the CVM interview, a number of variables reflecting protest as 
well as some variables regarding a respondent’s behaviour during the interview have been re-
gressed against the money attitude variable, thereby controlling for the standard set of demo-
graphic variables and the bid level. The results of the corresponding OLS regression models are 
displayed in Table 6-18. Taken as a whole, it is quite impressive that the money attitude variable 
has, in contrast to all other factors included in these regression models, great explanatory power 
for all six dependent variables under consideration. 
 Respondents with higher money retention scores are more likely to agree with the three pro-
test statements included in the questionnaire. The money attitude variable has a significantly 
positive effect on the level of agreement with the statements ‘Poor households should not have to 
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pay for the TEPP’ (PROTEST1); ‘Not households, but central government alone should pay for 
the TEPP’ (PROTEST2); and ‘Taxes are already so high that increasing taxes is not a good way 
to finance the program’ (PROTEST3). The relationship between money spending dispositions 
and protest attitudes is little surprising. People who hate spending money in general plausibly 
also object to the idea of paying money for an environmental project. These results reveal that 
misers have, on average, a greater tendency to reject the key aspects of the payment scenario. 
Thus, more widespread protest in the group of misers is likely to be another reason for the rela-
tively low average WTP in this group.  
 Given psychoanalysts’ and psychotherapists’ observations that clients who suffer from some 
money-related pathology mostly dislike talking about issues involving money, it is expected that 
a CVM interview, especially disclosing one’s WTP for an environmental project, is a rather un-
pleasant experience for a miser. The data obtained from the set of questions filled in by the inter-
viewers regarding a respondent’s behaviour during the interview strengthens this concern. The 
results of the regression models displayed in Table 6-18 indicate that respondents with higher 
scores on the money retention scale took the interview less seriously (MOTIV1), that they got 
angry more often when asked whether their household would support the TEPP financially 
(MOTIV2) and that these respondents more frequently pretended that the environmental project 
was not of their business (MOTIV3). This finding is particularly perturbing in view of the validi-
ty of the WTP data. It appears questionable that the answers of respondents who reacted very 
negatively to the referendum question represent valid WTP statements. Taken together, the anal-
ysis of protest statements and respondents’ behaviour during the interview backs the hypothesis 
that misers are rather unpleasant respondents. As expected, the hypothetical payment question 
more often provoked negative reactions when the respondent was stingy. 
 In sum, there is mixed evidence regarding the question whether or not the WTP statements of 
extremely stingy respondents are biased. On the one hand, stinginess is related to several valid 
reasons for stating a low or zero WTP, most notably, a careful weighing of the environmental 
project’s benefits and the opportunity cost of supporting the project. In addition to that, the rela-
tively low WTP of high-scorers appears plausible because these respondents are also more scep-
tical about the effectiveness of the environmental project. On the other hand, respondents with a 
great inhibition against spending money are as likely as others to perceive the benefits accruing 
from the TEPP to the citizens of Beijing, which are mainly existence and bequest values, indicat-
ing that both groups of individuals would experience an increase in utility if this environmental 
project was implemented. However, stingy respondents are especially likely to hold protest be-
liefs and to behave awkwardly during the CVM interview. Given these mixed findings, it is hard 
to decide whether zero WTP statements made by respondents with extremely high scores on the 
money retention scale should remain in the sample when computing the overall social value of 
the environmental project. 
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Table 6-18: Money retention, protest and behaviour during the interview 
Dependent 
variable: 
PROTEST11 PROTEST21 PROTEST31 MOTIV12  MOTIV22 MOTIV32 
 Coefficient3 
(Standard error) 
Variables   
CONSTANT 3.181*** 
(0.268) 
3.393*** 
(0.237) 
3.151*** 
(0.234) 
4.267*** 
(0.159) 
0.878*** 
(0.184) 
1.437*** 
(0.206) 
BID 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
MALE 0.006 
(0.078) 
-0.113 
(0.069) 
0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.031 
(0.046) 
0.001 
(0.054) 
-0.034 
(0.060) 
AGE 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
EDU 0.047 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
0.108*** 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.020) 
0.049** 
(0.023) 
-0.019 
(0.026) 
INCOME 0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
HH_SIZE -0.025 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
MONEYATT 0.105** 
(0.047) 
0.151*** 
(0.041) 
0.072* 
(0.041) 
-0.081*** 
(0.028) 
0.142*** 
(0.032) 
0.216*** 
(0.036) 
N 1070 1070 1070 1064 1064 1064 
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
1 Measured on a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
2 Measured on a five-point Likert scale (1=completely wrong, 5=completely true) 
3 Coefficients and standard errors of OLS regression models 
 
6.4.5 Discarding miser zeroes 
In the last section the relationship between money attitudes and attitudes towards the environ-
mental project and the related payment has been explored. Even though the survey results indi-
cate that respondents with high scores on the retention scale have reported partly valid reasons 
for stating a zero WTP, it also turned out that the answers to the elicitation question in the group 
of misers should be handled with some care. Despite having broadly identical impressions of the 
environmental project, misers are more likely to hold protest beliefs and get het up over the 
payment question than other respondents. Hence, the proportion of biased WTP statements, i.e. 
answers to the elicitation question which do not reflect the utility increase a respondent expects 
to experience through the environmental improvement in question, is likely to be higher among 
misers than among other respondents. Thus, it may be recommendable to exclude the answers of 
misers when estimating the sample’s average WTP and analysing its determinants. However, 
excluding the answers of a particular group of respondents from the WTP data often affects the 
 
188 
representativeness of the sample and inevitably comes at the cost of reducing the sample size. In 
view of these issues discarding potentially biased WTP statements, like meaningless zeroes or 
implausibly high bids, is not very common in CVM research. However, in the following a ‘dis-
carding experiment’ shall be performed; the potentially biased zero bids of respondents with ex-
tremely high scores on the money retention scale will be dropped from the sample. Average 
WTP, its determinants as well as the sample’s representativeness will be assessed and analysed 
anew. 
 As argued in chapter 5, the existence of misers in a CVM sample as such does not necessarily 
threaten the validity of the survey result. Miserliness only poses problems in the case that re-
spondents who hate spending money in general refuse to pay anything on the hypothetical mar-
ket, even though obtaining the environmental good that is ‘sold’ on this market would increase 
their utility. Therefore, potentially biased responses are zero bids stated by stingy respondents. In 
contrast to that, positive WTP statements made by misers pose fewer issues because they reveal 
that these stingy individuals are generally willing to make a trade-off between money and envi-
ronmental quality. Following this logic, the remainder of this section focuses on discarding the 
zero WTP statements of misers.  
 In the sample there are 56 respondents with an extremely high score on the money retention 
scale who stated a zero WTP, i.e. who selected ‘No, my household does not tolerate any increase 
of its monthly expenditures in order to get the TEPP realised’ when answering the referendum 
question. Naturally, the definition of ‘extremely high’ is very subjective and involves the some-
what random selection of a cut-off point. A certain score on the money attitude scale needs to be 
chosen in order to divide the sample into a group of misers and a group of respondents with un-
objectionable money attitudes. In the following application, respondents with a score of 4 and 
higher on the 5-point Likert scale, i.e. respondents who, on average, agreed with all six state-
ments of the modified retention scale, are counted as misers. After having discarded 56 misers 
from the sample (= 5.2% of the sample), the sample size shrinks to 1,014 observations and 1,012 
valid WTP statements. The characteristics of the discarded and the remaining data are summa-
rised in Table 6-19. A first thing to be noted is that the respondents whose answers have been 
deleted from the sample make up a group of apparently disadvantaged citizens. They are mostly 
female, older than the individuals in the adjusted sample, only a few have enjoyed higher educa-
tion and their monthly disposable income amounts to only 4,142 RMB, which is less than half of 
the income of the remaining respondents. Once again, it must be doubted that a high score on the 
modified retention scale unambiguously indicates miserliness. It may, to at least some extent, 
reflect a respondent’s disadvantaged position in society. 
 Regarding the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the adjusted sample, none of 
the key variables (GENDER, AGE, EDUCATION, HH_SIZE and INCOME) is, as indicated by 
the results of a means comparison test, significantly affected by the discarding procedure. Thus, 
the representativeness of the sample is not immediately affected by the selection process.     
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Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the adjusted data does not account for the prefer-
ences of some of the particularly disadvantaged members of Beijing’s urban population. 
Table 6-19: Sample characteristics subsequent to data cleansing 
Variable Full sample 
(N=1070) 
Discarded observa-
tions (N=56) 
Adjusted sample 
(N=1014) 
T-test of equal 
means across 
samples 
 mean 
(std. deviation) 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
p-value 
Bid level 89.014 
(68.546) 
95.892 
(66.845) 
88.634 
(86.650) 
0.828 
Male 0.519 
(0.500) 
0.411* 
(0.496) 
0.525 
(0.500) 
0.672 
Age 38.920 
(14.707) 
46.089*** 
(12.651) 
38.525 
(14.717) 
0.328 
Higher education 0.410 
(0.492) 
0.125*** 
(0.334) 
0.426 
(0.495) 
0.302 
Household size 2.912 
(1.404) 
3.179 
(1.130) 
2.898 
(1.416) 
0.743 
Monthly disposable 
household income (in 
1,000 RMB) 
8.871 
(8.315) 
4.142*** 
(2.949) 
9.133 
(8.415) 
0.347 
Notes: Mean significantly different from mean in the adjusted sample at *99%, **95%, ***90% significance level 
 
Running the univariate regression model presented in section 6.3.2 (cf. Table 6-6) for the adjust-
ed sample yields a slightly higher WTP estimate than previously. Mean WTP now amounts to 
112 (95% confidence interval: [100; 125]) RMB per month, which does not significantly differ 
from the original value of 102 RMB. Thus, deleting potentially biased zero WTP statements 
from the sample does not markedly affect Beijing households’ average WTP for the restoration 
of the natural environment along the Tarim River. It should be noted, however, that working 
with the higher WTP estimate derived from the adjusted sample makes a huge difference when 
computing the overall value of the environmental project for the entire megacity. Multiplying the 
WTP estimate by the total number of registered households in urban Beijing (2.8 million house-
holds, cf. section 6.2.1) yields an overall value of 183.6 million RMB for the entire sample and 
of 201.6 million RMB for the adjusted, ‘miser-free’ sample.  
 Furthermore, it is interesting to explore whether discarding the potentially biased answers 
given by misers affects the construct validity of the survey. Regarding the determinants of WTP, 
it might be the case that the magnitude and the significance level of some of the effects, which 
are typically viewed as indicators for construct validity, have changed. For example, it can be 
speculated that the income effect, which lacked significance previously, becomes observable 
when discarding respondents whose WTP is suspected to be neither related to their incomes nor 
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to the environmental project in question. Therefore, the basic regression model presented in sec-
tion 6.3.2 (cf. Table 6-7) has been run again using the adjusted data set. However, as can be seen 
from Table 6-20, the determinants of WTP remain broadly the same in the adjusted sample as in 
the full sample. In line with the results of the initial regression model, the bid (BID), the treat-
ment variable (TREAT), a respondent’s gender (MALE), education (EDU), the consideration of 
nonuse values (NONUSE) and protest against the payment scenario (PROTEST) are significant 
predictors of WTP. Moreover, unlike before, a respondent’s age (AGE) now has a significant 
effect on WTP. The new regression model suggests that older respondents have a higher WTP 
than younger respondents, possibly because awareness of the environmental and social problems 
in the Tarim Basin is more widespread among the older generations in Beijing. This plausible 
effect had not been observable when using the full sample, possibly because of the presence of 
many stingy elderly respondents. Nevertheless, there is still no observable income effect. Thus, 
there is no clear evidence that the validity of the WTP data has increased after having discarded 
the zero WTP statements of misers from the sample. The fit of the regression model, as indicated 
by the pseudo R2, however, slightly increases when using the adjusted sample (+0.005). 
Table 6-20: Determinants of WTP (adjusted sample) 
Dependent variable: WTP1 Model 6  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
CONSTANT 1.039*** 0.320 
BID -0.007*** 0.001 
TREAT 0.257*** 0.088 
MALE 0.171** 0.086 
AGE 0.007** 0.003 
EDU 0.064* 0.036 
INCOME 0.003 0.006 
HH_SIZE 0.049 0.032 
NONUSE 0.492*** 0.124 
PROTEST -0.351*** 0.054 
Log-Likelihood -580.993  
Pseudo R2 0.163  
N 1012  
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
 
Taken together, discarding the potentially biased WTP statements from the sample hardly makes 
a difference in the present study. Neither average WTP nor its determinants substantially change. 
The finding that the sample’s demographic characteristics remain broadly the same subsequent 
to the removal of presumably invalid observations shows that adjusting the CVM data does not 
pose issues in terms of the sample’s representativeness either. Naturally, this finding is likely to 
be specific to the present study where the number of misers who stated a zero WTP is, based on 
the classification rule employed, relatively small. 
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6.5 Implications and recommendations 
In this chapter the role of money attitudes in CVM surveys has been analysed empirically. Using 
econometric techniques it has been shown that individual dispositions to spend money in princi-
ple have a statistically significant effect on WTP statements. In the present study, WTP decreas-
es the more unwilling a person is to spend money in general. Furthermore, the likelihood of stat-
ing a positive WTP is also negatively affected by a person’s tendency to retain his or her money. 
Respondents with an extremely high score on the money retention scale (approximately 11% of 
the sample) answered the payment question in a different manner than expected; their average 
WTP amounts to 41 RMB per month and is significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, the 
WTP of people with lower scores, and hence more ordinary attitudes towards spending money, is 
almost three times higher. It is astonishing to see how robust the effect of the money attitude 
variable is in the present study. Unlike a respondent’s disposable income, which has hardly any 
observable effect on WTP, money spending dispositions affect the answers to the payment ques-
tion in a consistent way, even when controlling for several demographic and attitudinal factors 
which could be expected to confound, mediate or dominate this effect. 
 The data provides little evidence that people with high money retention scores use a lexico-
graphic decision rule when answering the payment question. In the present study, even extremely 
stingy people played the game in the sense of making hypothetical trade-offs between money 
and environmental quality. Thus, the existence of misers within the sample does not immediately 
threaten the validity of the WTP estimate. Still, it was found that misers were more likely to 
share a number of characteristics which are rather undesirable from a CVM practitioner’s      
perspective. For example, the money attitude variable, which has been used as an indicator for 
miserliness, is systematically related to protest beliefs. At the same time, this variable is essen-
tially unrelated to a person’s attitudes towards the environmental project in question. For in-
stance, the perception of non-use values accruing from more sustainable oasis management in 
the Tarim Basin is broadly unaffected by respondents’ levels of money retention. Thus, the low 
average WTP of misers cannot exclusively be explained by the possibility that this particular 
group of people would benefit less from the prospective environmental improvement than others. 
Rather than being the result of different levels of appreciation of the environmental good in ques-
tion, the substantial gap between the WTP of ordinary respondents on the one hand, and the 
WTP of misers on the other, seems to relate to the agglomeration of undesirable forms of behav-
iour and attitudes in the latter group of respondents. Negative reactions to the payment question, 
objection against several aspects of the payments scenario and indifference about the valuation 
task turned out to be systematically related to higher scores on the money retention scale. 
 Given these findings researchers may think of discarding the possibly biased WTP statements 
of misers from the data. As exemplarily shown at the end of section 6.4, deleting the zero bids of 
misers has practically no consequences for the results of the CVM survey considered here. In 
view of its insignificant effect on the sample’s average WTP and the determinants of WTP, de-
leting or maintaining the possibly biased observations hardly makes a difference. However, even 
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though it does not significantly affect the sample’s representativeness, the data cleansing implies 
that the preferences of some of the most disadvantaged members of Beijing’s urban population 
would be neglected when evaluating the long-distance benefit of more sustainable water man-
agement in the Tarim Basin. This is because the group of high-scorers who stated a zero WTP 
consists of mainly poor elderly respondents with relatively low levels of education. In view of 
their socio-demographic characteristics, especially their low incomes, it must be doubted that 
these people rejected the payment question exclusively for the sake of miserliness. Possibly, 
most of them were simply too poor to express their preferences for the environmental good in 
terms of money. Hence, discarding the WTP statements of respondents with a high score on the 
retention scale is not recommendable in the case of the present study. 
 Naturally, the present application has some limitations so that the results regarding the role of 
money attitudes in CVM surveys cannot be generalised very easily. First of all, the sample is not 
random. Therefore, some of the reported results, like the estimators derived from the economet-
ric models, may be biased. Secondly, respondents were interviewed in public; their answers 
might be influenced by several factors such as road noise or other people’s comments. Further-
more, the absence of a significant income effect on people’s agreement with the referendum 
question is somewhat disturbing – not only in view of the validity of the WTP estimate but also 
in relation to the effect of the money attitude variable. The robustness of the effect of the reten-
tion variable on WTP might be partly due to the absence of a significant income effect; and the 
lacking income effect, in return, could be the consequence of a measurement error inherent to the 
income variable. 
 However, given the explanatory power of money spending dispositions for the results of the 
CVM survey considered here, future studies should consider this psychological variable as well. 
For this purpose, a suitable inventory needs to be integrated into the CVM questionnaire. As 
shown in this chapter, six short statements are largely sufficient to assess a respondent’s disposi-
tion to spend money in general. In view of the high correlation between several of the statements 
used in the present study, even a lower number of items are likely to yield a valid measure. As 
shown in the appendix, using a shortened variant of the money attitude variable yields broadly 
the same results as those presented in the present chapter. The modified version of Furnham’s 
(1984) retention-subscale yielded satisfactory results in the present study but this measure defi-
nitely needs further refinement. One of the main drawbacks is the surprisingly strong correlation 
of the money retention scores with several demographic variables, especially with disposable 
household income. The latter correlation makes the interpretation of high scores on the money 
retention scale difficult. A high score may point to miserliness but also to poverty. It might also 
be useful to ask the set of money attitude questions at the very beginning of an interview, i.e. 
even before assessing a respondent’s WTP. This is because the group of respondents who is par-
ticularly likely to hold negative attitudes towards spending money, namely elderly and less edu-
cated people, is also more likely to break off the interview subsequent to the WTP elicitation 
question. In addition to paying attention to adequately measuring the money attitude facet of 
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interest, it appears to be of particular importance to correctly account for the socio-demographic 
factors which immediately relate to this variable. Especially a respondent’s financial resources 
should be carefully assessed, if possible not only by a single question regarding a respondent’s 
disposable household income but also by assessing alternative measures such as a person’s 
monthly salary and total wealth. 
 To summarise, this chapter provides new insight into the effect of respondents’ attitudes to-
wards spending money on stated WTP. Money retention, measured by means of a six-item in-
ventory adapted from social psychology, proved to be a useful predictor for stated WTP. The 
study finds some evidence that the WTP statements of extremely stingy respondents may be bi-
ased but there are also several indicators of the inexistence of such distortions. Hence, rather than 
being a source of bias, attitudes towards spending money appear to be respondent characteristics 
which plausibly affect the results of CVM surveys and contribute to a better understanding of the 
driving factors of people’s answers to hypothetical payment questions. 
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7 Summary and conclusion 
This study made a first attempt to scrutinise the role of money attitudes in survey-based envi-
ronmental valuation studies. It provided a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of 
the impact of respondents’ money attitudes on the results of contingent valuation surveys. It 
mainly focussed on one particular money attitude facet, namely individuals’ dispositions to 
spend money in general. 
 While money attitudes have been extensively explored in psychological literature, economic 
research on this topic is extremely rare. In view of the role money plays in the traditional 
branches of economics – a medium of exchange which individuals desire exclusively for the 
purpose of spending it for present or future consumption – it comes as little surprise that money 
attitudes have never been investigated in the context of environmental valuation studies. Even 
though it appears quite plausible that respondents’ attitudes towards spending money influence 
their answers to payment questions, no existing stated preference study has tested for this rela-
tionship. The present study therefore addressed the impact of money attitudes on WTP state-
ments theoretically in a first place, thereby reviewing, comparing and integrating the economic 
and the psychological approaches to analyse people’s behaviour with money. Researchers from 
both disciplines have pointed to the existence of misers in society, i.e. people who enjoy accu-
mulating money and hate spending it for anything in any situation. While economists usually 
disregard this phenomenon when analysing spending decisions, psychoanalysts and social psy-
chologists have made efforts to identify, explain and treat this neurotic money attitude. The 
comprehensive review of the psychological literature on people’s behaviour with money showed 
that the existence of misers in the general population may raise issues in survey-based environ-
mental valuation studies. Misers were suspected to reject the valuation task, which is the key 
element of any environmental valuation survey, because of their somewhat impalpable desire to 
accumulate money. Their WTP was hypothesised to be completely unrelated to the environmen-
tal improvement in question and a pure expression of their distorted money attitudes. Besides the 
potentially biasing effect of miserliness on the results of stated preference surveys, it was ex-
pected that people’s dispositions to spend money in general affect their WTP for environmental 
improvements, at least in the case of realistic and consequential surveys. The stingier a person is 
the lower his or her WTP will be, according to the hypothesis. For these reasons measuring atti-
tudes towards spending money in CVM surveys and testing their impact on WTP statements 
appeared to be of great relevance. The empirical part of this study therefore provided a compre-
hensive analysis of the impact of respondents’ attitudes towards spending money on their an-
swers to the payment question asked during a CVM interview. 
 The introductory chapter exposed the motivation for a study on contingent valuation and 
money attitudes. Chapter 2 provided a more detailed introduction to environmental valuation in 
general and to contingent valuation, a methodology which makes use of extensive interviews 
during which respondents are directly asked to state their WTP for a specific environmental   
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improvement, in particular. The chapter illustrated the theoretical foundations as well as more 
practical aspects of CVM research. As a survey-based method, CVM is prone to a lot of criti-
cism. However, the factors which threaten the validity of WTP statements have been extensively 
studied and are nowadays relatively well understood. Among other things, CVM practitioners 
identified a number of problems related to assessing the value people attach to environmental 
changes in terms of money. These problems include some people’s refusal to make trade-offs 
between environmental quality and money. Hence, former studies dealt with similar distorting 
effects as the one considered in this dissertation. However, certain individuals’ strong inhibition 
against spending money in general has never been discussed as a potential source of bias in stat-
ed preference studies. The chapter closed with an introduction of participatory approaches which 
are helpful to reduce sources of bias when preparing a CVM survey and to develop and interpret 
survey questions aimed to identify biased responses, such as the WTP statements of misers. 
 In view of the multidisciplinary nature of this dissertation, the following two chapters provid-
ed an overview of the economic and the psychological approach to analyse people’s behaviour 
with money. Chapter 3 explored the role of money in economics. As illustrated by the medium 
of exchange theory presented in the first section, the primary role of money in economic theory 
consists of facilitating the exchange of goods and services. From this perspective, rational indi-
viduals never desire money for its own sake but only for the things they can buy with it. This so-
called neutrality postulate shapes both the micro- and the macroeconomic branch of the disci-
pline. The second section showed that the economic analysis of consumer choice is based on the 
assumption that an individual’s utility is determined only by the level of consumption and not by 
the amount of money held in, for example, a savings account. Likewise, macroeconomists pre-
dict the effects of monetary policy based on the assumption that holding money serves one single 
purpose, namely spending it in the future. Since money is mainly analysed as a medium of ex-
change in economics, it is hardly surprising that money attitudes, especially those that may chal-
lenge the neutrality postulate, play no major role in economic literature. However, some behav-
ioural economists proposed alternative approaches to analyse people’s behaviour with money. In 
the 1960s Schmölders’ (1982) already highlighted the importance of accounting for individual 
differences in money spending dispositions when analysing people’s consumption and saving 
behaviour. More recently, a group of behavioural economists pointed anew to the existence of 
‘tightwads’, i.e. people who perceive the act of spending money as very painful (Prelec and 
Loewenstein, 1998, Rick et al., 2008, Rick, 2013). Experiments and surveys demonstrated that 
tightwads spend systematically less money than others, indicating that a so-called pain of paying 
drives people’s behaviour with money.  
 Chapter 4 reviewed the psychological literature on money. Although there is far less system-
atic research on money in psychology than in economics, some interesting studies on people’s 
money-related habits and emotions were identified. Analysing people’s attitudes towards money 
has a relatively long tradition in psychoanalytical literature. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century psychoanalysts like Freud ([1908] 1976) and Ferenczi ([1914] 1976) already published 
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articles on money-related pathologies, like hoarding and neurotic overspending. In addition to 
describing and explaining such money pathologies, clinicians developed typologies and ques-
tionnaires in an attempt to identify and classify their clients’ money-related problems. As ex-
plained in the second part of the chapter, psychoanalytical theories and typologies triggered and 
influenced the analysis of money-related attitudes in a broader context than the clinical context. 
Starting in the 1980s, social psychologists developed instruments to measure different facets of 
money attitudes and conducted empirical studies to analyse the distribution and the determinants 
of these facets in society. Most of the existing instruments explicitly account for so-called money 
retention. They contain sets of items describing the habits of misers and ask respondents to indi-
cate their agreement with these items on Likert scales. 
 Chapter 5 put the concept of money attitudes into the environmental valuation context. The 
most prominent attitude facets discussed in the psychological literature on money were analysed 
with respect to their possible influence on people’s spending decisions and their potentially dis-
torting effect on WTP for environmental improvements. Based on this analysis, only miserliness 
could be suspected to systematically affect and possibly bias WTP. Afterwards, two approaches 
of modelling the behaviour of misers when ‘purchasing’ an environmental good were proposed. 
The first approach integrated money, as a desirable good, into the standard neoclassical utility 
function. The second approach employed the less commonly used concept of lexicographic pref-
erences, thereby treating money as the primarily desired good. Both approaches yield similar 
predictions regarding the magnitude of a miser’s WTP but have different consequences for the 
validity of WTP. Both models anticipate that misers have an extremely low or zero WTP for 
environmental goods. However, only lexicographic choices, in the sense that misers systemati-
cally prefer the status quo situation to the environmental project and the related payment, thereby 
ignoring the characteristics and magnitude of the environmental improvement in question, chal-
lenge the validity of WTP. If stingy respondents indeed applied lexicographic decision rules, a 
miser’s zero WTP would be unrelated to the environmental improvement in question and thus 
meaningless. Naturally, this potential source of bias only merits attention if the share of misers in 
a society is sufficiently large. To gain more insights into the distribution of misers in the general 
population, dozens of empirical studies on money spending dispositions published during the last 
three decades were considered. Still, this literature review provided no definite answer regarding 
the actual relevance of miserliness. However, it backed the hypothesis that money retention mat-
ters for people’s actual behaviour with money. Given the results of former empirical studies on 
related topics, it was concluded that this money attitude facet probably also affects people’s stat-
ed WTP for environmental projects. The chapter closed with a presentation of several research 
questions and hypotheses to be tested in a representative CVM survey. 
 The role of attitudes towards spending money was finally analysed empirically in a CVM 
survey conducted in China in 2013. Chapter 6 analysed the results of 1,070 intercept interviews, 
which were based on a standardised questionnaire containing an adjusted version of Furnham’s 
(1984) money retention scale. The original question inventory had to be modified slightly and 
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translated from English into Mandarin Chinese. Participatory approaches and several rounds of 
pretests contributed to the gradual improvement of a Chinese six-item variant of the money re-
tention scale. The modified retention scale showed good levels of internal consistency and the 
corresponding variable proved to be logically related to several money-related habits assessed in 
the survey. While the latter result pointed to the scale’s validity, there were also a number of 
unexpected, partly distorting relationships between the attitudinal variable and certain socio-
demographic variables, including significant negative correlations with income and education 
levels. The finding that high levels of money retention were particularly widespread among eco-
nomically disadvantaged people raised issues in terms of the interpretation of the money attitude 
variable. It appeared quite possible that high scores on the retention scale did not only indicate 
strong inhibitions against spending money as a consequence of miserliness but reflected also 
some respondents’ very tight budget constraints. In view of this weakness the importance of con-
trolling for respondents’ socio-economic characteristics when testing the effect of the money 
attitude variable on WTP by means of regression analysis was stressed. The multivariate regres-
sion models provided evidence for most of the theoretical predictions regarding the relationship 
of money retention and respondents’ answers to the hypothetical payment question. Higher lev-
els of money retention went along with lower WTP amounts. Furthermore, higher levels of mon-
ey retention increased the probability that respondents stated a zero WTP. Nevertheless, the 
study provided no evidence that respondents with extremely high levels of money retention state, 
on average, a zero WTP. Even though the proportion of zero WTP was by far the largest in the 
group of high-scorers, mean WTP in this group was significantly different from zero. In view of 
this result, there was prima facie no evidence that misers used lexicographic decision rules when 
answering the payment question and hence no evidence of a lack of construct validity. However, 
the WTP statements of high-scorers raised other issues. Stingy respondents were more likely to 
hold protest beliefs against some aspects of the payment scenario. Furthermore, the interviewers 
reported that higher levels of money retention increased the likelihood that respondents were 
infuriated when asked about their WTP, that they did not take the payment question seriously 
and pretended that answering this question was none of their business. However, the survey re-
sults did not indicate that stingy respondents would benefit less from the environmental im-
provement in question than others. Hence, the comparatively low WTP in the group of respond-
ents with high scores on the retention scale did not seem to reflect minor expected utility gains 
from the environmental project to be valued. Instead, low WTP in this group appeared to be 
mainly a result of strong inhibitions against spending money in general, which in return induced 
more widespread protest beliefs and anger over the payment question. The empirical application 
closed with suggestions and an exemplary demonstration regarding the treatment of respondents 
with extremely high scores on the money retention scale when analysing the survey data. 
 In brief, this study identified attitudes towards spending money as a key determinant of stated 
WTP. However, it found mixed evidence regarding the question whether or not the WTP state-
ments of extremely stingy respondents are biased. Since the present study makes use of the    
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results of one single CVM survey, these results cannot be generalised easily. Furthermore, the 
empirical application has several limitations, most importantly the weaknesses of the instrument 
used to measure money retention. The correlation of the money attitude with respondents’ dis-
posable household income and education level poses problems. Given these correlations, it can-
not be ruled out that in the present study, high scores on this variable reflect money retention due 
to a low income rather than pure miserliness. An unambiguous distinction between misers, who 
hate spending money, on the one hand and poor people, who are not able to spend money be-
cause of their tight budgets, on the other is, however, crucial. While a low income is typically 
considered a legitimate reason for stating a zero WTP (see Bateman et al., 2002: 146), miserli-
ness may cause bias. Future research should concentrate on refining the money retention scale or 
on developing a more suitable instrument to measure miserliness. This instrument could then be 
used to test whether or not the effect of the money attitude variable on stated WTP discovered in 
the present study can be reproduced in other applications. It would be interesting to see if similar 
relationships between money spending dispositions and WTP exist in CVM surveys on other 
kinds of environmental improvements carried out in different socio-cultural contexts than the 
Chinese one. 
 Moreover, it appears promising to assess the effect of money spending dispositions on WTP 
by means of alternative elicitation formats. The present study employed a variant of the referen-
dum format, namely ‘trichotomous choice’ (Loomis et al., 1999). This format allows for an iden-
tification of zero WTP statements but gives only limited information regarding the distribution of 
positive WTP statements. Group-specific average WTP, like average WTP of stingy respond-
ents, can be estimated econometrically. However, the precise WTP of the individual group 
members remains unknown. Alternative payment formats, like the payment card, provide more 
insights into the magnitude of individual WTP statements. The hypothesis that misers state a 
zero or insignificantly low WTP should be tested anew by means of a payment card which con-
tains a zero answer option and intervals accounting for extremely low WTP amounts. If the pre-
dictions developed in the present study hold true, misers will always choose one of the lowest 
amounts from the payment card. 
 In addition to their role in CVM surveys, individual differences in money spending disposi-
tions are likely to also affect the results of studies that make use of other environmental valuation 
techniques. It is expected that the relationship between money retention and WTP is also observ-
able in simulated market experiments involving actual transactions and in surveys employing 
other stated preference techniques. It would be interesting to compare the effect of the money 
attitude variable on stated WTP to its effect on real payments in simulated market experiments. It 
is likely that more misers would refuse to make trade-offs between money and environmental 
quality in an experimental setting where they are asked to actually spend money, as compared to 
the purely hypothetical situation of a CVM interview. Moreover, the existence of misers among 
the participants of a choice experiment might pose similar problems as in CVM surveys. Pre-
sumably, misers always choose the status quo option, which implies no increase in expenditures, 
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when presented a choice set. Like misers’ zero WTP statements in CVM surveys, such choices 
are meaningless from the analyst’s perspective if they do not reveal the utility increase misers 
expect to experience from the different policy options displayed on a choice set. Lexicographic 
decision rules – the concept used in this dissertation to theoretically represent the behaviour of 
extremely stingy respondents when given the possibility to ‘purchase’ an environmental good – 
have been extensively discussed in the context of choice modelling (e.g. Jedidi and Kohli, 2008, 
Sælensminde, 2006, Yoo and Ready, 2014). Several studies reported that many respondents con-
sistently choose the policy option that is best with respect to one particular attribute, like the 
lowest expenditure increase, thereby ignoring the remaining attributes (attribute non-attendance, 
see e.g. Hensher et al., 2012). Lexicographic decision rules seem to simplify the choice task re-
spondents have to perform in stated preference interviews and certain respondent characteristics 
have proved to explain such choice behaviour (cf. Rosenberger et al., 2003). High levels of mon-
ey retention may be another so far overlooked explanation for attribute non-attendance in choice 
experiments and should therefore be analysed in this context. 
 Finally, besides money retention, other money attitude facets may also affect stated WTP for 
environmental improvements. A future study could address, for instance, individual differences 
in the importance attached to saving for future needs as well as the habit of boasting about one’s 
income and wealth, i.e. the foresight-dimension and the power-dimension of the established 
money attitude inventories. In the present study only the effect of retention, which has been iden-
tified as the money attitude facet with the most obvious and most problematic relationship to 
WTP, has been assessed empirically. As explained in chapter 5 neither high scores on the fore-
sight facet nor on the power facet are likely to distort the results of an environmental valuation 
study. However, it cannot be ruled out that power and foresight also have an impact on stated 
WTP. For example, greater concern for future financial security may go along with more con-
cern for prospective environmental quality and hence higher WTP for public projects with pro-
spective environmental impacts. Likewise, respondents who like boasting about their financial 
resources may state higher WTP than modest respondents, possibly because they want to impress 
the interviewer or because they stick to their habit of overspending. 
 In conclusion, this study provides a starting point for analysing money attitudes in the context 
of CVM surveys. It links different scientific approaches of analysing people’s behaviour with 
money. The empirical application shows that accounting for individual differences in money 
spending dispositions in CVM surveys is relatively simple. Integrating a short question inventory 
into the CVM questionnaire suffices to construct a variable with substantial explanatory power 
for stated WTP. However, the present study also demonstrates very clearly that the correspond-
ing items need to be carefully designed. Future research on accurately accounting for money 
spending dispositions and the extreme case of miserliness in survey-based environmental valua-
tion studies is therefore needed.  
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Table 8-1: Money attitude structure from principal component factor analysis (shortened inventory) 
Items 
Agreement1 
(%) 
Mean Std. dev. 
Factor load-
ing 
Q3 I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or 
not. 
19.4 2.419 1.187 0.708 
Q4 Even when I have enough money I often feel 
guilty if I spend money… 
26.5 2.594 1.278 0.765 
Q6 Money should be saved not spent. 
 
24.2 2.625 1.125 0.747 
Average score2 11.03 2.707 0.923  
Cronbach’s alpha 0.588    
1 Proportion of respondents who ticked ‘(4) predominantly true’ or ‘(5) completely true’ on the Likert Scale 
2 The average score generally equals the sum of item-specific scores divided by the total number of answered items. 
If the answer to one single item was missing, the average score was calculated based on the two remaining items. 
3 Share of respondents with an average score ≥4 
 
Table 8-2: Determinants of the money attitude score (shortened inventory) 
Dependent variable: 
MONEYATT2 
OLS regression coeffi-
cient 
Standard error 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient 
CONSTANT 3.453*** 0.139  
MALE -0.059 0.052 -0.064** 
AGE 0.004** 0.002 0.143*** 
EDU -0.182*** 0.021 -0.331*** 
INCOME -0.015*** 0.003 -0.228*** 
HH_SIZE 0.028 0.019 0.049 
 R2=0.128   
 N=1102   
Note: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
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Table 8-3: Money retention and WTP (sensitivity analysis) 
Dependent variable: 
WTP1 
 
Model 6   Model 7   
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx 
CONSTANT 1.693*** 0.351  1.008*** 0.384  
BID -0.007*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.002 
TREAT 0.184** 0.085 0.060 0.153* 0.088 0.049 
MALE 0.168** 0.084 0.055 0.177** 0.085 0.056 
AGE 0.005* 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 
EDU 0.050 0.036 0.016 0.051 0.037 0.016 
INCOME 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.001 
HH_SIZE 0.042 0.031 0.014 0.034 0.032 0.011 
NONUSE 0.485*** 0.120 0.158 0.390*** 0.124 0.124 
PROTEST -0.366*** 0.053 -0.119 -0.333*** 0.054 -0.106 
MONEYATT2 -0.188*** 0.049 -0.061 -0.183*** 0.050 -0.058 
WARMGLOW    0.186*** 0.040 0.059 
SAVE    0.085 0.089 0.027 
Log-Likelihood -614.403   -591.332   
Pseudo R2 0.169   0.186   
N 1069   1051   
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
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Table 8-4: Money retention and zero bids (sensitivity analysis) 
Dependent variable: 
WTP2 
 
Model 8   Model 9   
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dy/dx 
CONSTANT 2.955*** 0.396  2.464*** 0.428  
BID -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 
TREAT -0.054 0.091 -0.015 -0.090 0.094 -0.024 
MALE 0.002 0.089 0.000 0.010 0.092 0.003 
AGE 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 
EDU 0.028 0.039 0.008 0.007 0.040 0.002 
INCOME -0.005 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 0.006 -0.002 
HH_SIZE 0.049 0.034 0.014 0.040 0.036 0.011 
NONUSE 0.516*** 0.128 0.144 0.409*** 0.133 0.110 
PROTEST -0.461*** 0.061 -0.129 -0.441*** 0.064 -0.119 
MONEYATT2 -0.220*** 0.051 -0.061 -0.215**** 0.053 -0.058 
WARMGLOW    0.150*** 0.042 0.040 
SAVE    0.329*** 0.094 0.089 
Log-Likelihood -530.111   -503.791   
Pseudo R2 0.116   0.137   
N 1069   1051   
Notes: *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01 
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8.2 CVM Questionnaire 
The empirical part of this dissertation makes use of data gathered by means of an intercept CVM 
survey in Beijing in 2013. This survey was part of the Sino-German research project SuMaRiO 
(BMBF-Funding Measure ‘Sustainable Land Management’, LLA2-02). A standardised ques-
tionnaire was used to assess Beijing citizens’ WTP for more sustainable oasis management in the 
Tarim Basin. This questionnaire had been jointly developed by the project leaders Michael Ahl-
heim and Oliver Frör, in cooperation with the project assistant Sonna Pelz and the Chinese coun-
terparts Jiang Tong and Luo Jing. The following is a short version of the full questionnaire. 
Maps, pictures as well as text passages, questions and inventories that are not relevant for this 
dissertation are not displayed. 
 
1. Demographic questions 
 
 
1.  The respondent’s gender  (1) Male  (0) Female 
2.  
How long have you been living in 
Beijing? 
________ years 
3.  Where do you live in Beijing? 
 (1) Dongcheng 
 (2) Xicheng 
 (3) Chaoyang 
 (4) Fengtai 
 (5) Shijingshan 
 (6) Haidian 
4.  Which is your home province? 
 (1) Beijing 
 (  ) _______________  
 
5.  What is your year of birth?  Year of birth: ___________ 
6.  
Which ethnic group do you be-
long to? 
 (1) Han 
 (  ) ____________________ 
7.  
Which is your highest level of 
education?  
 (1) I didn’t graduate from Primary School  
 (2) Primary School  
 (3) Junior High  
 (4) Senior High  
 (5) College Graduate  
 (6) Bachelor Degree  
 (7) Master Degree (or higher)  
8.  What marital status do you have?  
 (1) I am married and live together with my spouse 
 (2) I am married and live separated from my spouse 
 (3) I am not married 
 (4) I am divorced 
 (5) I am widowed  
9.  
What is your employment situa-
tion? 
 (1) Employee 
 (2) Civil servant  
 (3) Teaching stuff / Researcher 
 (4) Self-employed  
 (5) Trainee / student 
 (6) Retired worker without a job 
 (7) Unemployed 
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10.  
How many persons do actually 
live in your household in Beijing, 
including yourself?  
____________ persons 
11.  
How many children (i.e. minors 
without an income of their own) 
live in your Beijing household? 
____________ children 
 
 
2. Water issues in the Tarim Basin: Personal experience 
With the following questions we want to investigate people’s awareness of environmental problems in remote 
areas of China. We chose the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang A.R. as an example. This small map shows the location of 
the Tarim Basin. Here you can see the Tarim River which gives its name to the great basin. 
12.  Have you ever heard about the Tarim River? 
 (1) Yes 
 (2) Not sure go to part 3 
 (3) No  go to part 3 
13.  Have you ever been to the Tarim area?  (1) Yes   (0) No  go to Q15 
14.  
Why did you go there? 
Int: tick all options that apply 
 (1) Living  
 (2) Tourism 
 (3) Visiting family or friends  
 (4) Work  
 (5) Other 
15.  
Have you ever heard about environmental problems in the 
Tarim area? 
 (1) Yes 
 (0) No  
 
 
3. Water shortage and environmental situation in the Tarim Basin 
The state of the environment in the Tarim area might also affect the feelings of people living far away. We would 
like to find out what Beijing residents think personally about the actual land and water use practices in the Tarim 
area, and if they are personally willing to support a more sustainable policy.  
Now, I am going to give you some more information about the Tarim River and its natural environment. The 
Tarim Basin is an extremely dry and vulnerable region due to very little rainfall. Agriculture, life in the oases 
cities, as well as nature therefore depend on water from the Tarim River, the longest inland river in China. 
The typical vegetation along the Tarim River consists of riparian forests and grasslands. Certain native herbs that 
can be found in the grasslands can be used as fiber and medicine. The riparian forests consist of shrubs and poplar 
trees. The roots of these plants hold the soil together, even during floods and storms. The huge crowns of the 
poplar trees protect the area from dust and sandstorms. Both the riparian forests and the grasslands provide habi-
tat for many animal and plant species typical for the region. The Tarim River itself is the home of rare fish spe-
cies, like the Tarim bighead carp. Last but not least, the local scenery is very beautiful. 
16.  [missing] 
Because of extensive water use in the upper and middle reaches by farmers, industry and private households the 
Tarim dries out regularly in its lower reaches leading to destruction of the natural environment. The areas covered 
by poplar trees, shrubs and grasslands are shrinking and as a consequence many of the benefits people get from 
nature are lost. Most strikingly, sandstorms occur more often than in the past, destroying the harvest of farmers 
and the local infrastructure; the air quality is worsening because of dust; some typical plants and animal species 
have already become extinct; and the lower reaches of the Tarim River have been transformed into a lifeless 
place. Under the conditions of future climate change temperatures will increase and the Tarim River is likely to 
dry out completely. Then the entire area will become a desert and lost for human inhabitance. 
17. [missing] 
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4. Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan 
Scientists have developed a program with the overarching goal to improve the living conditions in the area along 
the Tarim River for man and nature. This program is called the Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan and 
implies a science-based water management that ensures that more and more water arrives in the lower reaches of 
the Tarim River, so that the riparian forests and grasslands can recover there. Once the river and its natural envi-
ronment will have fully recovered, the area will be less exposed to sandstorms and dust; typical animals and 
plants will survive; also, the living conditions of future generations will improve. 
In order to get the Tarim Environmental Preservation Plan financed, Central Government needs to transfer more 
money to the Tarim area. In order to finance these transfer payments government would have to increase taxes if 
TEPP was realized. This would lead to rising monthly expenditures for households. Economists estimate that the 
proposed program would increase an average Beijing household’s monthly expenditures by approximately … (10 
/ 25 / 50 / 100 / 150 / 200) RMB. 
We would like to find out whether Beijing citizens support the implementation of the Tarim Environmental 
Preservation Plan although it implies an increase in their monthly expenditures.  
18.  
Considering that your monthly household expenditures 
would increase by approximately … RMB through the 
program would you personally be willing to support it? 
 
Int: Read the options 
 
 (1) Yes  go to question 20 
 (2) No, but if the amount was 
lower, my household would sup-
port the TEPP go to question 19 
 (3) No, my household does not 
tolerate any increase of its month-
ly expenditures in order to get the 
TEPP realized  go to question 
20 
 
19. [missing] 
 
5. Follow-up questions 
Now we would like to ask you some more questions regarding your general, personal opinion about the Tarim 
Environmental Preservation Plan and the environment in general. We would like to know how much you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. 
 
20.   
(1) 
Strong-
ly 
disa-
gree 
(2) 
Disa-
gree 
(3) 
Unsure 
(4) 
Agree 
(5) 
Strong-
ly 
agree 
20.1.  
Poor households should not have to pay for the 
TEPP.           
20.2.  
Not households, but central government alone 
should pay for the TEPP.           
20.3.  
Taxes are already so high that increasing taxes is 
not a good way to finance the program.           
20.4.  
Environmental conditions in the Tarim area will 
improve through the TEPP.           
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You just said that you would / would not accept an increase of your monthly expenditure in order to get the TEPP 
implemented. Before making this decision, did you consider any of these points?  
 
21.   (1) 
Yes 
(0) 
No 
21.1.  
Did you consider whether your household can afford to pay higher 
taxes?     
21.2.  Did you consider other things that you could buy for … RMB?     
21.3.  
Did you consider your chances of visiting the Tarim area some day 
in the future?     
21.4.  
Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects on the living condi-
tions of local people?      
21.5.  
Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects for future genera-
tions?     
21.6.  
Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects for plants and ani-
mals?     
 
For scientific purposes we would like to ask you some questions concerning the financial situation of your house-
hold. 
22. [missing] 
23. [missing] 
24.  
What is the monthly disposable income of 
your household altogether? Please state 
total income minus income tax, personal 
contribution to social security. 
Your statement will be treated confiden-
tially! 
Int: hand over income card 
 
 (1) <1000 元 
 (2) 1000 – 1999 元 
 (3) 2000 – 3999 元 
 (4) 4000 – 5999 元 
 (5) 6000 – 7999 元 
 (6) 8000 – 9999 元 
 (7) 10 000 – 13 999 元 
 (8) 14 000 – 19 999 元 
 (9) 20 000 – 29 999 元 
 (10) 30 000 – 39 999 元 
 (11) >40 000 元 
25.  Do you regularly save money?   (1) Yes  (0) No  go to 28 
26.  
Concerning your saving habit, which 
description fits? 
 
Int.: Read out all options.  
 (1) I save as much as possible 
 (2) I save a fixed amount each month/year  
 (3) I usually save the money that is left over at 
the end of a month/year 
 (4) Other saving strategy 
27.  
Why do you save money? How are you 
going to spend your savings? 
 
Int.: Don’t read out the options. Multiple 
choices. 
 (1) Don’t know 
 (2) As a general precaution 
 (3) To buy expensive goods (real estate, a car, 
etc.) 
 (4) For child(ren)’s (education, wedding, etc.) 
 (5) To support and take care of elders 
 (6) For own retirement 
 (7) For health care expenditure 
 (8) Other 
28.  
How well would you say your household 
is managing financially these days? 
 
Int.: Read out all options. 
 (5) Really good 
 (4) Doing mostly good 
 (3) Just getting by  
 (2) Finding it difficult  
 (1) Finding it very difficult  
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29. [missing] 
30. [missing] 
 
The following questions are unrelated to the environmental problems in the Tarim area, but very valuable for our 
research. We would like to ask you some questions regarding your attitudes when spending money on yourself 
and others. How true are the following statements? 
31.   (1) 
Com-
pletely 
wrong 
(2) 
Pre-
domi-
nantly 
wrong 
(3) 
Partly 
wrong, 
partly 
true 
(4) 
Pre-
domi-
nantly 
true 
(5) 
Com-
pletely 
true 
 
31.1.  
I often have difficulty to bring myself to spend mon-
ey, regardless of the amount.            
31.2.  
In making any purchase, for any purpose, spending 
money is painful for me.           
31.3.  
I often spend money, even foolishly, on others but 
grudgingly on myself.           
31.4.  I am very generous with people I love.           
31.5.  
I get a good feeling from contributing money to all 
kinds of good causes.           
31.6.  I often say ‘I can’t afford it’ whether I can or not.            
31.7.  
Even when I have enough money I often feel guilty if 
I spend money on necessities.           
31.8.  
I feel compelled to argue or bargain about the cost of 
almost everything I buy.           
31.9.  Money should be saved not spent.           
 
32. – 41. [missing] 
6. Questions for the interviewer 
How true are the following statements regarding the respondent’s behavior? 
 
42. 4
1 
 (1) 
Com-
pletely 
wrong 
(2) 
Pre-
domi-
nantly 
wrong 
(3) 
Partly 
wrong, 
partly 
true 
(4) 
Pre-
domi-
nantly 
true 
(5) 
Com-
pletely 
true 
42.1.  The respondent listened carefully to the information 
on the Tarim area           
42.2.  The respondent took the interview very seriously.           
42.3.  The respondent was highly motivated during the in-
terview.           
42.4.  The respondent wanted to end the interview as fast as 
possible.           
42.5.  The respondent got angry when asked whether his 
family would support the TEPP financially.           
42.6.  The respondent said that the questions related to the 
TEPP were not his business.           
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8.3 Description of variables used in the regression models 
Table 8-5: Variable description 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. N 
AFFORD ‘Did you consider whether your household 
can afford to pay higher taxes?’ (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.551 0.498 0 1 1068 
AGE  Age of the respondent 38.92 14.70 18 84 1070 
BID Bid amount 89.01 68.54 10 200 1070 
EDUCATION Level of education of the respondent (1=did 
not graduate from primary school, 7=master 
degree or higher) 
4.417 1.336 1 7 1070 
FINMGMT ‘How well would you say your household is 
managing financially these days?’ (1=finding 
it very difficult, 5=really good) 
3.136 0.871 1 5 1064 
GENEROUS ‘I am very generous with people I love.’ 
(1=completely wrong, 5=completely true) 
4.238 0.876 1 5 1057 
HHSIZE Number of persons living in the respondent’s 
household 
2.912 1.404 1 9 1070 
INCOME Monthly disposable household income in 
1,000 RMB 
8.871 8.294 1 50 1070 
MALE Gender of the respondent (1=male, 0=female) 0.519 0.500 0 1 1070 
MONEYATT Score on modified money attitude scale, e.g. 
‘Even when I have enough money I often feel 
guilty if I spend money on necessities’ 
(1=completely wrong, 5=completely true) 
2.678 0.918 1 5 1070 
MONEYATT2 Score on the shortened variant of the modi-
fied money attitude scale (1=completely 
wrong, 5=completely true) 
2.707 0.925 1 5 1070 
MOTIV1 ‘The respondent took the interview very 
seriously’ (1=completely wrong, 
5=completely true) 
4.225 0.757 2 5 1064 
MOTIV2 ‘The respondent got angry when asked 
whether his family would support the TEPP 
financially’ 
1.761 0.880 1 5 1064 
MOTIV3 ‘The respondent said that the questions relat-
ed to the TEPP were not his business’ 
2.005 0.991 1 5 1064 
NODOUBT ‘Environmental conditions in the Tarim area 
will improve through the TEPP’ (1=strongly 
disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
4.149 0.987 1 5 1066 
NONUSE Number of non-use aspects considered 
(0=none, 0.25=one out of four aspects, (…) 
1=all four aspects) 
0.498 0.351 0 1 1070 
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Variable Description Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. N 
AV ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects 
on the living conditions of local people?’ 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.440 0.497 0 1 1070 
BV ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects 
for future generations?’ (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.620 0.486 0 1 1070 
EV ‘Did you consider the TEPP’s positive effects 
for plants and animals?’ (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.530 0.499 0 1 1070 
OV ‘Did you consider your chances of visiting 
the Tarim area some day in the future?’ 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.404 0.491 0 1 1070 
OPPCOST ‘Did you consider other things that you could 
buy for … RMB?’ (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.421 0.494 0 1 1070 
PROTEST Average level of agreement with PRO-
TEST1, PROTEST2 and PROTEST3 
(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
3.989 0.836 1 5 1070 
PROTEST1 ‘Poor households should not have to pay for 
the TEPP’ 
3.840 1.264 1 5 1070 
PROTEST2 ‘Not households, but central government 
should pay for the TEPP’ 
4.090 1.123 1 5 1070 
PROTEST3 ‘Taxes are already so high that increasing 
taxes is not a good way to finance the pro-
gram’ 
4.037 1.113 1 5 1070 
SAVE The respondent regularly saves money 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.614 0.487 0 1 1070 
SAVE_STRAT Categorical variable for a respondent’s sav-
ing strategy 
1.571 1.429 0 4 1067 
BASE The respondent does not regularly save 
money (0) 
0.381     
SAVE_AMAP ‘I save as much as possible’ (1) 0.113     
SAVE_FIXEDA ‘I save a fixed amount each month’ (2) 0.127     
SAVE_RESIDU
AL  
‘I usually save the money that is left over 
at the end of a month/year’ (3) 
0.310     
SAVE_OTHER Other saving strategy (4) 0.068     
TREAT Experimental treatment (1=treatment group, 
0=control group) 
0.522 0.500 0 1 1070 
WARMGLOW ‘I get a good feeling from contributing mon-
ey to all kinds of good causes’ (1=completely 
wrong, 5=completely true) 
3.347 1.125 1 5 1053 
WTP1 Agreement with WTP question (1=yes, 0=no) 0.530 0.499 0 1 1068 
WTP2 Positive WTP (1=yes, 0=no) 0.751 0.433 0 1 1068 
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